

D
570
M16

CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



MAY 29 1968 M P		
GAYLORD		PRINTED IN U.S.A.

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U.S.A.


D 570.M16

United States in the world war (1918-192



3 1924 027 816 713

efir



Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

**THE UNITED STATES
IN THE WORLD WAR
(1918-1920)**

By
JOHN BACH McMASTER

**History of the People of
United States**

(From the Revolution to the Civil War.
In Eight Volumes.)

With the Fathers

**The United States in the
World War** (In Two Volumes)

These Are Appleton Books

D. APPLETON & COMPANY
Publishers **New York**

THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR (1918 – 1920)

BY

JOHN BACH McMASTER

PROFESSOR OF AMERICAN HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

AUTHOR OF "A HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES"

AND "THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR," 1914-1918



D. APPLETON AND COMPANY
NEW YORK LONDON

1920

COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY
JOHN BACH McMASTER

390 898 B
EW

Printed in the United States of America

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. SUBMARINES OFF OUR COAST	1
II. WAR WORK AT HOME	32
III. FIGHTING IN FRANCE	85
IV. PEACE OFFENSIVES	141
V. THE ARMISTICE	194
VI. THE PRESIDENT GOES ABROAD	228
VII. THE PEACE CONFERENCE	270
VIII. THE TREATY OF PEACE	324
IX. THE TREATY REJECTED	378
APPENDICES	
A. TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE	453
B. TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION TO CREATE A WORLD LEAGUE	459
C. TEXT OF THE PROPOSED COVENANT	461
D. COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS	471
E. RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION REJECTED BY THE SENATE	482
INDEX	485

THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

CHAPTER I

SUBMARINES OFF OUR COAST

Two visits to our ports by the merchant submarine *Deutschland*, one by the armed undersea boat *U-53*, and the torpedoing by her of five ships off Nantucket Island in the autumn of 1916 made it certain, now we were at war, that sooner or later our Atlantic coast would be the scene of this form of German frightfulness. No surprise, therefore, was felt when, about the middle of May, 1918, rumors of the presence of a submarine off the capes of Virginia became current.

The master of a British steamship which reached an Atlantic port May 22 reported that he had seen a submarine one hundred and fifty miles off the Virginia capes, and had fired five shots at her. The captain of a Clyde Line steamer which reached port a few days later had sighted three derelicts with cargoes untouched, sides torn open, and crews gone. One, a large four-masted schooner, was floating with her starboard side up, and had a great hole well below the water line. Another, found in latitude 37° north, longitude 75° west, was half submerged with bow down and stern high in air. Four small fishing vessels were standing by, examining her. A search for the missing crews, made by the Clyde liner, revealed no trace of them. Near the wreck were floating a few unmarked cork-ring life boats. Apparently the vessels had been hurriedly abandoned. Another, the three-masted schooner *Edna*, bound for Havana from Philadelphia with a cargo of

gasoline, sighted off the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, was towed by the Clyde liner to a point off the Delaware Capes and there abandoned. The report of the British captain that he had fired at a submarine was now believed to explain the mystery surrounding the three derelicts. Clearly, they had been destroyed by some undersea enemy craft off our coast, though the Navy Department officials declared there were no signs of a submarine on this side of the Atlantic, and that the British captain had probably fired at a bit of wreckage or some other floating object. Perhaps it was a whale, for a captain of a steamship which arrived at Mobile reported that he sighted a large one in the Gulf of Mexico. May 28 the *Edna*, with her decks level with the water, was towed into port by a tug and beached on the mud flats in the Delaware River off Port Richmond, and later was brought to Philadelphia and repaired. The fate of her crew of twenty-four was still as great a mystery as ever, and in hopes that they might be in life boats at sea, wireless messages were sent out to all vessels asking if they had picked up the men.

While the mystery of the derelicts was still unsolved, the Hamburg-American liner *President Lincoln*, one of the vessels taken over after we entered the war, and then used as a transport, was torpedoed and sunk May 31, while on her way from Br st to our country. Aboard were 715 persons, including the ship's officers and crew, and a few army officers and soldiers on their way home. Three officers and twenty-three seamen lost their lives.

At eight o'clock in the morning, as the *President Lincoln* with three other transports was running west, the convoying destroyers having left them the previous evening, she was struck by three torpedoes fired from a submerged submarine, the *U-90*, which had trailed the transports during the entire night. A few minutes after nine all hands were in life boats, or on rafts, and at half-past nine the *President Lincoln* turned over and sank. First Lieutenant Isaacs was taken prisoner,

carried to Wilhelmshaven, sent to the camp at Karlsruhe, and finally to Villingen, from which he escaped to Switzerland.¹

And now a Brazilian steamship reached an Atlantic port where the passengers stated that, when entering the Gulf Stream off the Florida coast, a wireless warning to look out for submarines caused the captain to make a wide détour. Sir Leslie Probyn, Governor General of Jamaica, one of the passengers, said that before leaving the Barbados he had heard that a German submarine had been sighted as early as May 16 near Bermuda. All doubt was put at rest June 3, when a Canadian-Pacific liner reached New York, and her captain announced that five vessels had been torpedoed off the Jersey coast. According to his story, his vessel was one of a slow convoy when, about seven o'clock on the evening of June 2, a wireless was received stating, "We are attacked by a submarine." The name of the vessel and her exact locality were given, but were not made known by the captain. In a few minutes came the words, "We have been torpedoed." He thereupon left the convoy and made all speed for New York. Half an hour later, as he sped through the darkness, a third message was received, reading, "We are attacked," and giving the name and location of a second tanker, and finally a fourth message from the same vessel, "We are sinking, S. O. S." Fuller details of the work of the submarine were brought to New York, on the morning of June 3, by the steamship *Bristol*, with eleven of the crew of the four-masted schooner *Edward H. Cole*, sunk on the evening of June 2, some fifty miles southeast of Barnegat Light, New Jersey. The captain of the *Cole* reported that a U-boat appeared suddenly, raised the German naval flag, circled about his schooner, and fired a shot across her bow; that after he came about a boat put off from the submarine; that her commander boarded the *Cole*, and said, "Captain, you and your men have seven and a half minutes to get into your boats;" and that just as they put off the submarine

¹ Lieutenant Isaacs has told his very interesting adventures in a little book, "Prisoner of the U-90."

commander called out, "You will find the Jersey or Delaware coast over there. It isn't far." The *Cole* was then sunk by bombs. Before she was out of sight the U-boat was seen to sink a steamship believed to be the *Carolina*, of the Porto Rico line. Towards eight o'clock the crew of the *Cole* was picked up by the *Bristol*.

On the afternoon of June 3 an American steamship came to port with forty-eight survivors of vessels destroyed by a submarine. They proved to be from the steamship *Winnieconnie*, and the schooners *Edna*, *Hattie Dunn*, *Hauppaug*, and *Isabel B. Wiley*, picked up some twenty-five miles from Barnegat. About half of them had been prisoners on board the submarine for eight days. The *Hattie Dunn* left New York on May 23, and when two days out met a submarine displaying the letters A.B., meaning stop at once. After the order was obeyed, a party came aboard, gave the crew ten minutes to get into a boat, put an armed guard over them, and took them, seven in number, to the submarine, which at once gave chase to the *Hauppaug*, five miles away. Her crew was also taken to the U-boat. Later in the afternoon the *Edna* was overhauled, and bombed, and her crew made captive. Continuing her course, the submarine, on Sunday, June 2, captured and sank the *Wiley* and the *Winnieconnie*, and putting all the prisoners into her boats, with water and bread, left them to shift for themselves. Next came the *Texel*, a Dutch steamship of 7,000 tons, operated by the United States Shipping Board, and carrying 42,000 pounds of sugar. Shortly after four o'clock on Sunday afternoon, when the *Texel* was sixty miles from New York harbor, a submarine suddenly arose off her bow, fired three rounds of shrapnel, sent a party aboard, ordered the crew to their boats, and sank her. Towards midnight, on Monday, the thirty-six survivors, exhausted by their long row, landed near the light-house at Atlantic City. More horrible still was the experience of the passengers and crew of the *Carolina*, destroyed about six o'clock on Sunday afternoon by the same U-boat, which, two hours before, sank the *Texel*. From the conflicting stories told

by survivors it appears that the *Carolina* was in latitude $37^{\circ} 59'$, longitude 72° , when brought to by shell fire, and her captain ordered to get all hands into the boats as soon as possible, as the ship was to be sunk. Twelve boats were lowered, filled without confusion or panic, and when all were clear of the ship, she was sunk by shell fire. Eight of the boats were made fast one behind another; but a thunder storm which had long been brewing soon burst, and fearing they might be crushed, they were cut loose and anchored. About eight o'clock, on Monday morning, a schooner picked them up, and the men, women and children, 244 in number, were safely landed at New York. Boat No. 5, when the ship was abandoned, rowed over to No. 1, a motor-driven life boat, which took it in tow, but when the storm came the tow line parted three times, and No. 5 could not be found in the darkness. The storm, meantime, grew worse and worse, and in the midst of it the motor boat capsized. When at last it was righted, seven of its twenty-six occupants had disappeared. The survivors, in a water-logged boat with an engine that would not work, drifted helplessly about until picked up by a British vessel some twenty-five miles off the Delaware Capes, and brought to Lewes. According to another of the survivors, there were thirty-five in the boat, and nineteen were lost. Boat No. 5, after the tow line parted for the third time, was headed for shore, and about two o'clock on the afternoon of Tuesday, June 4, made the beach at Atlantic City, where its occupants, twenty men and eight women and a girl, were warmly welcomed by the summer throng.

Wednesday, June 5, a Danish steamship entered New York Harbor with eleven men of the crew of the schooner *Mengel*, sunk on Sunday evening one hundred and seventy-five miles off New York. She was the eleventh victim of the U-boats, for it was now said that at least two, the *U-37* and the *U-151*, were cruising off our coast. Tuesday, June 4, the Norwegian steamship *Eidsvold* was destroyed, forty miles off the Virginia Capes, and sixty-five off the Maryland coast a submarine, while attacking the French steamship *Radioleine*, was driven undersea

6 THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD WAR

by the approach of a United States destroyer which rescued two men from the schooner *Edward H. Baird, Jr.* On the day following, the British steamship *Harpathian* was sunk, and the crew, after spending twenty-six hours in a boat, was picked up by a steamship and landed at Cape Henry. Fourteen² craft had fallen victims to the Hun sea raiders. The fifteenth was the *Vinland*, a Norwegian schooner destroyed off the Virginia coast on the evening of June 6. Her crew of nineteen men were brought to Cape May by a United States destroyer. The sixteenth was the *Pinar del Rio*, sunk on the morning of June 8, seventy miles off the Maryland coast. Sixteen of the crew made land in Virginia, after thirty hours in an open boat. A second boat, with the remainder of the crew, was still at sea. The seventeenth was the Norwegian steamship *Vindeggen*, whose crew were forced to transfer eighty tons of copper ingots to the submarine. The small boats, with the crew, were then taken in tow until the Danish vessel *Hendrik Lund* was sighted, when they were cut adrift. The crews of both vessels were picked up by a steamer and carried to New York. The steamer *Edward Pierce* now made port after being under fire from a submarine for three hours, seventy miles off the Virginia coast.

When a week passed without a sinking, it was supposed the U-boat raid was over. But, June 16, the Navy Department announced that the Norwegian bark *Samoa*, from Buenos Aires, was sunk by gunfire from a German submarine ninety miles off the Virginia coast; that the Norwegian sailing ship *Kringsjaa* had been destroyed, not far from the spot where the *Samoa* went down; and that the crew had been picked up by a destroyer.

The raid, it was explained, was nothing more serious than

²Schooner *Edna*, 325 tons; schooner *Hattie Dunn*, 436 tons; schooner *Hauppaug*, 1,500 tons; schooner *Edward H. Cole*, 1,791 tons; schooner *Isabel B. Wiley*, 776 tons; schooner *Jacob M. Haskell*, 1,778 tons; steamship *Winnieconnie*, 1,869 tons; steamship *Carolina*, 5,039 tons; schooner *Edward H. Baird, Jr.*, 279 tons; tanker *Herbert L. Platt*, 7,200 tons; steamship *Tezel*; Norwegian steamship *Eidsvold*; schooner *Mengel*; British steamship *Harpathian*, 4,500 tons.

a spectacular play to convince the German people that measures were under way to cut off, at their source, the supply of American men and material. Nothing so far done by the U-boats, it was argued, indicated they were under orders to attack American transports. They had been sinking small and defenseless craft in order to roll up a large number of victims with which to make a great impression at home. No seashore resorts, no cities, were in danger. The shallow water of the coast, south of New York, was a sure protection against the operation of submarines within a short distance of the shore. Blame for these sinkings was laid on the Navy Department. Lack of watchfulness, failure to appreciate the meaning of the *Edna* case, failure to send out timely warnings, were charged against it. Why, it was asked, were the authorities incredulous of the stories of pursuits, captures, sinkings, constantly brought in by captains and crews? When the captain of the British tanker, *Cheyenne*, took refuge at Lewes, May 16, and reported firing five shots at a U-boat, a hundred and fifty miles off the coast, why did the Navy Department say he had seen wreckage? When the *Edna* was towed into port with a hole in her side, why did the Department say there were no signs of enemy war craft off our coast, and that she had been wrecked by a storm? How came it that the captain of the *Bristol* could say, that so far as he knew no warnings to ships at sea had been sent out by the Government? Where were our submarines, scouts, and destroyers, during the last week of May and the first three days of June? If the presence of these raiders was known, why were our ships permitted to put to sea without warning? The assistant Secretary of the Navy replied, that official notice of danger had been sent out prior to Saturday, June 1, but did not give the exact date. Why the *Carolina* did not receive the warning was past understanding. That the schooners failed to get it was because they had no wireless apparatus. During a Senate debate on the matter, Senator Lodge, a member of the Senate Naval Committee, defended the Department. The navy had acted as soon as authentic informa-

tion of the presence of the submarines was received; had done everything that could be done; would do everything that could be done; and had the means with which to do it. He had gone to the Department, where everything had been laid before such members of the Naval Committee as cared to investigate, and he was entirely satisfied that the defense would be effective. Secretary Daniels explained that the Department could not "take it upon itself to warn all ships against sailing, or to direct ships at sea to return to port, on such information as we had prior to Sunday." Had such a course been followed in the case of every rumor of the presence of U-boats off the coast during the last six months, shipping would have been demoralized. Scarcely a fortnight had passed without somebody reporting having sighted a periscope, and if all ships had been ordered to remain in port our vessels "would have been tied up fast to their piers practically for all the time." Every report had been investigated, "but all proved erroneous, until the events of last Sunday brought indisputable evidence that at last an enemy submersible had come over to make an attack upon such American shipping as could be caught unawares." In a telegram published by the London *Times*, the Secretary said:

The activities of the German submarines off the American coast have not in any way changed the policy of the Government. The road to France will be kept open for transportation of our troops, and delivery of munitions, and food supplies for our troops, and those of our allies. There will be no weakening of our naval forces in European waters as a result of the new activity on our coast. The country has remained calm in the face of Germany's attempt to bring frightfulness to our doors. In fact, this enemy effort has stimulated recruiting and strengthened the determination of our people to use every resource to defeat the enemy.

Comments of the German press on the sinkings in May and June were cabled to Secretary Lansing, and by his authority made public as amusing examples of the false information the German people were allowed to receive. One journal described us as trembling with fear of attacks from the air; declared the

hour was near when our ports might be bombarded by German cannon, and asserted that the sudden appearance of the submarines off our coast "must be a presage of impending calamity"; and that the Government was "trying to conceal its concern." Another asserted that the transportation of American troops, and supplies, to France would be cut off at the very time they were most needed. "Our submarines are delivering decisive blows to French hopes by checking the delivery of American soldiers and supplies. No threat of increased war spirit can prevent us from continuing the submarine attacks, and Germany may wait patiently and confidently for future submarine activity on the American coast." They had only made a beginning. "The real work of the submarines begins when the Atlantic is filled with ships assembled by America. Germany possesses submarine cruisers which can cross the ocean, and then will occur scenes which will make the marrow in Wilson's bones turn cold."

Neutrals did not think so. The *National Zeitung*, published at Basle, Switzerland, believed Germany would pay a heavy price for the submarine attack, and said: "The submarine campaign on the American coast will, like all other similar undertakings, end in disappointment on the part of the undertakers. American hatred will be increased, and the war against Germany will now become a matter of personal importance for every American. It is very doubtful if the attack will really serve German military interests, and not result merely in a momentary advantage for which too high a price must be paid later. This naturally is beyond the comprehension of German military leaders and people. Immediate results will be innumerable American volunteers. A wave of hysterical fanaticism, an increased thirst for revenge, will sweep America and easily counterbalance the advantage of the attack for Germany." The *Cologne Gazette* rejoiced that Germany was making use of her war power to "show the friends of humanity in their homeland what war looks like, and what it means. Our U-boats first visited the American coasts for peaceful com-

merce. The North Americans may now feel the fist of the war lord. They need not be surprised. He who sows the wind reaps the whirlwind, even when he sits on the other side of the great herring pond where he is under the delusion that he is safe from storm." "Those," said the *Cologne Volks-Zeitung*, "who are prosecuting a starvation war against our wives and children are having revealed to them, off their own shores, the seriousness of war. This, in view of the character of our American opponents, evokes on all sides the liveliest satisfaction among the German people."

The *Nord Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* said, concerning the raid: "It is the first big and carefully planned action of our undersea warfare against the war prolonger in the far West. It is linked up with our offensive on the European battlefields. The U-boats have brought the war to the American shores, to catch American transports near the point of departure, because it is not always easy to deal with them in the open sea as in European waters. The German people wish their brave sailors good luck and success in their task."

His work ended for the time being, the captain of the U-boat returned to Germany and gave an account of his experience to the *Cologne Volks Zeitung*, which published it July 31, 1918:

When my U-boat was about 500 miles east of the Bermuda Islands I was reported to the American stations by a steamer which was equipped with wireless apparatus. Nevertheless, I went about my task, and forthwith dispatched three sailing vessels, from which I was able to disengage myself, as they were not equipped with wireless. I took the crews on board. The negroes were huddled together, the Europeans were put in another compartment. The captains were entertained in the officers' mess room.

We experienced a merry reunion in the case of two of the Captains. The Captains described the attitude prevalent in the United States, and were of the opinion that people were everywhere opposed to the war, and that every one was shouting against it; that it was merely begun in the interests of the money magnates; that the press, however, was agitating strongly for it. The extermination of all that was German, in language, etc., is being brought about there. All strikes, no matter where they occur, are being attributed to German

intrigue. Thereupon, inquiries are being made to find out if the guilty party might in any way be of German descent. In case such a one has been found guilty, he has often been assaulted and beaten to death by the mob.

The appearance of the U-boat before their very coast will hardly tend to improve the morale of the Americans.

When things became hot for the U-boat the people became somewhat frightened. One day we succeeded in sinking six vessels. After sinking the first sailing vessel the crew was put on a steamer which came in sight. They spoke very gratefully of the treatment which we accorded them. The Captain, to be sure, thought that they would be thoroughly questioned, at once, upon their landing; they said that what they would report would be of no consequence, however, as everything would be misquoted.

We met another steamer, the *Carolina*. It was halted by wireless. It had 300 passengers on board. In spite of the warning signal, it did not stop. On coming nearer, it became evident that the steamer contained about 5,000 tons of cargo. When the lifeboats, which were to carry the travelers to safety, were let down two of them which were filled were said, according to the American report, to have overturned. The remainder of the passengers escaped unhurt. Great excitement prevailed upon leaving the ship.

In the course of the next few days 36,000 tons were sunk. Included in this were shipments of cotton, copper and sugar. In America the scarcity of sugar is especially noticeable. The Americans are quite unhappy because there is no more whisky to be had. The beer, too, is bad; it is only rarely served at that.

The Captains of these ships said that the attempts to bring the Australian harvests to America could not succeed, because of the scarcity of ships; that the transportation difficulties, in general, were huge. One had to rely upon exports, from elsewhere, more than usually. Strangely enough, nearly all coal was transported along the coast in sailing vessels.

One day we met a Norwegian ship that contained about 1,000 tons of copper in addition to another valuable cargo. In the meantime another ship appeared, so that we ordered the Norwegian ship to wait until we returned. This the Norwegian ship really did, quite patiently, for a long time. The ship which we had encountered in the meantime was an American steamer, upon which four men entered as a prize crew. All passengers were saved. After the steamer had been sunk we went back to the Norwegian ship, and asked why it had not escaped. The Captain said he thought he would not have

been able to go very far; at any rate our speed and our guns would have reached him soon enough. Inclement weather had set in in the meantime, so that the valuable copper material could not be unloaded. Not until the next morning could this task be begun. The copper was in the handy form of bars.

The Captain of this ship had taken another Captain who wished to travel to his homeland, together with his wife and a two-year-old child, along with him. We took the woman on board. She was quite a genteel lady, only she used perfume somewhat too freely, so that it was not long before the whole U-boat reeked with it. We wanted to take her below deck, but owing to the rough weather this was not agreeable to her. So she stayed on the surface of the vessel, where her husband had some wicker furniture carried to her. The child was treated very considerably by the crew. Milk and chocolate were given to it.

The overhauling of the copper, about 70,000 kilograms were taken over, was quite a slow process. It was rendered more difficult by the mass of sharks which gathered about both sides of the vessel. The Norwegians began to shoot at the sharks with revolvers. But all this was useless. Finally three lines were let out, and a large shark was caught. Great joy prevailed. We were obliged to remain another night. The next morning the steamer was sunk.

Soon after the sinking I saw a new steamer, which, after the first warning shot, at once put out the lifeboats. The Norwegian Captain again met an acquaintance, and celebrated a reunion. Finally, we caught a little coastwise steamer, which took up the crew. The coastwise steamer dimmed its lights, but nevertheless it could be determined that the passengers were safely transferred.

On the return voyage, again two sailing vessels with copper ore were sunk. After the sinking of these ships I sent wireless messages to all that at such and such a point U-boats were active. To prove that the message was understood, I received a reply asking if the position given were correct. An American warship passed, at this point, without noticing the incident. One just had to learn how to wage war.

Upon sinking a transport, that was put out of commission by one torpedo, we had an opportunity of studying the new American swimming vest. A most charming fellow in a life boat, who took up a huge amount of space, attracted our attention. He was stout by nature, and by reason of his giant swimming vest required even more room. Therein was found a whisky flask, a box of provisions, and on the left side a container with compressed air so that the

wearer of this wonder-robe was not even obliged to inflate the swimming vest.

On the return voyage, through the North Sea, we had very bad weather. The enemy did not fail in making attempts to catch our U-boat. Nevertheless, they did not succeed. The whole voyage was very fatiguing, owing to the dangerous undertaking, and to the inclement weather. The crew had very little rest on the trip. Once four of my men were washed overboard. However, they were all soon rescued. One of the mates furnished us with amusement with his mandolin. The machines were in perfect condition, and, defying all difficulties, brought us safely to the home haven.

Nearly a month had passed after the departure of the U-boat when, on July 12, a British steamer reached port with the crew of the Norwegian bark *Manx King*, captured July 6, some 300 miles off Cape Race. What was done with the bark the crew did not know. A week later word was received by the Navy Department that two steamships were on their way to port with 1,156 officers and men of United States armored cruiser *San Diego*, sunk on the morning of July 18, ten miles south of Fire Island, and some fifty miles off New York harbor. According to some of the sailors who landed at Point-o-Woods, Long Island, the sinking was due to a torpedo; others declared it was caused by an internal explosion; but the commanding officer was sure the *San Diego* had struck a mine. While the question was still unsettled, on July 21, a German submarine attacked the tug, *Perth Amboy*, and four barges, without warning, three miles off the little town of Orleans on the elbow of Cape Cod.

A thick fog bank, a few miles off shore, hid the raider, nor was her presence known until a deck hand sighted something rushing through the water astern, quickly followed by two more torpedoes, which went wide of their mark. The sailor shouted a warning, and at the same instant there was a flash in the fog, and a shell struck the wheelhouse of the tug, and a fragment tore off the hand of the man at the wheel. Coming out of the fog the submarine, firing from her deck guns as she approached, continued her attack until the barges were sunk,

one by one, and the tug was a burning wreck. Forty-one persons, including three women and five children, made their escape in boats and landed in Nauset Harbor.

Reports of sinkings now followed in quick succession. Four men came ashore, from a dory, at Cape Porpoise some twenty-five miles south of Portland, Maine, and reported that their fishing schooner, the *Robert and Richard* of Gloucester, had been sunk by a U-boat on Cashe Bank, sixty miles southeast of the Cape, and that other dories, carrying 23 men, were coming in behind them; the British schooner *Dornfontein*, loaded with lumber, was stopped, looted of food, and sunk, twenty-five miles southwest of Brier Island, and three American schooners were destroyed off Seal Island on the Nova Scotia coast by a U-boat, whose crew claimed to have placed the mine which sank the *San Diego*. That a mine destroyed the cruiser was the opinion of the Naval Court of Inquiry. "On the day subsequent to this disaster," said the Court, "six contact mines were located by the naval forces in the vicinity of the position where the disaster to the U. S. S. *San Diego* occurred." Because of this, and other reasons, the Court decided that the cruiser was destroyed by a mine.

August 5, the crew of a fisherman, the *Nelson A.* of Yarmouth, came ashore in their dories at a port, not named, and reported that their vessel had been sunk August 4 by a bomb placed in her hold by men from a submarine five miles south by west of Loch, Nova Scotia.

Continuing her depredations the U-boat, August 5, when forty miles west of Halifax, fell in with the Standard Oil Company's tanker *Luz Blanca* and sank her after a three hours' fight. On the day following the British schooner *Gladys M. Hollett* was encountered on her way to New York with herring, was stopped, ransacked from stem to stern, sunk by a bomb placed in her hold, and the crew left to row ashore.

Meantime the presence of a second U-boat off our coast was made known by wireless calls for help. They came from the *O. B. Jennings*, a Standard Oil Company tanker, which sailed

from Plymouth, England, on July 20 for Newport News. All went well until a quarter past nine on Sunday morning August 4, when, some seventy miles off the Virginia coast, the captain of the tanker saw the wake of a torpedo coming towards the port beam. The helm was at once put over, the *Jennings* swung to port, and the torpedo barely missed her. The four-inch gun in the stern was quickly put into action, and the fight began. At a quarter before twelve a shell struck the main steam pipe in the engine room, and the tanker was helpless. The crew went over the starboard side into their boats, and about one o'clock pulled away from the ship. The submarine, which by that time had ceased firing, and was circling around the *Jennings*, changed her course and headed for the third boat commanded by the second officer, Mr. Rene Henry Bastin. When a hundred feet away some one sang out, "Where is your captain?" Nobody answered, whereupon the guns of the submarine were pointed at the little boat, and the question repeated. Mr. Bastin replied, in English, "The captain is dead." Again the question was repeated, and supposing the questioner did not understand English, Mr. Bastin replied in Flemish, that the captain was on the deck of the *Jennings* under the flag. "If you do not know where the captain is, you come here," was the order now received. On boarding the submarine, which proved to be the *UK-140*, the captain said, "You are an officer of the ship, so I must keep you as a prisoner of war." The *Jennings* was then bombarded until about a quarter to five o'clock when she turned bottom up, but did not sink. Finally, two torpedoes were fired, and at half past five she went down.


The *UK-140* was the finest and latest of the German submarines. She was finished in 1918, and put in commission in June. She was 380 feet in length, carried a crew of 102 men and six officers, was armored with two and a quarter inch plate, and had a diving depth of four hundred and ninety-five feet. Her armament consisted of two six-inch, and two four-inch, guns and twelve machine guns. In her hold were thirty-

five torpedoes, each twenty-four feet long; four thousand rounds of ammunition; and enough oil to cover thirty-two thousand miles at a speed of three knots. Submerged, she could make twelve, and on the surface, twenty-six knots.

One of the two remaining boats from the *Jennings* was picked up by a patrol boat. The other reached Norfolk in safety. On the morning of August 5, Mr. Bastin heard firing from nine until ten o'clock, and, during the afternoon, learned from other prisoners that the submarine had sunk a four-master schooner, the *Stanley W. Seaman* of Boston. An account of what happened to the *Seaman* was given by her captain when a British vessel reached Newport News with the crew of the destroyed vessel. She was fired on, the captain said, without warning when about one hundred and ten miles east of Cape Hatteras. Her crew at once took to their small boats, but were allowed to return for provisions, and then put off in the gasoline launch. After three days in the Gulf Stream the men were rescued by the British vessel. Before the *Seaman* was sunk, by a bomb, she was looted in the good old-fashioned pirate way. "While below that day," says Mr. Bastin, "I saw a lot of stores, provisions, clothes, and various things brought aboard from the *Seaman*." Strangely enough, the Captain of the *Seaman* described the submarine as the *U-132*, with four guns, one fore, one aft, and one on each side.

Cruising westward, the *UK-140* fell in with the small unarmed steamship *Merak*, three miles north of the *Diamond Shoal Lightship 71*, anchored twelve miles off Cape Hatteras. What then happened was described by an officer of the *Merak*, a Dutch vessel taken over by the Shipping Board and at the time of her destruction under the American flag.

We were fired on by the submarine at 1.40 o'clock in the afternoon. We were within three miles of the lightship, and we took up a zigzag course toward the shore, hoping to escape. We hit on the shoals, however, and as shells from the submarine were falling all about us, some striking the bridge, we abandoned the ship, taking to the boats.



The submarine then desisted in her fire on us, turned its attention to the lightship, and with a few shots put the wireless out of commission. A boat with several men was then sent from the submarine to the *Merak*, and in a few moments she blew up. The Germans then began shelling the lightship, and soon sank her.

As we were rowing away, the U-boat started after us and hailed us to stop. The submarine came to within a boat's length, and an officer, speaking perfect English, asked our name, nationality, cargo, and where we were from. He did not seem to place us, and he told one of his men, speaking in English, to go below and get him Lloyd's register. Examining the book, he said:

"Oh! Your ship was a Hollander, was it?" He then asked if we had a sail, and on being told we did, he advised us to hoist it, with the remark that the coast was only ten miles to the westward.

He wished us good luck, waved his hand, and then started after two ships that were visible about four or five miles away. He soon came within shooting distance, and we could see shells falling about both vessels, and puffs of smoke from both guns on the deck of the submarine.

The crews of the *Merak* and the Lightship reached the shore in safety. Again a wrong description of the *UK-140* was given. There were no numbers, nor marks, on the submarine by which it could be identified, the officer reported. It was, he said, 200 feet long, was very rusty and slimy, had no periscope in sight, and nothing on deck save a chain railing, a range finder, and two six-inch guns, one fore, and one aft, the conning tower.

Mr. Bastin, in his account of the attack on the Lightship, says:

In the afternoon everybody of the crew was on deck, and heavy gunfire was heard. Different shells, from other ships, I suppose, were bursting around the submarine. As we sat inside we could hear the shells bursting around us. We were called on deck (five prisoners), lined up, and the first thing I saw that struck me was *Diamond Shoal Light Vessel* at a distance of about 150 yards. At the same time I saw three steamers on fire, and the submarine was shelling the Light Vessel with her two 6-inch guns at 150 yards.

I noticed the smoke of these shells was yellow, and I think the shells fired on the *O. B. Jennings* were smokeless. I concluded, there-

fore, that the submarine was firing gas shells at the *Diamond Shoal*. I think she did that in order that none of the Light Vessel crew might escape. The Light Vessel blew up in a few minutes, and I saw her lee boat pulling away at a few hundred yards' distance. The submarine was shelling the boat with a four-inch gun, but missed it, and the submarine could not go any further in as it was shallow water.

During nearly three months Mr. Bastin was a prisoner on *UK-140*, and finally reached Kiel late in October. These months were full of adventure. On the evening of the day on which the Light Ship was destroyed, the submarine was sighted by destroyers, and forced to dive.

In twenty seconds I heard a rush of waters around the sides. The submarine went down by the head, and in a few seconds, in the room where we were, we saw that there was a big water depth in the gauge glasses. I noticed, after a minute, she was a hundred feet deep in the gauge glasses; at the same time we heard concussions of depth charges which were repeated at very short intervals.

Suddenly, a depth charge burst. It seemed to be right on her stern, because she got a lift, and went head first, and in a few seconds I saw the depth was 415 feet. More bombs exploded right on top of us, blowing up the middle hatch, putting out the lights, and giving the submarine a list of 40 degrees. Twenty-eight depth bombs were fired. Followed by the destroyers the *UK-140* ran under water for six days, leaving behind a trail of oil that came from her leaking tanks. Now and then the submarine's periscope came to the surface to take bearings of the destroyers searching for her, sometimes ahead, sometimes astern. On the morning of the sixth day she rose to the surface, and after an exciting chase, escaped. August 27, the British steamer *Diomed* was sunk and another prisoner brought aboard. August 28 a Brazilian steamer, convoyed by our destroyer *O'Brien*, was attacked. September 20, she was attacked by an American destroyer, and forced to submerge. Again depth bombs were used; but once more she escaped, and when, next morning, the prisoners were allowed on deck, they found the aft deck smashed, one of the 6-inch guns gone, the wireless completely wrecked, and part of the conning tower bent to pieces.

Steaming slowly, leaving a big oil track behind her, the *UK-140*, on September 28, fell in with the *U-117*; accompanied

her for a week, until off the coast of Scotland where the *UK-140* ran out of oil. For "two days and nights everybody, even the prisoners, were busy passing oil cans on ropes from 117 to 140, until 43 tons were received." She then signalled that she would go on to the Faraway Islands, wait "for the other submarines which were the 102, 156, 100 and 117, and that they all would then go through the mine fields in the North Sea, and through the nets." During the run the 156 struck a mine and "was blown 500 feet in the air." October 23, when near the Norwegian coast, destroyers were sighted, and the submarines scattered. On the night of the 24th the *UK-140* again ran out of oil, and lay on the surface off the Danish coast; but fortunately for her, before morning, she was met by a German destroyer, and given oil, and on the afternoon of the next day made Kiel.

For a week Mr. Bastin remained a prisoner on the U-boat; was then sent on to Wilhelmshaven; was a witness at both places of the revolt of the German navy, early in November; saw the troops returning from the front; was sent to the camp at Karlsruhe; and then to Villingen, whence he escaped to Switzerland.³

While Mr. Bastin, during August and September, was on his way to Germany, the U-boats continued their depredations off Nantucket Island, and on the Banks. Early in August an American schooner brought to port eighty-five of the crew of the Japanese freighter *Tokuyama Maru*, torpedoed two hundred miles off the Nova Scotia coast on August 1. August 11 the captain of a fishing schooner reported that while sword-fishing, 160 miles southeast of Race Point with four other schooners, a U-boat suddenly came to the surface in the midst of the fleet. He was some distance away, but saw several of the schooners disappear. The enemy craft was the *U-117*, the same which met the *UK-140* with Mr. Bastin a prisoner on board. The *U-117* was a large mine laying submarine, was 275

³The adventures of Mr. Bastin are told by him in *The Lamp*, a Standard Oil Company publication, for April, 1919.

feet long, carried two guns, forty-six mines, and twenty torpedoes. She left port on July 15, passed north of the Shetland Islands, made for the American coast and carried on her depredations between Nantucket and Cape Hatteras.

And now the fishing schooner *Helen Murley* reached New Bedford with four survivors of the crew of the *Kate Palmer* who reported that a submarine came to the surface in the midst of the fishing fleet and sank nine of them. The men on the *Palmer* were kept prisoners for one hour and then set adrift in a dory. The U-boat was described as 300 feet long, with a 6-inch gun in the bow, and a smaller one in the stern. Georges Banks, where the sinkings occurred, is sixty miles off Nantucket Island.

The crews of these captured vessels were ordered aboard the U-boat where ten of them were lined up before the conning tower and photographed. When asked why a photograph was taken, a member of the submarine crew said: "That goes back to Germany to show what we do over here. We have quite a lot of them. They look good in Berlin." The captain of the raider, with an American flag around his shoulders, gave "a grotesque exhibition of dancing," while his crew cheered loudly, and more loudly still when he flung it on deck and stamped on it. Six men of the sword-fishing schooner *Cruiser* rowed 180 miles in their dory before they were rescued off *Great Round Shoal Lightship* six miles from Nantucket Island. Six members of the crew of the schooner *Earl and Nettie* reached Nantucket, and reported their vessel, the tenth, sunk. August 11, the British steamer *Penistone* was destroyed near Georges Bank. Nine of the crew reached Nantucket, and twenty-nine, after suffering great hardship for four days, landed at Provincetown. The executive officer reported that the torpedo was fired at close range, tore a hole in the vessel amidships, wrecked the engine, scattered burning oil over the firemen, and killed one man. The Captain ordered his men into the boats, and stood by watching the work of the submarine. Finally, he called for eleven volunteers to go with him to the *Penistone*

and attempt to save the ship's papers and personal effects. All were captured by the Germans. The men were ordered back to their boats, but the Captain was held prisoner. The *Penistone* was then sunk by bombs, an hour and a half after the torpedo struck her.

The Swedish steamship *Sydland* was torpedoed August 8, a hundred miles southeast of Nantucket Island, and on the thirteenth a patrol boat of the Coast Guard entered New York harbor towing a life boat in which were thirty-one of the crew of the Norwegian freighter *Sommerstad*, torpedoed twenty-five miles southeast of Fire Island. Said the captain:

We were bound from Norway to New York, in ballast, under charter to the United States Government, and had called at Halifax for examination by the British officials. The *Sommerstad* was steaming along the Long Island coast, about eleven knots at 8 o'clock yesterday morning, when the lookout man forward reported that he saw the wake of a torpedo coming toward the ship from starboard. The torpedo missed the bow by a narrow margin, and sped on for several yards, and then made a half circle and returned toward our ship which it struck on the port side amidships, exploding with terrific violence. Several of the watch on deck were knocked down by the force of the explosion, and the cook was blown clean out of the galley.

I saw the *Sommerstad* would not be afloat long and ordered the crew to lower the two boats.

We saw no sign of a periscope, or a U-boat, and nothing disturbed the surface of the sea after we got into the boats.

The *Sommerstad* filled so quickly, after the torpedo struck her, that in four minutes she had settled so deeply that her funnel was awash. The steamship began to sink by the stern, and as we got the boats clear her bow was pointing skywards. There was a slight fog hanging over the water which was calm, and scarcely any breeze. We made towards the Long Island shore, and rowed all day.

Toward sundown we heard Fire Island's siren and made directly for the shore. Soon afterward we were sighted by the naval patrol vessel which brought us to this city. The men were tired with rowing all day, and were taken care of for the night on the patrol boat, and this morning we got into the lifeboat. There was no time to save any of our effects, and every member of the crew left her with only what we had on.

Still cruising south the *U-117* laid mines at intervals of 120 miles between Sandy Hook and Cape Hatteras, and destroyed all vessels she met. A coastwise steamer reached New York August 14 with thirty-five survivors of the crew of the tanker *Frederick R. Kellogg*, torpedoed ten miles off Barnegat, New Jersey. She was struck at six o'clock on the evening of the thirteenth, while on her way from Tampico to Boston with crude oil. No warning was given, and so terrific was the explosion that seven of the crew lost their lives. According to the statement of the Captain the explosion of the torpedo burst open the vessel, and she sank in four minutes. A boat, on the davits on the port quarter, was smashed to splinters, and the life boat, further forwards, dashed against the ship and wrecked. This left a life boat, and a motor boat which had scarcely been lowered and made clear when the *Kellogg* sank. The crew had to jump overboard and swim for the boats. "Like most motor boats," said a member of the crew, "supplied to ocean-going steamships, ours could not be made to go, so we had to tow it with the lifeboat, which was slow work. The mate rigged up a lateen-shaped sail, like they use in the Mediterranean, which helped us a little. Most of our fellows were in a hurry to get off the tanker, because they were afraid the Hun boat would turn his guns on us, but we saw no signs of him until we got clear away.

"As the rail of the *Kellogg* was just awash we saw a periscope appear above the surface of the calm sea, close to her side, and then the whole of the U-boat came into sight."

From later reports it appeared she did not sink, but two days later was still afloat off Barnegat.

The captain of the steam trawler *Walrus* now reported, that when seven miles off the Highland Light, Cape Cod, on his way to the fishing grounds, he sighted the conning tower of a submarine dead ahead. The U-boat submerged immediately, and a few minutes later the Captain saw the wake of a torpedo which missed his vessel by twenty feet. Aided by a light fog and calm sea he escaped.

The five-masted schooner *Dorothy Barrett*, bound for a New England port, was set on fire by shells from a submarine, August 14, twenty miles from Cape May, New Jersey, where the Captain and crew landed.

"We were startled by a shot fired across our bow," said the Captain. "That was the first warning we had of a submarine. We saw nothing even then, but we went ahead and prepared to leave the vessel when the submarine appeared, and fired four more shots. Then it submerged, and came up again a hundred yards away, and circled about us. We were not hailed, and the U-boat apparently was waiting for us to leave.

"By this time we had launched the dory, and all had gotten aboard. We tried to follow the periscope of the submersible, but the Germans apparently were not anxious for us to approach, and really wanted us to get away. Finally, we started to row toward shore.

"We rowed in about ten miles when we met a submarine destroyer coming out, attracted by the shots. I sent the crew on in, and returned on the destroyer to the spot where I had left my ship. When we got back to the place there were no signs either of our boat or the submarine. The last we saw of our vessel she was in flames, and fast sinking, but whether the Germans had boarded, and fired her, or she had taken fire from the shells, I do not know."

Two seaplanes gave chase, but the submarine sighted them and submerged. Depth bombs were dropped where bubbles from the U-boat were seen, but no wreckage appeared, and the submarine was not seen again.

On reaching Cape Hatteras the *U-117* turned northeastward and, August 16, fell in with the Norwegian four-masted schooner *Madrugada*, off Winter Quarters Shoal on the Virginia coast, shortly after seven o'clock in the morning. Nobody came on deck, but a gun at once appeared forward of the conning tower, and opened fire on the *Madrugada*. While the gunners were firing at the port side, the crew lowered the lifeboat on the starboard side, pulled away to a safe distance, and waited to

see what would happen. After firing eleven shots the submarine circled around the *Madrugada*, came close to the life boat, and when the schooner sank, followed her under water. As a conservation of food measure the Navy Department now decided to guard the fishing grounds.

A report reached Beaufort, North Carolina, August 16, that an oil tank steamer was afire some twenty-five miles off Cape Hatteras and that a submarine was standing by. After fuller reports were received it appeared that the British oil tanker *Mirlo* when a few miles off Cape Hatteras was struck, on the evening of Friday, August 16, by two torpedoes and destroyed. Burning oil spread over the sea and in it ten of the crew perished. The captain was brought ashore in a seaplane and reported:

We did not have a chance. The fact that so many of us got away is beyond any explanation I can make. We did not see the submarine, and we did not know one was anywhere near us. Two torpedoes hit us in rapid succession. Oil poured out of the ship and ignited. The whole sea was covered for about a mile and a half. We had no time to think about anything. We had to decide quickly. There were two things to do: take chances in a small boat in the burning sea, or go down with the ship. A tanker is a difficult boat to sink. They may turn over, and they may partly fill with water; but there are so many compartments, so many bulkheads that it is a hard matter to send one to the bottom unless you destroy the ship entirely. The *Mirlo* was struck in two places, and the ship began to break. Both parts remained afloat for some time, and I cannot say now that they have sunk completely. The ship, however, is virtually destroyed. We faced death for more than an hour after we left the ship. Oil burned around our lifeboats, and my men suffered untold tortures. Nearly all of us were burned, some severely. Seven of my men are in a hospital with burned legs, arms, eyes and backs. They got first-aid treatment on the American patrol boat which reached us a few hours after we left the ship.

Forty survivors of the crew were aided by boats sent out by the Coast Guard; but were picked up by a patrol boat and taken to Norfolk, Virginia. Seven were badly burned.

One of the sailors said:

After we got into the lifeboats our condition became worse. The sea was on fire for more than two miles. There was a fairly high sea and sometimes, when the waves beat against the sides of our boats, it threw burning oil in on us. We fought the fire as best we could. It could not be extinguished with water. We tried that, and it only added to our danger. We took off our coats and beat the flames around the boats. When our coats caught fire, and we could no longer hold them in our hands, we took off our trousers, and beat the flames. When our trousers burned up we took off our shirts. We kept this up for nearly two hours before we got out of the flaming surface of the ocean. We lost our clothes fighting the fire. We saved only a few of them as it was, but we would have presented a better appearance than we do had we not had to sacrifice our coats and trousers to fight the flames. We did not see any submarines. Reports that a submarine came alongside and took off our oil is false. We had no warning whatever. A lookout reported sighting what he thought was the wake of a torpedo; but it exploded against our sides almost at the same time that he made his report. Two of our crew were on fire in the lifeboats. One of the boats caught fire several times, and our hands were terribly burned in extinguishing the flames. In my boat three men were completely exhausted from fighting the flames. Eight of us were burned, four seriously.

The captain of the British steamship *Penistone*, held for eight days a prisoner on the submarine that sank his vessel, reached Boston August 19. With him came eight of the crew of the Norwegian steamship *San José*, sunk by the *U-117* somewhere off Nantucket Island. Another Norwegian vessel, the bark *Nordhave*, was sunk a hundred miles off Cape Henry August 17. Her crew of twenty-six escaped in their boats and were brought to one of our ports in a war vessel.

Strange stories were now told by captains of vessels that made port. One declared that when off the Virginia coast, near Winter Quarters Shoals, he rammed a submarine until the crew of the U-boat cried out that they were friends; that replying they were no friends of his he kept on his way and pointed to a badly damaged bow in proof of his statement. Another, an officer on a British tanker, told of a fight with a submarine, of the firing of twenty-six shots, and was sure the U-boat was sunk. This story was corrected by the Captain

of the *Penistone*, then a prisoner on the submarine. All shots, he said, fell short and no damage was done to either party.

Dories, containing crews of fishermen destroyed on the banks off Nova Scotia, reached a Canadian port August 21 and reported that the Germans had captured and armed the steam trawler *Triumph*. She left Portland, Maine, a few days before. After her capture and armament, with a crew of sixteen Germans, she became a raider, attacked the fishing fleet and sank four vessels. Swift patrol boats and destroyers, the Navy Department at once announced, would be sent and a cordon drawn around the place of her activity. Meantime the raid continued and in a few days she was known to have destroyed seven fishermen, almost the entire fleet of the Maritime Fish Corporation.

Still going north the *U-117* bombed a schooner on August 24, and sank an American fishing vessel on the 26th, a hundred and sixty miles from Cape Canso. The crew were ordered aboard the submarine and sent below while their vessel was destroyed. They were then put into their boats, were picked up by a fishing vessel and were landed at Cape Canso. On August 27, *U-117* torpedoed a steamer, without warning, south of Cape Race. So quickly did it sink that all the boats could not be lowered and many of the crew were compelled to jump into the water.

The *U-117* now turned homeward, cruised around Cape Race, sank two schooners on August 30, and, September 9, was reported in company with *UK-140*. During her cruise the *U-117* sank twenty ships and ten sailing vessels, most of which were American, aggregating 19,913 tons. After the end of the war she was surrendered to the British, went to Harwich, and in May, 1919, in charge of American officers and crew, was brought to Washington, moored to a wharf, and opened to inspection by the public.

While the *U-117* was on her way home, the *U-152* left Kiel, and September 30 fell in with the transport *Ticonderoga* some 1,700 miles from our coast. The *Ticonderoga* was bound to France with a cargo of railway cars, and carried besides her

crew, 113 officers and men of the army. She had fallen behind her convoy when sighted by the U-boat, which at once opened on her with shrapnel, and destroyed the bridge and radio house, and killed four members of a gun crew before the cruiser *Galveston* hove in sight and forced the *U-152* to submerge. An hour later she rose to the surface, renewed the attack, and finally reached the engine and fire rooms. A sheet was then hoisted on the *Ticonderoga* as a sign of surrender, but the firing continued and the Captain, the executive officer and the first assistant engineer, having been wounded, the order was given to take to the boats. Most of them were riddled with shrapnel, but the Captain and 21 soldiers and sailors were put into the only uninjured boat, and 15 others found refuge on a raft. The *Ticonderoga* now sank and the U-boat came alongside the life boat and enquired for the captain, but not finding him, took off two sailors. Later she picked up, from the wreckage, the executive officer, and going alongside the raft, took off the first assistant engineer, and put the two seamen on the raft. Those on the raft begged to be taken aboard the submarine, but the commander answered, he had room for no more, and left them to their fate. After drifting four days those in the boat were picked up by the *Moorish Prince*, and carried to a port in the United States.

Continuing her voyage the *U-152* entered the Gulf Stream in search of Allied shipping, and while so engaged received a radio message "Engage men-of-war only. The merchant war is ended." Nevertheless, October 12, the Norwegian bark *Stifinder* was destroyed off the coast of Newfoundland and the crew left in their boats hundreds of miles from shore. Several duels with armed ships occurred between that day and October 20, when the radio order, "All submarines return to Kiel," was received and obeyed. November 11 *U-152* reached the North Sea mine barrier, passed through it on the surface, and the crew having voted not to interne, the armistice having been declared, she entered Kiel harbor, and November 15 made fast to the mother ship. The terms of the armistice required the

surrender to Great Britain of all German submarines, November 20; therefore, a number of them, one column led by *U-155*, the old *Deutschland*, and the other by the *U-152* with her former prisoners, Lieutenants F. L. Muller and J. H. Fulcher of the United States Navy on board, set off for Harwich.

Since April, 1917, our navy which then consisted of three hundred and forty-four vessels fit for service and sixty-eight thousand officers and men had been increased to two thousand vessels of all sorts and more than five hundred and forty thousand officers and men. The Marines numbered nearly seventy-three thousand and the Coast Guard more than six thousand officers and men. Vessels of the navy had been in the White Sea, on the Moravian coast, in the North Sea, off the British Islands, in the Mediterranean, in the Adriatic, in the Caribbean Sea, off South America, had covered the Atlantic and had been on the Pacific from our own coast to Vladivostok. The little fleet of destroyers, which twenty-eight days after the declaration of war reached Queenstown under Admiral Sims, had been added to until he now commanded more than three hundred vessels of all sorts and more than seventy-five thousand men.

Six battleships under Rear Admiral Rodman crossed in December, 1917, and became part of a division of the British Grand Fleet. Others under Rear Admiral Rodgers had their base at Berehaven, on the coast of Ireland. Vice Admiral Wilson at Brest commanded the American forces on the French coast; Rear Admiral Niblack at Gibraltar commanded our vessels in the Mediterranean; and Rear Admiral Dunn was in charge of our naval base in the Azores. Naval air stations were established on the coasts of England and Ireland and in France from the Spanish border to the Channel at out of the way places and on uninhabited islands and the whole line covered by seaplanes and dirigibles. Naval aviators bombed the German submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge, and fought enemy seaplanes over Heligoland Bight.

No piece of work done by the navy during the war surpasses the laying of the mine barrage from the Orkneys to Norway,

across two hundred and thirty miles of the North Sea. Suggested by Rear Admiral Earle in the early days of the war, the plan was carried out in 1918. One hundred thousand mines of a new type were made; a fleet of mine layers and transporters was built and manned; bases were established in Scotland at Inverness and Invergordon, and Rear Admiral Strauss placed in charge. Of seventy-thousand two hundred mines used more than fifty-six thousand six hundred were laid by our Navy. The transportation of more than two-million men with the loss of but a few hundred, and the transportation of supplies to the army and navy overseas with the loss of but a few cargo-carrying ships was another well-done task and greatly to the credit of the navy. During the height of the movement of troops and supplies in July and August, 1918, American destroyers convoyed into French ports two hundred and sixty thousand troops, and furnished three-fourths of the escorts for more than three hundred vessels to British ports, steaming nearly sixteen thousand hours and covering two hundred and sixty thousand miles.

Concerning the work of the battleships, Rear Admiral Rodman said, "In our operations in the North Sea we were frequently attacked by submarines, and our battleships had numerous escapes, often only by prompt and skillful handling. On one occasion a submarine rammed the flagship *New York*, dented the bottom and demolished the starboard propeller. But there is every reason to believe that the blows from the propeller sank the submarine. En route to drydock to make repairs and instal a new propeller three torpedoes in rapid succession were fired at her by hostile submarines, but again she avoided them by clever maneuvering and escaped." On another occasion, off the Norway coast in midwinter, six torpedoes were fired at her; but again she escaped them. In April, 1918, when the Italians destroyed the Austrian naval base at Durazzo, American submarine chasers took part in the bombardment, sank one submarine and, it was said, probably damaged another.

CHAPTER II

WAR WORK AT HOME

LONG before the submarine had finished its work of destruction, in June, one of the many effects of its depredations was clearly shown in the eagerness of young men to help win the war. Day after day enlistment stations were crowded with men seeking service in the army, the navy, the merchant marine. None of draft age were accepted for the army; yet each day in the great cities scores of men under 21 or over 31 joined the colors. No such restriction applied to the navy, or to the marines, and in these branches of the service hundreds enlisted. Reports from the Sea Service Bureau showed that even the Merchant Marine had felt the good effects of the German challenge to merchant shipping, and that all previous records of enlistments had been broken during the first week in June. "The enemy is at our gates," one applicant was reported to have said, "and it is up to us to hit back." To these volunteers were now added all men who came of age between June 5, 1917, and midnight of June 4, 1918, for they had been summoned to appear, June 5, before their respective boards and register. On the eve of registration Provost Marshal General Crowder addressed to them a message.

On the 5th of June, 1917, just one year ago to-morrow, occurred one of the most memorable events in the history of democratic institutions.

On that day 10,000,000 self-governed young Americans marched quietly to the polls, and in a voice that was heard around the world, registered their invincible determination to preserve for themselves, and their posterity, the blessings of the liberty with which they have been so richly endowed.

A year has passed. Many of these men are now on the battlefields

of France, and on to-morrow, the 5th of June, that voice will have found its echo when 1,000,000 more will rally to their support.

The nation is engaged in a struggle for its existence. Our activities have been diverted from the normal peacetime channels, and the energy of those who remain at home is being directed more closely, every day, toward the accomplishment of the things upon which our armies must depend, and without which success is impossible.

Every American must do his duty in this great crisis, even though he remains at home. Those who are of such an age, and condition in life, that they may, without detriment to the economic support of the army, actively oppose themselves against our enemy on the European battlefields, are indeed privileged.

Most of the men who register to-morrow will be so classified, and I have no hesitancy in predicting that their services will win for them the undying affection of a proud and grateful nation.

At least 1,011,598 men, it was expected by the Census Bureau, would register; but when returns from the eight and forty States and the District of Columbia were received the number was found to be 744,868, or 266,724 short of the estimate of the Census Bureau. But the number of men, twenty-one years old, who, during the year, enlisted in the army, navy, and marine corps was 208,588, and when to these was added the number of aliens who need not register, the figures rose to 998,551, or but 13,000 below the Census Bureau estimate.

June 27 was the day fixed for the draft, which was conducted in the same manner as the great one of 1917. The place was again a room in the Senate Building, where, in the same glass jar used the year before, were deposited 1200 master numbers concealed in black capsules. As each was drawn from the bowl it was broken by an attendant, the number announced and verified by two men, and then written on tally sheets, and on a blackboard of which, in time, a photograph was taken and kept as a record.

Since the great registration of June, 1917, a new system of classification of registrants had gone into effect. In November a questionnaire had been sent out, and in accordance with his sworn answer each registrant had been placed in one of five

classes. The effect of classification in Class I was to make him liable to be called for service at an early day, for in it were included single men without dependent relatives; married men who habitually failed to support their families; married men dependent on their wives for support; married men supported by income independent of labor; unskilled farm laborers; unskilled industrial laborers; and registrants who did not claim deferred classification, or did not answer the questionnaire, or were not included in any other class. Classification in Class II granted the draftee temporary discharge from draft until Class I, in the jurisdiction of his Local Board, was exhausted. Class III became liable only when Classes I and II, in the jurisdiction of their Local Boards, were exhausted, and Class IV when Classes I, II and III were spent. Classification in Class V was equivalent to exemption, or discharge from draft, and in it were included, legislative, executive and judicial officers of the United States, the States, the territories, and the District of Columbia; ministers of religion; students of theology on May 18, 1917; all in military, or naval service of the United States; alien enemies; resident aliens claiming exemption; all permanently physically unfit for military service; all morally unfit to be a soldier of the United States, and pilots actually engaged in their vocation.

Nearly every man drawn on June 5, 1918, was able bodied, unmarried, without dependents and not engaged in an essential industry. It was announced, therefore, that they would be placed at the bottom of Class I, now almost exhausted. Day after day thousands of the old registrants were moving into the cantonments to take the place of those already sent across the sea.

That men in Class I should be trained to fight, while those in the deferred class should be free to follow occupations which counted for nothing in our effort to win the war, seemed neither just, nor good policy. Provost Marshal Crowder, therefore, with the approval of the President and the Secretary of War, issued what was popularly known as his "work or fight" order,

requiring all men of draft age, who were habitual idlers or engaged in non-essential industries, to appear before their Local Boards before July 1, 1918, and explain why they were not working in essential industries, or find occupation therein.

Idlers were defined to be "gamblers of all descriptions, bucket shop and race track attendants, fortune tellers, clairvoyants, palmists, and the like." Men in non-essential occupations were clerks and salesmen in stores and mercantile houses; persons in domestic service, doormen, footmen; and attendants at clubs, hotels, apartment houses, office buildings; persons engaged in games and sports, and amusements, save actual performances in operas and plays, and all who served food or drink in hotels, clubs or public places. Direct industrial conscription, it was explained, was not possible at this time. But the effect of the new regulation would be to force men out of occupations not essential to winning the war, and put them into war work that was essential. It meant a greater number of men available for the production of war material or, if drawn into immediate service, the prevention of any drain on men engaged in war industries, and the postponement of any call on the deferred classes until the advanced classes were exhausted. Non-essential workers would not be permitted to seek exemption because they had drawn a late order number, or had been placed in Class II, III or IV on the ground of dependency. The fact that they were not usefully employed would outweigh all other considerations. To take men from the farms, from the mills and factories, and out of essential employments, and march them away to training camps, "past crowds of idlers and loafers," was worse than foolish. We were not fighting armies, but nations in arms. Civilization was facing life or death, and we, too, must, as a nation, drop idleness and vain pleasures.

At least half a million men, it was estimated, would, by the order, be made available for the army, and another half million be turned into necessary industries.

In June, General Crowder told the Senate Committee on

Military Affairs that an extension of the draft age would be necessary, because all men in Class I would be exhausted before June, 1919. Of the 2,248,000 men in that class 1,347,000 had already been called to the colors. Some 400,000 more would be secured from those who registered on June 5, and 200,000 would be obtained from the re-examination of the questionnaires and reclassification. Thus by the first of August 3,000,000 men would be under arms.

He urged, therefore, that the draft age limits be extended from eighteen to forty-five, not only to obtain more fighting men, but to apply the "work or fight" rule to slackers above thirty years of age. There was no intention to call into the army, at once, all eligible men between these ages, but to enable the Government to draft older single men with no dependents, and leave untouched the younger married men, with children, then in the deferred Class. When, therefore, towards the close of June, the Senate had under debate the army appropriation bill, carrying appropriations amounting to \$12,000,000,000, Senator Fall, of New Mexico, introduced an amendment fixing the age limits at 20 and 42, and Senator France, of Maryland, an amendment providing for the industrial enrollment of men and women between 18 and 45 years of age that they might be drawn into occupations for which they were best suited. The President approved of both, but did not wish them adopted at that time, nor made part of the appropriation bill. The Fall amendment was accordingly defeated.

The Allies now called on the United States to maintain an army, of 120 divisions of 40,000 men each, overseas, and a reserve force of 1,000,000 at home under arms. This completely changed the plans of the War Department, and led it to adopt a program calling for 80 divisions, or 3,200,000 men overseas, and a reserve of eighteen divisions, or 720,000 men under arms and in training at home. Lack of ships to transport and maintain 120 divisions had forced the modification. To get men for so great an army it was necessary to extend the draft age limits at once, and August 5 a bill, submitted

by the Secretary of War, was introduced into both houses of Congress. It provided for the extension of the limits to eighteen and forty-five. Under such a law, General Crowder believed, that 13,200,644 men would register; that 10,028,973 would be between the ages of thirty-one and forty-five, and 3,171,671 between eighteen and twenty, making the total number of men registered since June 5, 1917, some 23,000,000. There were then abroad, he said, 1,300,000 troops, and the plan was to add to them 250,000 men a month until the end of the year, when there would thus be overseas an American army of 2,300,000 men. If this program were to be carried out the bill must be passed before the end of August. In that event the President could issue his proclamation fixing registration day as early as September 5. If the new men in Class I were to be in camp in October, registration day must not be later than September 15. Believing that Congress when it reassembled, after a short recess, August 26, would pass the bill, steps had already been taken to act at once. State headquarters, local boards and other officials in all the States had been notified to be ready. The situation was urgent, for, by October 1, Class I, under the ages fixed by the draft act of 1917, would be exhausted, and must be replenished at the earliest possible moment. During the discussion of the bill several amendments were offered, but the struggle was around that known as the "work or fight" amendment which, in its final form, read:

That when any person shall have been placed in a deferred or exempted class for any of the reasons in this paragraph set forth, he shall not be entitled to remain therein unless he shall in good faith continue, while physically able so to do, to work at and follow such occupation, employment, or business, and if he fails so to do, he shall again become subject to the draft. The President shall make regulations for enforcing this provision.

This proviso shall not apply in the case of a strike, if the strikers have submitted, or will at once submit, the dispute to the War Labor Board, agree to abide and do abide by its decision, and do at once resume work and continue work pending such decision. The said

board shall take up and decide all such disputes as speedily as practicable.

To any such provision Mr. Gompers objected. It was a reflection on the services and loyalty of the workers of our country. Here and there, he said, a few might have failed to do their full duty, but, taken as a whole, the workmen were doing their full duty, and rendering every aid possible to win the war. Nevertheless, it was adopted by the Senate, was stricken out by the House, was abandoned in conference, and the bill was passed without it. August 31 the act was signed by the President who immediately issued a proclamation requiring all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, not already registered, or not in the military or naval service of the United States, to register on September 12.

In this proclamation the President said:

Fifteen months ago the men of the country from twenty-one to thirty-one years of age were registered. Three months ago, and again last month, those who had just reached the age of twenty-one were added. It now remains to include all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five.

This is not a new policy. A century and a quarter ago it was deliberately ordained by those who were then responsible for the safety and defense of the nation that the duty of military service should rest upon all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. We now accept and fulfill the obligation which they established, an obligation expressed in our national statutes from that time until now. We solemnly purpose a decisive victory of arms, and deliberately to devote the larger part of the military man-power of the nation to the accomplishment of that purpose.

The younger men have from the first been ready to go. They have furnished voluntary enlistments out of all proportions to their numbers. Our military authorities regard them as having the highest combatant qualities. Their youthful enthusiasm, their virile eagerness, their gallant spirit of daring make them the admiration of all who see them in action. They covet not only the distinction of serving in this great war, but also the inspiring memories, which hundreds of thousands of them will cherish through years to come, of a great day and a great service for their country and for mankind.

By the men of the older group now called upon, the opportunity

now open to them will be accepted with the calm reassurance of those who realize to the full the deep, the solemn significance of what they do. Having made a place for themselves in their respective communities, having assumed at home the graver responsibilities of life in many spheres, looking back upon honorable industrial records, they will realize, perhaps, as no others could, how entirely their own fortunes, and the fortunes of all whom they love, are put at stake in this war for right, and will know the very records they have made render this new duty the commanding duty of their lives. They know how surely this is the nation's war, how imperatively it demands the mobilization and massing of all our resources of every kind. They will regard this call as the supreme call of their day and will answer it accordingly.

Only a portion of those who register will be called upon to bear arms. Those who are not physically fit will be excused; those exempted by alien allegiance; those who should not be relieved of the present responsibilities; above all, those who cannot be spared from the civil and industrial tasks at home upon which the success of our armies depends as much as upon the fighting at the front. But all must be registered in order that the selection for military service may be made intelligently, and with full information.

This will be our final demonstration of loyalty, democracy, and the will to win; our solemn notice to all the world that we stand absolutely together in a common resolution and purpose. It is the call to duty to which every true man in the country will respond with pride and with the consciousness, that in doing so, he plays his part in vindication of a great cause at whose summons every true heart offers its supreme service.

So rapidly were young men sent to the training camps, that, by the middle of August, Class I was almost exhausted. To meet the call for 200,000 men for the camps during September, it must be replenished. Therefore, the President, by proclamation, summoned all men who came of age between June 5 and August 24 to register on the latter day. General Crowder believed that they would number at least 150,000, and that one-half of them would be available for Class I. The day chosen was a Saturday. All who observed that day as a Sabbath were to register on the following Monday.

There would be no drawing at Washington to determine the

order in which they were to be called; they would be treated as belated registrants. "It will not be necessary," said General Crowder, "to hold another drawing in Washington to determine the order of liability to service of those who will register on August 24. The same method will be followed as that adopted for belated registrants whose names went on the books after June 5 last. In other words, advantage will be taken of the fact that enough numbers were drawn in the official drawing of June 27, 1918, to fix the orders of liability not only for all who registered June 5, 1918, but for all who are expected to be enrolled on August 24. Altogether, 1,200 numbers were drawn at that time, although the total number of registrants in any one registration district on June 5 did not exceed two-thirds of that number. Thus, one-third of these numbers are available for distribution among the new registrants.

"This distribution will be made by the Adjutant General, or draft executive, in each State, for each of the registration districts under his jurisdiction, copies of all registration cards, with blank spaces for the numbers, having been furnished him. He will pick the available numbers at random and assign them according to the order in which he takes up the registration cards. When a registrant has thus received his number he will be able, by reference to the official drawing of June 27, 1918, to which he will have access, to determine the order in which he will be called."

Preparations, made in the great centers of population for speedy registration in September, were most interesting. In New York City, where upwards of 900,000 men were expected to register, the registration districts were 189; the registrars, clerks and interpreters, for fifty-two foreign languages are spoken in that city, appointed to aid the District Boards numbered 12,000, or one for every 80 registrants, and extra registrars and interpreters were gathered at the headquarters of the Director of the Draft ready to be sent by automobile to any district where the registration became unexpectedly large.

On the appointed day the Stock Exchange, the Cotton Exchange, the Public Schools were closed, and corporations employing large numbers of men of draft age gave them time to register in order to decrease as much as possible the last minute rush at night.

When the returns from all the States were made it was found that 13,228,000 men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one and thirty-one and forty-five had registered. In all registrations the number of men registered for selective service was 23,709,000. Nothing now remained but to fix upon the time when the great draft should be made. Monday, September 30, was chosen, and on that day the President, blindfolded, in the Caucus room on the second floor of the Senate Building, drew, from the historic glass bowl used for the draft of 1917, one of the 17,000 black capsules it contained. The number was 322; whereupon each man who had received that number in each of the 4557 registration districts where there were so many as 322 registrants became No. 1 in order of liability to be called for service by his district board. Each of the 10,500 master numbers drawn from the bowl in July, 1917, were announced by the press. On this occasion only the first one hundred were made public. The others were to be announced to the registrants by their district boards when they received their questionnaires.

Drafting young men under twenty-one years of age, it was clearly foreseen, would seriously affect the education of those in High Schools and Colleges. Section Seven of the Act, therefore, provided that the Secretary of War might "assign to educational institutions, for special and technical training, soldiers who enter the military service under the provisions of this Act, in such numbers and under such regulations as he may prescribe; and is authorized to contract with such educational institutions for the subsistence, quarters and military and academic instruction of such soldiers." Every student, from 18 to 21, it was explained, who wished to continue his studies at High School or College, might enter the Students Army Train-

ing Corps, have all his college expenses paid by the Government, receive \$30 a month pay, and become a soldier in the United States Army, uniformed and subject to military discipline and training.

The course of study and the time were prescribed by the Military Authorities, whose aim it was to have the students trained as officer candidates and technical experts to meet the needs of the service. Upwards of five hundred universities, colleges and technical schools were called on to state how many they could take, and 145,012 were finally accepted. At noon on October 1 this splendid body of young Americans was duly mobilized, and standing under the Stars and Stripes at the respective institutions, took the oath of allegiance and listened to the reading of messages from President Wilson, the Acting Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff.

The step you have taken, said the President, is a most significant one. By it you have ceased to be merely individuals, each seeking to perfect himself to win his own place in the world, and have become comrades in the common cause of making the world a better place to live in. You have joined yourself with the entire manhood of the country and pledged, as did your forefathers, "your lives, your fortunes, and your sacred honor" to the freedom of humanity.

The enterprise upon which you have embarked is a hazardous and difficult one. This is not a war of words; this is not a scholastic struggle. It is a war of ideals, yet fought with all the devices of science, and with the power of machines. To succeed you must not only be inspired by the ideals for which this country stands, but you must also be masters of the technique with which the battle is fought. You must not only be thrilled with the zeal for the common welfare, but you must also be masters of the weapons of to-day.

There can be no doubt of the issue. The spirit that is revealed, and manner in which Americans responded to the call, is indomitable. I have no doubt that you will use your utmost strength to maintain that spirit, and to carry it forward to the final victory that will certainly be ours.

The Acting Secretary of War said:

As college students you are accustomed to contests of physical force. You are familiar with the tedious training and self-sacrifice

ing discipline that are required to develop a team that can win the game. You know that the contest is won by team work, push, enthusiastic coöperation with one another, and coördination of every individual talent to the single purpose of common success.

In the military struggle in which you are about to enter, the same conditions prevail. In order to succeed, many weeks of thoroughgoing training and drill are essential to develop the coördination of skill and imagination that is essential to achieving the vast and vital end to which the country has pledged its every effort. The fighting machine will come into effective working order more rapidly in proportion as each individual in it devotes his full attention to the particular service for which he is best qualified. In entering upon this training as student soldiers you have the opportunity of developing your abilities to the point where they will be most effective in the common struggle.

I am sure that you will do this in the same spirit, and with the same enthusiasm that you have always exhibited in the lesser struggles to which you have been accustomed to devote your energies. I am sure that you will rise to this opportunity and show that America, the home of the pioneer, the inventor, and the master of machines, is ready and able to turn its every energy to the construction of an all-powerful military machine which will prove as effective in liberating men as have the reaper, the airplane, and the telephone.

General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff of the Army, reminded the boys of the great opportunity that opened before them.

The Students Army Training Corps has been organized to assist in training a body of men from whom the United States will draw officer material in large numbers. The need for these officers is one of the most imperative orders connected with our large army program, and patriotic young men will be given an opportunity to acquire this training, with the knowledge that they will thus be enabled to better serve their country in the great drive which is to come. Superior leadership spells success in war, and it is the duty of every member of the Students Army Training Corps to do his utmost to qualify as a leader of men.

While preparations for the draft were under way, renewed efforts were made to reach the slackers, the men who had not registered for the previous draft, and those who had not an-

swered the questionnaire. For months past not only the Department of Justice but the American Protective League, the secret service of the Council of National Defense, and scores of private local organizations had been busy seeking for men who shirked the call of their country. Since registration day, June 5, 1917, some 25,000 had been captured. In June, 1918, ball parks, theaters, moving-picture houses, bar rooms, pool-rooms, restaurants, parks, railway stations, steamboat docks, every place where young men were likely to gather, were raided by police officers and agents of the American Protective League, and 300 who had not registered and 4,000 who had not filed questionnaires were arrested. In Ohio 1,000 were found in one day. And so it was the country over. Hundreds had fled to Mexico where life, according to General Crowder, was far from pleasant. Even there the man with the yellow streak was heartily despised. Such as had means, and had "established a sort of colony" in Mexico City were "ostracized completely, not only by other American residents above draft age, but by the natives as well." Those without funds were in desperate straits. "Native and foreign business houses alike refused them employment. At Guanajuato, for example, not only a crowd of these slackers, applying for work at the mines, was refused employment in spite of a labor shortage, but a committee of Americans living there is reported to have waited on them with a demand that they leave the town in a specified number of hours." In this work the women "in all communities, particularly those having relatives who have gone to the front," according to General Crowder, had been most helpful, "in ferreting out young men who failed to register." To encourage them in this good work, Dr. Anna Howard Shaw, chairwoman of the Woman's Committee of the Council of National Defense, now made an appeal.

A new and imperative call comes to the women of our land from which at first there may be a spirit of shrinking, but the splendid response which the patriotic women of America have made to every call of their country assures us of a willing and courageous compli-

ance with this, the greatest and most important demand made upon the loyalty of our people since the beginning of the war. Every woman is equally in honor bound to inspire, encourage, and urge the men of her family to perform their patriotic duty.

To inspire us in our task we have but to remember this! we must win the war. We must win it in the shortest possible time. It can be done only with a sufficiently large army to break the military power of Germany. This army can be obtained if we do our duty.

Every consideration of honor, of patriotism, of love of justice, and hope for the future peace of the world calls us to this sacred sacrifice.

In Chicago during four days in July, 1918, in a drive to round up slackers, over a hundred and fifty thousand men were stopped and summoned to show their registration cards. Ball games and motion picture shows, bathing beaches and cabarets, saloons and factories, were visited and searched. On the streets, at the gates of railroad stations, on the platforms of the elevated roads, at steamboat landings, in the theaters and in motor cars men were stopped and some twenty thousand who could not give satisfactory replies were hurried to the Municipal Pier, to the Bureau of investigation, to court rooms, jails and vacant store-rooms for further examination and fourteen held for service. In September, in the Federal Districts of Southern and Eastern New York and Northern New Jersey, upwards of fifty-one thousand suspects were seized, temporarily detained and each given a yellow card to fill out. The answers thus obtained were telephoned to the various draft boards for verification. When truly given, the yellow card was exchanged for a white slip which was an honorable discharge from custody. By nightfall on the third day, several hundred slackers had been sent to Governor's Island and Camp Upton.

The raid, the manner in which it was conducted, the fact that nobody knew by whose authority it was made, aroused great indignation in the United States Senate. Senator Caldwell announced that he was in New York at the time and witnessed the proceedings. He saw a street car stopped, a sailor enter and take out men, some of whom were accompany-

ing women. Armed soldiers, he said, went into business offices and took men from behind their desks, went into theaters and took men away from the ladies they were escorting. Men were stopped on the streets, seized on the corners and packed into vans like sardines, were hurried to the police stations and kept under observation until they could send for some one to prove they were not slackers. Even men over the draft age were arrested and required to furnish evidence that they were exempt.

Senator Smoot offered a resolution to the effect, that the daily newspapers having announced the seizure and temporary incarceration of many thousands of citizens in New York, and the participation in this so-called "round-up," of sailors and soldiers in uniform, the Committee on Military Affairs be directed to investigate and report who was responsible for their presence, and who issued orders resulting in their participation in the arrests, if they were present and did participate. The resolution was placed on the Senate calendar after a long and stormy debate. Meantime, the President requested the Attorney-General to investigate and report to him.

Beginning with a statement why such raids were necessary, the Attorney-General, in his report, assumed entire responsibility for putting them into effect, but condemned the manner in which that in New York had been carried out, as unlawful, contrary to his express instructions, and due to excess of zeal for the public good. "In order," said he, "to set forth intelligently the proceedings at New York it is necessary to touch on a serious national problem. There are many deserters and slackers at large in this country."

The Secretary of War referred to this condition "as an indictment against the honor of the nation." To permit it to continue would weaken substantially the nation's fighting power and do grievous injustice to the great body of the youth of the land who so gallantly met their military obligations. Energetic measures were required. The Secretary of War naturally looked to this department for assistance. To attempt to appre-

hend so great a number of offenders by running down individual cases obviously would have been futile. Some form of dragnet process, within the law of course, was absolutely essential.

It was accordingly decided to adopt the plan of canvassing, or rounding up in the large cities, on particular days all men apparently within the draft age and arranging for a summary and immediate investigation of their status through their local draft boards. Of necessity this involved detaining, pending investigation, all men who did not have registration or classification cards (which registrants are required by the regulations to keep always in their personal possession), or who were not able to establish by satisfactory evidence that they were outside the draft ages. It was expected that for the most part such men would voluntarily go to the places of detention, which were usually armories, while the investigation of their status was being made. Where arrests were necessary it was never contemplated that they should be made by any but police officials of the United States, or of the States and municipalities where the canvass was being conducted. The making of arrests in such cases by the military, or by the members of any private organization, would have been contrary to law and contrary to the express directions of the Attorney General, except in the case of deserters, where, of course, the military authorities had the power to make arrests. It was expected, however, that where the number detained was large this department in making the necessary investigation, would have the aid of the American Protective League, a private organization of established standing which had long been participating in the enforcement of the selective service law by express invitation of the Provost Marshal General; and that in guarding the persons taken into custody it would have the aid of units of the military and naval forces.

While this plan was evolved in discussion with a representative of the Provost Marshal General's office, I take full and entire responsibility for adopting it and for putting it into effect. I know

that some such dragnet process is necessary unless thousands upon thousands of deserters and slackers are to remain at large; I believe the plan adopted is authorized by the regulations; I believe also, judging by the results at a number of different points, that the great body of our people will cheerfully submit to the minor inconveniences which the execution of any such plan of necessity entails, to the end that this indictment of the nation's honor, this drain on the nation's strength, may be removed. I shall, therefore, continue to employ the plan unless you give directions to the contrary.

Coming to the city of New York, I again accept full and entire responsibility for putting into effect there the general plan of rounding up deserters and slackers which I have described. Contrary to my express instructions, however, instructions which I have repeated over and over again, and contrary to law, certain members of the investigating force of this department, without consultation with me or with any law officer of the department, used soldiers and sailors and certain members of the American Protective League, I am satisfied, in making arrests. I am convinced by the inquiries which I have made that they were led into this breach of authority by excess of zeal for the public good. While this extenuates, it does not excuse their action.

During the three-day canvass in Manhattan and the Bronx, 11,652 persons were apprehended and temporarily held at places of detention. Of these, about 300 were inducted into the military service, and at least 1,500 turned over to their local boards as delinquents. In Brooklyn, 9,750 were detained, of whom 252 have been held by order of court, and at least 1,000 turned over to their local boards as delinquents. These figures do not include a large number of persons who, on being accosted, made a satisfactory showing, and were not detained; nor do they include a smaller number who were taken to the police station, and required to give further information before being released.

Simultaneously with the canvass in New York, one was made in the cities of Northern New Jersey, where, so far as I can learn, there was little if any criticism. The canvass in Northern New Jersey was carried out in accordance with the instructions and known policy of the department. In the city of Newark, for example, the canvass was made by groups of men composed of one regular police officer, who, in every instance, made the arrest aided by members of the American Protective League and uniformed unarmed members of the State militia, who assisted in the work of accosting

and making inquiries. No soldiers, sailors, or members of private organizations were employed in making arrests.

There were apprehended in the five cities of Northern New Jersey—Newark, Jersey City, Hoboken, Paterson and Passaic—a total of 28,875 persons. Out of this number 749 men have been ordered inducted into the army, and in addition 12,515 were delinquents, whose draft records of classifications were corrected by the local boards. These delinquents were persons who at one time had been given a temporary classification by reason of illness, exemption, &c., but who had failed to report for a corrected classification, or else persons who had failed to register, failed to appear for physical examination, or failed to file questionnaire, &c.

All told 50,271 persons were apprehended and temporarily detained, of whom 15,015 were turned over to their local boards as delinquents, 1049 sent to camps, and 252 held by order of court.

By this time our troops were going abroad by hundreds of thousands each month. Beginning with the departure, on May 8, 1917, of Base Hospital No. 4, and the nurses' reserve corps, those dispatched each month rose so steadily in number that during March, 1918, 83,811 sailed and at the end of the first year of our participation in the war, 366,522 had been safely landed over seas.

Then came the great German drive, and the call of the Allies for men and more men. "I shall never forget that morning," said Lloyd George, speaking at Leeds during the parliamentary elections in December, "when I sent a cable message to President Wilson telling him what the facts were and how essential it was that we should get American help at the speediest possible rate, and inviting him to send 120,000 infantry and machine gunners to Europe. The following day there came a cablegram from President Wilson, 'Send your ships across and we will send the 120,000 men.' Then I invited Sir Joseph McKlay, the Shipping Controller, to Downing Street and said, 'Send every ship you can.' They were all engaged in essential trades because we were down and out right to the bone. There was nothing that was not essential. We said: 'This is the time

for taking risks.' We ran risks with our food, and we ran risks with essential raw materials. We said: 'The thing to do is to get these men across at all hazards.' America sent 1,900,000 men across and out of that number 1,100,000 were carried by the British mercantile marine. The good old ships of Britain have saved the liberty of the world many times. They saved it in the days of Queen Elizabeth; saved it in the days of Louis XIV; saved it in the days of Napoleon; and have saved it in the days of Kaiser Wilhelm II."

When the shipping Controller was questioned, he said:

Ships were gathered from every source, with the result that, in the six months between April and September, 850,000 American troops, or 60 per cent. of the total number carried within that period, were transported in British bottoms. In all, of the 2,079,000 American troops transported to France, well over a million were carried in British ships. The whole of this million were escorted to the United Kingdom danger zone by ships of the Royal Navy. British shipping at that time was in a perilous situation, but in order to further the movement of American troops we were prepared to make every sacrifice.

From South Africa was taken every passenger ship, from India and Australia were taken all fast steamers, and a dangerous sacrifice of meat supply for the British army was made by their transfer to the North Atlantic. One hundred and seventy-five British vessels of more than 1,500,000 tons dead weight were used to carry our men, and even fighting ships were fitted up for that service.

During April, May and June more than 600,000 were hurried across to help the hard pressed Allies, for new victories had been won by the Germans, Paris and the Channel ports were in danger of capture, and a new Austrian drive was under way in Italy. Our forces abroad then numbered 1,019,115, or more than 700,000 fighting men.¹

¹ When the armistice was signed in November, 1918, the number of men sent over seas was 2,079,880. Of these 912,082 were carried in American naval transports; 40,499 in other American craft; 1,006,987 in British vessels; 68,246 in Italian ships leased by Great Britain; and 52,066 in French and Italian bottoms.

Before the first of August more than 1,300,000 men of all sorts were under the command of General Pershing. In the opinion of the German press these statements were untrue. "Mr. Baker," said the *Koelnische Zeitung*, "thinks he will be able to dissipate all doubts about the correctness of his figures with his recitations. It is, however, only the usual American bluff. We know from reliable sources that the figures in question are inordinately exaggerated, and in no way correspond to the truth." Vice Admiral von Capelle belittled our aid both in men and ships:

The military help of America in the first year of the war was very little regarding troops and airplanes. The expectation of our enemies has been greatly disappointed. If America wants to maintain half a million troops in France it will need permanently a freight space (in steamships) of about 2,000,000 tons, which would be taken from the service of supplying her allies.

According to American and British statements, the participation of such a large army is no longer involved in this campaign.

In order to carry out the gigantic American program of shipping construction, the shipyards must first be built. In 1917 America, following all her huge promises, built 750,000 gross tons of sea-going ships. The large merchant fleet which America has ordered is not being built for the war, but in order to take the place of England as the world's shipper after the war, when the ships will have been completed.

Our ship building was no subject for contempt. Stimulated by the work of the submarines in foreign waters, and by the growing demand for an American Merchant Marine, our ship yards, while we were still neutral, had been pressed with orders, and had so expanded their capacities that, by the close of 1916, some fifty thousand gross tons of wooden ships, and a million and a half tons of steel ships were under construction and likely to be finished within two years. When we entered the war two million eight hundred thousand dead weight tons of steel shipping was under way in private yards. This the President could commandeer; but it was far below our need, and by midsummer the Emergency Fleet Corporation, by encour-

aging the expansion of old and the building of new yards, had been able to contract for a million eight hundred thousand tons more, and it seemed possible to finish at least three million tons in eighteen months. Even this was not enough. To feed and maintain every man sent to France would require five tons of shipping space per annum. Three million tons more were needed at once, if we were to send an army of several million men, and to get them in the shortest possible space of time, the Fleet Corporation adopted the fabricated ship. Almost every ship built since the world began had been made to order. Now ships must be standardized, their parts made by hundreds in shops scattered over the country, and assembled and put together in the shipyards. Not all the yards in the country could build the needed ships as quickly as required. To hasten the work, therefore, the greatest shipyard in the world was constructed. The site chosen for it was Hog Island, on the Delaware River near Philadelphia. On the September day, 1917, when the contract for the ships was signed, the Island was a scrubby wooded tract unconnected by rail or trolley with anywhere. Yet, on this island in ten months' time were built, side by side, for a mile and a quarter along the river, fifty ship ways; and stretching along another mile and a quarter, outfitting basins, with seven great piers each a thousand feet long and berths for twenty-eight ships; a barracks for six thousand workmen; hundreds of buildings for every sort of use, a hotel, a hospital, indeed, a city of no mean size.

August 5, 1918, the first steel cargo carrier built at Hog Island was launched. But others had been built elsewhere, and from a few tons of shipping completed and delivered to the Shipping Board in January, 1918, the output grew steadily, month by month, until, in May, two hundred and sixty thousand tons of shipping were delivered. Among the forty-three steel ships then completed was the *Agawan*, the first fabricated vessel in the world. Another, the tanker *Tuckahoe*, launched at Camden, New Jersey, was finished and in the water 27 days, 3 hours and 43 minutes after the workmen began to lay the

keel. Ten days later, complete in every part, her trial trip over, she was delivered to the Shipping Board and one week from that day began her maiden voyage.

Even this fine record was outdone in the case of the destroyer *Ward*, whose keel was laid at the Mare Island Navy Yard, in California, and whose hull, eighty-four per cent. completed, was launched seventeen and a half days later.

As the fourth of July drew near the Chairman of the Shipping Board appealed to the ship builders to make their celebration of Independence Day the launching of as many ships as could possibly be ready. None were to be held back; only such were to go into the water on the Fourth as, by extra exertion, were finished ahead of schedule time. The response was hearty; the workmen gave up their usual Saturday half holidays, worked over time, accepted only regular pay instead of time and half time for extra hours, and so speeded the building that on Independence Day ninety-five vessels, destroyers, transports, cargo carriers, forty-two of steel and fifty-three of wood, in fifty-nine shipyards scattered along our Atlantic and Pacific coasts, the Great Lakes and the Gulf of Mexico, all destined to help win the war, stood on their ways ready to be launched. Eleven were held by a freshet on the Columbia River; two stuck on the ways, but eighty-two went into the water and 474,464 tons, dead weight, were added to our marine, an amount far in excess of all our tonnage destroyed by German U-boats since the war began in 1914. This was, indeed, a declaration of independence of German ruthlessness, and as such it was hailed abroad and at home. "I have just heard that one hundred ships have been launched in the United States," Lloyd George telegraphed to President Wilson, "Heartfelt congratulations on the magnificent performance." From our fighting men in France came the words, "The launching of one hundred ships on the Fourth of July is the most inspiring news that has come to us. With such backing we cannot fail to win. All hail the American shipbuilders!" To the workers in every shipyard where a launching took place the Chairman of

the Shipping Board sent the message: "Our historic launchings to-day are a new Declaration of Independence." When the month ended 236,130 tons of shipping had been delivered to Government account, and September 1 found 340,145 tons added, which raised the output since January 1, 1918, to 1,650,000 tons.

As, month after month, hundreds of thousands of our boys were sent to fight in France, the need of food conservation at home grew greater and greater. Not only must they have ample supplies, but our Allies must be aided as heretofore. The demand for our beef, Mr. Hoover said, was beyond present supply. It would, therefore, be a real service to our army, and to the Allies, if our people would substitute pork, bacon, and ham for beef products.

The public will realize that the changing conditions of production from season to season, the changing situation in shipping and, therefore, of the markets available to the Allies, and the increasing demand for our growing army, with the fluctuating supply of local beef in France, all make it impossible to determine policies for a long period in advance. We have recently asked for economy in all meat consumption; we wish now to emphasize further reduction of beef by the substitution of pork. It is anticipated that this program will hold good until September 15, and the coöperation of the public is most earnestly requested.

Two ounces of Victory bread, and four ounces of cornbread containing not more than one-third of wheat, might be served each person, each meal; but when this allowance had been given no other bread or cereal product of which wheat was a part could be eaten at the same meal. No hotel, no restaurant or club could consume more than six pounds of wheat flour for each ninety meals served, nor could any wheat products be served unless ordered, nor bread or rolls be placed on the table until the meal was served and then only in individual portions. Boiled beef was to be used at but two meals each week; roast beef at but one, and beef steak at but one. No sugar bowls were to be placed on the tables. All sugar must be served in

individual portions of not more than two lumps, or one-half ounce per person, with tea or coffee, or one ounce with cereals or fresh fruit, and must not be used for icings or coatings of cakes, or in sherbets or water ices.

In obedience to this order it was arranged that at clubs, hotels, restaurants and public eating places, roast beef should be served at the midday meal on Mondays; stewed and boiled beef on Wednesdays and Saturdays, and steaks on Thursdays at midday. No restriction was placed on the use of such by-products as liver, tongue, sweetbreads and kidneys.

By July the scarcity of sugar became a matter of very serious concern, and new regulations were issued. Householders were asked, as a patriotic duty, not to use more than three pounds per person each month, and as much less as possible. City retailers were not to sell more than two pounds to any one person at any one time, and country retailers not more than five pounds, save for canning purposes. Commercial users of sugar were arranged in five classes; makers of candy, soft drinks, chocolate, cocoa, syrup, sweet pickles, operators of soda fountains; hotels, restaurants, clubs, hospitals, dining cars, steamships, boarding houses caring for more than twenty-five persons; bakers and cracker makers; retail stores. Persons in each class, before July 15, must make a report of all sugar on hand, or in transit, July 1. Whatever was in excess of three months' supply was to be taken over and redistributed. Consumption was to be limited to fifty per cent. of normal.

Shortage of sugar was due, to the needs of the army for transports which reduced the number of ships bringing sugar from Hawaii and the West Indies; to smaller crops in sugar producing countries; to shortage in the Louisiana cane supply and in the domestic sugar beet crop; to destruction of beet sugar factories in France and Italy, and to the sinking of sugar carrying ships by submarines. July 24, therefore, the ration was cut to two pounds per person each month for the next five months. To keep down the price of sugar, the President created a Sugar Board with authority to buy, even at a loss

to the Government, the output of all sugar beet factories that could not be sold at a reasonable price, and resell it at a stabilized price.

Wonderful were the results of this voluntary rationing. During the fiscal year ending with June, 1918, more than three billion pounds of meats and fats, an increase of eight hundred and forty-four million pounds over the year previous; more than three hundred and forty million bushels of cereals, an increase of eighty-one million bushels over the shipments of 1916-1917, were sent overseas to the Allies and our army. Nearly one hundred and fifty-five million bushels of these foodstuffs were for the Allies, and over and above this, in response to their appeal for an extra seventy-five million bushels of wheat, we sent them eighty-five million at the very time our surplus was more than exhausted, for the wheat crop had been very short, and corn had largely failed to mature. Wheat shipments to the Allies, therefore, represented savings from our wheat bread consumption. When July, 1918, ended, the Allies' food crisis had passed away, and the Food Administrator, then in London, by cablegram, released hotels, restaurants, and the dining car service from their voluntary pledge to use no wheat until the harvest was gathered. After August 1 they need observe only the Food Administrator's baking regulation, and serve Victory bread. In the course of his conference, at London, with the Food Administrators of the Allied Nations, Mr. Hoover agreed to adopt an international Victory loaf containing eighty per cent. of wheat and twenty per cent. of substitutes. This new regulation went into effect on September 1, 1918, when wheatless days and wheatless meals were abolished.

This did not mean that food saving was ended. Before the close of September Mr. Hoover was forced to make another appeal. "There is," he said, "no prospect of an end to the war before the campaign of the summer of 1919. To win, even then, we must put three and a half million troops in France. To accomplish this we must not only find the men, the ships, and the equipment for our army, but our army, the

Allied armies, and the Allied civil population, must have ample food meantime. The food problem is no small part of our efforts to win the war. To carry our army to France we must not only build all the ships we can, but the Allies must help, and to help they must take food ships from the more distant markets. We must cut down our imports of sugar, coffee, and tropical fruits and feed the Allies more generously than ever before. We must send for our army, the Allied armies and civilians, for Belgian relief, and for certain neutrals who depend on us, two million six hundred thousand tons of meat and fats; ten million four hundred thousand tons of breadstuffs; one million eight hundred thousand tons of sugar; and two million seven hundred thousand tons of feed grains, in all, seventeen million five hundred and fifty thousand tons as against eleven million eight hundred and twenty thousand tons during the year ending July 1, 1918." Under directions from the President the Food Administrator had assured the Allies that "in this common cause we eat at a common table." At best the Allied table would be less than ours, for the Allies were denying themselves more, in order to provide ships to carry our soldiers. Of sugar there was enough, at the then rate of consumption, for ourselves and the Allies without forcing them to send ships to the Far East. What coffee we needed could be brought in sailing ships if no one made "an over-brew." Home products, bread cereals, beef, pork, poultry, dairy and vegetable-oil products, must be conserved. We must cut off half a pound per person from our six pounds per week per person of breadstuff, and our four pounds a week a person of meats and fats. Not every one could do this, for many with small incomes could not provide even all the food they ought to have. But many could save more by living more simply than last year, and hotels, restaurants, boarding houses and clubs could save much by adopting "a more strict program" for the nine million people who ate at such places. This was not rationing. It was an appeal to the people in their homes, and to the proprietors of public eating places, to work out for them-

selves the manner and means of saving. It was necessary that every family in our country study its food budget, "buy less, serve less, return nothing to the kitchen, and practice the gospel of the clean plate."

Food stuffs were not the only articles conserved during the summer of 1918. Early in July the War Industries Board announced that, "It is necessary that all newspapers put the following economies into effect Monday, July 15, 1918. Discontinue the acceptance of the return of unsold copies; discontinue the use of samples or free promotion copies; discontinue the arbitrary forcing of copies on newsdealers; discontinue all buying back of papers at either wholesale or retail prices from newsdealers or agents; discontinue the payment of salaries or commissions to agents, dealers, or newsboys to secure the equivalent of return privileges; discontinue all free exchanges." Everywhere the newspapers complied.

To conserve fuel for winter use the Fuel Administration directed that on and after July 10, the nights of Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of each week were to be lightless, and that on and after July 15, all elevator service was to be cut down. In buildings where there were five passenger elevators one must be cut out; where there were ten, two must be disused. All must stop from half-past six in the evening until half past seven in the morning, and from three o'clock on Saturday until half-past seven Monday morning. The first stop up, and the last down, was to be the third floor; when none ran above the third floor they were to be abandoned. None were to leave the first floor during the off-rush hours unless loaded to fifty per cent. of their capacity. Passengers when entering must call the number of the floor to which they wished to be carried, for no return trip was to be made after once passing a floor. By this means a saving of twenty per cent. in the use of power was expected. Trolley lines were required to cut down the number of car stops and thus save electricity and fuel, and that there might be plenty of coal the President, on

August 11, called on "all engaged in coal mining" to do their utmost to increase the supply.

The existing scarcity of coal is creating a grave danger, in fact, the most serious which confronts us, and calls for prompt and vigorous action on the part of both operators and miners. Without an adequate supply, our war program will be retarded; the effectiveness of our fighting forces in France will be lessened; the lives of our soldiers will be unnecessarily endangered, and their hardships increased, and there will be much suffering in many homes throughout the country during the coming Winter.

I am well aware that your ranks have been seriously depleted by the draft, by voluntary enlistment, and by the demands of other essential industries. This handicap can be overcome, however, and sufficient coal can be mined in spite of it, if every one connected with the industry, from the highest official to the youngest boy, will give his best work each day for the full number of work hours.

The operators must be zealous as never before to bring about the highest efficiency of management, to establish the best possible working conditions, and to accord fair treatment to everybody, so that the opportunity to work at his best may be accorded to every workman.

The miners should report for work every day, unless prevented by unavoidable causes, and should not only stay in the mines the full time, but also see to it that they get more coal than ever before. The other workers, in and about the mines, should work as regularly and faithfully, so that the work of the miner may not be retarded in any way. This will be especially necessary from this time forward, for your numbers may be further lessened by the draft, which will induct into the army your fair share of those not essential to industry.

Those who are drafted, but who are essential, will be given deferred classification, and it is their patriotic duty to accept it. And it is the patriotic duty of their friends and neighbors to hold them in high regard for doing so.

The only worker who deserves the condemnation of his community is the one who fails to give his best in this crisis; not the one who accepts deferred classification and works regularly and diligently to increase the coal output.

A great task is to be performed. The operators and their staffs alone cannot do it, nor can the mine workers alone do it; but both

parties, working hand in hand, with a grim determination to rid the country of its greatest obstacle to winning the war, can do it.

It is with full confidence that I call upon you to assume the burden of producing an ample supply of coal. You will, I am sure, accept this burden, and will successfully carry it through, and in so doing you will be performing a service just as worthy as service in the trenches, and will win the applause and gratitude of the whole nation.

Unskilled labor, also, must be conserved. Shortage in certain classes of such labor; increasing shortage of unskilled labor needed for war industries; the competition of essential and non-essential industries for laborers; the constant shifting of workmen lured from one city to another, had caused a labor turnover which had become alarmingly great, and brought about a situation which was unbearable. A remedy must be found, and was sought in a plan prepared by the War Labor Policies Board and put in operation by a proclamation forbidding private recruiting of unskilled labor after August 1. The President said:

There has been much confusion as to essential products. There has been ignorance of conditions, men have gone hundreds of miles in search of a job and wages they might have found at their doors. Employers, holding Government contracts of the highest importance, have competed for workers with holders of similar contracts, and even with the Government itself, and have conducted expensive campaigns for recruiting labor in sections where the supply of labor was already exhausted. California draws its unskilled labor from as far east as Buffalo, and New York from as far west as the Mississippi. Thus labor has been induced to move fruitlessly from one place to another, congesting the railways and losing both time and money.

Such a condition is unfair alike to employers and employee, but most of all to the nation itself, whose existence is threatened by any decrease in its productive power. It is obvious that this situation can be clarified and equalized by a central agency, the United States Employment Service of the Department of Labor, with the counsel of the War Labor Policies Board as the voice of all the individual agencies of the Government. Such a central agency must have sole direction of all recruiting of civilian workers in war work; and,

in taking over this great responsibility must, at the same time, have power to assure to essential industry an adequate supply of labor, even to the extent of withdrawing workers from non-essential production. It must also protect labor from insincere and thoughtless appeals made to it under the plea of patriotism, and assure it that when it is asked to volunteer in some priority industry the need is real.

Therefore, the President urged all employers engaged in war work "to refrain after August 1, 1918, from recruiting unskilled labor in any manner except through this central agency"; appealed to labor to respond as loyally as heretofore to any calls issued by this agency for voluntary enlistment in essential industry, and asked "them both alike to remember that no sacrifice will have been in vain if we are able to prove beyond all question that the highest and best form of efficiency is the spontaneous coöperation of a free people."

How the plan, thus to be put in force on August 1, 1918, was to be carried out was explained by the Director General of the United States Employment Service. The work of supplying war industries with common labor would be centralized in the United States Employment Service, and all independent recruiting of common labor by manufacturers having a payroll of more than 100 men would be diverted to the United States Employment Service. In each community would be a local labor board, with jurisdiction over recruiting and distributing labor in its locality. No laborers were to be transported out of any community by the United States Employment Service without the approval of the State Director; nor any removed from one State to another without the approval of the United States Employment Service at Washington. Every effort would be made to discourage any movements from community to community, or state to state, by any other service. In Pittsburgh, there were advertisements calling for men to go to Detroit, and in the Detroit street car posters asking men to go to Pittsburgh. The same condition was apparent over

all the United States, and in the consequent shifting of labor a great part of our war effort was dissipated.

Nothing, it was determined, should be allowed to interfere in any way with the efforts of the Government to win the war. When, therefore, early in July, a threatened strike of the Western Union Telegraph Company operators bade fair to paralyze the business of the country, Congress rushed through a resolution giving the President power to take over all telephone, telegraph, cable and radio systems, and "to operate the same in such manner as may be needful or desirable for the duration of the war."

A little later, when the workmen in an arms factory in Bridgeport, Connecticut, refused to abide by the decision of the National War Labor Board and struck, the President told them their act was disloyal. "If," said he, "such disregard of the solemn adjudication of a tribunal to which both parties submitted their claims is temporized with, agreements become mere scraps of paper. If errors creep into awards, the proper remedy is submission to the award with an application for rehearing to the tribunal. But to strike against the award is disloyalty and dishonor." They must, therefore, return to work or be barred, for a year, from employment in any war industry, and lose all claim to exemption from military service based on "alleged usefulness in war production."

Continuing the policy of conservation, the Fuel Administrator requested that on Sunday, September 1, and on every Sunday until further notice, all owners of automobiles east of the Mississippi River should not use them for pleasure riding. There were in that vast region at least four million automobiles, of which two hundred thousand were trucks. Should the three million eight hundred thousand pleasure cars cease to run on Sunday and save at least two gallons of gasoline each, seven and a half millions of gallons would be conserved. Each owner must decide for himself, or herself, whether or not the request would be obeyed. During seven consecutive Sundays this voluntary restriction was fully observed. Taxicab companies

agreed to do no unnecessary business. Motor bus lines reduced the number of their trips; the people willingly kept their cars in the garages; and in the great cities thoroughfares, usually crowded on Sundays, were deserted. Along the country highways leading to summer resorts the people in many places stopped the few motorists who came along and suffered none to pass who could not give a good reason.

The Director General of Railroads appealed to the people to travel as little as possible. The movement of our boys from their homes to the cantonments, and from the cantonments to the seaboard, and the demand for track and terminal facilities for transportation of the great amount of coal, food, raw material needed by the army and navy made it necessary to cut down the number of passenger trains. It was a patriotic duty, therefore, to refrain from unnecessary traveling, and thus liberate all means of transportation for war use and save money for the buying of Liberty Bonds.

Into Liberty Bonds went also the cash, and proceeds, of the sale of stocks, bonds, property of every sort belonging to alien enemy persons, firms, corporations, taken over by the Custodian and sold at private sale or public auction. Provisions in the trading-with-the-enemy act of October, 1917, created the office of Alien Property Custodian and made it the duty of all persons having the care or control of property of any sort belonging to, or held for, or owing to an enemy, to report it to the Alien Custodian who must hold such property and administer it as would a common law trustee.

Neither Congress nor the people, when the act was passed, had any idea of how serious was the German industrial menace to our country. But, little by little, as more and more German property came into the hands of the Custodian, the hostile object of Germany in planting in the United States an industrial and commercial host became clear, and in March, 1918, the act was amended. Then the Custodian was given authority to sell enemy property at auction to loyal American citizens, unless the public interest would be better served by private sale.

Under the power thus bestowed the mills and factories of scores of German owned or German controlled concerns, cotton mills in New England, woolen mills in New Jersey, breweries and mines in the West, the Bosch Magneto Company, the Faber pencil factory, the ships of the American Transatlantic Company, and the Foreign Transport and Mercantile Corporation; the factories of firms making printers' ink, colors, chemicals, patent medicines, and a host of other going concerns, were taken over by the Custodian and sold to Americans. By the close of the year the money realized from such sales exceeded five hundred millions of dollars.

All alien enemies were required to file with the Custodian a statement of the property they held. Among the aliens who made such returns was the vice-president and publisher of the New York *Evening Mail*. His statement set forth that the *Mail* was an 'American owned newspaper; but the Government was in possession of documents which went to show that it was really owned by the Imperial German Government; that it was purchased in June, 1915; that the money was drawn from deposits standing in various banks to the credit of von Bernstorff and Dr. Heinrich Albert; that the change from pro-Ally to pro-German cut down subscriptions and advertisements; and that, up to the time of our break with Germany, the venture had cost the Imperial Government \$1,361,000.

None of these facts were made known to the Alien Property Custodian, and because of this the vice-president of the *Mail* and another were arrested, one afternoon in July, and indicted for perjury and conspiracy. Perjury, because they had made false statements to the Custodian; and conspiracy, because they had combined to conceal the true ownership of the *Mail*.

Further investigation of German activities in our country before the war revealed the work of George Sylvester Vierick, editor of the pro-German weekly *Fatherland*. Placed on the witness stand, he admitted that when the *Fatherland* was started von Bernstorff made the initial contribution of a thousand dollars; that for a long time he had received two hundred

and fifty dollars a week from Dumba; and that other large sums were paid him by Dr. Carl A. Fuehr, paymaster of the German propaganda bureau of which Dernburg and Albert were the heads. Questioned as to the propaganda council of which Dernburg, von Papen, Boy-Ed, Dr. Fuehr were members, he admitted he was concerned in the circulation of a large number of pro-German books and pamphlets which cost during 1914 some twenty-five thousand dollars. Seven of these, "The Truth About Germany"; "The German White Book"; "Germany's Just Cause"; "Germany and the War"; "The Case of Belgium"; "Germany's House of Destiny"; "Current Misconceptions About the War," had a combined circulation of six hundred and fifty thousand copies. Count Reventlow's book, "Vampire of the Continent," sent by the German Imperial Government, came to this country in the submarine *Deutschland*. After our entrance into the war, when it was no longer possible to obtain money from Berlin, Vierick organized the Agricultural Farm Labor League under the pretense of relief of unemployed labor, and through agents collected upwards of a hundred thousand dollars. Some of this money he admitted having spent in the publication of books and pamphlets and salary to himself. As the examination went on from day to day, it appeared that he had urged the expenditure of thirty millions of dollars for the purchase of thirty morning newspapers in as many cities scattered over the country, but had opposed the purchase of the *Evening Mail* because it was a dying evening newspaper.

From a written statement, made by the president of the Association of Foreign Language Newspapers, the Federal authorities learned that he was concerned in the widespread advertisement, in 1915, urging alien workmen to quit munition factories. In the spring of 1915, he said, there was laid before him a plan for stopping the manufacture of munitions; that he agreed to send out an appeal through the foreign language press provided it appeared in the English dailies also; that he ascertained the cost of the advertisement in newspapers

printed in thirty languages would be two hundred and five thousand dollars; and in the course of a few days was handed two hundred thousand dollars in cash. The advertisement was then written by the vice-president of the Association of Foreign Language Newspapers, and the vice-president of a well known advertising company in Chicago which received the contract for the English newspapers and was paid forty-eight thousand dollars. Sometime later he was paid the remaining five thousand dollars, and the request made that the receipts for payments to the newspapers be delivered to Dr. Albert. Another newspaper bought by Count von Bernstorff with funds obtained from Dr. Albert, was *Fair Play*.

There were other means of spreading propaganda far more insidious than a few newspapers, and against these popular feeling ran high. There was the "whispering campaign" intended to arouse religious animosity, race prejudice, class feeling, and spread rumors and falsehoods of every sort regarding the war. It was "a rich man's war," a "business man's war."

Slanders on the Red Cross and its officials were put afloat, to discourage loyal citizens from giving money or work. Sweaters knitted by patriotic women, it was said, were sold to Department Stores, were used at the front to pack guns in, were unraveled abroad by peasants who wanted the yarn. The War Department was attacked. Our boys in the camps it was charged were trained with wooden guns because we had no rifles; there was a shortage of machine guns and heavy ordnance at the front; bayonets were so defective that they bent double when driven into the dummies in the training camps; the War Department did not know who were saved and who were lost when the *Tuscania* was torpedoed; the metal identification tags worn by the men were not numbered, were blank; eighteen major generals had been sent on one ship to France; drunkenness and immorality were shockingly prevalent among our troops; and the Secretary of War was deliberately holding back the number of our killed and wounded. Not one of these

charges was true, but, with scores of other pro-German lies, were spread by word of mouth.

With the result of such propaganda in Russia and Italy in plain sight a drive against everything German soon became country wide. School boards were forced to drop the German language from courses of study. Public libraries withdrew German books from circulation; hotels, restaurants, insurance companies, dropped their German names, and governing bodies in many cities and towns adopted resolutions which drove German and pro-German publications from the news stands and the streets. In this work the American Defense Society for Pennsylvania and the Patriotic Order of Sons of America took an active part. German education, text books, subsidized teachers, preachers, language press and rumor mongers, they demanded, must go, and a campaign was begun to obtain "fifteen miles of signatures" to a protest to the President against the publication of newspapers, magazines, books in the German language.

The treatment of German subjects resident in our country had been mild. Less than six thousand had been interned as dangerous alien enemies. One of them, Captain-Lieutenant Franz von Rintelen, once more rose to public notice. His nefarious work in our country finished, von Rintelen attempted to return to Germany in a Dutch vessel, was taken from her deck by the British, held in custody, and after we entered the war, was turned over to the Government to answer for the crimes for which he had been indicted, and for which, after conviction, he was sent to the Atlanta penitentiary for a year and a half. Germany now demanded his exchange for an American prisoner, and a *note verbale* presented April 20, 1918, by the Swiss Minister, threatened retaliation if the demand were not granted.

On December 20, 1917, the merchant and interpreter, Siegfried Paul London, a citizen of the United States, was condemned to death by court-martial at Warsaw from war treason as a spy. The Governor General of Warsaw, exercising judicial clemency, on

January 19, 1918, commuted this sentence to ten years' penal servitude. According to facts established at the court-martial, London obtained citizenship in the year 1887. He is married to an American citizen, Mary Leonard.

London was found guilty because, for the period from the beginning of the war until about May, 1915, he served the enemy as a spy. He was arrested on this account as early as August 27, 1915. He succeeded, however, in escaping, but was recaptured on September 24, 1917; for this reason the chief proceedings against him took place only recently.

Up to the present time the efforts of the German Government to effect an improvement in the situation of Captain Lieutenant Rintelen, who passed into the hands of the American authorities by reason of acts of the British Government, contrary to international law, have been unsuccessful. The attempt to bring to a halt the criminal proceedings brought against him in America and to secure his release have likewise been without result. In order to lend greater emphasis to the protests which have been lodged with the American Government, the German Government contemplates some appropriate measures of reprisal. It, however, prefers to avoid the contingency that persons be taken and made to suffer because the Government of the United States was apparently not sufficiently cognizant of its international obligations toward a German subject.

Before making a definite decision the German Government believes it should propose to the Government of the United States that Captain Lieutenant Rintelen be set at liberty by exchange for the American citizen, Siegfried Paul London, who was condemned to death for espionage, and who since was commuted to ten years' penal servitude, and that Captain Lieutenant Rintelen be permitted forthwith to return to Germany. Should the Government of the United States agree to this proposal, the German Government would take steps that London's uncompleted term of imprisonment be remitted and that he be set at liberty in order that he may immediately leave the country.

Secretary Lansing replied that

The threat of the German Government to retaliate by making Americans in Germany suffer, clearly implies that the Government proposes to adopt the principle that reprisals occasioning physical suffering are legitimate and necessary in order to enforce demands from one belligerent to another. The Government of the United States acknowledges no such principle, and would suggest that it

would be wise for the German Government to consider that if it acts upon that principle it will inevitably be understood to invite similar reciprocal action on the part of the United States with respect to the great numbers of German subjects in this country. It is assumed that the German Government, before acting, will give due reflection and due weight to this consideration.

I beg that you will be good enough to bring the foregoing statement to the attention of the German Government.

At the time of our entrance into the war only the property of interned aliens in this country, or the property in this country of persons resident within the enemy's lines, was taken over by the Alien Property Custodian. In May the President by proclamation added five new classes. In the first were placed the wives of officers, officials, agents of the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments; the wives of persons within the territory of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the military areas occupied by their forces, and the wives of persons resident without the limits of the United States, and doing business in enemy countries. In this class were scores of American women of wealth who married titled Germans and Austrians. In the second class were placed persons who were prisoners of war, or who had been or might be interned by any ally of the United States; in the third, persons who, since our entrance into the war, had spread, or might spread, propaganda injurious to the cause of the United States or its allies, or had aided or might aid in plots or intrigues against our country or its allies. In the fourth were all those who at any time since August 4, 1914, had resided on enemy soil. The fifth included a great number, for in it were placed all persons then, or who thereafter might be, on the enemy trading list.

That more money would be needed to meet the growing cost of war was well known to everybody. Nevertheless Congress was much surprised when on May 27, 1918, the President appeared before the Senate and House and stated the country's needs.

It was, he said, with unaffected reluctance that he appeared before them to ask that the session be prolonged "to provide more adequate resources for the Treasury." The President fully appreciated "how arduous the session had been." Summer was coming, when lassitude and fatigue made labor twice arduous. The elections were at hand, when the members should render accounts of their trusteeship to the people. But would they dare go to the elections with a duty unperformed, and a duty to be done was that of providing more revenue. To raise too large a porportion by loans would be unsound policy. Additional taxation must be resorted to for the four billions already provided for by taxation would not be enough, and these taxes should be levied on war profits, incomes and luxuries. "But the war profits and incomes upon which the increased taxes will be levied will be the profits and incomes of the calendar year 1918. It would be manifestly unfair to wait until the early months of 1919 to say what they are to be. It might be difficult, I should imagine, to run the mill with water that had already gone over the wheel. Moreover, taxes of that sort will not be paid until the June of next year and the Treasury must anticipate them. It must use the money they produce before it is due. It must sell short-time certificates of indebtedness. In the autumn a much larger sale of long-time bonds must be effected than has yet been attempted. What are the bankers to think of the certificates if they do not certainly know where the money is to come from which is to take them up? And how are the investors to approach the purchase of bonds with any sort of confidence or knowledge of their own affairs if they do not know what taxes they are to pay, and what economies and adjustments of their business they must effect? I cannot assure the country of a successful administration of the Treasury in 1918 if the question of further taxation is to be left undecided until 1919.

"The consideration that dominates every other now, and makes every other seem trivial and negligible is the winning

of the war. We are not only in the midst of the war, we are at the very peak and crisis of it. Hundreds of thousands of our men, carrying our hearts with them and our fortunes, are in the field and ships are crowding faster and faster to the ports of France and England with regiment after regiment, thousand after thousand, to join them until the enemy shall be beaten and brought to a reckoning with mankind. There can be no pause or intermission. The great enterprise must, on the contrary, be pushed with greater and greater energy. The volume of our might must steadily and rapidly be augmented until there can be no question of resisting it. If that is to be accomplished, gentlemen, money must sustain it to the utmost."

How much would be needed to meet the cost of war was not known until June 6, when the Secretary of the Treasury announced to Congress that twenty-four billion dollars was his estimated expenditure for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1918. At least one-third of this sum, he thought, should be raised by taxation, and three suggestions were made as to how it should be raised. There should be "a real war-profits tax" levied on all war profits "superimposed upon the existing excess profits tax." There should be "a substantial increase in the amount of the normal tax upon so-called unearned incomes," and heavy taxation should "be imposed upon all luxuries."

The Government was not alone in appealing to the people for money. The Red Cross must have another hundred million dollars, and towards the close of May the drive to get it began. In the Philadelphia District where many organizations were constantly asking for money to help win the war, a plan was adopted to form a War Chest, appeal to the people of Philadelphia, Bucks, Delaware, Chester and Montgomery Counties to contribute twenty million dollars, divide this sum among the organizations according to their needs, and make no further call for money for a year. The drive began on May 20, and on that day men and women earning two thousand dollars a year were asked to sign a

pledge to contribute one day's pay each month during a year, and "31 to 1" became the slogan of the campaign. "One day's pay each month for the boys who are fighting your fight," it was said. "They give thirty-one days a month for your liberty; you must give one for their comfort." "We have made a lot of money out of the war in Philadelphia, more than any other city. Yet compared with other cities we have given less to war relief than any other city of our size. We have given \$1.42 per head; other cities have given more than five dollars per head, cities that have in some cases had no war contracts in their factories. Our plants are bulging with these contracts. Can't we afford to be liberal? And we will be liberal if we give according to this schedule.² While all giving must be optional, contributors are reminded that unless this table is generally followed it will be impossible for the War Chest to meet the growing needs of the war relief agencies at the front with the increasing number of troops. Remember that the War Chest must care for the French and Italian soldiers as well as our own boys. These armies have no Y. M. C. A. We must give them ours. So follow this table if you possibly can, even if you have to make a sacrifice. That is what our boys are doing for us."

Every dollar of the War Chest Fund, the War Welfare Council stated, would be devoted to war work and to nothing else. "The United States Government has selected certain national agencies as best fitted to carry on war relief work. Each of these national agencies has created a separate board to carry on this war work. The American Red Cross has its National War Council; the Y. M. C. A. its National War Relief Council; the K. of C. its Training Camp

²Men and women with incomes of \$2,000 and \$3,000 were asked to contribute four per cent. in twelve monthly installments; those with incomes of \$3,100, \$4,000, \$5,000, five per cent.; with \$5,100, \$6,000, \$7,000, \$8,000, \$9,000, \$10,000, six per cent.; with \$11,000, \$12,000, \$13,000, \$14,000, \$15,000, seven per cent. Incomes from \$15,000 to \$25,000 should contribute seven per cent.; from \$26,000 to \$40,000, eight per cent.; from \$41,000 to \$50,000, nine per cent.; from \$51,000 to \$99,000, ten per cent.; from \$100,000 up, twelve per cent.

Commission; the Y. W. C. A. its National War Relief Council, and the Y. M. H. A. its War Relief Board.

"The National War Board, by whatever name it may be known, of each organization then decides what amount is necessary to do the work assigned to it by the government and asks the country as a whole for that sum.

"Each state and large city is given proper quota based upon its population, banking resources, etc. The only function of the War Chest Board, therefore, is to determine that the quota assigned to the five counties is in just proportion to the total amount to be raised.

"No part of the fund goes to any of the general work of these organizations, but it is applied wholly to war work approved by the United States Government. There are, of course, a number of necessary local relief bodies, but they will require much smaller sums. In the case of such of these as desire to participate in the fund, the amount to be given to each will be appropriated by the War Chest Board after full investigation."

Every means possible to stimulate subscriptions were used. Posters, placards, calls through the newspapers, speeches, mass meetings, street parades, a house to house canvass, appeals by women workers at the street corners, were everyday features of the campaign. In scores of workshops and factories, stores and corporations, banks, trust companies, business houses, every employee signed the 31 to 1 pledge and bound himself to give one day's pay each month to the War Chest, and wore the button inscribed "I helped."

On May 28, with two days of the campaign left, the War Chest Fund was four million dollars short. It was then pointed out that three cities had tried the War Chest plan with remarkable results. In Columbus, Ohio, thirteen dollars was subscribed for each man, woman and child in the city; in Rome, New York, fifteen dollars a person; in Syracuse, New York, nine dollars a person. What, it was asked, will Philadelphia and the five counties do? "So far our best

record (to the Red Cross) is this lamentable showing: less than a dollar and a half a person." The quota was obtained and from the people the country over \$169,575,598 were collected by March 1, 1919, as the result of this great drive. Forty-three million people it was estimated had subscribed. Both drives brought to the treasury of the Red Cross \$283,500,000.

Scarcely was this drive over than, in June, another was begun for the sale of War Savings Stamps. There were two kinds of such stamps, the Thrift Stamps, and the War Savings Certificate Stamp. The Thrift Stamp costing twenty-five cents earned no interest. When sixteen were affixed to a Thrift Card it might be surrendered, on payment of from sixteen to twenty-three cents, for a War Savings Certificate Stamp which earned four per cent. compound interest until its maturity, January 1, 1923. When the sale of these stamps began on January 1, 1918, the War Savings Stamp cost four dollars and twelve cents, and was to increase in value one cent a month, until December, 1922, when it would cost four dollars and seventy-one cents and be redeemable January 1, 1923, at five dollars. Nobody could invest more than one thousand dollars in such stamps. They were sold at all post offices the country over, at banks, at street booths, by boy scouts and solicitors, and to stimulate the sale still more a week was set apart, in June, for a great drive. The twenty-eighth of the month was designated Thrift Day and May 29 the President appealed to the people to save and invest.

This war [he said] is one of nations, not of armies, and all of our hundred million people must be economically and industrially adjusted to war conditions if this nation is to play its full part in the conflict. The problem before us is not primarily a financial problem, but rather a problem of increased production of war essentials and the saving of the materials and the labor necessary for the support and equipment of our army and navy. Thoughtless expenditure of money for non-essentials uses up the labor of men, the products of the farm, mines and factories and overburdens trans-

portation, all of which must be used to the utmost and at their best for war purposes.

The great results which we seek can be obtained only by the participation of every member of the nation, young and old, in a national concerted thrift movement. I therefore urge that our people everywhere pledge themselves, as suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, to the practice of thrift; to serve the Government to their utmost in increasing production in all fields necessary to the winning of the war; to conserve food and fuel and useful materials of every kind; to devote their labor only to the most necessary tasks, and to buy only those things which are essential to individual health and efficiency, and that the people, as evidence of their loyalty, invest all that they can save in Liberty Bonds and war savings stamps.

The securities issued by the Treasury Department are so many of them within the reach of every one that the door of opportunity in this matter is wide open to all of us. To practice thrift in peace times is a virtue and brings great benefit to the individual at all times; with the desperate need of the civilized world to-day for materials and labor with which to end the war, the practice of individual thrift is a patriotic duty and a necessity.

I appeal to all who now own either Liberty Bonds or war savings stamps to continue to practice economy and thrift and to appeal to all who do not own Government securities to do likewise and purchase them to the extent of their means. The man who buys Government securities transfers the purchasing power of his money to the United States Government until after this war, and to that same degree does not buy in competition with the Government.

I earnestly appeal to every man, woman and child to pledge themselves on or before the 28th of June to save constantly and to buy as regularly as possible the securities of the Government; and to do this as far as possible through membership in war savings societies. The 28th of June ends this special period of enlistment in the great volunteer army of production and saving here at home. May there be none unenlisted on that day.

To each city and town was assigned a quota, and its people urged to reach the goal. Each citizen was urged to sign a pledge to buy as many as he could each month during the remainder of the year. "Limit Clubs" were formed, and each member bound to buy the two hundred War Savings Stamps

beyond which he could not go. In New York City a day, "Soldiers in France Day," was set apart during the drive, and an effort made to match every American soldier in France with a stamp buyer in the city. Hundreds of towns went over their quotas, and the sale of stamps since January 1, 1918, was thus raised to over five hundred million dollars. By the middle of August the sales amounted to \$697,578,000, or over one-quarter of the two billion dollars authorized. At the end of the year they reached \$966,269,370.

While the drive for the sale of War Savings Stamps was still going on, the Secretary of the Treasury announced that the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan would begin on Saturday, September 28th, and continue during three weeks, but made no statement concerning the rate of interest, the life of the bonds, or the amount to be offered. Not until the twenty-third of the month was it known that the rate of interest would be four and a quarter per cent., that the bonds would run for twenty years, and that the minimum amount asked for was six billion dollars.

Preparations for the campaign were then well under way. Every form of appeal known to man was to be employed, appeals to the eye, to the ear, to patriotism, to humanity, to the feelings excited by the brutality of the Huns, to the sense of imperative duty to provide everything needed by our army and navy. One poster bore the imprint of a bloody hand and the words, "The Hun, His Mark. Blot it out with Liberty Bonds." Another was a pair of blood-stained boots and the words, "Keep these off the United States." Automobiles, motor trucks, trolley cars, carried long strips of cotton bearing such inscriptions as, "What do you think of the U-boats?"; "Ask his Mother how many Bonds you should buy"; "My boy, I backed you"; "My boy and your boy"; "Bonds buy Bullets"; "One \$50 Bond will buy 12 shirts"; "One \$50 Bond will buy 18 bayonets"; "One \$50 Bond will buy 110 grenades."

New York City opened her campaign on the evening of

September 27th, with the noise of the ten great sirens of the Police Department, sirens provided when the U-boats were off our coast, to warn the citizens should an air raid happen. As their shriek rose shriller and shriller the Fire Department sirens, steamboat and factory whistles, motor horns and church bells made answer, thousands of red flares blazed, thousands of young men began to distribute copies of the *Stars and Stripes*, the soldiers' newspaper in France, and thousands of speakers scattered over the country began their appeals in behalf of the loan. On the morning of Saturday, September 28th, there was a parade down Fifth Avenue, twenty-four blocks of which were named the Avenue of the Allies. At each end, and suspended midway of each block, was a large banner bearing the name of the Ally to which it was dedicated. From the windows of the second and fourth stories of buildings along the block hung flags of that Ally, and from the third stories the Liberty Loan banner. In the window of each shop was some suitable display, and at Madison Square was the great Altar of Liberty, where day after day appropriate ceremonies were held by the people of some one of our Allies.

Never before, in a Liberty Loan campaign, had so many speakers been employed. A hundred and ten thousand men and women, some four minute men, some volunteers, some under the supervision of the Central Loan Organization, spoke in theaters, churches, in schools, before audiences at the movies, at street corners, and from automobiles in the rural districts. In nearly every county and township the country over was a staff of speakers who traveled from town to town, from village to village, appealing to the people to buy bonds and more bonds. Twenty-four trains loaded with war trophies, rifles, shells, helmets, mine throwers, captured by Pershing's men, guns, trench mortars, went about the country, each with speakers and American soldiers who had been wounded or gassed on the fighting front in France. Even France was drawn upon, and from her came twelve officers and

one hundred and ten men. Sixty were members of the far-famed Foreign Legion. The rest were interpreters and men who had been wounded. They, too, traveled the country from the Atlantic Coast to Oklahoma, from New Orleans to the Great Lakes. The flag carried by the men of the Foreign Legion was the first in the French Army to receive the decoration of the Military Medal, had repeatedly been decorated with the palms of the War Cross, and had received the Cross of the Legion of Honor. So many had been the deeds of valor done by the Legion that its members wore on the left shoulder the cord known as the fourragere, having the three colors of the French national emblem.

On the evening of September 27th, at New York City, the President opened the campaign with a speech. He had little to say concerning the loan, but much concerning the terms and conditions of peace, for he spoke to a far greater audience than that gathered to hear him in the Opera House, to his countrymen everywhere.

"I am not here," he said, "to promote the loan. That will be done, ably and enthusiastically done, by the hundreds of thousands of loyal men and women who have undertaken to present it to you and our fellow citizens throughout the country, and I have not the least doubt of their complete success, for I know their spirit and the spirit of the country." He had come rather to present some thoughts which might give a more vivid sense of the great issues involved, that his hearers might appreciate the grave significance of the duty of supporting the Government by their men and their means "to the utmost point of sacrifice and self-denial. No man or woman," he said, "who has really taken in what this war means can hesitate to give to the very limit of what they have, and it is my mission here to-night to try to make it clear once more what the war really means. You will need no other stimulant or reminder of your duty." With these remarks the President turned to that part of his speech which related to peace and the issues involved.

Despite the great effort made, subscriptions to the loan lagged. At the end of the first week but \$1,323,716,050 had been reported to the Treasury Department. With one-third of the time gone and but twenty-seven per cent. of the loan taken, the prospect was discouraging. Blame for the apparent indifference was laid on the Austro-German peace offensive. An epidemic of influenza and pneumonia which was sweeping over the country, and was especially acute in Boston and Philadelphia, where hundreds of citizens died each day, and where parades, public gatherings, meetings and demonstrations in behalf of the loan were forbidden by the Public Health authorities, was believed to be another cause of failure to respond. When half the time had expired and but \$1,791,463,200 subscribed, new and urgent appeals were made in the advertising columns of the newspapers, and by men of national distinction; loan workers redoubled their efforts, and at the close of the business day of October 10 the Treasury Department reported \$2,024,037,050 subscribed. President Wilson now appealed to the Nation.

Recent events have enhanced, not lessened, the importance of this loan, and I hope that my fellow-countrymen will let me say this to them very frankly. The best thing that could happen would be that the loan should not only be fully subscribed, but very greatly oversubscribed. We are in the midst of the greatest exercise of the power of this country that has ever been witnessed or forecast, and a single day of relaxation in that effort would be of tragical damage alike to ourselves and to the rest of the world. Nothing has happened which makes it safe or possible to do anything but push our effort to the utmost. The time is critical, and the response must be complete.

William Jennings Bryan urged the American people to stand back of the President and oversubscribe. "There are but two sides to a war, our country's side and the side of the enemy," he said. "The patriot is wholly on the side of his country, heart, voice, pocketbook, and life, if necessary.

"War's heaviest burden falls upon those who, in the army

and navy, offer their all, not some of their income, but life itself. No one else is in their class. The burden imposed by war taxes comes next, because the money collected is not returned, and yet no one should complain of war taxes while one mother's son is required to offer himself on his country's altar.

"Those who lend money to this Government have the easiest task of all. This money they advance is returned with interest.

"The money needed should not only be furnished, but furnished promptly. The moral force of a loan reaches its maximum when it is subscribed immediately. The Fourth Loan comes at a time when our soldiers are advancing victoriously and when the retreat of the enemy assumes more and more the nature of a rout. Germany is so hard pressed that she proposes peace.

"A failure of the people to respond to the call for money now would be disastrous. It would encourage the enemy more than a successful battle. The supreme moment has come, no one can fail to see the importance of prompt action. Over-subscription at once will be an announcement to Germany that the American people stand back of the President, the Government, and the army, and are ready to furnish the money necessary to win the war."

Premier Clémenceau was pressed into service and sent a message made public by the Liberty Loan Publicity Bureau at Washington.

The people of the United States are preparing to win a new victory. I send them the cordial greetings of France. You know what has to be accomplished. Fighting does not bring victory. Gold is needed. France, invaded and mutilated, has done its best. The French people during the war have drawn on their own resources to the amount of twenty-four billion dollars. You have subscribed over ten billion dollars to the loans. You have advanced almost seven billion dollars to the Allies. To-day a new appeal is made to you. I feel certain of your response. You will bring the billions which your Government is asking for the service of your flag so recently glorified on the plains of Lorraine. This is the hour of

supreme effort for the crushing of military despotism. Now, on all fronts, behold the dawn of victory. Your soldiers are ready for the attack. Be ready for the loan!

In Philadelphia, where five thousand persons had died of influenza and pneumonia during the week, where parades and public gatherings of every sort were forbidden, where subscriptions, in consequence, had lagged, three days were set apart in hopes of rousing the people. On Thursday, October 10, Flag Day, every patriotic citizen was expected to see to it that the Stars and Stripes were displayed outside or in the windows of his house, and add to it the four-striped Liberty Loan flag, that showed he was a subscriber. Friday, October 11, was Preparation Day, when direct appeals were made to the slackers to prepare to subscribe on Saturday, which was Emblem and Conscience Day. From five o'clock to half past six in the afternoon four minute men appealed to the crowds in the Reading Terminal, and in the Pennsylvania Railroad Stations, and in all subway stations from 15th Street to the Delaware River. Between four and seven o'clock conductors on the Philadelphia Rapid Transit cars read to the passengers these words: "President Wilson expects every Philadelphia home to display the four-striped Liberty Loan honor emblem to-morrow. Get busy and buy bonds." At seven o'clock every noise-making device in the city, automobile horns, whistles of factories and steamboats, church bells, broke forth, as a clarion cry to slackers. Fifteen minutes later from every police district there went forth twenty squads of men, headed by a town cryer in Continental uniform, a Boy Scout carrying a flag, and men and women speakers, to march through the chief streets and deliver messages to the people in the language of the district. In Little Italy, the cryer was an Italian; in Chinatown, a Chinese, and so for each of the twenty or more nationalities in the city. On Conscience and Emblem Day, October 12th, Liberty Day throughout the land as proclaimed by the President, it was left to every one's conscience to subscribe to the limit. Sunday was designated

"Pershing Day" by the Loan Committee, a day when the people shut from their churches by the dreadful diseases which ravaged the city, should dedicate it to the individual soldier or sailor in whom each was personally interested. Said the Committee: "The slogan of the day is, 'For Your Boy and Mine.' Every one has been doing his share for the 'boys over there,' but Sunday will be the first chance to do your share in a general public move for 'THE BOY over there.'"

The day should be opened with prayers for YOUR BOY. The balance of the day should also be devoted to YOUR BOY. You are asked to give only this short time in return for his entire time given for you.

You are called on to support him in every way. The one way in which you can do it best is to join with the rest of the city in sending him the best news that he could want, that this city is with him to the limit, and that it leads the country in this respect.

Imagine the happiness of your boy as he gets the following news in the trenches: 'Philadelphia leads the country in oversubscribing the fourth Liberty Loan, and in the number of persons subscribing. I helped to do this for you.'

And by devoting Pershing Sunday to your boy you can make this message possible.

After your prayers in the morning, whether they be at church or at home, you are asked to go to the nearest drug store and subscribe every cent you can to the Liberty Loan. If you have already subscribed, take another bond, 'for him,' if you can arrange to do so in any way.

Then wear your button and place the emblem in your window. Be sure that your house is decorated outside in some manner.

Following this, make a careful canvass of your friends and neighbors, and see that their houses are decorated, get them each to take another bond, 'for him,' and see that they wear their button, and have their honor emblem displayed.

This is for your boy. He is calling. Will you refuse to support him to the limit by giving the few hours required by the program for Pershing Sunday?

Again the Loan Committee were sorely disappointed. Again the slacker was dead to appeals, and on Saturday, in

the Philadelphia Federal Reserve District, but \$16,238,600 were added, and the total subscription for two weeks raised to \$166,948,200, or just one-third of its quota of five hundred million dollars. In New York City, on Saturday, President Wilson marched at the head of a great parade, and reviewed it from the Altar of Liberty, and Secretary McAdoo addressed a mass meeting at Chicago.

Subscriptions from all of the Twelve Federal Reserve Districts, which covered the entire country, amounted, when the third and final week opened, to \$2,798,419,950.

In hopes of overcoming so much of the apathy as was due to the belief that peace was near, the President now made a second appeal to the people.

The reply of the German Government to my note of inquiry dated Oct. 8 gives occasion for me to say to my fellow countrymen that neither that reply, nor any other recent events have, in any way diminished the vital importance of the Liberty Loan. Relaxation now, hesitation now, would mean defeat when victory seems to be in sight; would mean years of war instead of peace upon our own terms.

I earnestly request every patriotic American to leave to the Governments of the United States, and of the Allies, the momentous discussions initiated by Germany, and to remember that, for each man, his duty is to strengthen the hands of these Governments, and to do it in the most important way now immediately presented, by subscribing to the utmost of his ability for bonds of the Fourth Liberty Loan. That loan must be successful. I am sure that the American people will not fail to see their duty and make it successful.

Still the loan lagged. When Friday, October 18, came but \$3,607,597,350 had been subscribed. And now the long desired rally began. Subscriptions large and small poured in, and despite the ravages of influenza and pneumonia, despite peace talk started by the German note, and the victories of the Allies in Belgium and France, when the last subscription was taken the loan had gone "over the top," and bonds to the amount of \$6,989,200,000 had been purchased.

Never before in the history of the world had such a sum of money been raised, in any nation, in three weeks.

No sooner was the Liberty Loan campaign over than the Young Men's Christian Association, the National Catholic War Council, Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare Board, the Salvation Army, the American Library Association, the War Camp Community Service and the Young Women's Christian Association joined in a United War Work Campaign to raise \$170,500,000. The time was far from opportune, for on the day it opened, November 11, the armistice was declared and fighting ceased, and the celebrations which followed caused two days' loss of work. The influenza was still raging and public meetings were forbidden. Reports of immediate demobilization led many to believe that the army would be mustered out in a few weeks. But it made no difference, and during the week the campaign went on, every possible sort of appeal was made to the people, and when the week ended more than two hundred millions of dollars had been subscribed.³

Even this did not end the calls for money. In the spring of 1919 the people were again summoned to subscribe to a fifth, the Victory Loan, of four and a half billion dollars of short-term Gold Notes bearing four and three-quarters per cent. interest per annum. The time was more inauspicious than ever. Fighting had ceased, the war had been won; the armistice was in force; German territory was occupied by the armies of the Allies; the Germans had received the terms of peace, and our boys were coming home. Many of the old incentives to subscribe were gone. Patriotism no longer burned so brightly as before, and the slacker was more in evidence. Nevertheless, when the Treasury Department announced the results, late in May, notes to the amount of \$5,249,908,300 had been purchased, an over-subscription of nearly seven hundred and fifty million dollars.

³ \$203,179,038.

CHAPTER III

FIGHTING IN FRANCE

BEFORE our troops came pouring into France the sector in which they should fight had already been determined by physical conditions which must be met. To land an army of a million men in the ports of northern France was quite impossible, for they were crowded with ships bringing supplies for the British armies in Picardy and Flanders. Even if room could have been found for transports and supply ships, the railroads leading thence to the fighting front were taxed far beyond their capacity to supply the British troops. There was nothing to do, therefore, but use the ports on the Bay of Biscay coast and to Bordeaux, La Pallice, St. Nazaire and Brest, were sent our troops, munitions and supplies.¹ Use of the railways running northeast from these ports required the great depot for supplies to be located somewhere near Tours, Bourges, or Châteauroux, and meant that the American sector, when taken over, would be somewhere in the southern part of the battle front. Thus it came about that the first fighting done by our men in 1917 was east of the city of Rheims. After arrival in France one month was allowed for training in small units; another in the trenches in some quiet sector, and a third for training in divisions. Four divisions had reached the trench stage when on March 21, 1918, the great German drive began in Picardy, and General Pershing, March 28,

¹ Our troops sailed from Quebec, Montreal, St. Johns, Halifax, Portland, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Norfolk. More than a million and twenty-five thousand landed in Great Britain. The ports used were Glasgow, Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol, Falmouth, Plymouth, Southampton and London. The French ports were Le Havre, Brest, St. Nazaire, La Pallice, Bordeaux, and Marseilles.

placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch all our troops to use as he thought fit.

In this attempt to drive a wedge between the British and French armies, isolate the one, and force the other to its bases, the battle front was carried eastward to Albert and Montdidier, and southward below Lassigny, Noyon and La Fere.

Held on this line, the Germans April 8 opened a second drive, this time in Flanders, between Armentieres and La Bassée, for the Channel ports. Their attack was along a twelve-mile front from Givenchy to Fleurbaix. Near Neuve Chapelle, where the Portuguese held the line, the Germans broke through and drove the British from the low ground along the valley of the Lys, from La Bassée to near Ypres.

The fall of Neuve Chapelle and Mount Kemmel threatened the line of retreat from Ypres, and forced the British to abandon all the gains they had made east of Ypres during the autumn of 1917, and before the month of April closed the battle line was carried westward beyond Locre, Bailleul, and Merville to La Bassée. This was the most anxious moment of the whole war and drew from General Haig his memorable appeal to the army to hold the line to the last man. "With our backs to the walls, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one of us must fight on to the end. The safety of our homes and the freedom of mankind depend alike on the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment." But again the enemy was held and until May 16 stood on the defensive, while the Allies by local offensives recovered some lost ground and consolidated their lines.

At dawn on the morning of May 27th the Germans began a third offensive against the Allied armies at two points on the long front. One, a minor attack, was made between Locre and Voormezele near Ypres, and one of great violence along the front from Soissons to Rheims. In the bend of the front stretching across the Aisne River between Craonnelle and Berméricourt, a distance of fifteen miles, were the British. The right of their line held firm and kept in close touch with

the French; but the left gave way before the pressure of overwhelming numbers, the French were driven from the Chemin-des-Dames, and the enemy crossed the Aisne along an eighteen-mile front between Vailly and Berry-au-Bac, crossed the Vesle east of Bazoches and west of Fismes on the 28th, an advance of twelve miles from their old line of May 26; entered Soissons, pushed on towards Rheims, took the forts northwest of that city, and captured large depots of munitions, railway trains, hospitals and an aerodrome with machines ready to fly. The night of May 31 found the Germans on the Marne along a ten-mile front from Dormans to a point near Château-Thierry, with over 45,000 prisoners, more than 400 guns and thousands of machine guns, in their hands. In five days they had advanced twenty-four miles.

In June a fourth drive was begun, this time on the Marne salient, and the battle line was driven westward between Château-Thierry and Soissons, and southward between Soissons and a point south of Noyon. The fighting then extended along a seventy-four-mile front divided into three sectors, that from Noyon to Soissons eighteen miles; that from Soissons to Château-Thierry twenty-eight miles; and that from Château-Thierry to Rheims twenty-eight miles.

In this desperate fighting the First Division of the American Expeditionary Force bore an honorable part. The first to reach France, in June, 1917, it received its training in modern warfare under French officers in scattered camps, and in the autumn began its trench apprenticeship not far from Nancy, and there fired its first shell against the Germans, lost its first prisoners to the Germans, took its first prisoners from the Germans, and lost the three men who were buried with especial honors as the first American soldiers to be killed on the soil of France. In January, 1918, the Division took over a sector northwest of Toul near St. Mihiel, and was still there when, March 28, General Pershing tendered the entire Expeditionary Force to General Foch. A week later the Division began a most difficult journey, over roads in dreadful condi-

tion, to Picardy, and until July occupied a place on the Cantigny front a few miles northwest of Montdidier, at the apex of the great German salient. Its duty was to hold the line, for, if the enemy broke through, Amiens and its railway system would pass into German hands, and the British army could no longer be supplied from its Channel port. Hold the line it did against repeated attacks, and despite heavy casualties in killed, wounded, gassed and missing. Standing on high ground, strongly fortified and dominating the American front was the village of Cantigny. That it should be captured was necessary for many reasons, and early on the morning of May 28, 1918, the First Division set out to make the capture.

The operation began [wrote a correspondent of the *London Times*] with neutralization fire on the enemies' batteries from our heavies. This lasted one hour and was followed by the combined heavies and light guns for another hour and a half of preparation, diversion and destructive fire. Then, at 6:45 the Americans upon a front of one and one-half miles hopped from their trenches and, under the protection of a well directed rolling barrage from the light guns, with the heavies concentrated upon the distant areas, they advanced in two sturdy waves. They crossed the intervening zone to their objective, a depth of nearly a mile, in exactly 40 minutes, preceded by 12 tanks. There were sharp individual fights in the town of Cantigny. Two hundred and fifty German dead were counted.

The action was finely carried out; but what, in that hour of German triumph, was far more important than the capture of Cantigny, was the heartening effect of the fight on the Allies. It showed them the fighting qualities of the American soldier, and proved that under the worst of battle conditions he was more than a match for the enemy.

Meanwhile the Germans were drawing nearer and nearer the Marne and Paris. Each hour the crisis grew more serious, and again every available American soldier was placed at the disposal of Marshal Foch. The Second American Division was there in rest billets at Chaumont-en-Vexin, northwest of Paris, and had just finished the services held on Memorial Day, May 30th, when orders came from French Headquarters

to entrain at once, move to the front to meet the Germans advancing on both sides of the Paris-Metz highway near Château-Thierry. May 31 was spent on the journey, and June 1 found most of the men beyond Montreuil-aux-Lions, ten kilometers west of Château-Thierry. The line finally taken over ran from Bonneil, near the Marne, to Le Thiolet on the Paris-Metz highway, whence the 6th Marines extended it to Lucy-le-Bocage, and the 23d Regiment to Bois-de-Veuilly. On the right of the line the French 164th Division held the south part of Château-Thierry on the left bank of the Marne. Opposite the line was a ridge of hills and beyond them the valley of a little stream along which were the villages of Bouresches, Belleau, Torcy, Bussiares. The steep hills along the stream were held by the Germans.

At the same time that the Second Division received orders to move to the front, the Third Division, at Châteauvillain and La Forte-sur-Aube, was commanded to hasten to the south bank of the Marne near Château-Thierry and prevent the crossing of that river by the Germans. First to arrive was the 7th Machine Gun Battalion, a motorized unit of the Marines which, after thirty-six hours without sleep, entered Château-Thierry at six o'clock on May 31 under a shower of bursting shells to find the French fighting the Germans in the streets of the northern part of the town across the river. Taking positions, as quickly as possible, where their guns could sweep the banks up and down the river and the bridge in the center of the town, the Marines entered the fight, and during ninety-six hours withstood the enemy. Again and again the Germans came down to the river bank in attempts to cross only to be driven back by the splendid gunnery of the Americans.

Château-Thierry [wrote a Reuter correspondent, describing the battle] lies on both banks of the Marne which is spanned by a big bridge. A little to the northward a canal runs parallel to the river and is crossed by a smaller bridge.

The Americans had scarcely reached their quarters when news

was received that the Germans had broken into the northern part of Château-Thierry, having made their way through the gap they had driven in our lines to the left of the town and then pouring along the streets to the bridge, intending to establish themselves firmly on the south bank and capture the town.

The American machine gunners and French Colonials were thrown into Château-Thierry together. The Americans immediately took over the defense of the river bank, especially the approaches to the bridge. Fighting with their habitual courage and using their guns with an accuracy which won the highest encomiums from the French, they brought the enemy to a standstill.


Already wavering under the American fire, the Germans were counter-attacked by the French Colonials and driven from the town. They returned to the attack the next night and under cover of darkness crept into the town along the river bank and began to work their way through the streets toward the main bridge. At the same moment a tremendous artillery bombardment was opened upon the southern half of the town.

When within range of the machine guns the Germans advanced under the cover of clouds of thick white smoke from smoke bombs, in order to baffle the aim of the American gunners. A surprise, however, was in store for them. They were already crossing the bridge, evidently believing themselves masters of both banks, when a thunderous explosion blew the center of the bridge and a number of Germans with it into the river. Those who reached the southern bank were immediately captured.

In this battle in the streets, and again at night, the young American soldiers showed a courage and determination which aroused the admiration of their French colonial comrades. With their machine guns they covered the withdrawal of troops across the bridge before its destruction, and although under severe fire themselves, kept all the approaches to the bank under a rain of bullets which nullified all the subsequent efforts of the enemy to cross the river. Every attempt of the Germans to elude the vigilance of the Americans resulted in disaster.

During the last two days the enemy has renounced the occupation of the northern part of Château-Thierry, which the American machine guns have made untenable. It now belongs to No Man's Land, as, since the destruction of the bridges, it is not worth while for the French to garrison it.

Against their casualties the Americans can set a much greater loss inflicted by their bullets on the enemy. They have borne their



AREAS GAINED IN GERMAN DRIVES, 1918

full part in what a French staff officer well qualified to judge described as one of the finest feats of the war.

Some very fine work [said the special correspondent of the *London Times*] was done at Château-Thierry on May 31 and June 1 by American machine-guns, acting under the command of a well-known French fighting general. I did not see the general, who had had no sleep for four days. But his Chief-of-Staff was most enthusiastic about the services rendered to the division by our new Allies. They had only just arrived in their billets south of Château-Thierry when they were rushed up to the town, together with French Colonial troops billeted alongside of them, as soon as it was threatened by the enemy. They at once threw themselves into the defense, taking the bridge over the Marne especially under their protection, and thanks to the way in which they supported the French counter-attack with their machine-guns the enemy were driven right away from the town.

The next day at 9 o'clock in the evening the Germans took advantage of darkness to steal up to the bridge through the suburbs on the west side of the town, masking their approach with smoke grenades which made machine-gun shooting very difficult, the town meanwhile being subjected to heavy bombardment. The Germans succeeded in reaching the bridge, and some of them, who were promptly made prisoners, even got to the French side. But the bulk of them were destroyed by an explosion thoughtfully arranged for them by the Americans as they were in the act of crossing the bridge, and from that time on this machine-gun unit has shown such vigilance in watching the bridge as well as in preventing all attempts to construct temporary substitutes that it has been impossible for the enemy either to repair the bridge or to get across in any other way.

Before the incident of the explosion the Americans had shown extraordinary courage in holding the position and enabling the French who were evacuating the north part of the town to get safely over to the south bank. The Colonials who were pretty competent judges are particularly keen about their coolness and courage under fire as well as their deadly execution and the thorough way in which they have guarded approaches to the river. They have done their work so well that the Germans prefer not to occupy the part of the town which has been evacuated. It is not, say the French, a healthy place for a picnic. Nor, as a matter of fact, was the American post on this side of the bridge. But what they have done was worth the loss it

cost them, not only because it enabled the French troops to get away from the town and has prevented the enemy from establishing himself in it, but because in one action it has earned for them the affectionate admiration of the French by whose side they are fighting. These are allies worth having. That is what the French feel and say, and every Englishman will agree with them.

Speaking at the Printers' Pension Fund dinner in London on June 7, Premier Lloyd George said of the American soldiers in France:

I have only just returned from France and met a French statesman who had been at the front shortly after a battle in which the Americans took part. He was full of admiration not merely of their superb valor but of the trained skill with which they attacked and defeated the foe.

His report of the conduct of the American troops, a division that had been in action for the first time, was one of the most encouraging things I have heard, because they are coming in steadily. There is a great flow, and we are depending upon them, and the fact that we know that when they appear in the battleline they will fight in a way which is worthy of the great traditions of their great country is in itself a source of support and sustenance and encouragement to all of those who with anxious hearts are watching the conflict which is going on in France.

On the night of June 3, the Second Division took over the French lines, and on the morning of the 4th faced the Germans from Belleau Wood to Bouresches village. The first work assigned it was to drive the enemy from observation points. At five o'clock on the morning of the 5th, therefore, the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 5th Marines, with the 167th French on the left, assaulted the edge of the wood and the crest of the hills near Veully, captured them by seven o'clock, and took a hundred and forty prisoners. The left having advanced the center of the Division started forward and at five o'clock in the afternoon the 5th and 6th Marines with the 23d Infantry attacked from a point east of Bussiares to Bouresches. All night the two armies went forward and backward in the thickets and among the boulders of the Bois de Belleau and

the Bois de Triangle until by eight o'clock on the morning of the 6th the Americans had carried by storm Hill 142 half a mile south of Torcy, and chased the Germans out of Veully wood. The following day they gained more ground, captured the villages of Veully-la-Poterie, Bussi re and Boursches, entered Torcy, took some 200 prisoners and extended their line over a front of six miles and to a depth of nearly two and a half miles. At midnight on the 7th the Germans counter-attacked, but, despite their use of gas, were completely defeated and driven back before they reached the American lines. Following up these successes the Marines on the 10th entered the German lines for a depth of two-thirds of a mile along a six-hundred-yard front in the Belleau wood just west of Boursches and south of Belleau. As the Germans still held a part of this wood the Marines attacked again on the 11th, took it, and captured 250 prisoners and forty machine-guns and trench mortars.

Fighting in the woods was from tree to tree, from rock to rock. Every available spot was a nest of German machine guns not to be destroyed by artillery or grenade fire, but taken with the bayonet. In these attacks the Marines suffered heavy losses. Companies, it is said, which entered the fight two hundred and fifty strong were soon reduced to fifty or sixty. But over the bodies of the dead and wounded the boys came on wave after wave. Time and again the officers sent back word their men were exhausted. But the answer was that the lines must be held and if possible new attacks made, and without water, with little food, without rest, with men so tired that they fell asleep under shell fire, the lines were held and new advances made.

A captured German officer reported that a fresh division was to be thrown in and a desperate effort made to wrest from the Marines their hard-won territory. June 13 at two o'clock in the morning it came, and under orders to drive back the Americans at all costs, to retake Boursches and the wood however great the loss of life, the Germans launched an attack along

the whole front. The thin line of Marines held fast, the drive was checked, the Germans forced back and thousands of rounds of ammunition and a score of machine guns were captured and used against the enemy. Time after time, says Secretary Daniels in his account of the fight, messages such as the following traveled to the post command:


Losses heavy. Difficult to get runners through. Some have never returned. Morale excellent, but troops about all in. Men exhausted.

Still they fought on, gaining ground day by day until their position was such that they were ready for the final rush which was to clear the Wood of Belleau. The objective was an important German position south of the village of Torcy northwest of Château-Thierry. Stretching for three kilometers along a wooded hill north of the Bois de Belleau, it commanded the German line and was dotted with machine-gun nests which gave our men much trouble. Just before six o'clock in the evening, of June 25, after a terrific bombardment of thirteen hours, the Marines advanced through the wood, throwing hand grenades and shooting from behind trees, and by nine o'clock had herded the Germans in the north end of the wood, captured 200 prisoners and practically destroyed a force of twelve hundred.

From the prisoners it was learned that a German army had been landed in our country, that it had captured New York and was marching on Philadelphia; that another great drive would be made in August, that Paris would be taken, the American army destroyed, and peace forced on the Allies.

The success of the 25th was followed up on the evening of July 1 when, after a heavy bombardment which lasted all day, our troops at six o'clock went over the top, captured the village of Vaux close to the western edge of Château-Thierry, recovered a piece of the Paris highway and entered the Bois de la Roche. On the 2nd the Germans came back with a strong counter-attack, but were defeated. "Our own positions," General Pershing reported, "were advanced on a front of a mile

ADVANCE
OF THE
AMERICAN ARMY
IN THE
CHÂTEAU THIERRY
SECTOR
JUNE 6 TO AUGUST 6
1918



and a half and to a depth of a thousand yards. The enemy's losses in killed and wounded were heavy. His regiment holding the sector attacked offered obstinate resistance and was practically annihilated. The prisoners captured in the attack and counter-attack number over five hundred and include six officers. This increases the total number of prisoners taken by our troops in this vicinity during the last month to nearly 1,200."

In grateful appreciation of the splendid work of the Marines the General commanding the French Sixth Army ordered, on June 30, 1918, that:

In view of the brilliant conduct of the Fourth Brigade of the Second United States Division, which, in a spirited fight, took Bouresches and the important strong point of Bois de Belleau, stubbornly defended by a large enemy force, the General commanding the Sixth Army orders that henceforth, in all official papers, the Bois de Belleau shall be named "Bois de la Brigade de Marine."

*Division General Degoutte,
Commanding Sixth Army.*

July 6 what remained of the brigade was sent back to rest billets for recuperation.

June 13 was the anniversary of the landing in France of the first American troops, and because of the great things done by those troops, by those who followed, and by the people who sent them, the day was made the occasion for expressions of gratitude and appreciation by men high in public affairs in France. President Poincaré in a cablegram to President Wilson said:

The Allies, owing to the Russian Capitulation, are living through the most difficult hours of the war, but the rapid formation of new American units and the uninterrupted increase in oversea transportation are leading us with certainty towards the day when the equilibrium will be restored.

President Wilson replied:

Your telegram of yesterday was certainly conceived in the highest and most generous spirit of friendship and I am sure that I am

expressing the feeling of the people of the United States as well as my own, when I say that it is with increasing pride and gratification that they have seen their forces under General Pershing more and more actively coöperating with the forces of liberation on French soil. It is their fixed and unalterable purpose to send men and materials in steady and increasing volume until any temporary inequality of force is entirely overcome and the forces of freedom made overwhelming, for they are convinced that it is only by victory that peace can be achieved and the world's affairs settled upon a basis of enduring justice and right. It is a constant satisfaction to them to know that in this great enterprise they are in close and intimate coöperation with the people of France.

General Pershing was congratulated by the President of France, the Premier, and by Generals Foch and Petain. "The anniversary of your arrival in France," said President Poincaré, "furnishes a happy occasion to address my warmest congratulations to you and the valiant troops which you command, and who have so admirably conducted themselves in the recent battles. I beg you to receive the assurance of my best wishes for their success."

On the anniversary of your arrival in France to take command of the American forces, I wish [said M. Clémenceau] to express to you once more, my dear General, the greatest admiration for the powerful aid brought by your army to the cause of the allies. With ever-increasing numbers the American troops cover themselves with glory under your orders in barring the route of the invader. The day is coming when, thanks to the superb effort of your country and the valor of its persons the enemy, losing the initiative of operations, will be forced to bow before the triumph of our ideal of justice and civilization.

A year ago [said General Foch] brought to us the American sword. To-day we have seen it strike. It is the certain pledge of victory. By it our hearts are more closely united than ever.

Your coming to French soil a year ago filled our country with enthusiasm and hope [said General Petain]. Accept to-day the grateful homage of our soldiers for the daily increasing aid on the battlefield brought by their American brothers in arms. The last battles, where the magnificent qualities of courage and military virtue

of your troops were demonstrated in so brilliant a manner, are a sure guarantee of the future. The day is not far off when the great American army will play the decisive rôle to which history calls this army on the battlefields of Europe. Permit me, my dear general, to express to you on this anniversary day, my entire confidence and assure you of my feelings of affectionate comradeship.

Between Villers-Bretonneux and the Somme on July 4 Australian troops and American infantry surged forward at dawn of day, behind a fleet of tanks, captured Hamel village, drove the Germans out of Vaire and Hamel Wood and sent back fifteen hundred prisoners to the cages.

The victory was a fitting one to mark the day, but greater celebrations were held at home and abroad. Standing at the Tomb of Washington, President Wilson surrounded by the diplomatic representatives of the Entente powers and neutral nations again restated "the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting."

This, then, is our conception of the great struggle in which we are engaged. The plot is written plain upon every scene and every act of the supreme tragedy. On the one hand stand the peoples of the world, not only the people actually engaged, but many others also who suffer under mastery but cannot act; peoples of many races in every part of the world, the people of stricken Russia still, among the rest, though they are for the moment unorganized, and helpless. Opposed to them, masters of many armies, stand an isolated group of governments who speak no common purpose but only selfish ambitions of their own by which none can profit but themselves, and whose peoples are fuel in their hands; governments which fear their people and yet are for the time their sovereign lords, making every choice for them and disposing of their lives and fortunes as they will, as well as of the lives and fortunes of every people who fall under their power, governments clothed with the strange trappings and the primitive authority of an age that is altogether alien and hostile to our own. The past and the present are in deadly grapple and the peoples of the world are being done to death between them.

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No half-way decision would be tolerable. No half-way decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which

the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace.

First. The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

Second. The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

Third. The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern States in their relations with one another, to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

Fourth. The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.

These great objects can be put into a single sentence: What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.

In Philadelphia there was a great parade of foreign-born citizens and the signing of a new Declaration of Independence, independence of militarism. At the head of the procession as it passed down Broad Street to City Hall and on to Independence Square marched marines and sailors from the Navy Yard, veterans of the Civil War and wounded soldiers of the Allies. Then came the foreign born, many thousand in number, representing four and twenty nations, dressed many of them in their national costumes, carrying inscribed ban-

ners and accompanied by floats. In Independence Hall, in the chamber where the Declaration of 1776 was adopted, five representatives of each nation signed a declaration of intent to wage relentless war on autocracy. The signing finished the signers passed to a stage in the Square where the Declaration was read and formally adopted. The representatives of each nation whose names were affixed were then called upon to give a verbal pledge, and having done so, the bell in the tower struck once for each nation.

Abroad the day was widely observed. Lloyd George in a message to General Pershing assured him:

We join with our whole heart in your Fourth of July celebrations. Once a bitter memory, we now know that the events to which you dedicate these rejoicings forced the British empire back to the path of freedom from which in a moment of evil counsel it departed.

The entry of the United States army into this great struggle for human liberty, side by side with the allies, is sure proof that the mistakes and misunderstandings which formerly estranged our two countries are being transformed into a genuine friendship in the fiery furnace of common sacrifice.

The American army in France [was Pershing's reply] feels special satisfaction in knowing that yours is beside it for the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. I have learned with equal pleasure that the people of England are uniting with our soldiers and sailors to celebrate the Fourth with unusual brilliance, uniting for a manifestation of sympathy and international concord, which will remain a memorable date in the history of our two nations.

Field Marshal Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief, sent greetings in behalf of the British army in Flanders.

In behalf of myself and the whole army in France and Flanders, I beg you to accept for yourself and the troops of your command my warmest greetings on American Independence Day. Fourth of July this year soldiers of America, France and Great Britain will spend side by side for the first time in history in defense of the great principle of liberty, which is the proudest inheritance and the most cherished possession of their several nations. That liberty

which the British, Americans and French won for themselves they will not fail to hold, not only for themselves, but for the world. With the heartiest good wishes for you and your gallant army.

On the Chelsea Football Ground there was a baseball game, between nines from the American army and navy, to which came the King and Queen, the Royal Family, and a host of titled personages and people of distinction. When the game was about to begin the King left the Royal box, shook hands with the Captains and presented a ball on which he had written his name. Another was used in the match and the autographed ball was preserved to be sent to President Wilson. Our flag was everywhere in London. It was sold on the streets, worn on the person, carried by taxicabs and mail vans. Lord and Lady Albemarle presented a full length portrait of Washington to be hung in No. 10 Downing Street, to commemorate our entrance into the war. The portrait was painted by Charles Wilson Peale, was on a vessel captured on its way to Holland by the British Captain Keppel, was appropriated by him and inherited by the Earl.

From the heads of the Allied Governments came congratulations to President Wilson. President Poincaré sent the wishes and felicitations of France.

The government of the republic, at one with all the national representatives and the whole country, ordained that to-morrow, the Independence Day of the United States, shall also be a French holiday. Paris will give your glorious name to one of its handsomest avenues and acclaim to the skies the parade of the valiant American soldiers. In every department, in every town, large and small, these manifestations of fraternity will be echoed. Two peoples in communion of thought will, one and all, remember the fights of old that won liberty for America, and hope for the forthcoming victories which will secure for the world a just and fruitful peace based on the law of nations and fortified by the approval of human conscience. Permit me, Mr. President, cordially to extend to you on the eve of that great day of union and confidence the wishes and felicitations of France for the United States and yourself.

The King of the Belgians sent thanks for the efforts of America to relieve his stricken people, and expressed his admiration for the bravery of our boys.

On the occasion of the memorable anniversary occurring on the Fourth of July I wish to thank once more the great American nation for its untiring efforts toward ameliorating the unfortunate condition of my fellow countrymen and to express to it my admiration for the bravery displayed by its great army on the battlefields of France. Be pleased, Mr. President, to accept the ardent wishes I make for the greatness and prosperity of the United States of America.

King Emmanuel of Italy sent expressions of brotherly feeling.

Even on proclaiming their independence the American people affirmed that their mission in the world was one of liberty and justice; they have nobly kept faith with that supreme ideal, always and more than ever in that ruthless conflict of all the people by spontaneously intervening in the defense of right against violence. Wherefore, this anniversary is to-day celebrated by all the free peoples as it were their own gladsome holiday, as a rite portending the victory of Liberty and Justice. Italy, unshaken in her resolution to bear and do everything in the great common cause, sends to the people of the United States her expression of brotherly sympathy at the very moment when she enthusiastically and proudly welcomes the sons of America who have come to fight by the side of her own sons. To you, Mr. President, who, with enlightened wisdom and unswerving decision, worthily preside over the destinies of your very great nation, I am glad to manifest those sentiments, those purposes and that confidence of the Italian people.

King Alexander of Greece joined the Hellenic people in cordial felicitations and ardent wishes for the happiness and prosperity of our people.

On this memorable day in which the great republic celebrates the anniversary of its independence, I join the Hellenic people in expressing to you, Mr. President, and to the American nation, my cordial felicitations and the ardent wishes I make for the happiness and prosperity of the American people. The republic's participation

in the world war constitutes all the more valuable a factor in the Allies' struggle, as it has for its sole aim the defense of the inalienable rights of the oppressed peoples and the restitution of their spoliated property.

The Mayors of Meux and nearby towns in a letter to the American commander said:

The civilian population will never forget that since the beginning of June, when their homes were threatened by the invader, the — Division victoriously stepped forth and succeeded in saving them from the impending danger. They were eyewitnesses of the generous and effective deeds of the American army in stopping the enemy advance, and send heartfelt expression of their admiration and gratitude.

General Joffre wrote to the *Echo de Paris*:

The entry of America into the war brought the Allies moral strength of the deepest meaning, but the great sister republic did not want to content herself with sentimental manifestations. With all her material power she has ranged herself beside us. Thanks to American assistance, we shall surmount all the perils of the hour and come out gloriously from the trials of so long a war.

From the Belgian minister at Havre in behalf of the Belgian army came cordial greetings to General Pershing.

On this memorable day I send you the cordial greetings and respectful sympathy of the Belgian army, which associated itself with your national fête with élan and fervor, the troops who for nearly four years have been fighting resolutely for the independence of their country. On this occasion detachments of all arms defiled before the American colors floating over the Flanders plain. All hearts are united in the same wish, success to the allied armies, and look forward to the glorious day when your troops, in their turn, will defile before our tri-colored flag hoisted in our reconquered cities.

Lord Reading, the British Ambassador, gave out this message to the American people:

To-day the thoughts of all people in my country are centered on America, and from millions of hearts prayers will ascend for your

great nation and for your gallant men on sea and land, and for your brave women who minister to them. These men and women, worthy representatives of the nation, have, as all of you, that individual and passionate love of liberty which collectively, as a nation, is your ideal and lodestar.

Loving liberty and freedom, you have taken up arms because the freedom of the world is in peril. With us and our allies you intend to destroy that menace, and when there comes, as assuredly there will, the end of Prussianism, there will arise a new independence day which will be the glorious common heritage of all those nations which have set their faces to the light.

André Tardieu, French high commissioner to the United States, sent a message in the name of France to the citizens of New York, Baltimore, Washington and Toledo, where French soldiers and sailors took part in the celebrations.

I have been happy to learn that detachments of our army and navy will participate in the celebration of the Fourth of July in your city. Our soldiers will be the living messengers of the sentiments that on this great day fill all French hearts. France in arms, full of confidence, sends to your fellow citizens her cordial greetings.

At Rome there was a celebration attended by officials of the government and the city at the Victor Emmanuel monument and a procession to the residence of the American Ambassador where a speaker tendered the greetings of Italy to America. Demonstrations were also held in Turin, Florence, Genoa, Naples and Perugia, and the day was made a national holiday in San Salvador, Nicaragua, Brazil and Peru. At St. Pierre, Martinique, at Algiers, at Tunis, the Fourth of July was celebrated as a national fête.

Never before had foreign nations taken note of Independence Day.

Ten days later, July 14, Bastille Day, came our opportunity to express admiration for France. By a spontaneous movement of our people, without any official call, the day was gladly made one of demonstration over all our land. From President Wilson went a message to the people of France.

Congress sent greetings from the American people, President Poincaré and General Foch replied, and Samuel Gompers in behalf of the American Federation of Labor addressed the French people.

On all fronts where our boys were stationed they wore the French colors, displayed French flags on billets and trucks and joined their French comrades in celebrating the day. At Lyons a new bridge over the Rhone was opened with due ceremonies and named Pont Wilson. At home more than two hundred cities observed the day. At New York there were salutes from warships in the harbor and special services in the churches, open-air meetings and a great mass meeting at night in Madison Square Garden to which the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Italy spoke.

The celebration of Bastille Day had scarcely closed in Paris when the Germans, at dawn on July 15, began a fifth drive, this time on both sides of Rheims from Château-Thierry on the west, to a famous field-work, the Main de Massiges in the Champagne Sector on the east. The objective was Epernay on the west of Rheims, and Chalons-sur-Marne on the east. Had the attack succeeded, had these towns been captured, Rheims must have been forced to surrender, the lines of communication at Epernay and Chalons would have been cut and Verdun seriously threatened. But it did not succeed. The French stood firm as a rock and were well supported in the fight by two battalions of the 165th Infantry, better known as New York's "Fighting 69th," which that day held a small part of the front at Somme-Py. It belonged to the 42d, "the Rainbow," Division, stationed in the rear to drive back the Germans should they break through.

West of Rheims and north of the Marne the fighting was especially severe and the French and Italians were forced back to a line running south through Bouilly, Marfaux, Cuchery, Châtillon-sur-Marne. Between Châtillon and Mézy the enemy crossed the Marne at several places and, sweeping all before him, drove the French south of the Bois de Conde, south to

St. Agnan, and around to Comblizy. Near Mézy was the right flank of the 3d Division, which held the south bank of the Marne from Château-Thierry eastward. The Germans having crossed the river, opened fire on Mézy to drive the 38th Regiment, the right flank of the 3d Division, into their dug-outs, and under a thick cloud of smoke which completely hid them from view attempted to cross the Marne in boats. Had the Americans gone into their dugouts the crossing would have been easy; but they remained in the open, fired with rifles and machine guns through the smoke screen at the German boats and prevented all save one getting across. As it touched the bank its occupants were made prisoners. East of Mézy the Germans made a landing and met the men of the 38th Infantry. In the fighting which followed one of its platoons was annihilated, and a second almost cut to pieces, but reinforcements came, the enemy were driven to the railroad skirting the south bank, and six hundred prisoners were taken. Later the Germans were driven across the river as far as Jaulgonne. Concerning this fight General Pershing said:

A single regiment of the 3d wrote one of the most brilliant pages in our military annals on the occasion. It prevented the crossing at certain points on its front, while on either flank, the Germans who had gained a footing, pressed forward. Our men, firing in three directions, met the German attacks with counter-attacks at critical points and succeeded in throwing two German Divisions into complete confusion, capturing six hundred prisoners.

The victory was indeed a great one. Again our army checked a drive on Château-Thierry, the pivot on which the Germans expected to swing their army southward towards Paris. Again was demonstrated the splendid fighting qualities of the American soldier. Our Allies were heartened and by them the victory was hailed with delight. The *London Telegraph* said:

The feature of the battle upon which the eyes of all the world are fixed, and those of the enemy with particular intentness, is the conduct of the American troops. The magnificent counter-attack in which the American Army corps flung back the Germans upon

the Marne after they had crossed was much more than the outstanding event of the first day's fighting. It was one of the historical incidents of the whole war in its moral significance.

The *Graphic* thought that:

Our French comrades should admit the chief honors in the initial days to the resistance of the American troops. The Americans showed the enemy the stern stuff of which they are made, and also proved by their tactics that they have taken the measure of Ludendorff's favorite method. They demonstrated the wisdom of the policy of hitting at an offensive as soon as it shows itself.

To the *Daily News*:

By far the most interesting and gratifying event of the battle was the achievement of the Americans. They held, perhaps, the most critical position and kept their front intact. Their success was a significance which the enemy will best appreciate. The Germans have been buoyed up with a belief that the war would be over before the American factor in the struggle became a reality. That belief is now shattered. It never can be restored. That is the momentous fact that emerges from the battle of Fossoy.

When Mr. Bonar Law announced in the House of Commons that the Americans had driven the Germans across the Marne the good news was greeted with cheers.

North of Château-Thierry an attack was made on the Americans, but they quickly broke it down, drove back the enemy several hundred yards and did not return to their old position until the advance of the Germans southeast of Château-Thierry made the reoccupation of their trenches necessary.

Tuesday, July 16, found the battle line south of the Marne running from Fossoy through Crézancy, St. Agnan, La Chapelle-Monthodon, Oeuilly; but the French and Americans by a brilliant counter-attack recovered St. Agnan and La Chapelle-Monthodon. On the following day the enemy made gains between the Marne and Rheims, in some places to a depth of a mile and a half. There the advance stopped, for, on July 18, Foch opened the offensive which drove the Ger-

mans back to the Hindenburg line and never ended until three months later when the armistice went into force. This he was able to do, because the great movement of troops from our country was well under way and thousands were arriving each week; because what our men had done showed what those coming would do, and because, sure of an endless supply of splendid fighting Americans, he was enabled to freely use his reserves. On July 18, therefore, when the great Allied offensive began, every available American soldier was put in the line, and the First and Second Divisions with some chosen French divisions were sent to the front west of Soissons. The line ran from in front of Ambleny to Laversine, Cutry and into the Foret de Retz. At the northern end was a French Division; then came the American 1st Division; then a Moroccan Division and then the American 2d Division, and near Château-Thierry the 26th Division. The 1st had marched down from Cantigny to the neighborhood of St. Pierre-Aigle-Cutry-Laversine. During four days and nights, now on foot, now on trucks, over unknown roads, and through woods lest the enemy should observe the movement, the men went on with scarce any rest and at dawn on July 18 advanced to the attack. Before them lay the villages of Missy-aux-Bois, Ploisy, Berzy-le-Sec and the highway leading down from Soissons to Paris clearly marked by the lines of trees on either side. All of these places were to be taken and the highway crossed that day. Such was the resistance met with that night found the division on the Missy-aux-Bois-Chaudun line with the right well in advance of the left. That night the enemy was heavily reënforced; but at four o'clock on the 19th the 1st Division again went forward with a line from Berzy-le-Sec to Buzancy as its objective. Neither village was to be taken, but merely the ground between, for the one lay in the sector of a French and the other in the sector of the Moroccan Division. Desperate fighting brought the Americans to Chazelle; but the French were unable to reach Berzy-le-Sec and the Americans were ordered to take it early in the after-

noon of July 20. At two o'clock, accordingly, after a furious barrage, the left of the Division went forward. Then followed a desperate struggle which lasted until morning. Again and again all that afternoon and night the lines swept backward and forward in attack and counter-attack. Machine-gun nests were taken, lost, and taken again, and the men fought with bayonets, trench knives, hand grenades. So heavy were the losses that the expediency of relieving it was seriously considered, but early in the morning of July 21 one last effort was made and the men rushed over the ruins of Berzy-le-Sec, capturing machine guns, a field battery and hundreds of prisoners. On the right the 1st Brigade was then across the Château-Thierry highway. July 22 the 1st Division was relieved and sent to a rest area near Paris.¹

The 2d Division, which on the morning of July 18 occupied a sector from Chavigny Farm to a point across the Soissons-Paris highway, fought its way through Vaucastille, encountered desperate resistance at the village of Vierzy, and by night was halfway between Vierzy and Tigny. July 19 Tigny was captured and the Bois d'Hartennes reached and there, reduced to almost half its strength, the Division was relieved by the French. Further down the front behind the Savieres River near Troesnes were troops of the 4th Division fighting with the French. July 18 when Foch began his great offensive they crossed the Savieres, passed the village of Noroy-sur-Oureq, and by evening on the following day were well past Chouy, where, on the 25th, they were relieved. Still further south other units of the 4th, fighting with the French, took Hautevesnes, and Courchamp, la Grenouilliers, and Sommelans, and by the night of July 22 had crossed the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway and were in the Bois-du-Chatelet. That night they were withdrawn and the whole 4th Division sent to reserve positions.²

Still further south was the 26th Division, which relieved

¹ *Stars and Stripes*, January 3, 1919.

² *Ibid.*, February 14, 1919.

the 2d on July 10, and held a sector from near Vaux to near Bussiares. July 18 it, too, went forward and under cover of a heavy mist surprised the enemy, captured Torcy, Belleau and Givry, and was there held by the failure of the French to reach their objective, Licy, Monthiers and Hill 193. Small gains were made on the 20th. Early on the 21st the Germans withdrew from Château-Thierry and began a retreat, followed all day by the French and Americans who by evening had carried their advance well across the Soissons-Oulchy-Château-Thierry highway to near Epieds and Trugny. There more resistance was met until the morning of the 24th, when it was found the Germans were again in retreat. Once more they were pursued towards the Fere-en-Tardenois-Jaulgonne highway, near which at evening the advance was checked. That night the 26th was relieved by the 42d.³ During three days no important advance was made between Soissons and Oulchy-le-Château; but from that town to the Marne and along it to Châtillon the battle raged fiercely. Along the crests north-east of Château-Thierry, and about the village of Epieds, our troops met with desperate resistance. German infantry, hurried forward to check the advance, held our men at bay for thirty-six hours, and three times drove them from Epieds. During this fighting the village, from ceaseless bombardment by both sides, disappeared. Meantime the Americans had taken the slopes on either side, brought their artillery to the crests, and fired on the Germans until none were left to surrender. At the edge of the woods near the hamlet of Trugny German machine guns held back the advance a little longer, but, making a feint frontal attack, the Americans, in Indian fashion, crept around the flanks, captured the guns and carried their line a mile to the north of Epieds.

Pushing on through the Foret-de-Fere and the Foret-de-Riz, filled with German machine guns, our troops by July 25 had carried their front to a line from Beuvardes to Le Charnel. The 3d Division, meantime, from its position at the

³ *Stars and Stripes*, January 10, 1919.

bend of the Marne east of Château-Thierry, had fought its way to the line Frenes-Ronchères, where on July 27 men from the 28th Division relieved it.

The Allied front then ran from near Fontenoy southeastward to near Soissons, southward around Buzancy and along the Soissons-Château-Thierry highway to Oulchy-le-Château, and then eastward through Bruyeres, Courmont, Ronchères, Passy-Grigny, la Neuville, Chaumuzy, Vrigny, to the old line near Ormes. July 28 the 42d Division forced the passage of the Ourcq River and captured the villages of Sergy and Seringes by assault. At Sergy the Americans met two of the best divisions of the German army, the 4th Prussian Guards and the Bavarians, which had been held in reserve and then hurried through the retreating Germans to attack the Americans. Their first attack was successful and our men were forced out of Sergy, Seringes-et-Nesles and a few hamlets. In the streets of the little towns, on the slopes of the river banks, in the water, the fighting was often hand-to-hand. Again and again the line of battle went backwards and forwards until late in the afternoon the 42d Division for the ninth time captured Sergy and held it.

As our men swept through the Forêt-de-Fère and the Forêt-de-Riz, they found the forests and the country round about a great arsenal. At some places more than an acre was covered with shells of all calibers. Along the edges of the woods they were stacked in long rows; along the roads and open spots they were camouflaged with limbs of trees; they were piled in every clump of trees, under every patch of shrubbery, while along the edges of the woods, mile after mile were cases of cartridges. July 28 the 55th Brigade of the 28th Division took over the line between the 42d and the 3d Divisions, along the Ourcq in front of the Bois de Grimpettes, and Cierges, and early on the morning of the 29th opened an attack, but made no progress during the day. That night the 3d Division was relieved by the 32d, which took position on the right of the 28th and three hours later, on the morning

of the 30th, went over the top and by dark had entered the Bois des Grimpettes and were close to Cierges. That night, July 30-31, the 28th Division was relieved and the 32d occupied the entire front of the sector. Desperate fighting July 31 and August 1 brought the capture of Cierges and Hill 230 north of it. Capture of the Hill forced the Germans to retreat and the advance to the Vesle at once began.


In the opening days of August the whole line of the Allies went forward. The French entered Soissons, the Crise River was crossed along its whole length, and Goussancourt, Villers Agron, Coulonges and Ville-en-Tardenois were taken. The German retreat now became hasty, and by the night of August 3 the Allies had advanced from Soissons eastward along the Aisne River to the Vesle and along that river to the neighborhood of Rheims. The Americans were then in the outskirts of Fismes, which on August 4 the 127th Infantry, 32d Division, carried by storm. The men of the 32d were, during the night of August 6-7, relieved by men from the 28th Division, who during the night of the 7th forced the passage of the Vesle and the next morning captured and held the village of Fismette until August 27, when they were driven across the river. To the west, on August 3 the 4th Division relieved the 42d near the village of St. Thibaut, some five kilometers west of Fismes, took it on the morning of August 5, forced a crossing of the river on the night of the 6th, made their way to the Soissons-Bazoches-Rheims highway, and entered outskirts of Bazoches, but August 9 were driven back across the river, and during the night of the 11-12th were relieved by the 77th Division. The Marne salient was gone.

Three months had now passed since the British and French forces along the front north of Montdidier had struck an important blow. But their turn had come and early on the morning of August 8, after a violent artillery preparation, the blow was struck, and the German lines for twenty miles along the Albert-Montdidier front east of Amiens were vigorously attacked. The Germans were taken by surprise. Neverthe-

less north of the Somme at Morlancourt and Chipilly and south of the Somme at Moreuil the fighting was desperate; elsewhere the enemy fled in haste, leaving behind in the ruined houses and dugouts personal belongings, letters, official papers, books, photographs, and uniforms. By nightfall the French and British had reached Plessier, Beaucourt, Caix, Framerville, Chipilly, and were west of Morlancourt. This was but the beginning. Day after day the drive continued; day after day the enemy fell back until when a week had gone by the battle front was a little to the west of Chaulnes, Roye, Lassigny and east of Ribécourt. When the month of August closed the British had pushed their front eastward from near Arras to La Bassée, had crossed the Hindenburg line southeast of Arras, and taken Peronne; the French, seven miles south of that city, had crossed the Somme canal; Noyon had been wrested from the Germans and the Americans had captured Juvigny and advanced two miles east of it, after an all day desperate fight, and had taken 600 prisoners. During the first weeks of September the progress of the Allies was slower. Nevertheless gain was made and by September 12 the French were closing in on St. Quentin and La Fere.

That day will ever be memorable in our history, for then it was our army struck its first great blow and began its first great drive in France. With the destruction of the Marne salient our period of tutelage ended. That American units should be scattered along the front holding portions of the line under command of foreign officers was neither necessary nor desirable. We could not consent to send two million or more men to France to fight under any other than American leadership. August 10 accordingly the 1st American Army was organized with General Pershing as Commander-in-Chief.

The work assigned to this army was the destruction of the St. Mihiel salient, which since 1914 had remained thrust into the French line, and from August 21 to September 12 preparations were made with the utmost secrecy for the attack. All divisions scattered along the west front, save the 27th and 30th



which were left with the British, were brought down to the sector and moved into the woods at night. No unusual activity either of traffic, of air service or of artillery was allowed. Even the new heavy guns when they came were not permitted to fire registration shots, for the attack if possible was to be a surprise. These preparations involved the movement of divisions, the organization of corps, the assembling of artillery, transports, aircrafts, tanks and ambulances, the building of hospitals, and the placing of some six hundred thousand fighting men. The French loaned some divisions and artillery and placed their Independent Air Force at Pershing's command; the British sent bombing squadrons, and these, with our own air men, gave us the largest aviation force ever brought together in any one sector.

Along the front, when finally taken over, from Ronvaux to a point a few miles west of St. Remy, were the 4th American Division, the 15th French and the 26th American, forming the 5th Corps. From the right of the 26th southward around St. Mihiel and eastward to near Xivray were the French Colonial troops. From Xivray to Clemery were the 1st, 42d and 89th American Divisions, forming the 4th Corps, and the 2d, 5th and 90th Divisions, forming the 1st Corps, and then the 82d.

The German line along the west side of the salient and around its point occupied high ground, running over the crests of ranges of hills. On the low ground at the point of the salient was the town of St. Mihiel, where the Germans held the inhabitants to prevent the French shelling the place and driving out German troops. From St. Mihiel their line ran along the hills to Apremont and then across the low valley of the Rupt de Mad river to the hills east of Pont-a-Mousson. Dominating this valley was the isolated peak known as Montsec, from which the enemy observers could distinctly see all that went on behind the American line.

Defending the salient were nine German Divisions, two-thirds of which were Landwehr, Austro-Hungarians and second class troops. According to the plan of battle, the main attack

was to be made down the open valley of the Rupt de Mad, the 5th Corps at the northwest end was to advance into the hills that rose before it, and if as a result of this pinching the Germans retreated, the French Colonials were to follow them.

At one o'clock on the dark and rainy morning of September 12, just four years to a day since the Germans thrust the salient into the French lines, the artillery preparation began and shells were dropped on batteries, dugouts, trenches and on Montsec, in particular, which was drenched with smoke shells to blind the German observers.

At four o'clock the rolling barrage was laid and at five o'clock seven American divisions moved forward to the attack along a ten-mile front east of St. Mihiel. At six o'clock another attack opened along a shorter front north of St. Mihiel, and at eight the French moved against the town itself at the apex of the salient. Following close after the American barrage went the tanks, then groups of wire cutters, then the infantry in open order, while overhead airplanes in low flying squadrons dropped bombs on the German infantry. Taken by surprise the enemy made but little resistance. Only here and there was the fighting stubborn, and along the southern front the Americans advanced rapidly to Thiaucourt, Pannes, Montsec. At the northwest end of the salient the French in their advance were retarded by heavy fire on their exposed left flank, and so was the 26th American Division by machine-gun fire in the hills south of St. Remy. Neither made all its objectives that day, but during the night the 102d Regiment in column formation was marched down a highway, through the German lines, and shortly after three o'clock in the morning found itself in the village of Hattonchâtel. Yet a little while and a patrol from the 1st Division entered the town and to their astonishment found it full of Americans. Thus was it that in twenty-seven hours after the battle opened the St. Mihiel salient vanished.

Besides liberating more than 150 square miles of territory and taking 15,000 prisoners [said General Pershing] we have captured

a mass of material. Over 200 guns of all calibers, and hundreds of machine guns and trench mortars have been taken. In spite of the fact that the enemy during his retreat burned large stores, a partial examination of the battlefield shows that great quantities of ammunition, telegraph material, railroad material, rolling stock, clothes and equipment have been abandoned. Further evidence of the haste with which the enemy retreated is found in the uninjured bridges which he left behind.

At the cost of only seven thousand casualties, mostly light, [said General Pershing in his final report,] we have taken 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, a great quantity of material, released the inhabitants of many villages from enemy domination, and established our lines in a position to threaten Metz. This signal success of the American First Army in its first offensive was of prime importance. The Allies found they had a formidable army to aid them, and the enemy learned finally that he had one to reckon with. The French took the town of St. Mihiel.

Among the prisoners were several thousand Austro-Hungarians.

In anticipation of such an attack [said the German report] the evacuation of this salient, liable to encirclement on both sides, which has been under consideration for years, was begun a few days ago. We did not therefore fight this battle to a finish, but carried out the movements contemplated, which the enemy was unable to prevent . . . In the night the evacuation of the salient was completed without interference.

Congratulations on this splendid victory now came from France and Great Britain. King George, in a message to the President, said:

On behalf of the British Empire I heartily congratulate you on the brilliant achievement of the American and Allied troops under the leadership of General Pershing in the St. Mihiel salient. The far-reaching results secured by these successful operations, which have marked the active intervention of the American Army on a great scale under its own administration, are the happiest augury for the completion, and I hope, not far distant triumph of the Allied cause.

Mr. Lloyd George telegraphed General Pershing:

I desire to offer to you and your brave Armies heartiest congratulations on your great victory. The enemy has made many mistakes in this great war, and none greater than when he underrated the valor, determination, and intrepid spirit of the brave soldiers of the United States of America. Now he has tasted the mettle of the American Armies the enemy knows what is in store for him. The news came to me on a sick bed. It was better, and infinitely more palatable, than any physic.

General Sir Douglas Haig assured General Pershing that:

All ranks of the British Armies in France welcome with unbounded admiration and pleasure the victory which has attended the initial offensive of the great American Army under your personal command. I beg of you to accept, and to convey to all ranks, my best congratulations and those of all ranks of the British Armies under my command.

In Paris the Stars and Stripes flew from the Hotel de Ville in honor of the victory; the President of the Municipal Council requested Mr. Lansing to send to all cities and towns in the United States the brotherly greeting of Paris; and President Poincaré, congratulating President Wilson on the "victory of which the first stage has been so brilliantly accomplished," said:

I express to the people of the United States the lively thanks of France. Allow me to add the expression of my deep personal esteem. I represented for a quarter of a century in the French Chamber the region now delivered. None knows better how patriotic our people are, how attached they are to right and liberty. The great sister Republic may be assured of their eternal gratitude.

Having accomplished their objective, the Americans strengthened their lines and the fighting became such as was constantly going on along the whole front. Patrols brought in more prisoners, combats were fought in the air, the lines were shelled by the Germans and their trenches were shelled in return; quantities of gas were sent over by the enemy; here and there a raid was repulsed by the Americans. Metz was bombarded by long range guns, and the Germans, as they had so often done before,

threw high explosives round about a clearing hospital and finally struck a large tent and killed eight of our men who had been gassed. During two weeks, however, no advance was attempted.

At this stage of the struggle the Allies took the offensive in Macedonia. Their line then extended some 350 miles from the Adriatic on the west to the *Ægean* on the east. North of it lay mountains and hills easy to defend, and not to be penetrated save by the narrow valleys of the rivers Struma, Vardar and Cerna. The Cerna was chosen and September 15 the attack was begun by French and Serbian troops who fought their way down the valley and having taken Prilep went on to the junction of the Cerna and the Vardar, crossed that river and cut off communication between the Bulgarian First Army based on Strumnitza and the Second Army and its German allies based on Prilep. Ishtip fell September 25 and on the following day the British and Greek forces, moving along the valley of the Vardar, captured Strumnitza. That same day Italian, French and Greek troops entered Kichevo, and the Bulgarians asked a suspension of hostilities. The terms of the Allies were accepted, the armistice was signed at Saloniki on the night of September 29, and at noon on the thirtieth hostilities ceased. Bulgaria was out of the war.

On Germany and Austria the effect was most depressing. But far more depressing still was the steady advance of the Allies on the western front. The Belgians, aided by the British, on September 28 attacked the German lines between Dixmude and Ypres, made an advance of two miles, and by October 1 had taken Dixmude and advanced their front from Nieuport to the outskirts of Roulers, to the Lys River, and on to Armentiers. The British and French were then in the outskirts of Cambrai and St. Quentin, and gains had been made north-west of Rheims. In this fighting our men again won distinction.

The 30th Division, composed of National Guard troops of North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, and drafted

men from Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee, landed in France in May, 1918, and before its training period ended was sent to the Ypres Sector to support the 2d British Corps, Second Army. July 4 it marched into Belgium to support two British Divisions, and in August took over the Canal Sector, extending from the outskirts of Ypres to near Voormezeele. August 31 to September 1, with the British on its left and the 27th American Division on its right, it took part in an offensive and captured Lock No. 8, and the city of Voormezeele.

The 27th Division, New York National Guard, landed in France in June, 1918, was assigned to the British Second Army, was stationed in Belgium in the Ypres and Mont Kemmel salient, and from July 8 to August 20 held the East Popeinghe line behind Dickebusch Lake. August 21 it was moved up to the front line of the sector, and during the offensive of August 31-September 2, captured Vierstraat Ridge, Rosignoll Wood, Petite Bois and Plateau Farm. This done it went back to a rest area for intensive training.

Before the month ended the 27th was again at the front with the 30th Division on its right and facing it the St. Quentin tunnel and the famous Hindenburg Line of defenses. As described by Lieutenant Colonel Kincaid, this line "consisted of three deep trenches with concrete firing steps, each trench protected by a belt of barbed wire entanglements twenty to thirty feet in width. The first belt of wire might be cut, but there was another beyond, and still another beyond that. These trenches were as strong as human ingenuity and human power and human labor could make them. Behind them, acting as a great warehouse for fresh troops and a haven for exhausted ones, lay the famous St. Quentin Canal tunnel built by Napoleon in 1811. It was 5.7 kilometers long (about 6,000 yards in our measurement), dug straight through a hill, and constructed of arched brick walls with a broad towpath running along the side. The Boche had filled the canal within the tunnel with canal boats in which men were quartered, and had sealed

both ends with ferro-concrete walls four feet thick. The tunnel lay from ten to fifty meters under ground. Access to the fighting lines was had through passages and galleries cut from the tunnel to the trenches.”⁴

In front of the Hindenburg Line were three outpost positions known as the Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm. Against these outposts men of the 27th Division (106th Regiment) advanced in the face of machine gun fire on the morning of September 27. The fighting was desperate. The Knoll changed hands four times, but when night came Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm, and all but a small part of the Knoll were in our hands. On the 29th the attack on the Hindenburg Line was made. Preceded by twenty-six of the heaviest British tanks, two regiments, the 107th and the 108th, went forward; but within two hours ground mines and anti-tank guns wrecked all the tanks save one, which returned badly damaged. Despite this disaster the men of the 108th pushed on, broke through the Hindenburg Line and held their ground. To their right the 107th, meantime, tore its way through the belts of barbed wire to attack the tunnel. But as it went forward, conquering one area after another, the Germans, armed with machine guns and grenades, came through the underground passages connecting with the tunnel and attacked our troops in the rear, and opened a fire on their left flank from Vendhuille. The 105th regiment was then sent to aid the 107th, and these two, after desperate fighting and in spite of heavy odds, reached the line and forced the Germans out of the tunnel. Men from the 30th Division by this time had driven the Germans before them and captured Bellicourt, Noroy, Riqueval, Carriere, Etricour and Ferme, and had advanced nearly two and a half miles.

October 1 both divisions were withdrawn; but four days later the 30th was back in the front, and in four days of continuous fighting captured a score of towns and villages and advanced nearly ten miles. October 11 the Division was relieved by the

⁴ *New York Times Magazine* Section, March 9, 1919.

27th, but was again at the front on the 16th, taking over a part of the sector held by the 27th Division near St. Souplet on the Selle River. October 17 the two Divisions forced a passage of the river, climbed the slippery banks on the further side, and by the 19th had driven the enemy back to near Catillon.

When the Argonne-Meuse advances had reached Landres-et-St. George, and Aincreville, October 18, the 37th and 91st Divisions were withdrawn from the front and hastily sent to help the French Army in Belgium. Detraining near Ypres they moved to the Lys River, were attached to the French Army and placed at the disposal of the King of the Belgians. On the night of October 29th the 37th Division crossed the Lys, occupied a line along the Ghent-Courtrai railroad in front of Olsene, and early on the morning of October 31 attacked the Germans and drove them to the Cruyshautem Ridge, half way between Lys and Escaut or Scheldt Rivers. There the enemy made a stand, but was again attacked, routed and driven across the Escaut. Preparations were at once made to force a crossing and attack the Germans on the other side. November 2 the attempt was made, and despite machine gun bullets and shrapnel a bridge was completed by nightfall. All day long November 3 the fighting went on more desperately than before, but by dark nine companies of infantry and four machine gun companies had crossed and established a bridgehead, and there they remained until relieved by the French November 5. Meantime the 91st Division captured Spitals Bosschen, a wood extending across its sector, reached the Escaut and entered the town of Audenarde.

In the 37th and 91st Divisions [said General Degoutte in a general order] I found the same spirit of duty, and the willing submission to discipline which makes gallant soldiers and victorious armies.

The enemy was to hold the heights between the Lys and the Escaut "to the death." American troops, of these divisions, acting in concert with the French Divisions of the group of Armies in Flanders, broke through the enemy on the 31st of October, 1918, and after severe fighting threw him on the Escaut.

Then, attempting an operation of war of unheard of audacity, the American units crossed the overflowed Escaut under fire of the enemy and maintained themselves on the opposite bank of the river in spite of his counter-attacks.

Glory to such troops and their chief! They have valiantly contributed to the liberation of a part of Belgian territory and to final victory.

From October 2 to 9 the 2d Division fought with the French against the Germans in their old position before Rheims, broke down the defense works on their front, attacked the strongly held wooded hill of Blanc Mont, captured it on the second assault and swept "over it with consummate dash and skill," said General Pershing. "This division then repulsed strong counter-attacks before the village and cemetery of St. Etienne and took the town, forcing the Germans to fall back from before Rheims and yield positions they had held since September, 1914."

Reduction of the Château-Thierry salient, the Montdidier salient, the St. Mihiel salient, left nothing for the Allied armies to do but begin a frontal attack along the whole battle front. The part assigned the American First Army was to take over a sector northwest of Verdun, stretching from the Forest of Argonne to the river Meuse. Behind this line was the Longouyon-Sedan railway, over which passed the greater part of the supplies for the German armies on the western front. There also were the Briey iron mines, then used by the Germans and which contained more than half the iron ore in Europe. To cut this railway, and deprive the Germans of the use of the mines, was the task assigned the American army. That it was a task difficult to accomplish and would be attended by heavy losses was well known, for between the railway and the German front, concentrated on the hilltops along a strip of territory but twenty kilometers wide, were five lines of defense, the Hindenburg Stellung, the Hagen Stellung, the Volker Stellung, the Kriemhilde Stellung and the Freya Stellung. The country, about to become the field of an ever memorable battle, was admirably adapted for defense. The Forest of Argonne, impene-

trable save by a few paths, seemed almost impregnable. The rolling hills, the patches of forest, the heights along the Meuse dominated from its eastern bank were well suited for defense and were well defended by every means known to modern warfare—trenches, great and small, barbed wire entanglements, "pill boxes," dugouts and thousands of machine guns behind rocks, in trees, in holes.

To this front the army was accordingly moved from St. Mihiel, and on the night of September 25 the line from La Harazée in the Forest of Argonne to the Meuse, near Forges, was quietly taken over.

On the right from the Meuse to Malancourt was the 3d Corps, composed of the 33d, 80th and 4th Divisions in line, and the 3d Division as Corps reserve. The 5th Corps from Malancourt to Vauquois consisted of the 79th, 37th and 91st Divisions in line, and the 32d as Corps reserve. From Vauquois to Vienne-le-Château was the 1st Corps, composed of the 35th, 28th and 77th Divisions in line, and the 92d as Corps reserve. The 1st, 29th and 82d Divisions formed the Army reserve. On the left from the Forest of Argonne to the Suippe was the French 4th Army. On the right bank of the Meuse was the 17th French Corps. East of the Argonne the American Army was to drive a deep salient into the German line, while the French drove another to the west and so pinch out the Germans, for it was asserted that the Forest could not be cleared by direct attack. The first objective of our army was a line from the forest to Apremont, Exermont, Romagne, and Briulles.

It was past eleven o'clock on the night of September 25th when the Americans began a heavy artillery fire; half past two in the morning of the 26th when the guns along the twenty-mile front opened with drum fire, and half past five o'clock when the infantry went over the top, and with true American dash attacked the first defenses of the Hindenburg Line. On the right and the left the advance went steadily forward, but in the center it was checked by the stubborn defense of Montfaucon,

which rose before the troops as did Montsec in the St. Mihiel sector. By nightfall the 35th Division had not reached Charpenry but had passed Véry, the 37th had not reached Ivoiry, and the 79th was stopped in front of Montfaucon. Early on the 27th the attack was resumed, Ivoiry taken, and the enemy driven from Montfaucon. It had long been supposed to be untakable and from a tower on its summit the Crown Prince had watched the operations against Verdun. This tower, which now fell into American hands, was a telescopic pole eighty feet long when extended and twelve feet when folded. On one side was a seat where the Crown Prince sat to observe with field glasses. That observations might be made from the ground, there was a periscope consisting of an objective piece at the top of the pole and at the bottom a telescope with three eye pieces. Tower and hoisting apparatus were mounted on a gun carriage.

When night came our men had entered the German lines to a depth of seven miles, and held 8,000 prisoners and twelve villages. Along their front the French also had been victorious, and by the close of the second day had captured some 10,000 prisoners, and advanced at some points five miles.

On the 27th the fighting was of great intensity. New divisions were brought up by the enemy for counter-attacks, and reënforcements were hurried forward to stop our advance. Work with the tanks was hampered by pitfalls dug in the roads and covered with a few inches of earth, into which the tanks fell; by stone walls built across the roads at intervals, and across streets in the little villages, and by masonry which rose several feet above the ground. Trenches, large and small, ditches and barbed wire entanglements in amazing quantity, hindered the advance of the infantry; yet gains were made, and at the end of the third day the center of the army, despite masonry, pitfalls, barbed wire, machine guns and gas, had reached Apremont, Exermont, Cierges.

During September 29 and 30 and October 1 the battle front went backward and forward with small gains to either side, and

at the end of the third day remained much where it was on the first. Against the Americans were concentrated division after division of the best German troops. Three Prussian Guard divisions, the flower of the enemy army, were fighting our boys who, but a few months before, had been called from civil life. October 2, as the 77th Division drove through the Argonne Forest, the first battalion of the 308th Infantry, a company of the 307th, and some members of the 306th Machine Gun Company, six in all, under command of Major Charles S. Whittlesey, pushed through a gap in the German trenches, advanced to a ravine at Charlevaux Mill and were cut off in the heart of the forest. During five days without food, surrounded by the enemy firing on them from all sides, they held their ground until rescued on the night of October 7. The next day two hundred and fifty-two survivors of the six hundred and seventy-nine who entered the ravine went back to a rest area to find that they had become famous as the "Lost Battalion."

Meantime the French had advanced west of the forest, and the Germans in the woods were in a pocket from which they must retreat. October 3 the French smashed their way through defenses composed of trenches and barbed wire five miles deep, drove the enemy out of Challange, advanced to the edge of Mouron, and occupied the crest of the valley known as Croix des Soudans, overlooking the valley of the Aisne. October 4 our line ran from Briulles-sur-Meuse through Gesnes and Fleville to a point north of Binarville. This ended the first phase of the battle with the army ahead of the first objective in the forest, but short of it east of the Aire. Along the line on the morning of October 4 our men drove the enemy to a line two kilometers north of Binarville and Gesnes, and at nightfall were astride the Kriemhilde Line near Briulles. Fighting on the 5th and 6th was the fiercest our army had as yet encountered. On one stretch of the battle front, it was reported, the Germans had five machine guns to the yard, and at another the artillery was grouped in a zone two miles deep. The forest was full of steel and concrete pill boxes, of trenches running in every direc-

tion and of machine gun nests. Nevertheless the Germans were driven from Châtel and Chéhéry, and from commanding hills west of the Aisne, in hand-to-hand fighting. October 9 the Kriemhilde Line was broken between Cunel and Romagne, and the French line joined at Lancon.

As our troops pushed northward along the west bank of the Meuse they suffered much from machine gun and artillery fire turned on them by the Germans on the east bank. It became necessary, therefore, to push forward the line east of the Meuse, a line held by the 17th French Corps, to which the 29th American Division had been assigned as a unit. Beginning at the river and going eastward the Divisions were 29th American, and 18th and 26th French. Along the west bank of the Meuse from Regnéville northward was the 33d American Division, and this on October 6 was also transferred to the 17th French Corps. October 8 the advance began, and while the troops east of the river drove the enemy northward, engineers from the 33d Division, despite constant artillery fire, built two bridges, one at Brabant-sur-Meuse, and one at Consenvoye. Several battalions crossed, and by night the line ran from north of Consenvoye to Beaumont. October 9 the line was pushed to the outskirts of Sivry. West of the river from the Argonne to the Meuse our troops had now reached the Kriemhilde Stellung, a system of defense some two and a half miles in depth, and running over the hills around Sommerance, Romagne, Cunel Bantheville and Landres-et-St. Georges. If this line were broken nothing could prevent the cutting of the four-track railroad from Carigan to Mézières, over which passed the supplies, munitions, men, the life blood of the German armies in France. General von der Marwitz therefore determined to hold the line at all costs, and the next twenty days were passed in a desperate effort by the American Army to break through. October 11 all the Argonne Forest was in American hands, and on the 16th Grand Pré was taken by our troops. At six o'clock in the morning, without artillery preparation, without attracting the attention of the enemy in any way, men of the 77th Division moved

forward through the woods, waded across the Aire River at four places, struggled across a mud flat and coming suddenly upon the Germans drove them into the woods north of Grand Pré and held the town. There again the resistance of the Germans stiffened, and October 23 they were back in Grand Pré, but were driven out, and Champigneulle was taken and lost.

Captured orders showed they were to hold back the Americans at all costs, and in their efforts to do so division after division was brought forward. Since the drive began twenty German divisions had been so cut to pieces that replacement was necessary, and some thirty were concentrated to stop the advance. It could not be stopped and October 23 the fighting was north of Bantheville, which had several times changed hands in the course of a few days, and the enemy had been driven from Brioules. The month closed with Aincreville in possession of the Americans, and the second phase of the long and desperate battle of Argonne ended, with our men on the southern edges of the Bois des Loges.

November 1 was a day long to be remembered. The enemy was forced back past Imécourt and Bayonville; Andevanne was stormed; the Bois des Loges was nearly cleared, the outskirts of Villers-devant-Dun were reached, and a dozen villages and some 3,000 prisoners captured. November 2 the newly constructed Freya Stellung was broken through at Bayonville, Champigneulle and Briquency taken, Buzancy stormed, and Fosse, Tailly, Villers-Devant-Dun and Doulecon captured. So rapidly did the enemy retreat that in the early afternoon all contact with him was lost and a hurry call was made for trucks with which to give chase. "We are moving infantry in trucks after the retreating enemy, but have not overtaken him," said an official report.

A great wedge with Fosse at the peak was thus driven into the enemy front. November 3 the western side of the wedge was straightened out, and the line carried past Authe, St. Pierremont, Sommauthe, Vaux-en-Dieulet, and to beyond Sassey-sur-Meuse.

On the evening of November 3 the 2d Division was near Vaux-en-Dieulet. That night two infantry regiments, the 9th and 23d, formed in column on the road leading to Beaumont, and, with no other protection than the usual advance guard and flank patrols, marched all night through the enemy's lines for a distance of some eight kilometers. Details of German troops passing along the road were met and captured, machine gunners asleep at their guns were made prisoners, as were some officers found sitting around tables in a farm house.

November 4 our army swept through the woods of Dieulet, and driving along the west bank of the Meuse took Laneuville, pushed on to the outskirts of Létanne and carried their front northward and westward through Beaumont and la Berliere to near Tannay. In the dark hours of the morning of November 5th the Meuse was crossed near Briulles and later near Clery le Petit. On the following day Dun, Milly, Lion, Fontaines were taken, and by the 11th the front was driven eastward beyond Chaumont, Damvillers, Jametz, Remoiville and Stenay. Meantime west of the Meuse the Americans day by day went irresistibly onward, and on the afternoon of November 7 patrols of the 42 Division entered Wadelincourt, opposite Sedan. The army had fought its way for twenty-five miles from its line of departure, had day after day beaten back the best troops Germany could produce, had reached the goal for which it set out, had cut the enemy's main line of communication and left him nothing but an armistice or surrender. No better fighting was ever done by any army than by our boys on their way to Sedan. Forty-six enemy divisions had been used against them, and all in vain. They had taken 44,000 prisoners and 1,400 guns, howitzers and truck mortars.

It was now the plan of General Pershing to send the First Army in the direction of Longwy, while the Second Army, organized October 10th, and sent to occupy a sector in the Woivre, moved towards the coal fields of Briey. Attacks were accordingly ordered, and that by the Second Army was under

way when the armistice was signed and orders came to cease firing at eleven o'clock on the morning of November 11th.

We had then in France 1,338,169 combat troops. Including these, the regiment in Italy, the men at Murmansk and those on their way to Europe, the total number sent from our country to fight, and to help those who fought, was 2,075,834.

As the French and British along the western front drove back the Germans and recovered cities, towns and villages, they found such evidence of German brutality as astonished them even after four years of experience.

To those who entered St. Quentin, after the Germans withdrew, it presented the appearance of a dead and ruined city. Of all its former inhabitants not a man, woman or child remained. Here and there it had been damaged by shell fire and here and there wrecked by the Germans for unknown reasons. In the houses and shops not an article of the smallest value remained. Everything movable had been carried away. They had been stripped clear, "to the plaster on the walls and the boards on the floor," said one who wandered through its streets.

Elsewhere, as the Germans fell back, every town, village and countryside had been burned, sacked, destroyed and systematically laid waste. Angered and aroused by this long series of wanton outrages, without any military excuse, the French Government publicly protested and threatened reprisals.

The German Government has never ceased to proclaim that should it ever be obliged to abandon the French territories it has occupied, it will leave behind it only land completely devastated and desolated. This savage threat has been carried into effect with methodical ferocity on the occasion of every enemy withdrawal. Compelled now to retire continuously under the unrelaxing pressure of the Allies, the German armies, in revenge for their invariable defeats, are wreaking their fury more cruelly than ever on the people, on their towns, on the soil itself.

Nothing is spared to the unfortunate inhabitants of our provinces. Torn brutally from their homes and their homesteads, deported in

crowds, driven like herds of cattle before the retreating German armies, they see behind them their houses and factories pillaged and demolished, their schools and hospitals in flames, their churches blown up with dynamite, their gardens and plantations utterly laid waste. They meet with villages mined and roads sown with diabolical machines scientifically timed to explode and cause the maximum of murder among the refugees returning to their hearths and homes. To all these horrors is now added the bombing of hospitals and the cynical slaughter of the wounded.

In view of these systematic violations of Right and Humanity, the French Government is under the imperious necessity of addressing a solemn warning to Germany and the States which assist in this monstrous work of ravage and devastation. Conduct which is equally contrary to international law and the fundamental principles of all human civilization will not go unpunished. The German people, who are accomplices in these crimes, will have to bear the consequences. The authors and directors of these crimes will be held responsible morally, judicially and financially. They will seek in vain to escape the inexorable expiation which awaits them. The account with them is opened and will have to be settled. France is now in communication with her Allies as to the decisions that may be come to.

The *Allgemeine Tiroler Anzeiger* on September 9, 1918, published the following order issued by the military authorities at Innsbruck: "Every effort must be made to prevent enemy aircraft which have landed from restarting. Notification should immediately be telegraphed of such enemy aircraft the moment they land. In order that all troops, the local gendarmerie, and the civil population may coöperate efficiently, the military authority notified at the same time the Governors of Innsbruck and Linz, the Provincial Governor of Salzburg, and the provincial commandants of gendarmerie in addition that the dropping of manifestoes and proclamations by enemy airmen constitutes a crime against the State, and that every airman who drops such manifestoes, or who merely carries them with him, places himself by the mere fact outside international law, and will be held guilty of a crime punishable with death."

The Government of the French Republic hereby gives notice to the Austro-Hungarian Government that if measures so contrary to the most elementary laws of humanity should be carried into execution against French airmen, the French authorities will make reprisals which will apply the same penalty to double the number of Austrian officers who may fall into their hands.

The French National Committee for the Reparation of Damages Caused by the War made a vigorous protest.

The attention of the National Committee for the Entire Reparation of Damages Caused by the War has been called upon to determine devastations, plunder, war tax levies, taxes created without military necessity, in invaded regions, and which, despite the reprobation and the feeling of horror caused by such deeds all the world over, have been increasing more and more.

These odious proceedings, reviving long forgotten historical scenes, are contrary to the usages of war, as the Germans themselves dare to qualify their military operations which change hostilities into an abominable robbery, meaning to bring about, above all, the industrial and commercial ruin of the invaded country, ought not to remain unpunished. And this punishment of crimes and murders patiently premeditated, carefully prepared, and coolly and cruelly accomplished, cannot be inferior to their monstrous character.

The ancient law of retaliation, however repugnant it is to the nations fighting for the triumph of justice and liberty, is the only one fit, in the circumstances, to be invoked against a nation that has willfully and deliberately put itself outside of civilization and finds itself in a state of systematic retrogression.

The National Committee, on behalf of the interests intrusted to their care, invite all Governments whose peoples participate in this new crusade to announce their formal resolve to make use of a modernized retaliation law, according to the barbarians' own wish, town for town, village for village, church for church, castle for castle, property for property. Such is the only formula likely to make an impression on minds and hearts closed to all feeling except that which may arise from fear of punishment.

Even our own government was forced to protest and address a note to Germany through the Swiss Minister at Washington.

I have the honor [said Secretary Lansing] to request that you will bring the following to the attention of the German Government:

In its note of Oct. 20th the German Government announced that "the German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability."

Information has now reached the Government of the United States to the effect that the German authorities in Belgium have given voice to the coal mining companies that all men and animals should be

brought out of the pits; that all raw materials in the possession of the companies should be delivered to the Germans, and that the mines will be destroyed at once.

Acts so wanton and malicious, involving as they do the destruction of a vital necessity to the civilian population of Belgium and the consequent suffering and loss of human life which will follow, cannot fail to impress the Government and the people of the United States as willfully cruel and inhuman. If these acts, in flagrant violation of the declaration of Oct. 20, are perpetrated, it will confirm the belief that the solemn assurances of the German Government are not given in good faith.

In the circumstances the Government of the United States, to which the declaration of Oct. 20 was made, enters an emphatic protest against the measures contemplated by the German authorities for whose conduct the Government of Germany is wholly responsible.

As the week closed, October 5, reports from the western front set forth that flames were shooting up from Douai; that the torch had been applied in village after village in the country east of Douai and Cambrai; that flames in Roulers were plainly visible; that towns along the Belgian coast were burning, and that great anxiety was felt for the fate of Lille, which the Germans were hastily evacuating.

Everywhere along the front the week had been one of triumph. Each of the nine armies of the Allies, the Belgian, the four British, the three French and the American, had been victorious. Truly enough did the Frankfort *Zeitung* say:

The Allied plan of attack is being carried out in an extraordinary manner. It is an awful strain on our front. The situation on the Meuse, where American attacks are just beginning, is extremely critical. Part of the Chemin des Dames has been given up, and the whole German front is gradually crumbling away under the Allied attack.

Another week brought no diminution of the crumbling away. Cambrai was taken by the British; Anglo-American troops drove a wedge as far eastward as Solesmes; the French along the Aisne forced back the German front past Berry-au-Bec, and Rheims, at last, was out of reach of German guns. By Satur-

day, October 19th, the retreat of the Germans in Flanders had almost become a rout, Ostend and Zeebrugge had been taken, the King and Queen of the Belgians had entered Ostend and Bruges, the French were within fifteen miles of Ghent, and Thielt and Roulers and Courtrai were captured. Between the Lys and the Scarpe the front was forced well to the west of Tourcoing, Roubaix, Lille and Douai. Between the Scarpe and the Oise southwest of Cambrai where Americans fought beside the British, Le Cateau and Wassigny were occupied and the enemy forced across the Oise River. La Fere was taken and Laon.

Along the Italian front for some weeks past no fighting of serious importance had occurred. On the night of October 23-24, however, vigorous attacks were made by the Italian army, in the Monte Grappa sector, and by British forces on an island in the Piave, and some 3,000 prisoners taken. This was the beginning of a great drive by the Italian, British, French and American forces before which the Austrian army crumbled away, and when the month ended the Piave had been crossed, the defeat of the Austrians had become a rout, Belluno had been reached and passed and the Austrian army divided. As the Allies drew near the Tagliamento General Diaz delivered to the Austrian commander-in-chief the Allies' terms for an armistice. By November 3d patrols had crossed the Tagliamento, Udine had been entered, Trent had been occupied; and land and naval forces held Trieste. Sunday, November 3d, the armistice was signed and went into effect at three o'clock on Monday afternoon, November 4th.

CHAPTER IV

PEACE OFFENSIVES

DURING the month of June, 1918, the German armies had almost reached the point of their extreme advance. None of the objectives had been attained. No wedge had been driven between the French and the British. The Channel ports had not been captured. Paris was still in French hands. Viewed from the standpoint of the German people the advance had been a series of victories crushing to their foe. Germany was still triumphant. But to the rulers of Germany the situation was serious indeed. The arrival, week after week, of thousands of Americans; the knowledge that several millions more were ready and would come; the fighting qualities shown by the American soldier at Cantigny, at Château-Thierry, at Belleau Wood, wherever they had fought, gave to the high command no comfortable assurances for the future. Clearly the time had come for another 'peace offensive. No surprise therefore was expressed by the Allies when, on June 24, in the Reichstag, von Kühlmann reopened the peace discussion.

He considered it necessary to say quite simply and in a way easy for all to understand "what our positive desires are."

We wish for the German people and our Allies, a free, strong, independent existence within the boundaries drawn for us by history. We desire overseas possessions corresponding to our greatness and wealth; the freedom of the seas, carrying our trade to all parts of the world.

Once the moment arrived [when the nations then locked in battle should exchange peace views], one of the preliminary conditions must be certain degrees of mutual confidence in each other's honesty and chivalry. For so long as every overture is regarded by others as a peace offensive, as a trap or as something false for the purpose of

sowing disunion between allies; so long as every attempt at a rapprochement is at once violently denounced by the enemies of a rapprochement in the various countries, so long will it be impossible to see how any exchange of ideas leading to peace can be begun.

In view of the magnitude of this war and the number of Powers, including those from overseas, that are engaged, its end can hardly be expected through purely military decisions alone and without recourse to diplomatic negotiations.

Our position on the battlefields, our enormous military resources, the situation and the determination at home permit us to use such language. We hope our enemies perceive that in view of our resources the idea of victory for the Entente is a dream.

I do not believe that any responsible man in Germany, not even the Kaiser or the members of the Imperial Government, ever for a moment believed they could win the domination in Europe by starting this war. The idea of world domination in Europe is a Utopia, as proved by Napoleon. The nation which tried it would, as happened in France, bleed to death in useless battle and would be most grievously injured and lowered in her development. One may here apply Von Moltke's phrase, "Woe to him who sets Europe afire."

At no moment of our later history was there less occasion for us to start, or to contribute to the starting of, a conflagration than the moment in which it occurred. In a former debate I pointed out that the absolute integrity of the German Empire and its allies formed the necessary prerequisite condition for entering into a peace discussion or negotiations. That is our position to-day.

From England the reproach is constantly made that we are not prepared on a hint from England to state our attitude publicly on the Belgian question. On this point the fundamental views of the Imperial Government differ from those ascribed to us by English statesmen. We regard Belgium as one question in the entire complex. We must, however, decline to make, as it were, a prior concession by giving a statement on the Belgian question which would bind us, without the least binding the enemy.

I believe that one can say without fear of contradiction, as the result of revelations, that the deeper we go into the causes of this war, the clearer it becomes that the Power which planned and desired the war was Russia; that France played the next worst rôle as instigator and that England's policy has very dark pages to show.

England's attitude before the outbreak of the war was bound to strengthen Russia's desire for war. Of this there are proofs enough in the documents already published.

On the other hand, Germany did not for an instant believe that this war could lead to the domination of Europe, much less to the domination of the world. On the contrary, the German policy before the war showed good prospects of being able satisfactorily to realize its essential aims, namely, the settlement of affairs in the East and colonial problems by peaceful negotiations.

The remainder of the speech was an attempt to justify the action of Germany in Russia, in Finland, Courland, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, and the advance of Turkey in the Caucasus.

That part of the speech in which he said the end of the war "can hardly be expected through purely military decisions alone and without recourse to diplomatic negotiations"; that part in which he asserted that Russia was the Power that planned and started the war, and that "the idea of world domination in Europe is a Utopia" were received by the Reichstag with marked disapproval. In the course of the debate which followed one member feared that "abroad they will consider it as a new peace offensive." Another declared it would have a most depressing effect; that not negotiations but hammer blows brought peace in the East. The Chancellor, Count von Hertling, said he "originally had no intention of taking part in this debate," because of the experience of his predecessor and himself.

If we spoke of our willingness for peace, it was regarded as a symptom of weakness and our impending collapse. By others it was interpreted as a crafty trap. Did we speak, on the other hand, of our unshakable will to defend ourselves in a war of conquest so criminally thrust upon us, it was said that it was the voice of German militarism to which even the leading statesmen must submit willy-nilly.

I went a step further, on February 24, and expressed my attitude toward the message of President Wilson in which he discussed his four points and gave, in principle, my assent to them. I said that these four points of President Wilson might possibly form the basis of a general world peace. No utterance of President Wilson whatever followed this, so that there is no object in spinning any further the threads they started.

There is still less object after statements which have since reached

us, especially from America. These statements, indeed, made it really clear what is to be understood by a peace league of peoples, or a league of peoples, for the maintenance of freedom and justice. Our opponents made it clear what would be the kernel of this league of people, that it would not be difficult to isolate the uncomfortable upward strivings of Germany and by economic strangulation to extinguish her vital breath. I considered it, as against this, quite proper that the Foreign Secretary make a statement on the details of our political position in the East from Finland to the Black Sea, and in my opinion he carried out the task thoroughly. On the other hand, some of his statements got a more or less unfriendly reception in wide circles.

I feel obliged to clear away a misunderstanding which, it seems, was caused by the interpretation of the second part of the Foreign Secretary's statement. The tendency of these utterances of the Foreign Secretary was purely to ascribe the responsibility for the continuation and immeasurable prolongation of this terrible war to the enemy Powers entirely in the sense I had indicated on February 24, for it goes without saying there can be no question of lessening our energetic defense or our will, or of shaking our confidence in victory.

Stormy applause followed this utterance by the Chancellor. To the pan-Germanists the speech of von Kühlmann was especially offensive, and July 9 he resigned. On the following day Count von Hertling formally announced to the Reichstag that Admiral von Hintze would succeed von Kühlmann, and again reviewed the war aims and policy of Germany.

I maintain the standpoint of the imperial reply to the peace note of Pope Benedict. The pacific spirit which inspired this reply has also inspired me. At the time, however, I added that this spirit must not give our enemies free conduct for an interminable continuation of the war. What have we lived to see, however? While for years there can have been no doubt whatever of our willingness to hold out our hand toward an honorable peace, we have heard until these last few days inciting speeches delivered by enemy statesmen. President Wilson wants war until we are destroyed, and what Mr. Balfour, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has said must really drive the flush of anger to the cheeks of every German.

We feel for the honor of our Fatherland and we cannot allow ourselves to be constantly and openly insulted in this manner, and

behind these insults is the desire for our destruction. As long as this desire for our destruction exists we must endure together with our faithful nation. I am also convinced, I know it, that in the widest circles of our nation the same serious feeling exists everywhere. As long as the desire for our destruction exists we must hold out, and we will hold out, with confidence in our troops, in our army administration and in our magnificent nation which bears so wonderfully these difficult times, with their great privations and continuous sacrifices.

In the direction of our policy nothing will be changed. If, in spite of these hostile statements by these statesmen, any serious efforts for a paving of the way to peace were to show themselves anywhere, then, quite certainly, we would not adopt a negative attitude from the very beginning, but we would examine these seriously meant,—I say expressly seriously meant—efforts immediately, with scrupulous care.

This was not only his position but emphatically that of the Chief of the Army Administration, who does not conduct war for the sake of war, but has said to me that as soon as a serious desire for peace manifests itself on the other side we must follow it up.

Some remarks of the Chancellor which related to Belgium were not given to the press; but, on the following day, an official statement was issued at Berlin:

With regard to the statements made to-day (July 12) by the Imperial Chancellor in the Main Committee of the Reichstag, regarding Belgium, a view has spread among the public which may give rise to misunderstandings. We are therefore giving in full that part of the Chancellor's speech. Count Hertling said:

"With reference to the future of Belgium, as I already said yesterday, the occupation and present possession of Belgium only means that we have a pawn for future negotiations. By the term 'pawn' is meant that one does not intend to keep what one has in one's hand as a pawn if negotiations should bring a favorable result. We have no intention of keeping Belgium in any form whatever. What we precisely want, as already expressed by me on February 24, is, that after the war restored Belgium shall, as a self-dependent State, not be subject to anybody as a vassal and shall live with us in good and friendly relations. I have held this point of view from the beginning with regard to the Belgian question, and still hold it to-day.

"Gentlemen, this side of my policy is fully in conformity with the

general lines of direction which I yesterday clearly laid before you. We are waging war as a war of defense, as we have done from the very beginning, and every Imperialistic tendency, every tendency to world domination, has been remote from our minds. Therefore our peace aims will agree with what we want. That is, inviolability of our territory; open air for the expansion of our people, especially in the economic domain; and naturally, also, the necessary security in regard to future difficult conditions. This is completely in conformity with my point of view in regard to Belgium, but how this point of view can be established in detail depends on future negotiations and on this point I am unable to give binding declarations."

But this was not all he said concerning Belgium, and a few days later, on demand of members of the Reichstag, the conclusion of his remarks was made public:

With regard to the West, the Belgian question is still in the foreground. From the beginning of the war there was no intention of retaining Belgium for ever. As far as we are concerned, the war, as I said on November 29 last, was from the beginning a defensive war and not a war of conquest. That we marched into Belgium was a necessity forced upon us. The occupation of Belgium was also a necessity forced on us by the war. It fully corresponds to The Hague regulation regarding warfare on land that we established a civil administration in Belgium. Similarly we introduced a German administration there, in all domains, and I believe this was not to the disadvantage of the Belgian population. Belgium, in our hands, is a pledge for future negotiations. This pledge in our hands means a pledge against certain dangers which are warded off by the retention in our hands of this security. This pledge is, therefore, only surrendered when these dangers are removed. Belgium, as a pledge, means therefore for us that we must secure ourselves by the peace conditions, as I have already said, against Belgium's ever becoming a jumping-off ground for our enemies, and not only in a military but also in an economic sense. We must protect ourselves against being strangled economically after the war. Owing to its conditions, its position, and its development, Belgium is completely dependent on Germany. If we enter into close relations with Belgium in the economic domain it will be also entirely to the interest of Belgium.

If we succeed in getting into close relations with Belgium, and if we succeed in coming to an understanding with Belgium also with regard to political questions which touch Germany's vital interests,

then we have a definite prospect that therewith we shall have the best security against future dangers which might menace us from Belgium, and through Belgium from England and France. This also tallies with Herr von Kühlmann's view.

The Berlin *Tageblatt* condemned the speech, saying:

The Chancellor is silent about war aims. If Count von Hertling considers Belgium is part of the peace question he must remember that for nobody outside of Germany is Belgium even a question for argument. At the beginning of the war Germany entered into very definite obligations regarding Belgium, and even if these obligations did not exist the Belgian question for most people in the world is merely a plain question of right. The Chancellor's remarks about Russia smell of powder. After reading von Hertling's whole speech the uncomfortable impression is left that in view of the entire situation a policy of waiting is deemed advisable. The Chancellor pursues no policy of large principles, but is merely an adroit opportunist. He considers it sufficient if he again bridles the Reichstag majority. He will then return to main headquarters and say with a smile: "You see how easy it is!"

The Frankfurter *Zeitung* said:

Chancellor von Hertling's declaration regarding Belgium is a great step in advance. Enemy statesmen cannot interpret it, as the British Foreign Secretary Balfour did the Chancellor's February speech, by indicating that Germany intends to make Belgium subservient to herself by means of commercial, territorial, and military conditions. There is now no obstacle on Germany's side to the ending of the war.

The Vossische *Zeitung* believed:

Chancellor von Hertling's statement on Belgium was made with a definiteness which always hitherto has been lacking. The Chancellor's thorough exposition of his conception of the Belgian problem will silence chatter about German statesmen being intentionally silent on this subject or expressing themselves with studied obscurity.

Germania held that:

Belgium is the most important question raised by the war, and with the Chancellor's clear statement regarding it the internal political situation can now be considered as no longer strained.

The foreign press was still commenting on von Hertling's speech when, July 16, Baron Burian, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, in an address to the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers on the eve of the meeting of the Reichsrat, replied to President Wilson's speech on the Fourth of July.

It is not easy to draw a picture of the present world situation in view of the swiftly moving nature of events. Everything is in full swing and a repetition of what has so often been said regarding the causes and responsibilities for the past can no longer influence our judgment because, on that subject, everybody already has formed his own view. The consequences of the war already have grown infinitely and have gone far beyond the original causes of the war. The present phase of events and developments, too, throw a glaring light on the conflicting interests of the different belligerent groups which clashed at the beginning of this murderous struggle, but they, perhaps, are not without slight signs of an internal change taking place in the relations of the groups.

In the midst of the terrible struggle, and in every phase of this war of successful defense, the Central Powers have had no other aim in view but to secure the enemy's will to peace. If we sum up all that has been said on the enemy's side in regard to their war aims we recognize three groups of aspirations which are being set forth to justify the continuation of bloodshed so that the ideals of mankind may be realized:

The freedom of all nations, which are to form a league of nations and which in future shall settle their differences by arbitration and not by arms, is to reign.

The domination of one nation by another nation is to be excluded.

Various territorial changes are to be carried out at the expense of the Central Powers.

These annexationist aims, though variously shaped, are generally known. The intention, however, also exists, especially in regard to Austria-Hungary, to carry out her internal disintegration for the purpose of the formation of new States. Finally, our opponents demand our atonement because we dared to defend ourselves, and successfully, against their attacks. Our ability to defend ourselves is termed militarism and must, therefore, be destroyed. Territorial aims are, in fact, the only things now separating the different belligerent groups. For the great interests of humanity and for the justice, freedom, honor, and peace of the world, as set forth in the laws of modern political conception, regarding which we need not accept

any advice, we also are ready to fight. There is hardly any difference between the general principles enunciated by the statesmen of both belligerents. President Wilson's four new points of July 4 shall not, apart from certain exaggerations, arouse our opposition. On the contrary, we are able to approve them heartily to a great extent.

Nobody would refuse homage to this genius and nobody would refuse his coöperation. This, however, is not the main point, but it is what can also be understood in the interests of mankind. Both groups should certainly honestly attempt to clear this up and settle it by mutual agreement, but not in the same manner as, for instance, our peace treaties in the East were judged.

The fact is that all our opponents were invited to join in those peace negotiations and they could have contributed their share in bringing them to a different issue. But now, when it is too late, their criticism stands on weak grounds, for there is no legal right which would have entitled them to condemn the peace conditions which were acceptable to the contracting parties or which could not be avoided.

From the confident utterances of our opponents it appears they have no fear of being defeated. If they, nevertheless, represent the peace treaties as a warning of our treatment of a defeated enemy we do not consider the reproach justified. None of the belligerent States need ever come into the position of Russia and Rumania as we are ever ready to enter into peace negotiations with all our opponents. If our enemies continually demand atonement for wrong done and restitution, then this is a claim which we could urge with more justification against them because we have been attacked, and the wrong done to us must be redressed.

The enemy's obstinacy regarding his territorial demands concerning Alsace-Lorraine, Trieste, the Trentino, and the German colonies appears to be insurmountable. There lies the limit of our readiness for peace. We are prepared to discuss everything except our own territory. The enemy not only wants to cut from Austria-Hungary what he would like for himself, but the inner structure, that of the monarchy itself, too, is to be attacked and the monarchy dissolved, if possible, into component parts. Now that it is recognized that ordinary war methods have not sufficed to defeat us, interest in our internal affairs suddenly has become supreme. The Entente, however, discovered its sympathy with our internal affairs so late that many an enemy statesman who now prates about the monarchy's national questions as a war aim had probably no idea of their ex-

istence at the beginning of the war. This fact can be recognized from that amateurish and superficial manner in which our opponents discuss an attempt to solve these complicated problems. This method, however, appears to them to be useful. They, therefore, organized it as they have organized the blockade, and in England they now have a propaganda minister.

We wish to place this attack on record without useless indignation or whining. The choice of this new means of fighting us does not show too great a confidence in the success of the enemy's previous efforts. We are certain it will be unsuccessful. Our opponents start from a completely mechanical misjudgment of the character of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and prefer in their satisfaction to overlook, in the present difficult internal problems, the fact that these States with their various nationalities are no accidental structure, but a product of historical and ethnographical necessity which carry in themselves the fundamental principle of life and race. They, therefore, possess, and this applies fully to Austria and Hungary, the necessary elasticity and adaptability to the changing events of the times, the ability to reform themselves according to the necessity of their standard of development and to solve all internal crises without uncalled-for foreign interference.

Our enemies want to paralyze us by an offensive of irritation and to render us helpless. They want to crush our very powerful organism in order to make weak parts, one after the other, serviceable to their own purposes. According to their uninvited prescriptions one-half of Austria-Hungary's population may perish in order to make the other half happy. For that purpose this senseless war must be continued. As has always been the case, for centuries past, the States and races of the monarchy will settle their internal problems in agreement with their ruler. The monarchy resolutely declines foreign interference in any form just as it does not meddle with the affairs of foreigners. We have never prescribed a program for our enemies as to how they shall deal with their domestic questions, and when we have had occasion frequently to recall that it is not all happiness and harmony with our enemies in their domestic affairs, and that they have their own problems in Ireland, India, etc., we did so only by way of exhortation to reciprocity giving the advice: "Sweep before your own door." Our enemy's inflammatory activity is not content with trying to stir up our races against one another, but it does not even scruple, by means of circulating monstrous and base calumnies, to sow distrust between the races of the monarchy and the hereditary dynasty.

Two days after the delivery of this speech Foch began his memorable offensive, the German armies were driven eastward and northward day by day, and at the end of seven weeks Bapaume, Peronne, Noyon, Soissons and the Vesle were within the Allies' lines. Defeat faced the Germans. Again a time had come for a peace offensive, and September 9, Count Karolyi, head of the Hungarian Independent party, in an open letter to his supporters, endorsed the President's peace program as a basis of negotiation. "A decisive military victory," said he, "despite its military successes, is a dream which it is useless to follow. The prime condition for peace negotiations is the democratization of nations and the abandonment of imperialist theories. A second condition is that we should not become slaves to the idea of a Middle Europe, either military, economic, or political; that we should not strengthen our alliance with Germany which would be the first step towards the realization of this Central Europe. We ought to accept as a basis for negotiations President Wilson's program."

Count Czernin, in the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse*, endorsed the League of Nations, and on September 10, Baron Burian, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, when speaking to German newspaper men visiting Vienna, said:

I would not delude you with baseless prospects of peace at a moment when the war fever is still shaking the world. I must, however, talk to you of peace because we all honestly want it and because we are certain there is an ever-growing number of like-minded persons in all enemy countries.

Our adversaries need only provide an opportunity in a calm exchange of views, some sort of direct informative discussions is thinkable which would be far from being peace negotiations, of discussing and weighing everything which to-day separates the belligerent parties, and no further fighting will, perhaps, be needed to bring them closer together. I am certain that this war must cost this tormented earth a terrible amount of bloodshed and an immeasurable destruction of precious possessions before the end can be reached by the military overthrow of the enemy, if, indeed, this at all is possible. We are oppressed by the same cares, but we are not downhearted. You can convince yourself here that we, just as in Germany, with

head erect and without fear or arrogance, are waging a defensive war, rejecting all responsibility for the prolongation thereof which was criminally and quite uselessly forced upon us by the enemy. No party can be sure of the issue until the end of a war, but it is not to be expected that either party should renounce the possibility of a military victory. But it is unthinkable that even the most confident hopes of final victory could permit the enemy in the long run to avoid considering whether the most terrific exertions and sacrifices can longer be justified in order to carry through principles which are not the enemy's monopoly, or to regulate the affairs of other peoples who can manage them quite as well themselves. I believe that careful and sincere investigation would bring many on the other side to realize that they often are fighting for imaginary things. It may be an ungrateful task to want to communicate one's own perceptions of things to the enemy. The enemy group can, if it wishes, convince itself that in all questions of humanity and justice and of future international relations it will encounter on the part of our group no opposition, and this will be in line with our existing progressive aspirations. But at the same time it will meet our determination to continue steadfastly to stand up for our own right.

This question arises: Is it not a crime against humanity even to think of completely pulling down a structure which has become historical, and which certainly, here and there, needs improvement, but is capable of improvement, in order to found a paradise of the future on its ruins? The defect in this is that in accordance with the destructive methods of our enemies it can be created only with a much too great sacrifice. Count the past hecatombs of this war. Think of those to come, and ask whether striving to attain war aims at such a price is justifiable, war aims in which the principle of justice is put foremost, without investigation whether an understanding could not be reached by a fair application of that principle. We desire to contribute to the best of our ability to a mutual understanding and help to pave a way for conciliation. But, so long as necessary, we shall hold out in a loyal and resolute defense.

Austria-Hungary having broken the way, Germany followed on September 12, when the Kaiser, the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor spoke concerning peace.

The Kaiser saw no signs of peace. Standing before the Krupp Munition workers at Essen he bemoaned the hatred engendered by the war.

But who was it [he asked] introduced terrible hatred into this war? It was the enemy. Every one of you in the remotest corner of the Fatherland knows that I left no stone unturned to shorten the war, as far as possible, for you and your people and for the entire civilized European world. In December, 1916, I presented the enemy public with a clear and unambiguous offer of peace in the name of the German Empire and my allies. Jeers, mockery and contempt were the answer.

Even though in the opinion of many among you the war is lasting too long, every German man, every German woman must, in witnessing the heroic deeds of the army and navy, be aware that we are fighting and struggling for existence and that we must make the utmost effort to defend ourselves victoriously, not only through the work, but as regards the thoughts of our people.

You will acknowledge that I am right in describing this war as the product of a great negation. And do you ask what that negation is? It is the negation of the German people's right to existence. It is the negation of all our kultur, a negation of our achievements, of all our work. The German people were industrious, meditative, assiduous, imaginative in all domains. It worked with body and soul. But there were people who did not wish to work, but rest on their laurels. Those were our enemies. We got close to them through our profitable work and the development of our industry, science and art; through our popular education and social legislation. Thereby our people thrived and then came envy. Envy induced our enemies to fight and war came upon us. And now, when our opponents see that their hopes have been deceptive, and how our mighty generals, after whom your new workshops are rightly named, have dealt them blow upon blow, hatred springs up. We only know the honest wrath which deals the enemy the blow, but when he lies prostrate and bleeding we extend to him our hand and see to his recovery.

Hatred manifests itself only among peoples who feel themselves beaten. If, therefore, such terrible hatred exists among our enemies, it owes its origin to the fact that their calculations have been wrong. Every one who knows the character of the Anglo-Saxons knows what it means to fight them—how tenacious they are. We do not know when the struggle will end, but one thing we do know, namely, that we must fight the battle through.

Friedrich von Payer, the Imperial Vice-Chancellor, in his speech at Stuttgart, reminded his hearers of the State debts "everywhere reaching fantastic heights"; he told them "that the

longer the European peoples lacerate each other" the greater the certainty that a weakened and impoverished Europe would be "lost in favor of cleverer and more calculating peoples"; but consoled them with the reflection that after four years of warfare the fighting was still almost entirely on enemy soil; that the loss of shipping would ruin Great Britain; that "if we lack cotton and oil our enemies lack coal," and urged the Germans to hold together.

The struggle, Herr Payer said, would not end with a peace of the usual sort.

In former peace negotiations, the middle and lower classes, when it came to the council table, fell quietly into the background. This, now, is over and the governments will conclude the coming peace treaties in close harmony with the entire people. The main thing for them in peace is not the acquisition of land, treasure and glory; they aim nowadays at least at the conclusion of a lasting peace and therefore there will be no peace of conquest. Despite everything, the peace treaty will have purely positive contents. The nations of the earth cry out for further preservation from the further misery of wars, for leagues of nations, for international courts of arbitration and agreements regarding equal disarmament, cries which the enemy governments have made their own and the fulfillment of which would not be wrecked by the German Government's opposition. We are, on the contrary, ready to collaborate to the best of our ability.

We desire to have a disarmament agreement on the condition of complete reciprocity applied not merely to land armies, but even to naval forces. In pursuance of the same idea, and even going beyond it, we will raise in the negotiations a demand for the freedom of the seas and sea routes, for the open door in all oversea possessions and for the protection of private property at sea. And if negotiations take place regarding the protection of small nations and of national minorities in individual States we shall willingly advocate international arrangements which will act for deliverance in countries under Great Britain's domination.

Germany, he said, would never consent to the restoration of despotic Russia; never place Poland or Finland again under the Russian yoke; never allow the border states on the German

frontier and the Baltic to be subjected against their wills to Russian imperialism or thrown into the perils of civil war and anarchy. They had come to an understanding with Germany and never would she suffer any one to meddle in this matter, never would she submit to the Entente for approval the treaties with Russia, Rumania, the Ukraine.

For the rest, the territorial possessions which existed before the war can everywhere be restored. A preliminary condition for us and our allies is that all the territory should again be restored which we possessed on August 1, 1914. Germany must, therefore, in the first place receive back her colonies, in which connection the idea of an exchange on the grounds of expediency need not be excluded.

We Germans, as soon as peace is concluded, can evacuate the occupied regions. We can, when once things have been brought to that stage, restore Belgium. If we and our allies are once again in possession of what belong to us and if we first are sure that in Belgium no other State will be more favorably placed than we, then Belgium, I think I may say, can be given back without incumbrance and without reserve. It is hypocrisy to represent Belgium as the innocent victim of our policy [Herr von Payer said] and to clothe her, as it were, in the white garment of innocence. The Belgian Government, that is what matters, not the Belgian people, took an active part in Great Britain's policy of encircling Germany.

As to the question of war indemnities from one party or the other, it was enough to say that if Germany had been allowed to pursue her work in peace there would have been no war, no injuries.

There can be no question, therefore, of our paying, but only whether we should receive compensation for the injuries inflicted on us. We are deeply convinced that, as the innocent and attacked party, we have a right to indemnification. To go on prosecuting the war, however, to that point would cost us such heavy sacrifices, irreparable by money, that we prefer, on calm reflection, and even with our favorable military situation, to abandon this idea, quite apart from the question of jeopardizing a future peace which would be inevitable if compensation were forcibly urged.

Unreliable conditions of peace, of course, should not be laid down

for our participation in the peace negotiations. We laugh at the idea that we should first penitently ask for mercy before we are admitted. We laugh at the fools who babble of revenge. I have wished only to show that peace by understanding will bring nothing humiliating for us nor a period of misery and wretchedness. Strong and courageous in the consciousness of our invincibility, equal among the nations of the earth, we will lead a life of labor, but also with contentment and with an assured future. In common with others we will protect the world's peace from future dangers. It would be an illusion to calculate on will to peace in those circles among our enemies which are responsible for the opening and the continuing of hostilities. For years they have been living on the inflaming of war passions. They cannot admit to their countrymen that their aims are unattainable and that their sacrifices have been made in vain.

Others among those peoples will think differently. Moreover, they will prevail sooner or later. Until then, however, there remains nothing for us to do but to defend our lives. We place the responsibility for the blood which will yet fall on the shoulders of our enemies. Germany's strength, capacity, courage and self-sacrifice must teach our enemies that it has become hopeless for them to continue to wage this baneful war.

Unless all these signs failed another German "peace offensive" might soon be expected. They did not fail, and, September 15th, just after the Allies had reached the outskirts of Cambrai and Laon, and the First American Army had swept across the salient at St. Mihiel, and come under the fire of the guns around Metz, the expected peace note appeared. It was addressed by Austria directly to all the Allied Powers through the media of such neutral nations as were charged with the care of the Allies' interests at Vienna.

The peace offer which the powers of the Quadruple Alliance addressed to their opponents on December 12, 1916, and the conciliatory basic ideas of which they have never given up, signifies, despite the rejection which it experienced, an important stage in the history of this war. In contrast to the first two and a half war years, the question of peace has from that moment been the center of European, aye, of world discussion, and dominates it in ever-increasing measure.

Almost all the belligerent states have in turn again and again expressed themselves on the question of peace, its prerequisites and

conditions. The line of development of this discussion, however, has not been uniform and steady. The basic standpoint changed under the influence of the military and political position, and hitherto, at any rate, it has not led to a tangible general result that could be utilized.

It is true that, independent of all these oscillations, it can be stated that the distance between the conceptions of the two sides has, on the whole, grown somewhat less; that despite the indisputable continuance of decided and hitherto unbridged differences, a partial turning from many of the most extreme concrete war aims is visible and a certain agreement upon the relative general basic principles of a world peace manifests itself. In both camps there is undoubtedly observable, in wide classes of the population, a growth of the will to peace and understanding. Moreover, a comparison of the reception of the peace proposal of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance on the part of their opponents with the later utterances of responsible statesmen of the latter, as well as of the non-responsible but, in a political respect, nowise uninfluential personalities, confirms this impression.

While, for example, the reply of the Allies to President Wilson's proposal made demands which amounted to the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, to a diminution and a deep internal transformation of the German Empire, and the destruction of Turkish European ownership, these demands, the realization of which was based on the supposition of an overwhelming victory, were later modified in many declarations from official Entente quarters, or in part were dropped.

Thus, in a declaration made in the British House of Commons a year ago, Mr. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary, expressly recognized that Austria-Hungary must itself solve its internal problems, and that no one could impose a constitution upon Germany from the outside. Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, declared at the beginning of this year that it was not one of the Allies' war aims to partition Austria-Hungary, to rob the Ottoman Empire of its Turkish possessions or to reform Germany internally. It may also be considered symptomatic that in December, 1917, Mr. Balfour categorically repudiated the assumption that British policy had ever engaged itself for the creation of an independent state out of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine.

The Central Powers leave it in no doubt that they are only waging a war of defense for the integrity and the security of their territories.

Far more outspoken than in the domain of concrete war aims has

the rapprochement of conceptions proceeded regarding those guiding lines upon the basis of which peace shall be concluded and the future order of Europe and the world be built up. In this direction President Wilson, in his speeches of February 12 and July 4 of this year, has formulated principles which have not encountered contradiction on the part of his Allies and the far-reaching application of which is likely to meet with no objection on the part of the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance also, presupposing that this application is general and reconcilable with the vital interests of the States concerned.

It is true, it must be remembered, that an agreement on general principles is insufficient, but that there remains the further matter of reaching an accord upon their interpretations and their application to individual concrete war and peace questions.

To an unprejudiced observer there can be no doubt that in all the belligerent states, without exception, the desire for a peace of understanding has been enormously strengthened; that the conviction is increasingly spreading that the further continuance of the bloody struggle must transform Europe into ruins and into a state of exhaustion that will mar its development for decades to come, and this without any guarantee of thereby bringing out that decision by arms which has been vainly striven after by both sides in four years filled with enormous sacrifices, sufferings and exertions.

In what manner, however, can the way be paved for an understanding and an understanding finally attained? Is there any serious prospect whatever of reaching this aim by continuing the discussion of peace problems in the way hitherto followed? We have not the courage to answer the latter question in the affirmative. The discussion from one public tribune to another, as has hitherto taken place between statesmen of the various countries, was really only a series of monologues. It lacked, above everything, directness. Speech and counterspeech did not fit into each other. The speakers spoke over one another's heads. On the other hand it was the publicity and the ground of these discussions which robbed them of possibility of fruitful progress. In all public statements of this nature a form of eloquence is used which reckons with the effect at great distances and on the masses. Consciously or unconsciously, however, one thereby increases the distance of the opponents' conception, produces misunderstandings which take root and are not removed, and makes the frank exchange of ideas more difficult. Every pronouncement of leading statesmen is, directly after its delivery and before the authori-

tative quarters of the opposite side can reply to it, made the subject of passionate or exaggerated discussion by irresponsible elements.

But anxiety lest they should endanger the interests of their arms by unfavorably influencing feeling at home, and lest they prematurely betray their own ultimate intentions, also causes the responsible statesmen themselves to strike a higher tone and stubbornly to adhere to extreme standpoints.

If, therefore, an attempt is made to see whether the basis exists for an understanding calculated to deliver Europe from the catastrophe of the suicidal continuation of the struggle, then, in any case, another method should be chosen which renders possible a direct, verbal discussion between the representatives of the governments and only between them. The opposing conceptions of individual belligerent States would likewise have to form the subject of such a discussion for mutual enlightenment as well as the general principles that shall serve as the basis for peace and the future relations of the States to one another, and regarding which, in the first place, an accord can be sought with a prospect of success.

As soon as an agreement has been reached on the fundamental principles an attempt would have to be made in the course of the discussions concretely to apply them to individual peace questions and thereby bring about their solution.

We venture to hope that there will be no objection on the part of any belligerents to such an exchange of views. The war activities would experience no interruption. The discussions, too, would only go so far as was considered by the participants to offer a prospect of success. No disadvantages would arise therefrom for the states represented. Far from harming, such an exchange of views could only be useful to the cause of peace.

What did not succeed the first time can be repeated, and perhaps it has already at least contributed to the clarification of views. Mountains of old misunderstandings might be removed and many new things perceived. Streams of pent-up human kindness would be released, in the warmth of which everything essential would remain and, on the other hand, much that is antagonistic, to which excessive independence is still attributed, would disappear.

According to our conviction all the belligerents jointly owe to humanity to examine whether now, after so many years of costly but undecided struggle, the entire course of which points to an understanding, it is possible to make an end to the terrible grapple.

The Royal and Imperial Government would like, therefore, to propose to the governments of all the belligerent states to send delegates

to a confidential and unbinding discussion on the basic principles for the conclusion of peace, in a place in a neutral country and at a near date that would yet have to be agreed upon—delegates who were charged to make known to one another the conception of their governments regarding those principles and to receive analogous communications as well as to request and give frank and candid explanations on all those points which need to be precisely defined.

The Royal and Imperial Government has the honor to request the government of ———, through the kind mediation of Your Excellency, to bring this communication to the knowledge of the government of ———.¹

A dispatch from London announced that according to information received Germany had made a definite peace offer to Belgium and that the terms were that Belgium shall remain neutral until the end of the war. That thereafter the entire economic and political independence of Belgium shall be reconstituted. That the pre-war commercial treaties between Germany and Belgium shall again be put into operation after the war for an indefinite period. That Belgium shall use her good offices to secure the return of the German colonies. That the Flemish question shall be considered and the Flemish minority, which aided the German invaders, shall not be penalized.

No admission was made that Germany had in any way wronged Belgium, nor did the proposal allude to reparation or indemnity. Instructions, it was further reported, had been given to the German legation at Helsingfors to declare to the Finnish government that in order to remove all danger of trouble between Finland and Sweden, Germany would not send troops to Eastern Karelia, and promised, if Great Britain and the other Entente Powers would evacuate Karelia and the Murman coast, to withdraw her troops from those regions within a period not named. American journals said:

Certainly Austria has wanted peace and wants it still, but it wants peace on terms which the Entente Allies not only cannot grant, but

¹ The names of the intermediary government and of that addressed in the particular note dispatched are left blank.

cannot listen to. The Entente is perfectly willing to make peace tomorrow, but that peace must be sued for by Germany, not Austria, and must be asked on the basis of the acknowledgment of defeat, the admission of wrong, and a pledge of reparation of the wrong. On no other basis could a lasting peace be arranged, and we have fought too long and sacrificed too much to consent to any other than a lasting peace.²

The answer will be a firm and decisive negative. There will be no "calm exchange of views."

President Wilson has specifically stated and repeatedly affirmed the main conditions of peace. These conditions and principles have been fully indorsed by Entente statesmen in every country concerned. Nothing short of full compliance with them will satisfy the nations now fighting together for freedom—and a condition precedent to their consideration at a peace conference is that the Central Powers and their accomplices shall lay down their arms, withdraw from occupied territories, including Russia, and that the shameful Brest-Litovsk treaty shall be abrogated. Until these conditions are complied with the answer to Austria-Hungary is NO!—and this is backed up by force "without stint or limit."

After spreading hell over thousands of miles and making deserts out of smiling gardens, these savages suggest a halt. It isn't for them to say. There may be pacifists who will advocate such an agreement. Put them down for friends of Germany the moment they begin their sentimental or treasonable talk. Why should Germany be consulted on how to terminate the war? Terms must be for her to obey, not to make. The Austrian dodge deserves notice only as an admission of defeat.³

Do we believe what we say about this German thing—that it is frightful beyond redemption, that it has no faith to pledge, that it has betrayed the very principles of civilization, that it cannot be lived with, and that it must be utterly destroyed. If all of this be true, and we believe it, then not only is it impossible to make peace with Germany, but we cannot even discuss with her the terms on which she shall be permitted to continue her existence on earth.

It is evident that Germany has abandoned the ambition to conquer the world. Shall the world be grateful on that account? Shall it parley with the thing it resolved to destroy for reasons which, if they

² *Boston Transcript.*

³ *Hartford Courant.*

are valid at all, require free people rather to perish than to compromise? To do so would stultify democracy beyond the imagination of its posterity.⁴

What the instinctive answer of the average red-blooded American will be we have no doubt. He will repeat Grant's words and say, that no terms will be accepted but an immediate and unconditional surrender. And that is what we hope the United States Government and the Governments of England, France and Italy will say. The present German Government cannot be trusted. It is more important now than ever before to apply force, without stint or limit.⁵

Germany started this war; civilization will finish it. The spirit that animates the allied millions, which commands them to get into battle and conquer, is the spirit of liberty. That spirit is now aflame throughout the world, and in outraged majesty is driving its sword straight toward the heart of its assailant. Who will attempt to stay Liberty's hand? Who is the statesman or ruler who will dare to stay the execution of the assassin? Who is the man who will try to interfere with God's will as voiced by His people?⁶

Let the Hun whine, let him sing his song of peace and brotherhood. Our answer to his peace twaddle shall be more war. We shall reply to his whimpers with machine guns. Against his flimsy structures of whining deception we let loose our armies with renewed vigor.⁷

The answer to this bit of sinister Teutonism should be unconditional surrender. Then a conference may be held to arrange the details. America, England, France, and Italy can do no other than insist upon this. They owe it to the heroic dead of their armies who gave their lives for the maintenance of the principles the President enunciated and all approved; they owe it to the fighting men in the field who are cheerfully accepting the dangers, the hardships, and the strain of battle that liberty and democracy may live, and they owe it to their people at home who have been undergoing and are still undergoing the privation and sacrifices the support of the armies entails to accept no peace of compromise. It must rather be surrender or force to the limit.⁸

⁴ *New York Tribune.*

⁵ *Baltimore Sun*

⁶ *Washington, D. C., Post.*

⁷ *Cleveland Plain Dealer.*

⁸ *Chattanooga Times.*

Our answer should be a stiffening of our offensive on all fronts and a still greater determination on the part of those at home to do their part in pushing this struggle unfalteringly until Germany is not only crushed but crushed beyond all possibility of restoration among the nations of the world. Then only can we have real peace.⁹

Only one answer is possible, and that answer must be an emphatic refusal. We know enough of Austria and Germany to know that they cannot be negotiated with. They are beyond the pale. Acceptance of the proposal would be foolish and dangerous.¹⁰

True Americans will take their stand promptly and unmistakably. We are not going to bargain with the blood-stained gang of thugs and pirates in high places who deliberately and after long and careful planning plunged the world into war in July, 1914. We are going to smash them utterly and completely.¹¹

In the opinion of the British press the peace offer meant either of two things: that Germany was using Austria to make a sham proposal that time to reorganize her beaten army might be gained; or that Austria put such pressure on Germany that she was forced to consent. Neither Germany nor Austria, it was held, has the least expectation that the Allies would accept the offer. What they desire is rejection that it may be held up before their dejected armies and peoples as a conclusive reason for going on with the war. But the Austrian note must not be taken alone. It must be read together with the German offer to withdraw from Northern Russia if the Allies will do the same, and with the bid for Belgian neutrality. The intent in both instances is to arouse discord among the Allies, not to promote peace between the belligerents. It is an impudent, shameless proposal never intended to benefit Belgium or satisfy the Allies. But in vain is the net spread in the sight of the bird. It is a disingenuous, cynical, insincere attempt to divert the Entente Powers from a resolute prosecution of the war.

⁹ *Cheyenne State Leader.*

¹⁰ *Idaho Statesman.*

¹¹ *Charleston, S. C., News and Courier.*

None save the London *Daily News* had one word to say in favor of the note. The *News* believed:

Discussions at some stage must be the essential preliminary to peace. Can there be any warrant for deciding that discussions at this stage must of necessity be futile? There are no solid grounds on which statesmen, sincerely zealous for peace, could justify rejection of the Austrian proposal.

Discussion would not involve an armistice. That is specifically laid down. There would and could be no question of the Allies compromising their fundamental principles. On the other hand, there is more than a remote prospect that discussions that might leave Germany obdurate might have a very different result in the case of Turkey or Bulgaria or even Austria. The Allies in short, with an unassailable moral case, have everything to gain and nothing to lose by discussion.

The only reply we can make to the Vienna note [said the *Evening Standard*] is simply this: We are ready to negotiate with responsible representatives of the German and Austrian peoples, if the principle is accepted that they will pay compensation for damage done and accept as a basis of discussion our general principles of the sacredness of public law, and the right of nations to self-determination. But we will not parley with representatives of systems which are a negation of all we are fighting for.

Mr. Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, at a luncheon given in London by the Royal Colonial Institute to the overseas press representatives, spoke long on the subject of the Austrian note, and having passed in review its many points, and the impossibility of settling the issues at stake by conversation which bound nobody, said:

I say it is impossible to conceive that any conversation can bridge over differences so deep, or restore to the German power over those unhappy populations he has misused, or restore to Germany control over those naval bases to be misused as she knows how to misuse them, and so make her controller not merely of lines of communication binding one element of the British Empire to another, but make her master of all the lines of communication binding the whole civilized world. Is that to be put right by conversation?

In Germany, the press threw on Austria all responsibility for the note. *Die Tages Zeitung*, of Berlin, thought the initiative should have been left to the Allies; the *Berlin Tageblatt* was sure that "the independent action" of Austria would lead the Allies to increase their military activity.

Keeping up the pretense of independent action by Austria, the Imperial German Government on September 20, through its Ambassador in Vienna, made reply to the Austrian note.

The summons of the Austro-Hungarian Government to all belligerent States to enter into confidential unbinding discussions in a neutral country of the fundamental principles for the conclusion of peace corresponds to the spirit of peace readiness and conciliatoriness which the responsible statesmen of the quadruple alliance and the authorized representatives of allied (Teutonic) peoples have again and again announced. The reception which previous similar steps met with from our enemies was not encouraging.

The Imperial Government, however, follows the new attempt to bring the world nearer to the just and lasting peace which it desires, with the sincere and earnest wish that the statement of the Austro-Hungarian Government, inspired by profound conciliatory feeling and noble humanity will this time evoke the desired echo.

In the name of the Imperial Government, the undersigned has the honor to declare that Germany is ready to participate in the proposed exchange of ideas.

Our own Government ere that time had answered No! Mr. Lansing, September 16th, had given assurance that such would be the reply.

I am authorized by the President [he said] to state that the following will be the reply of this Government to the Austro-Hungarian note proposing an unofficial conference of belligerents.

The Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace, and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

And so it came about that when the formal note was delivered to the Swedish Minister in charge of Austro-Hungarian interests in our country the words given out by Mr. Lansing were embodied in it.

I beg to say [was the reply of the Secretary] that the substance of your communication has been submitted to the President, who now directs me to inform you that the Government of the United States feels that there is only one reply which it can make to the suggestion of the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government. It has repeatedly and with entire candor stated the terms upon which the United States would consider peace and can and will entertain no proposal for a conference upon a matter concerning which it has made its position and purpose so plain.

President Wilson's answer, and Mr. Balfour's speech, were held, by the press in Germany, to prove that the Allies sought complete destruction of the Central Powers and dismemberment of their territory. "This cold, cutting scorn, this cool rejection, has a more overwhelming and more annihilating effect than all the official phrases which the man in the White House could have employed," said the *Rheinische Westphaelische Zeitung*. "What does this mean," said the *Deutsche Tages Zeitung*, concerning the demand for Alsace-Lorraine and the colonies, "if the Entente do not intend to dismember and crush the German Empire? There is but one thing left for us, victory or destruction." There were two points, the Socialist journal, *Vorwaerts*, said, which the German people were willing to discuss, Belgium and the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and two points, the retention of the German colonies and Alsace-Lorraine, which could never be yielded save after a complete military victory by the Entente. "If the matter of giving back to us our colonies is a closed incident for England, then peace talk is useless so far as we are concerned," said the *Lokal Anzeiger*.

From the press the discussion of peace passed to the Chancellor, Count von Hertling, who, in speaking before the Main Committee of the Reichstag, complained that no attention had

been given to his acceptance of the four points of President Wilson's message of February 11, 1918.

As is known, the President of the United States laid down in fourteen points the guiding lines for a conclusion of peace. On January 24 of this year I discussed in your committee all these points, and regarding the last remarked that the idea of a league of nations as suggested had my entire sympathy on the condition that an honest will to peace and the recognition of the equal rights of all States of the league were guaranteed. How necessary was this reservation was shown by the statements of our enemies who, in a league of nations, thought of an alliance directed against Germany and her allies.

President Wilson in a message on February 2 (February 11?) took a further step in the same direction and laid down four points or principles, which in his opinion should be applied in an exchange of views. In my Reichstag speech of February 22, I declared myself in principle in agreement with the possibility of discussing a general peace on such a basis. President Wilson, however, has neither then nor since taken any notice of it.

Meanwhile the former idealist and zealous friend of peace seems to have developed into the head of the American imperialists. But the plan of a league of nations yet to be established is not to be discredited by such an action. It has found eloquent advocates in the Swiss President and the Norwegian Premier Knudsen, both of whom dwell especially on the interest of neutral States in such an institution.

I also do not hesitate to express my opinion again to-day on this question and to indicate publicly the aim and basis of such an association. It is a question of promoting universal, equal and successive disarmament, the establishment of obligatory courts of arbitration, freedom of the seas and the protection of small nations.

Regarding the first point, on February 24, I described the idea of restriction of armaments as thoroughly discussable, adding that the financial position of all the European States after the war would give the most effective support to a solution of this question.

Regarding the question of arbitration, my standpoint has long been history. I will not go into details, but interesting material which I have before me shows that Germany in the past repeatedly suggested arbitration of disputed questions, the carrying out of which in several cases, however, was prevented by opposition raised in Great Britain or America. If an international understanding could be reached that disputed questions of law between various States must

always be submitted to arbitration courts, and if this were made obligatory for members of a league of nations, it would undoubtedly be an important step toward the attainment of the general aim. More precise prescriptions, especially regarding requisite guarantees for the recognition of verdicts made by arbitration, need careful and thorough consideration.

I have expressed myself before this on the question of freedom of the seas which forms a necessary prerequisite for the unrestricted intercourse of states and peoples. Here, however, the greatest difficulties, naturally, are not raised on our side. On a former occasion I pointed out that there must be unhindered access for all nations to the inland seas, no predominant position of Great Britain at Gibraltar and Malta and in the Suez Canal. . . . An English newspaper has called this impudence.

Finally, there is a protection of small nations. Here we can forthwith and without reserve state that in this matter we have an entirely clear conscience. May, therefore, a league of nations be no mere dream of the future. May the idea deepen and may the people in all countries zealously concern themselves with the means for its establishment. The first and most important prerequisite will be an energetic will to champion peace and justice.

At this stage of the peace debate the British entered Strumnitza, the Italians, French and Greeks took Krichevo, and the Bulgarians asked a suspension of hostilities.

A high Bulgarian official, General d'Espérey reported to Paris, had come in the name of the Bulgarian commander and asked for an armistice of forty-eight hours to permit the arrival of two delegates from the Bulgarian Government, and that the Minister of Finance and the commander of the Second Army were on their way to arrange for the armistice at the French headquarters. Fearing that the request might be a ruse to enable the Bulgarians to rearrange their forces and perchance obtain reënforcements, General d'Espérey replied:

I can accord neither an armistice nor a suspension of hostilities tending to interrupt the operations in course. On the other hand, I will receive with all due courtesy the delegates, duly qualified by the royal Bulgarian Government, to which your excellency alludes in the letter. These delegates to present themselves in the British lines, accompanied by a *parlementaire*.

An official Bulgarian statement announced that:

In view of the conjuncture of circumstances which have recently arisen and after the position had been jointly discussed with all competent authorities, the Bulgarian Government, desiring to put an end to the bloodshed, authorized the commander-in-chief of the army to propose to the generalissimo of the armies of the Entente at Saloniki a cessation of hostilities and the entering into of negotiations for obtaining an armistice and peace.

The members of the Bulgarian delegation left yesterday evening in order to get into touch with the plenipotentiaries of the Entente belligerents.

The Berlin newspapers denied that the delegation had gone to meet the French commander, and asserted that German troops were on their way to aid the Bulgarians. "It must, therefore, be hoped that the King and pro-Germans must soon again be masters of the situation," said the Berlin *Deutsche Zeitung*. "Premier Malinoff is supported by only a part of the Bulgarian General Assembly," said the Berlin *Tageblatt*, "and such efforts as are now proceeding were proposed while the Kings of Saxony and Bavaria were visiting Sofia. Malinoff's plan is to give up the territories taken from Sofia and to demand compensation in Turkish territory." Admiral von Hintze, the German Foreign Secretary, was reported to have explained the situation in a speech before the Main Committee of the Reichstag. It was not clear, he said, whether the Bulgarian government had acted in accordance with the wishes of the army or of its own accord. There were indications that Premier Malinoff's act would be disavowed later. The peace delegation reported to have left for Saloniki on Wednesday was, he said, in Sofia Thursday, and some counter action was evidently coming. The German High Command threw all reserves at its disposal into Bulgaria when the bad news came from Macedonia. Austria also sent reserves and these forces would restore the military situation. It was serious, but would be clearer in a few days, and there was no reason to give up the game in Bulgaria.

Nevertheless, the report that a delegation was on its way to the French commander was true. On Saturday, September 28, they reached Saloniki, on Sunday all the terms of the Allies were accepted by Bulgaria, and an armistice signed, and at noon, Monday, hostilities ended. The terms were not announced, but they were believed to be that Bulgaria should withdraw her troops from all territory occupied in Serbia and Greece, demobilize her army at once, surrender all means of transportation by land and water, grant free passage for the Allies through the country for military purposes, and give up to the Allies arms, ammunition, strategic points and ports.

That Turkey would soon sue for peace was now thought certain. Indeed there were those who saw in the utterances of the German press unmistakable signs of collapse.

On the night of the day on which the news of the Bulgarian request was made public in our country, September 27th, the President, in New York City, opened the Fourth Liberty Loan Campaign with a speech in which he once more defined the issues of the war and the terms on which peace could be concluded.

The war [he said] had lasted more than four years and the whole world had been drawn into it. Individual statesmen, it might be, had started the conflict, but neither they nor their opponents could end it as they pleased. It had become a peoples' war, and peoples of all sorts and races were involved in it. We came into it when its character had become fully defined and it was plain that no nation could stand apart or be indifferent to its outcome.

We accepted the issues of the war as facts, not as any group of men either here or elsewhere had defined them, and we can accept no outcome which does not squarely meet and settle them. Those issues are these:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal

affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They are the issues of it; and they must be settled—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely, and once for all, and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already, and have seen them deal with other Governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot "come to terms" with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

It is of capital importance that we should also be explicitly agreed that no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting. There should exist no doubt about that. I am, therefore, going to take the liberty of speaking with the utmost frankness about the practical implications that are involved in it.

If it be indeed and in truth the common object of the governments associated against Germany and of the nations whom they govern, as I believe it to be to achieve by the coming settlement a secure and lasting peace, it will be necessary that all who sit down at the peace table shall come ready and willing to pay the price, the only price, that will procure it, and ready and willing, also, to create in some virile fashion the only instrumentality by which it

can be made certain that the agreements of the peace will be honored and fulfilled.

That price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, no matter whose interest is crossed; and not only impartial justice, but also the satisfaction of the several peoples whose fortunes are dealt with. That indispensable instrumentality is a League of Nations formed under covenants that will be efficacious. Without such an instrumentality by which the peace of the world can be guaranteed, peace will rest in part upon the word of outlaws and only upon that word. For Germany will have to redeem her character, not by what happens at the peace table, but by what follows.

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations, and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, is in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms, again, why it must be guaranteed is, that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Rumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First. The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

Second. No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interests of all.

Third. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings with the general and common family of the league of nations.

Fourth. And more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the league and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the league of nations itself as a means of discipline and control.

Fifth. All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

* * * * *

In the same sentence in which I say that the United States will enter into no special arrangements or understandings with particular nations let me say also that the United States is prepared to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest. We still read Washington's immortal warning against "entangling alliances" with full comprehension and an answering purpose. But only special and limited alliances entangle; and we recognize and accept the duty of a new day in which we are permitted to hope for a general alliance which will avoid entanglements and clear the air of the world for common understandings and the maintenance of common rights.

Germany now faced the great political crisis of the war. Bulgaria had deserted her; Turkey might soon be forced to follow Bulgaria, and the whole western front from Ostend to the Meuse was crumbling. "Germany's most serious hour seems to have struck," said the *Lokal Anzeiger* of Berlin. "It is useless to gloss over this news," said the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, when it heard of Bulgaria's request for an armistice, "and we are not quite sure whether it would not be useful to attach considerable importance to the semi-official attempts to veil the threatening secession of Bulgaria, or raise any hopes." *Vorwaerts* called loudly for peace. "The question is no longer one of conquest, but of attaining peace in an orderly way and without unbearable burdens. The Government must do everything

possible to enable it to come to the conference table together with its allies as speedily as possible. It must be the Government of the German democracy which goes to the conference. The greatest war humanity has experienced ends as a war of purely German defense, and as such it must now quickly, and as well as possible, be brought to an end."

Excitement over the defection of Bulgaria rose high in Germany. War industry stocks fell rapidly in Berlin; a peace demonstration followed; a cheering crowd gathered before the Bulgarian Legation; and Chancellor von Hertling and Foreign Minister Admiral von Hintze resigned. Even the Kaiser showed signs of alarm. When accepting the resignation of Count von Hertling, he said, "I desire that the German people shall coöperate more effectively than hitherto in deciding the fate of the Fatherland." In a message to the Fatherland party he appealed to the people for support. "I have the confident hope that the whole German people in these most serious times will resolutely gather around me and give their blood and wealth until the last breath for defense of the Fatherland against the shameful enemy plans. Such a unanimous resolve to exist will and must, with God's help, succeed in breaking the enemy's will to war, and secure the Fatherland the peace it is worthy of among the peoples of the world." "Bulgaria," said *Vorwaerts*, "deserts the Central Alliance to make peace. We, the German people, thus remain alone to face the French, the English and the Americans, our backs to the wall and death facing us. Such is the situation that we have in view to-day, and we must meet it with the necessary courage." The *Lokal Anzeiger* did not think any man could "help seeing how great the danger is owing to the Bulgarian" defection. "It would be a crime to conceal it."

From Amsterdam it was reported that Vienna newspapers described the excitement caused in that city by the collapse of Bulgaria as tremendous. Rumors were afloat that Turkey had followed the lead of Bulgaria, that King Ferdinand had abdicated, that his palace had been blown up, and that a revolution

had broken out in Roumania. They were at once denied. Nevertheless, there was a panic on the Berlin Bourse, and such was the excitement on the Budapest Bourse that business was suspended. Later dispatches from Amsterdam announced that Prince Maximilian of Baden had been chosen Chancellor to succeed von Hertling; that he would announce his policy at a full meeting of the Reichstag in a few days; that Philip Scheidemann, vice-president of the Reichstag and leader of the Majority Social Democrats, and Adolf Gröber, leader of the Centrist party in the Reichstag, would be Secretaries of State without portfolios, and that the Socialist and Social Democrat groups had agreed to aid in the organization of a Government, under Prince Maximilian.

Austria, too, felt the blow. No sooner had the news of Bulgaria's request reached Vienna than Premier von Hussarex summoned the party leaders and asked if, in view of the seriousness of the situation, it were well to have the lower House assemble on October 2. The Deputies thought it should meet at the appointed time and when it did the Premier made a long speech on the situation, and declared his belief that the hour was near when action would be taken on the peace offer of Baron Burian. In the course of discussion which followed the Socialists demanded peace and stated the terms on which it should be made. They were: A league of nations; no economic war; no annexations; restoration of Belgium, Serbia, Montenegro; revision of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest; autonomy for each nation in Austria-Hungary; settlement of their own affairs by the Poles, and of the Eastern issues on the basis of nationalities. Just what was happening in Austria-Hungary was not known; but such rumors as reached the Allies through Amsterdam, untrue as many of them were, left no doubt that another peace movement was under way. According to the Berlin *Tageblatt*, Austria-Hungary had requested Holland to invite the belligerents to take part in peace negotiations. According to the Cologne *Gazette*, the Hungarian Premier Werkerle, with Count Julius Andrássy, Count Stephen

Tisza and Count Albert Apponyi, had gone to Vienna in the interest of peace. Dispatches from Budapest stated that demands for a coalition Cabinet in Hungary were insistent, and that Baron von Hussarex must resign.

Holland had not been asked to invite the belligerents to consider peace; but a movement for peace was under way, and on October 5 the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Stockholm was instructed to send to President Wilson a proposal for a general armistice and peace.

The Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war, and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to his lordship, the President of the United States of America, and offers to conclude with him and his Allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations toward a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address on February 12, 1918, serve as the foundation and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account.

It was now the turn of Germany to cry for peace. When, therefore, the new Imperial German Chancellor met the Reichstag on October 5 he announced that a note had been addressed to President Wilson through the Swiss Government. President Wilson had been addressed because, in his message to Congress January 8, 1918, and in his speech at New York on September 27, 1918, he had proposed a plan for a general peace which Germany and her Allies would accept as a basis for peace negotiation. The official translation of the German note reads:

The German Government requests the President of the United States of America to take steps for the restoration of peace, to notify all belligerents of his request and to invite them to delegate plenipotentiaries for the purpose of taking up negotiations. The German Government accepts, as a basis for peace negotiations, the program

laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent pronouncements, particularly in his address of September 27, 1918. In order to avoid further bloodshed, the German Government requests to bring about the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on water and in the air.

The Chancellor opened his speech with the statement that "in accordance with the Imperial decree of September 30, the German Empire has undergone a basic alteration of its political leadership"; and that in accordance "with the government method now introduced, I submit to the Reichstag, publicly and without delay, the principles upon which I propose to conduct the grave responsibilities of the office." These principles, he said, had been agreed upon by the federated governments, and by the majority parties' leaders, before he decided to accept the Chancellorship. They contained, therefore, not only his own "confession of political faith," but that "of an overwhelming portion of the German people's representatives; that is, of the German nation which has constituted the Reichstag on the basis of a general, equal and secret franchise and according to their will." The knowledge that the will of the majority of the people was back of him alone gave him strength to take upon himself the conduct of the affairs of the Empire "in this hard and earnest time in which we are living."

His resolve so to do had been strengthened by the fact "that prominent leaders of the laboring class have found a way," under the new Government, into "the highest offices of the Empire." Hence, "what I say to-day I say is not only in my own name and those of my official helpers, but in the name of the German people."

In their name, therefore, he said:

The program of the majority parties upon which I take my stand contains, first, an acceptance of the answer of the former Imperial Government to Pope Benedict's note of August 1, 1916, and an unconditional acceptance of the Reichstag resolution of July 19, the same year. It further declares willingness to join a general

league of nations based on the foundation of equal rights for all, both strong and weak.

It considers the solution of the Belgian question to lie in the complete rehabilitation of Belgium, particularly of its independence and territorial integrity. An effort shall also be made to reach an understanding on the question of indemnity.

The program will not permit the peace treaties hitherto concluded to be a hindrance to the conclusion of a general peace.

Its particular aim is that popular representative bodies shall be formed immediately on a broad basis in the Baltic provinces, in Lithuania and Poland. We will promote the realization of necessary preliminary conditions therefor without delay by the introduction of civilian rule. All these lands shall regulate their Constitutions and their relations with neighboring peoples without external interference.

* * * * *

At the peace negotiations the German Government will use its efforts to the end that the treaties shall contain provisions concerning the protection of labor and insurance of laborers, which provisions shall enable the treaty-making States to institute in their respective lands within a prescribed time a minimum of similar, or at least equally, efficient institutions for the security of life and health as for the care of laborers in the case of illness, accident or invalidism.

During a month past, the Chancellor continued, "a continuous, terrible, murderous battle has been raging in the west. Thanks to the incomparable heroism of our army, which will live as an immortal, glorious page in the history of the German people at all times, the front is unbroken. This proud consciousness enables us to look to the future with confidence." But, because of this confidence, and "the conviction that it is also our duty to make certain that the bloody struggle be not protracted for a single day beyond the moment" when it could be closed with honor, the Chancellor had "not waited until to-day to take a step to further the ideas of peace."

Supported by the consent of all duly authorized persons in the empire, and by consent of all our allies acting in concert with us, I sent on the night of October 4-5, through the mediation of Swit-

zerland, a note to the President of the United States in which I requested him to take up the bringing about of peace and to communicate to this end with all the belligerent States.

The note will reach Washington to-day or to-morrow. It is directed to the President of the United States because he, in his message to Congress January 8, 1918, and in his later proclamations, particularly in his New York speech of September 27, proposed a program for a general peace which we can accept as a basis for negotiations.

I have taken this step not only for the salvation of Germany and its allies, but of all humanity, which has been suffering for years through the war.

I have taken it also because I believe the thoughts regarding the future well-being of the nation which were proclaimed by Mr. Wilson are in accord with the general ideas cherished by the new German Government and with it the overwhelming majority of our people.

Resting on his firm faith in a "great and true people, a people capable of every devotion and upon their glorious armed power," the Chancellor awaited "the outcome of the first action" which he had "taken as the leading statesman of the Empire. Whatever this outcome may be, I know it will find Germany firmly resolved and united either for an upright peace which rejects every selfish violation of the rights of others, or for a continuance of the struggle for life and death to which our people would be forced, without our own fault, if the answer to our note of the Powers opposed to us should be directed by a will to destroy us.

"I do not despair over the thought that this second alternative may come. I know the greatness of the mighty power yet possessed by our people, and I know that the incontrovertible conviction that they were only fighting for our life as a nation would double these powers.

"I hope, however, for the sake of all mankind, that the President of the United States will receive our offer as we meant it. Then the door would be opened to a speedy, honorable peace of justice and reconciliation for us as well as for our opponents."

In the opinion of our countrymen the offer was not worthy of consideration, but should be rejected at once. It was an attempt, now that the Hindenburg Line has been smashed in every sector from Dixmude to St. Mihiel, to transfer the struggle from the western front to the council table, from the battlefield to diplomatic negotiation. Then, if no peace were made, and it surely would not be, the German Emperor, with his army rested, and a new Hindenburg Line constructed, could once more plunge into war. Why were not the President's fourteen points, which at last had made such a deep impression in Germany, accepted as a "basis for negotiations" in January, 1918? Because, when the German armies began their offensive in March the Emperor was sure they would fight their way to Paris and the North Sea before our country could lend the Allies a helping hand.

From one end of the country to the other arose the demand for no armistice, nothing but unconditional surrender. The whole press of the country joined in the demand. "Peace, yes, but only that kind of peace dictated by the Allies." "It is useless for the Central Powers to talk of peace while their talons still clutch the lands which they have grasped." "We are at war with the most murderous lot of outlaws that has ever disgraced the earth. They must pay for the hellish crimes they have committed." "There can be no safe peace but a peace written with the sword." "Absolute and complete surrender, with no German allowed at the councils, other than as a criminal at the bar, ought to be the only terms upon which the Allies will halt fighting." "Let us beware of calling a halt to listen to empty talk which is intended to flatter and dupe. The proper course was taken with Bulgaria." "The fact is that Germany can have peace, and have it now, on the same terms as Bulgaria." "Absolute surrender is the *sine qua non* for peace, the condition precedent to the consideration of terms." "Talk of peace from the Kaiser is momentous news. But, except as news, it is of no importance. We do not want to talk to the Kaiser. From him we want one thing first, unconditional sur-

render, and what happens afterward we will decide for ourselves." "The German armies must lay down their arms before peace talk begins. The democratic world has the chance now to rid itself of Hohenzollernism. If this generation does not seize this opportunity, it will deserve the condemnation of posterity. Let there be no 'next war.'"

In France the press was of the same mind. "Germany wishes to stop the war the moment she is going to be beaten and knows it," said *Figaro*. "Let us suppose the offer is accepted. Immediately in Germany there would be a delirium of joy. The people are electrified, and the Kaiser has taken them into his hands. The humiliation of having demanded peace would disappear rapidly. He becomes the hero of heroes. He has resisted a world coalition."

"We must not be misled by appearances," said the *Journal*. "The enemy offers to negotiate on the basis of President Wilson's peace program. There is no discussion between conqueror and conquered. Beaten on all fronts and facing the menace of being completely vanquished, but not definitely conquered, she wishes to save what is left of her military prestige and materials in arms. She wishes to represent herself as having asked for peace out of consideration for humanity." "An armistice is not possible at the point at which we now are," said *L'Homme Libre*. "We would not be satisfied without reparation for the past and guarantees for the future. Maximilian is silent on these two important points." "'Admit as a basis' is vague," said the *Temps*. "Germany only invokes President Wilson's principles to make us let fall our arms. Then, when the fighting has ceased, when the German troops have regained their breath, when the Imperial Government has become popular and strong, the German diplomats will undermine and overthrow one by one the pretended bases of negotiation." "The cornered beast," said the *Journal des Debats*, "draws in its claws and offers us its blood-stained paw. We shall keep our program of restitution, reparation, guarantees."

The German note having been sent, and the speech of the

Chancellor made, the Emperor, in a proclamation, announced the peace offer to the army on October 6.

For months past the enemy, with enormous exertions and almost without pause in the fighting, has stormed against your lines. During weeks of the struggle, often without repose, you have had to resist a numerically far superior army. Therein lies the greatness of the task which has been set for you and which you are fulfilling. Troops of all German States are doing their part and are heroically defending the Fatherland on foreign soil. Hard is the task.

My navy is holding its own against the united enemy naval forces and is unwaveringly supporting the army in its difficult struggle.

The eyes of those at home rest with pride and admiration on the deeds of the army and the navy. I express to you the thanks of myself and the fatherland.

The collapse of the Macedonian front has occurred in the midst of the hardest struggle. In accord with our allies I have resolved once more to offer peace to the enemy, but I will only extend my hand for an honorable peace. We owe that to the heroes who have laid down their lives for the Fatherland, and we make that our duty to our children.

Whether arms will be lowered is a question. Until then we must not slacken. We must, as hitherto, exert all our strength unwearily to hold our ground against the onslaught of our enemies.

The hour is grave, but, trusting in your strength and in God's gracious help, we feel ourselves to be strong enough to defend our beloved Fatherland.

All eyes at home and abroad now turned to the President. That the offer would be promptly and vigorously rejected was confidently predicted and expected, because it asked for an armistice that would not be granted, because Germany had not accepted the program outlined by the President, but merely offered to use it as a "basis for peace negotiations," because this was an invitation to talk peace, and because the President, in his speech on September 27, had said, "no peace shall be obtained by any kind of compromise or abatement of the principles we have avowed as the principles for which we are fighting." Instead of a summary rejection of the offer, and a

demand for unconditional surrender, Secretary Lansing asked questions.

I have the honor to acknowledge on behalf of the President your note of October 6, inclosing a communication from the German Government to the President, and I am instructed by the President to request you to make the following communication to the Imperial German Chancellor:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the president in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January last, and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil.

The good faith of any discussion manifestly would depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authority of the empire who so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.

While the answer of the President was still unknown, the request of Germany was discussed in the Senate. All who spoke were for a relentless prosecution of the war, for the unremitting use of force until the enemy made an unconditional surrender. Said one:

The President has very definitely stated that it would be impossible to negotiate with Germany until the German people have established a Government that believed in honesty. That has not been done. The same Government that brought about this war, that depended

upon militarism, that violated treaties with Belgium and other weak peoples, is still in existence. The President of the United States, I am satisfied, will still hold that the German people have not come within the requirements of negotiation in the establishment of an honest Government.

The proposal of Prince Maximilian [said another] simply begs for an armistice for the purpose of entering upon a discussion. That is a mere trap to divide and separate the Allies. When Germany disbands her army, or when that army is conquered in the field, it will be time enough to consider terms of peace.

To hear about the German Government being concerned about bloodshed, or express the desire to avoid further bloodshed, is the supreme joke of the century, the grimmest piece of irony I have seen perpetrated in this war [said a third]. A nation which sprang like a tiger at the throats of an unoffending and unsuspecting civilization, which destroyed not one nation, but other nations, especially small nations, and caused the river and streets and fields to run red with innocent blood, now insults the intelligence of the world by pretending that it is very much concerned about the shedding of blood.

A trail of fire and blood from the Rhine to Berlin should be the course our armies should take. And when our armies have reached Berlin, there we will tell them what the terms of peace will be.

We want to assure the American people that we will not commit the sacrilege of dishonoring our dead soldiers by thinking of peace until our army has entered Berlin.

Let us [said a fourth] leave this matter to the Commander-in-chief of our armies over there, Marshal Foch; let Germany, through her military authorities, propose to him to lay down their arms and ask for an armistice. In other words, let the Germans do as the Bulgarians have done, and say to the Allies, "We will lay down our arms; we will evacuate this territory, and we will submit to the dictates of the allied Governments in this matter of peace."

A fifth offered a resolution which was sent to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

Be it resolved by the Senate of the United States, the House of Representatives concurring:

That there shall be no cessation of hostilities and no Armistice until the Imperial German Government shall disband its armies

and surrender its arms and munitions, together with its navy, to the United States and her allies in this war;

That before any armistice shall be considered the Imperial German Government shall unreservedly consent to the principles of reparation declared as terms of peace by our allies;

That it will pay in damages the cost of rebuilding and reconstructing all the cities and villages destroyed by its armies, and restore to fertility the lands devastated by it;

That it will repay every dollar and the value of all property exacted from the people of any territory invaded by it;

That it will make proper compensation and allowance for every crime committed by its armies contrary to the laws of warfare and humanity, whether on land or sea;

That it will return to France, Alsace and Lorraine and the indemnity exacted from her in 1870;

And that it further accepts all the conditions laid down by the President in his address of Jan. 8, 1918.

When, therefore, the answer of the President was made public, not a few of the Senators were greatly disappointed that it was not a flat rejection of everything the Chancellor had requested. Nor were they alone in their disappointment. "Let us hope," wrote William Howard Taft, "that the President has not taken a false step. He has not answered Germany as it was hoped by the American and Allied people he would. His dialectic queries are, of course, intended to show by Germany's answers that she is not sincere. He thus wishes to deprive the Kaiser of an opportunity to rouse his people to a 'last ditch' struggle to avoid annihilation." Was it not dangerous to invite acceptance of points which might need amendment because of the changed situation since January 8, 1918? "Why should we ask who is making the inquiry? Do we not know it is the Kaiser through a minister whose past liberalism he is using as a cloak to fool his own people and ourselves? . . . Our gallant troops at the front, and those of our Allies shedding their blood so freely in the greatest battle in the world's history, should not have their high purpose to fight through to victory and Berlin chilled by any hesitation as to the goal we seek."

The press of the country in general took the position that the

President had met the German peace offensive with a counter offensive. He had simply shifted the issue back to Berlin and left the German Government to get out, as best it could, of the trap so carefully set for the United States and her Allies. "President Wilson has matched General Foch's military success with a diplomatic triumph." "In dealing with the German peace offensive President Wilson has employed the same tactics that Foch used in breaking the German military offensive—a counter-offensive." "Ten thousand words of amplification could add naught to this incomparably effective response. It argues nothing, it promises nothing, but, serenely and without the least bluster of rhetorical phrase, it hamstring the Kaiser's horse." "This time the Hun Government has been outmaneuvered. Since it has chosen, like Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to resort to subterfuges and indirect attack, the President, like Foch and Pershing, has answered his adversary in kind; he has adopted 'tactics' rather than point-blank fire." The reply had prevented Prince Max from turning to the German people and saying, "You see, we offered America peace on her own terms and she has refused them. I have exposed the insincerity of her principles. I have revealed the purpose of the Allies. You see now it is to destroy the German people. Therefore fight on." That was a shrewd thrust. But the President has parried it.

Such journals as expressed disappointment said: "If the nation expected that the President would return, as the answer to Germany's peace proposals, two words, unconditional surrender, it will be disappointing. Apparently the time to proclaim that ultimatum (in the opinion of the President) has not yet come." "To deny that the American people will be deeply disappointed at the President's first step in response to the note of the new Imperial Chancellor would be to deny a phenomenon of nature." "America feels that there should be nothing that savors, even remotely, of diplomatic weakening. Unfortunately the President's note of inquiry is likely to be so construed." "It goes without saying that the reply is not what we have all expected and hoped for. . . . It is the part of

wisdom, however, to conclude that the President is right, knowing more than we can know."

October 12 a wireless from Nauen, seemingly the reply of the German Government to the President's note, was picked up in France and forwarded to Washington. President Wilson was then in the Metropolitan Opera House, at New York City, attending a concert for the benefit of the Queen Margherita Fund for Blinded Italian Soldiers, for the day had been Italy Day at the Altar of Liberty. A newspaper man brought a copy to the President's Secretary, Mr. Tumulty, who handed it to the President, who read:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January 8, and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms. The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Government of the United States also take the position taken by President Wilson in his address.

The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the proposition of the President in regard to evacuation. The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation.

The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

SOLE,

State Secretary of Foreign Office.

Against this request for a mixed commission to arrange for evacuation, the whole country protested vigorously. From one end of it to the other came the cry, "no armistice," "unconditional surrender." Solf's answer was held to be no surrender, but a move to avoid surrender. An armistice, it was said,

purchased at the price of mere evacuation of invaded territory, would be a fine bargain for Germany but a foolish one for the Allies. To permit the Hun to retire to his bloody lair still a belligerent was unthinkable. His arms must be stacked on the battlefield. There must be a transfer of ammunition to the Allies, a surrender as complete as that of Bulgaria. What kind of terms did Bismarck grant when France asked an armistice of three weeks in 1871? "The immediate surrender of the twenty-five forts around Paris with all their war supplies; the garrison of Paris to lay down their arms as prisoners of war; the immediate payment of 200,000,000 francs."

The President asked for whom Prince Maximilian was speaking, for he had already said, "We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee unless supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting." Have we, it was asked, any such evidence? Was not what Solf calls "the German Government" created by an Imperial decree? Solf is very careful to omit the word Imperial, and for the first time in a note from the Foreign Office the "Imperial German Government" is not mentioned. But is there any reason to believe that there is any change in the German system which would prevent the Emperor revoking that decree? Coming from an honest Government such a reply as Germany has made might be accepted as an unconditional surrender. But coming from the German Government with its record of atrocious crimes, and its wanton defiance of the laws of God, man, and humanity, this offer of surrender, without guarantees, is another scrap of paper. Unless the German people themselves destroy the autocratic power which has plunged the world in war, and may do so again, the Allied armies must go on with the work of destroying that power on the battlefields of France, Belgium and Germany. Who will give bonds for Germany? Who feels safe to rely on her word? Who is sure "that her official liars and wreckers of treaties, who can be restored to power overnight, will not be

running ruthless again before a negotiated peace can be carried into effect?"

Newspapers in Paris pointed out that the German Constitution had undergone no change; that if the Government was responsible to the people it was also responsible to the Emperor; that Foch was the proper man to decide whether there should or should not be an armistice, and what should be the terms; that when Germany, in 1914, sought the neutrality of France she demanded as a guarantee of that neutrality the German occupation of Toul and Verdun. "We must not undertake anything," said *L'Eclair*, "that savors of negotiation. The military must announce the conditions of the suspension of arms. One single man must speak—Foch." Germany, said *Les Temps*, seems to think the French and British conquered like herself, and the President an arbitrator intervening to put everything right. Instead of promising to withdraw her troops, and abstain from devastation, Germany calmly asks a mixed commission where the conquered invader would speak as an equal. There was no mixed commission in 1871 when Bismarck imposed an armistice on France. "This Reichstag which is spoken about, but never allowed to speak, is the same that voted preparation for the war, voted for the war, and voted the peace dictated to the Russians and Rumanians." "The idea of a representative commission denotes a desire to negotiate on an equal footing," said the *Matin*. "There are only two persons in an armistice, the conqueror and the conquered. The one orders, the other obeys."

London scouted the idea of an armistice. Since President Wilson stated his fourteen points, said *The Times*, rivers of blood have soaked into the soil of Belgium and France. The ravages of Attila and even those of the earlier stages of the German invasion have been cast into the shade. Yet the fourteen points Germany accepts make no provision for a single one of her manifold crimes, nor for the punishment of the master criminals who inspired them. "Before President Wilson accepts the rôle of intermediary, now thrust upon him, we trust

he will see fit to remind the German Chancellor that each and all of these problems must be faced." Slaughter of men and women on the *Leinster* and the *Hirano Maru*, the German refusal to exchange prisoners, and the wanton devastation by the retreating German armies in Northern France served but to strengthen the demand for no leniency, for no armistice. To all this, said the *Dispatch*, the answer is "Get out! No arrangements are necessary. Men who believe in God cannot bargain with the fiends who sank the *Leinster*."

October 10 while the *Leinster*, a mail packet steamer plying between England and Ireland, was crossing the Irish Sea with six hundred and eighty-seven passengers and a crew of seventy, she was struck by two torpedoes and sank in fifteen minutes. No warning was given. Upwards of four hundred persons, of whom one hundred and thirty-five were women and children, were drowned. The *Hirano Maru* was a Japanese steamer homeward bound from an English port with two hundred passengers. When three hundred miles south of Ireland she was torpedoed and in a few minutes sank, with all on board, save such as were able to jump into the sea. Nearby was an American destroyer, and hearing the sound of the explosion her captain hurried to the scene and picked up thirty survivors. A British freighter, on October 10, brought to one of our ports twenty soldiers and sailors, all that were left of two hundred and fifty on board the United States steamer *Ticonderoga*, torpedoed early in the month in mid-Atlantic. Seven of her eight life boats were destroyed by shell fire.

All these new atrocities were duly noticed by the President in his reply to the German note.

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the eighth of January, 1918, and in his subsequent addresses justified the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the

communication of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide completely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and the Allies in the field.

He feels confident that he can safely assume that nothing but this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in.

At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain not only but often of their very inhabitants.

The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary, also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of July last.

It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly and of its single choice disturb

the peace of the world, or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotency."

The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

The President will make a separate reply to the Royal and Imperial Government of Austria-Hungary.

With this reply the country was delighted. Peace by negotiation which threatened, it was said, is now far removed. The reply will be read by the American people with a deep sigh of relief. It is not a note but a decision. An armistice is declined; the Kaiser and his autocratic government must go; U-boat frightfulness on the seas must stop; burning and pillaging the towns of Belgium and France must stop, definite and satisfactory guarantees must be given, and when all these conditions have been met the question of an armistice will be referred to the Allied and American commanders in the field. It is an American answer, given by a great American, and gives voice to the deep convictions of the whole American people. It will stir the blood of the American people and command their instant assent by acclamation. It is an ultimatum to a defeated power. Only two courses are open to Germany; submission, which means present surrender; or resistance, which means ultimate destruction. Senators approved the answer; the Allies approved, and the whole world waited to see what would be the effect on Germany.

Turkey meantime had joined her allies in an appeal for an armistice. The note, received October 12 by the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs from the *Chargé d'Affaires* of Turkey

in Madrid, was delivered by the Spanish Ambassador at Washington to Secretary Lansing October 14.

The undersigned, *Chargé d'Affaires* of Turkey, has the honor, acting upon instructions from his Government, to request the Royal Government to inform the Secretary of State of the United States of America, by telegraph, that the Imperial Government requests the President of the United States of America to take upon himself the task of the reestablishment of peace; to notify all belligerent States of this demand and to invite them to send delegate plenipotentiaries to initiate negotiations. It (the Imperial Government) accepts as a basis for the negotiations the program laid down by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of January 8, 1918, and in his subsequent declarations, especially the speech of September 27.

In order to put an end to the shedding of blood the Imperial Ottoman Government requests that steps be taken for the immediate conclusion of a general armistice on land, on sea, and in the air.

CHAPTER V

THE ARMISTICE

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY now seemed to be fast going to pieces. Discontent, war weariness, demands for peace, signs of revolution were everywhere. Hungary was in ferment; the Czechoslovaks had broken away from the Empire, and the Emperor Charles, alarmed by the prospect before him, proclaimed the reorganization of Austria-Hungary on a federal basis.

To my faithful Austrian peoples:

Since I have ascended the throne I have tried to make it my duty to assure to all my peoples the peace so ardently desired and to point the way to the Austrian peoples of a prosperous development unhampered by obstacles which brutal force creates against intellectual and economic prosperity.

The terrible struggles in the world war have thus far made the work of peace impossible. The heavy sacrifices of the war should assure to us an honorable peace, on the threshold of which, by the help of God, we are to-day.

We must, therefore, undertake without delay the reorganization of our country on a natural, and therefore solid, basis. Such a question demands that the desires of the Austrian peoples be harmonized and realized.

I am decided to accomplish this work with the free collaboration of my peoples in the spirit and principles which our Allied monarchs have adopted in their offer of peace.

Austria must become, in conformity with the will of its people, a confederate state in which each nationality shall form on the territory which it occupies its own local autonomy.

This does not mean that we are already envisaging the union of the Polish territories of Austria with the independent Polish State.

The city of Trieste with all its surroundings shall, in conformity with the desire of its population, be treated separately.

This promise of federalization came too late. The day it was made public in our country the President answered the Austro-Hungarian note of October 7, and the Czecho-Slovak declaration of independence, published in Paris October 18, was printed in full in our newspapers. Mr. Lansing's reply, as handed to the Swedish Minister, reads:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the congress of the United States the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires and that the Czecho-Slovak national council is a de facto belligerent government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks.

It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

From Amsterdam and Switzerland there now came reports of what would be the answer of Germany to the President. The reply, it was said, has been delivered to the Swiss Government. Germany agrees to evacuate Belgium, but will require months in which to do so; protests against the charge of cruelty, declares she was forced into submarine warfare by the Allied

blockade, and denies responsibility for the loss of women and children on passenger boats, but in the interest of peace will stop such attacks. October 21 what purported to be the text of the reply was received in London by wireless. October 22 the Swiss Chargé delivered to Mr. Lansing "the original German text" and "an English translation of the communication in question as transmitted to the Swiss Foreign Office by the German Government." This official translation reads:

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhuman actions made against the German land and sea forces, and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary, and are, in so far, permitted by international law. The German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur, in spite of these instructions, the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes, with regard to all these charges, that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be dispatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions for peace, the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately,

secretly and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people in decision on peace and war. These conditions have just now undergone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed in complete accord with the wishes of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. In future no Government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the constitution of the empire so that the consent of the representation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

'At once there arose from our countrymen the cry, "unsatisfactory, evasive." The ink and paper, it was said, are new; but it is the same old handwriting. Item by item it reveals its insincerity. It is mere bosh, a new mask through which Germany looks at her conquering enemies. The voice has been given a new modulation, but behind the mask and the voice there has been no change. It is altogether unsatisfactory, so wholly unsatisfactory and hypercritical, evasive and contentious that there is nothing in it to promote peace. Why continue the correspondence? Why not on to Berlin and finish the job? It was an attempt to weaken the will of the Allies by peace talk.

Three courses, in the opinion of the people, were before the President from which to choose. He might return no answer, a course he would not pursue. He might return a curt answer, saying that the time had come to treat with Foch. He might, while standing firmly by his terms, return such an answer as would leave the way open for further discussion. What Mr. Lansing did reply was this:

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the 27th of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and, having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the Powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the present German authorities to the governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should

such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded.

Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with these who have hitherto been the masters of Germany. Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and cannot trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States cannot deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people, who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

While all the nations waited to see what action the Allies would take, news came that Baron Burian had been dismissed and Count Julius Andrássy had become Austro-Hungarian

Minister of Foreign Affairs; that General Ludendorff had resigned; that the Reichstag had placed the military under the civil power, and that Germany, October 27, had answered President Wilson's note.

The German Government has taken cognizance of the reply of the president of the United States. The President knows the far-reaching changes which have taken place and are being carried out in the German constitutional structure. The peace negotiations are being conducted by a government of the people, in whose hands rests both actually and constitutionally, the authority to make decisions. The military powers are also subject to this authority. The German Government now awaits the proposal for an armistice which is the first step towards a peace of justice as described by the President in his pronouncements.

Ere another twenty-four hours had passed the President received the reply of Austria-Hungary to his note of October nineteenth.

In reply to the note of the President, Mr. Wilson, to the Austro-Hungarian Government, dated October 18 of this year, and about the decision of the President to take up, with Austria-Hungary separately, the question of armistice and peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that it adheres both to the previous declarations of the President and his opinion of the rights of the peoples of Austria-Hungary, notably those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, contained in his last note. Austria-Hungary having thereby accepted all the conditions which the President has put upon entering into negotiations on the subject of armistice and peace, nothing, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, longer stands in the way of beginning those negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian Government therefore declares itself ready to enter, without waiting for the outcome of other negotiations, into negotiations for a peace between Austria-Hungary and the Entente States, and for an immediate armistice on all fronts of Austria-Hungary, and begs the President, Mr. Wilson, to take the necessary measures to that effect.

A semi-official note made public, in Vienna, the day this note was sent, explained why Austria-Hungary acted independently.

Austria was obliged to conform to the methods of President Wilson, who had successively replied to the three members of the Triple Alliance, and act apart from her allies. The Monarchy, which has formally adopted President Wilson's line of action, shares his opinion, as was shown by the Emperor's manifesto to the peoples, which, in proclaiming the federalization of the Monarchy, exceeded President Wilson's program.

However, the complete reorganization of Austria can only be carried out after an armistice. If Austria-Hungary has declared herself ready to enter into negotiations for an armistice and for peace, without awaiting the result of negotiations with other States, that does not necessarily signify an offer of a separate peace. It means that she is ready to act, separately in the interests of the reestablishment of peace.

Coming so close after the German note, and written in a tone so different, that of Austria was hailed as most important. The words, "without awaiting the results of other negotiations," seemed to indicate, it was held by some, that Vienna had broken with Berlin. Others claimed that this action of Austria-Hungary sealed the doom of Germany. It was the beginning of the end, a complete surrender, and though the terms might not be such as were demanded of Bulgaria, the Allies would surely see to it that they secured the use of the territory, railways and means of communication of Austria-Hungary against Germany should that Empire continue the war. With the Austrian armies withdrawn from the western front, with her territory open to invasion from the Austrian side, with the Italians free to move against her, Germany, at best, could continue the struggle single handed but a short time. Undoubtedly the reply to her by the Allies would be that she might learn their terms for an armistice by sending commissioners to Marshal Foch. Still others saw no sign of a break, because the action of Austria had aroused no resentment in Berlin. Behind the note was a hidden snare; the Allies must be careful.

What terms would be offered by the Supreme War Council of the Allies, which at once gathered at Versailles, was next a subject for speculation. That they would include the hand-

ing over of the German fleet and submarines, the cession of Metz and Strassburg and the occupation of Cologne, Mannheim and Coblenz as a guarantee of Germany's acceptance of the terms was fully expected. Bethmann-Hollweg when, on July 31, 1914, he asked France to remain neutral, demanded the German occupation of Toul and Verdun, as a guarantee of French neutrality. The same treatment should now be meted out to Germany.

How serious was the situation in Austria-Hungary, and how pressing the need of peace was made clear by a note addressed by Foreign Minister Count Andrássy to Secretary Lansing asking for his good offices with the President.

Immediately after having taken direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and after the dispatch of the official answer to your note of October 18, 1918, by which you were able to see that we accept all the points and principles laid down by President Wilson in his various declarations and are in complete accord with the efforts of President Wilson to prevent future wars and to create a league of nations, we have taken preparatory measures in order that Austrians and Hungarians may be able, according to their own desire and without being in any way hindered, to make a decision as to their future organization and to rule it.

Since the accession to power of Emperor King Charles his immovable purpose has been to bring an end to the war. More than this is the desire of the sovereign of all the Austro-Hungarian peoples, who acknowledge that their future destiny can only be accomplished in a pacific world by being freed from all disturbances, privations and sorrows of war.

This is why I address you directly, Mr. Secretary of State, praying that you will have the goodness to intervene with the President of the United States in order that the interest of humanity, as in the interest of all those who live in Austria-Hungary, an immediate armistice may be concluded on all fronts and for an overture that immediate negotiations for peace will follow.

If reports could be believed Hungary was on the point of revolt. In the Unterhaus at Budapest Count Karolyi, leader of the Radical Socialists, had moved a resolution calling for a separate peace, dissolution of the alliance with Germany, recog-

nition of the independence of the South Slavonians, a Hungarian King to reside in Budapest and the resignation of the Werkele ministry. Vienna was said to be threatened with famine, the authorities powerless and the law no longer enforced. Affairs in Germany, it was asserted, were daily growing worse, riots had occurred in various parts of the country, and want of raw materials was hindering the production of munitions. Socialists and Radicals were insisting that the President's demands concerning autocratic government be accepted. When a Socialistic member of the Reichstag said, "The baneful influence of the Kaiser must be removed," the members of his party cried "abdicate." One story, attributed to German court circles, ran, that the Kaiser had said: "I will not abandon my sorely tried people; but if necessary, I am ready to become something like a hereditary president of the German republic like the Kings of England, Belgium, Italy." On another occasion, speaking to some members of the Reichstag, he was reported to have said: "In any case, if the moment comes when the interest of Germany demands it, I should abdicate and would do so without hesitation, but the moment does not seem to have come yet." A manifesto said to have been issued by a section of the Social Democrats reads: "If the necessity arises and the hour comes, the organized masses of labor, with strong middle class support, will remove every hindrance to peace which does not voluntarily yield to the will of the huge majority of the people," which was understood to mean if the Kaiser did not abdicate he would be deposed. According to one rumor abdication was to be considered an accomplished fact. According to another he was persisting in refusing to abdicate. A third was to the effect that he had gone to headquarters at the front and was refusing to take any notice of the doings of the government at Berlin. *Vorwaerts*, the Socialist newspaper, the Munich *Neueste Nachrichten*, the Frankfurter *Gazette*, called on him to show his courage by abdicating. The *Vossische Zeitung* of Berlin declared that Philipp Scheidemann, Secretary of State without portfolio, had told

the Imperial Chancellor that the Emperor must leave the throne.

Every day brought astonishing news. Germany it was reported had again addressed the President assuring him that all necessary steps had been taken to meet his stand that peace could not be made with an autocratic government; that the State Department had declined to give out the note because it did not change the situation, and was of no public importance; that the real reason was a fear that, if made public, it would help to impress the false idea that the German Government had been reformed and that the German people were in control. October 31 it was reported that Great Britain had received peace proposals from Turkey, that an armistice between Turkey and the Allied Powers had been signed at midnight on October 30 at Mudras on the island of Lemnos; that the terms included free passage of the Allied fleet through the Dardanelles, occupation of the forts on the Dardanelles and on the Bosphorus and immediate repatriation of all Allied prisoners. Austria, too, had collapsed and her commander on the Italian front had applied to General Diaz for a cessation of hostilities.

According to report the dual monarchy was falling to pieces. Count Karolyi had presented to Emperor Charles his plan for an independent Hungary, which called for abolition of the parliamentary system; guarantees of a free political Hungary; recall of the Hungarian troops; abandonment of the German alliance; dissolution of the Hungarian lower house and new elections by both male and female voters; suppression of the censorship and establishment of freedom of speech, of the press, and of public meetings; recognition of the new states of Ukraine, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the South Slavs and German Austria. Charles rejected the plan; but the revolutionary movement, it was said, was going forward. The soldiers had replaced their imperial cockades with revolutionary colors, the imperial symbols had been removed from buildings, and imperial proclamations torn up, and Budapest was in the hands

of the revolutionary troops. At Prague the Czech National Committee had taken over the local government; the Berlin-Vienna railway where it entered Czecho-Slovakia had been cut; the German State of Austria had been created by act of the German National Council of Austria, and demanded admission to the peace negotiations, and the Croatian Parliament had declared the separation of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia from Hungary. Confusion was everywhere, reports stated. Mobs had looted the stores and attacked the banks at Budapest; a provisional soldiers' and officers' council had been set up in Vienna, and the people were parading the streets shouting: "Down with the Hapsburgs." By proclamation, it was reported, the Council had announced the taking over of all power, had declared democracy was sacred, and urged the workers and citizens to go back to their work and the soldiers to their barracks. The State Council had adopted the colors of Battenburg, red, white, red, as those of the new Austrian State; an Imperial Decree had ordered the fleet and all naval property delivered to the South Slav National Council; the Emperor had commissioned Archduke Joseph to approach all political chiefs in an attempt to settle the political crisis; Count Andrassy had resigned, and the Emperor had ordered all officers of the army to place themselves in the service of the armies of the newly organized governments. These governments were five in number: The Czecho-Slovakian comprising the northern part of the old Empire with Prague as the Capital; German Austria, on the west, comprising the greater part of old Austria with Vienna as the capital; the South Slav State embracing all the southwestern part of the Empire, save Italia Irredenta, with Agrane as its capital; Hungary, a part of the monarchy with Budapest as its capital, and German Bohemia embracing the northern and western parts of Bohemia with Reichenberg as its capital city.

November 2, General Diaz in person delivered to the Austrian commander the Allies' terms for an armistice with his country, and King Boris of Bulgaria, after a reign of just

one month, announced his abdication, and a peasant government was quickly formed. On the afternoon of Sunday, November 3, the terms of the Allies having been accepted by Austria, General Diaz signed, and they went into effect at three o'clock on the afternoon of Monday, and Germany, deserted by the last of her allies, stood alone awaiting the terms of an armistice the Allies and the United States were preparing at Versailles.

The Supreme War Council of the Allies, charged with preparing these terms, gathered informally at Versailles on October 28, and after a series of such meetings, held its first formal sitting on November 1 and finished its task November 4. "According to an official report received this evening," Mr. Lansing announced, "the terms of the armistice to be offered to Germany have just been agreed to unanimously and signed by the representatives of the Allies and the United States in Paris. The report further states that diplomatic unity has been completely achieved under conditions of utmost harmony."

Terms having thus been agreed on it became the duty of the President to notify Germany of the fact, for it was through the President that the Allies had been informed of Germany's desire for an armistice. November 5, therefore, Mr. Lansing requested the Swiss Minister "to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice." Mr. Lansing further stated that the President was "in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments" on the correspondence between the Government of the United States and that of Germany on the subject of an armistice; that the President was "in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum," and that the whole memorandum was as follows:

22—The allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the

United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.

They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

Further, in the conditions of peace, laid down in his address to Congress of Jan. 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air.¹

The terms of the armistice were not made known, nor was it expected they would be before they had been accepted or rejected by the German Government. There were those who believed that the conditions, while less severe than were imposed on Turkey and Bulgaria, would still amount to unconditional surrender. With her last ally gone, her army crumbling under the blows of Foch, Haig and Pershing, her people longing for peace and even calling for the abdication of the Emperor, Germany must realize the uselessness of continuing the war and accept the terms bitter as they were. There were those who held that the military situation on the front, bad as it was, did not yet call for unconditional surrender. The German armies were beaten but not crushed; they still fought on enemy soil; their morale was not gone and though the military power was said to be subject to the civil power they might not give up the fight. Indeed, it was reported that on Sunday, November 3, a meeting was held around the statue of Bismarck in Berlin

¹ The number "22" is that of the memorandum, each of those adopted by the conference being numbered serially.

and resolutions adopted protesting against a humiliating peace and favoring a continuation of the war.

November 6 dispatches from Amsterdam and Berlin, received in London, announced that: "A German delegation to conclude an armistice and take up peace negotiations has left for the western front," and that the members were General von Gruenell, military delegate to The Hague peace conferences; General von Winterfeld, one time military attaché at Paris, and Admiral von Hintze, late Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

About one o'clock in the afternoon of November 7 newspapers, the country over, that subscribed to the United Press Association news service, announced on their bulletins and in extra issues of their papers that a cable dispatch reported that the German commissioners had signed the terms of an armistice at two o'clock in the afternoon French time, or nine o'clock in the morning Washington time.

As the good news spread over the country in city after city all work and business was suspended while the people went wild with joy. Workshops, offices, factories, stores, homes were deserted, whistles and automobile horns were blown, bells were rung, and crowds delirious with joy and carrying flags marched shouting about the streets. By three o'clock the Secretary of State had been heard from and announced that the armistice had not been signed, and that the German representatives would not meet Marshal Foch until five o'clock French time, or noon Washington time. No attention was paid by the excited crowds to this official statement and the cheering, shouting, parading, whistle blowing went on until well into the night.

When at last the truth came out it appeared that about half past twelve on the morning of November 7 Marshal Foch received from the German High Command a dispatch which read:

The German Government, having been informed through the President of the United States that Marshal Foch had received powers to receive accredited representatives of the German Govern-

ment and communicate to them conditions of an armistice, the following plenipotentiaries have been named by it:

Mathias Erzberger, General H. K. A. Winterfeld, Count Alfred von Oberndorff, General von Gruenell, and Naval Captain von Salow.

The plenipotentiaries request that they be informed by wireless of the place where they can meet Marshal Foch. They will proceed by automobile, with subordinates of the staff, to the place thus appointed.

The German Government would congratulate itself in the interests of humanity if the arrival of the German delegation on the Allies' front might bring about a provisional suspension of hostilities.

On November 7, at 10:25 a. m., Marshal Foch replied:

If the German plenipotentiaries desire to meet Marshal Foch and ask him for an armistice they will present themselves at the French outposts by the Chimay-Fourmies-La-Capelle-Guise road. Orders have been given to receive them and conduct them to the spot fixed for the meeting.

A German wireless dispatch received November 7 at one o'clock in the afternoon announced that:

The German plenipotentiaries for an armistice leave Spa to-day. They will leave here at noon and reach at 5 o'clock this afternoon the French outposts by the Chimay-Fourmies-La-Capelle-Guise road. There will be ten persons in all, headed by Secretary of State Erzberger.

A wireless dispatch, in German, was received a few minutes before two o'clock:

German general headquarters to the Allied general headquarters. The supreme German command to Marshal Foch. From the German outposts to the French outposts our delegation will be accompanied by a road-mending company to enable automobiles to pass the La Capelle road, which has been destroyed.

Another wireless dispatch, in German, was received at six o'clock:

The German supreme command to Marshal Foch: By reason of delay the German delegation will not be able to cross the outpost line until between eight and ten o'clock (5 p. m. Washington time) to-night, at Haudroy, two kilometers northeast of La Capelle.

On receipt of the message orders were issued to cease firing at three o'clock on the afternoon until further orders. This, it was now said, might have been the basis for the false dispatch, sent out by the United Press Association, that the armistice had been signed. As stated by the General Manager of the United Press the facts were, that at 11:56 o'clock in the forenoon a message was received by the Western Union Telegraph Company, was at once sent to the Censor, was returned at 11:59 o'clock with his "O. K.," was immediately sent out to the newspapers, and that the message as received read:

Paris

Unipress, N. Y.

Urgent. Armistice Allies Germany signed eleven morning. Hostilities ceased two afternoon. Sedan taken by Americans.

In spite of the official denial by the Secretary of State, the General Manager of the Association in the United States refused to be convinced. The Association, he said, was standing by its message and held it to be authentic until proved false, and cited the instance of the landing of our troops at Vera Cruz in 1914. The United Press received the news, the Navy Department denied it, and three hours later received the official confirmation. It was quite possible, he said, that following the signing of the armistice the censorship was tightened until the time came to announce it simultaneously in all the allied countries. A report having spread that the cable censorship was holding up dispatches which might confirm the false message to the United Press, the chairman of the Committee on Public Information announced that "any such report is absolutely untrue. No dispatch bearing upon any phase of the armistice negotiations is being stopped or even halted in the New York office. The channel is wide open."

From the United Press Association then came the statement that the announcement of the signing of the armistice was made by Admiral Wilson at Brest; that he acted in good faith; and that a later message saying the news could not be confirmed

was probably delayed as it did not arrive until almost twenty-four hours after the first. Admiral Wilson promptly assumed the responsibility and said: "The statement of the United Press relative to the signing of an armistice was made public from my office on the basis of what appeared to be official and authoritative information. I am in a position to know that the United Press and its representatives acted in perfect faith, and that the premature announcement was the result of an error for which the agency was in no wise responsible."

On his return to the United States, from Brest, the President of the United Press Association made a statement:

The bulletin which Admiral Wilson gave out, and which The United Press carried, was not a "rumor" or a "report." It was a bulletin furnished to the Admiral as official, and so given to us.

It was given to us for publication by the ranking active United States naval officer in France. There was no more ground for doubting Admiral Wilson's source of news than there would have been for doubting the statement had it come from Marshal Foch.

It was about ten o'clock in the morning (French time) when I first learned of a rumor that the armistice had been signed. The report was current in both French and American Army circles in Brest when I arrived that morning to embark for the United States.

I put in the entire day endeavoring to confirm the report. But it was not until about four o'clock in the afternoon that Admiral Wilson was notified on what he stated was official authority, and on what I know he had every reason to believe was official authority, that the armistice had been signed.

The announcement had been made by the local Brest newspaper and the civilians, soldiers and sailors had their celebration under full headway before I was able to get from Admiral Wilson personally a copy of his written announcement and his personal assurance that the bulletin was official.

The Admiral then sent his personal aid with me to assist me in filing the dispatch, as I do not speak French fluently.

It was a fact that all Brest, including operators and censors, accepted the news as official, and was celebrating at the time that caused my wire to pass the French censorship at Brest unchallenged.

Upon my return to the United States I learned that no news had been published here of the fact that celebrations of the signing of

the armistice took place on November 7 at practically all the army and naval bases on the French coast.

I was also surprised to learn that nothing had reached here by cable concerning the fact that all Paris had the report of the armistice being signed. At the American Luncheon Club meeting in Paris on that day the toastmaster arose, and, with Admiral Benson seated on one side of him and American Consul General Thackera on the other, announced on what he said was the authority of the American Embassy that the armistice had been signed. All the celebration on that day was by no means on this side of the Atlantic.

Nothing much has yet been said as to the source of Admiral Wilson's information. This is not for me to discuss. Nothing has been said as to the reason for the report current on that day throughout France. No explanation has yet been offered of how the report reached the American Embassy in Paris as official. Neither has any explanation been offered yet as to what became of the first German armistice delegation, headed by von Hintze, which was reported to have reached the French lines on November 6, and which then disappeared from the news, being supplanted by the Erzberger plenipotentiaries. Some of these matters will be cleared up after peace is signed.

That the people might not be deceived a second time, Secretary Lansing announced that he was "requested and authorized by the President to state, that no information reaching this government concerning the armistice negotiations in France has been withheld; that any statement to the contrary is absolutely false, and that as soon as a definite decision in regard to the armistice has been reached it will immediately be made public by the Government."

Dispatches from Rotterdam now announced that the Kaiser was not to abdicate. After long discussion the leaders of the parties in the Reichstag had so decided. Socialists, it was reported, held that although President Wilson had not, in so many words, demanded that the Hohenzollerns be swept away, nevertheless, the Kaiser was looked on abroad as the head and front of German militarism; that militarism had been swept away, and therefore the Kaiser should go with it. The Centrals, Liberals, and Progressives answered that the Kaiser was

the symbol of German unity, that this unity was seriously threatened, and that in the interest of German unity he should remain, and so it was decided that he should. Now it was a report that the managing Committee of the Socialist Party through Philipp Scheidemann had sent an ultimatum to Chancellor Maximilian; that it had demanded the right of public assembly; that the military and police must be ordered "to exercise great reserve"; that the Prussian Government be at once brought into conformity with the views of the majority in the Reichstag; and that before noon of November 8 the Emperor abdicate and the Crown Prince renounce all claims to the throne. To this demand the Kaiser was reported to have answered, through the Minister of the Interior, that he would not voluntarily abdicate, that he could not at the moment of peace assume the terrible responsibility of giving up the Fatherland to anarchy. Nevertheless, the hour had come, and the newspapers of November 10 announced that the Kaiser had abdicated; that the Crown Prince had renounced his claims; that a Regent had been appointed, that Brunswick had revolted; that the reigning Grand Duke Ernest Augustus, son-in-law of the Kaiser, had abdicated his throne and that the Chancellor had issued this decree:

The Kaiser and King has decided to renounce the throne. The Imperial Chancellor will remain in office until the questions connected with the abdication of the Kaiser, the renouncing by the Crown Prince of the thrones of the German Empire and of Prussia, and the setting up of a regency have been settled.

For the regency he intends to appoint Deputy Ebert as Imperial Chancellor, and he proposes that a bill be brought in for the establishment of a law providing for the immediate promulgation of general suffrage and for the constitutional German National assembly which shall settle finally the future form of government of the German nation and of those peoples which might be desirous of coming within the Empire.

Germany, if reports were true, was in ferment. Day after day dispatches from Amsterdam told of rioting, mutiny and

revolution. Now it was said that the sailors on the battleships *Kaiser* and *Schleswig-Holstein* at Kiel had mutinied, and shot such officers as withstood them, had threatened to blow up the vessels if attacked, had been joined by some infantry sent to restore order and had displayed the red flag. Now it was reported that the garrison at Kiel had refused to march to the harbor, that a Workmen's and Soldiers' Council had been formed at Kiel; that the Governor had been forced to yield to their demands; that the revolutionary troops at Kiel were wearing red cockades and carrying red banners and had seized every warship in the harbor, taken control of railroads and street cars, occupied Kiel Castle and raised over it the red flag; that the Council of Workmen and Soldiers had taken over the government of the city, and that the movement had spread to Schleswig; that the greater part of the submarine crews had joined the revolutionists, and that practically the whole German navy was in revolt; that Kiel, Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, Borkum, Cuxhaven, were in the hands of the revolutionists; that Bremerhaven, Tilsit, Hamburg, Hanover, Cologne, Magdeburg, had joined in the revolt; that a great meeting of the people in Munich, called by the Socialist leaders, had demanded that the Kaiser abdicate and the Crown Prince renounce his claim to the throne; that an armistice be signed; that Bavaria be declared a republic and that there should be no war in future save for defense of the country; that the warships at Kiel had gone to Flensburg; that Prince Henry had fled from Kiel in an automobile carrying a red flag, and that six German battleships anchored outside of Flensburg had trained their guns on the mutineers.

The German armistice delegates meantime had reached the French outposts near La Capelle during the night of November 7th; had presented their credentials and, blindfolded, had been escorted within the lines and comfortably lodged for the night. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 8th they were received by Marshal Foch at his headquarters in a railroad car. Their credentials having been examined and approved Matthias Erz-

berger, so the report said, announced that the government had been informed by President Wilson that Marshal Foch had been authorized to make known to them the Allies' terms for an armistice, and that they were empowered to consider the terms and if acceptable to sign the armistice. Marshal Foch then read the terms; Erzberger asked for an immediate suspension of hostilities. Foch refused, whereupon a request was made for time to send the text of the armistice to German headquarters, and seventy-two hours, beginning at eleven o'clock French time on November 8, were granted.

The seventy-two hours were to expire at eleven o'clock, French time, on the morning of Monday, November 11. A courier was at once ordered to depart, but the German batteries were heavily shelling the road he was to take from La Capelle. It was then proposed by the German delegates that he go by airplane. Marshal Foch consented provided the German High Command agreed that it would not be fired at and a wireless message was sent to Spa, from which came the reply: "We grant free passage to the French airplane bringing our courier. We are issuing orders that it shall not be attacked by any of our machines. For the purpose of recognition it should carry two white flags very clearly marked." Despite this message, and repeated requests, the German batteries continued to fire on the road until late in the afternoon when a message from Spa announced that orders to cease firing had been given and that Captain Helldorf, the courier, was at liberty to come by land. Almost immediately the firing on the road stopped and shortly after three o'clock he departed. Spa was reached as quickly as the condition of the road would permit, and at 2:45 o'clock on the morning of Monday, November 11, the Department of State announced: "The armistice has been signed. It was signed at five o'clock a. m. Paris time, and hostilities will cease at 11 a. m. this morning, Paris time."

The Kaiser and the Crown Prince were reported to be fugitives in Holland. On Saturday morning, November 9, so the dispatch said, the Emperor signed a letter of abdica-

tion; the Crown Prince renounced his claim a few hours later, and about half past seven on Sunday morning father and son accompanied by a party of ten crossed the Dutch frontier at Eysden, made their way to Maastricht and found refuge in the home of their friend, Count Bentinck, the Château Midacht in the town of De Steeg near Utrecht. This was soon contradicted and the new version ran that the Kaiser left the train before Eysden was reached because of shots fired at his car, and reached the station by automobile; that the fugitives were held on the train near the frontier to await the decision of the Dutch Government. A later report had it that about half after seven o'clock Sunday morning ten travel-stained automobiles were seen to come along the Vise-Maastricht road and pass through the little border-line town of Moulant only to be stopped by the Dutch frontier guards at the barbed wire fence to await the arrival of the custom authorities, who were greatly astonished to find ten automobiles awaiting admission into Holland. It was a long wait while the question of octroi was being settled, an inspection of the seats and cars made, and the many formalities settled. The automobiles it was decided could not pass, whereupon the late Kaiser, the former Crown Prince, General von Hindenburg and all the members of the party walked to the little railroad station at Eysden. Another long wait followed before the train reached the station, and was at once entered, and the blinds pulled down and the party seen no more. No one knew where the train was to go. The Hague must be communicated with in consequence of which the party did not set off until after nine o'clock on Monday morning. Meantime the Empress and more generals arrived at Eysden. The destination of William Hohenzollern was then given as the castle of Count Bentinck at Amerongen.

This story in time proved false. General von Hindenburg was at the army Headquarters; nobody knew where the Crown Prince was; indeed, report said he had been killed by a soldier; the Empress did not come to Eysden. Long afterwards, in

January, 1919, the Dutch Premier Ruys de Beerenbranck gave his version of the entrance of the Kaiser. On Sunday, November 10, he said, a long train of automobiles arrived at Eysden. Officers of the rank of generals alighted and demanded of the sergeant on guard duty that he permit the passage of the Kaiser. He refused; whereupon one of the generals said: " 'Everything has been arranged with the Dutch Government and the Kaiser is expected.' " The sergeant, a mere non-commissioned officer, allowed himself to be overcome by the war lord of high degree and the Kaiser entered Holland. At nine o'clock that morning on my return from church, I was informed by my colleague, M. Van Karneback, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that he had received, at seven o'clock, a telegram from our representative at Brussels, M. Van Hollenboven, transmitting a request that the Kaiser be allowed to pass the frontier. Almost at the same hour the commander-in-chief of our army received a notification from the post commander of Maastricht of the event that had occurred at dawn, that is the Kaiser's entrance. We were face to face with a *fait accompli*. This unexpected arrival forced us to seek a place to lodge the visitor. After much ado and a great deal of telephoning we found it on the property of Count Bentinck, who has been subjected to a lot of vexation in consequence, the breaking off of long-standing friendships with Englishmen and annoyances of all kinds."

Early Monday morning the Kaiser and a personal suite of sixteen officers started by train from Eysden and early in the afternoon reached Maarn. There he was met by Count Bentinck and under military escort went to the castle at Amerongen which had been placed at his disposal at the request of the Dutch Government.

The Crown Prince and a suite crossed the frontier on the 12th, went to Maastricht, was taken to the house of the Governor and then interned as a German officer. In time he was sent to the little island of Wieringen in the Zuyder Zee.

Scarcely was the former Kaiser safe on the soil of the Nether-

lands than popular demands for his extradition began to be made. M. Clémenceau was reported to have asked the Dean of the faculty of law of the University of Paris for an opinion on the question of demanding the extradition of William Hohenzollern; the *Temps* could condone the reception of William when no one knew what was happening in Germany, when refusal might mean he would be shot at a frontier post. But for a country which owed its existence to the triumph of the Allies to shelter the man who caused the death of millions was nothing short of an outrage. Place him on a boat, conduct him to the Belgian frontier and the Allies would know what they ought to do with him. The Dutch legation in Paris made public a note from the President of the Netherlands Council of Ministers to the Chamber of Deputies stating that the ex-Emperor had entered the country as a private personage; that the refuge granted him was of the sort granted all refugees; that no exception could be made in his case because of his former position; that the Netherlands government could not believe that foreign governments whose subjects had so often enjoyed the benefit of refuge in that country would refuse to respect national tradition or forget that they themselves had given protection to dethroned monarchs.

That William had really abdicated was seriously doubted. So far as foreign governments were concerned he was still Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia. No official information of his abdication had been received. A report was set afloat that to end the discussion the German Government intended to publish his decree of abdication; but it did not do so. In the opinion of the London *Daily Mail* William undoubtedly regarded himself as Emperor and King. So far as the world knew there was no abdication document bearing his signature, nothing but the statement of Prince Max in which he used the words "thron verzieh" and not the word "abdankung."

In England the late Kaiser had been three times indicted for murder in connection with the sinking of the *Lusitania*, the Zeppelin air raids, and the shelling of defenseless coast

towns. Law officers of the Crown, it was reported, were therefore considering the question of extradition and were working in coöperation with the French. Even the German revolutionary press was by this time demanding a tribunal to pass sentence on the Hohenzollerns.

Towards the close of November Mr. Lloyd-George, in an election speech at Newcastle, stated that the British Government had consulted some of the greatest jurists of the kingdom and that each one of them was of the opinion that the former German Emperor was guilty of an indictable offense for which he ought to be held responsible. In the opinion of the French and British people the Kaiser, though living in a neutral country, was only awaiting an opportunity to return to Germany and resume the throne. He had never formally renounced the throne. Officers, once high in command, it was believed, were so directing the revolution that it must collapse, and thus prepare the way for a triumphant return of the Kaiser to Berlin. The Berlin Government, holding much the same opinion, is said to have sent a telegram demanding his formal abdication, and that of the Crown Prince. Be this as it may the Berlin Government on November 30 "in order to reply to certain misunderstandings which have arisen with regard to the abdication" gave out a document signed by the Emperor on the 28th.

By the present document I renounce forever my rights to the crown of Prussia and the rights to the German imperial crown. I release at the same time all the officials of the German Empire, and Prussia, and also all officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the Prussian Navy and Army, and of contingents from confederated States, from the oath of fidelity they have taken to me as their Emperor, King, and supreme chief.

I expect from them until a new organization of the German Empire exists that they will aid those who effectively hold the power in Germany to protect the German people against the menacing dangers of anarchy, famine, and foreign domination.

Made and executed and signed by our own hand with the imperial seal at Amerongen, Nov. 28.

WILLIAM

Nothing was said concerning abdication by the Crown Prince. "I have not renounced anything, and I have not signed any document whatever," he was reported to have said to a representative of the Associated Press. "However, should the German Government decide to form a Republic similar to the United States or France, I should be perfectly content to return to Germany as a simple citizen ready to do anything to assist my country. I should even be happy to work as a laborer in a factory." Speaking of his flight to the Netherlands he said: "I was with my group of armies after the Kaiser left Germany. I asked the Berlin Government whether they desired me to retain my command. They replied negatively, and I could not continue to lead armies under orders of the Soldier's and Workmen's Council."

That a Crown Council had been held at Potsdam to decide on war he positively denied. Neither his father nor he wanted war. People blamed him for the failure at Verdun. Twice he had refused to attack with the troops at his disposal. The third time he obeyed, and was successful for three days; but was not properly supported. Ludendorff was the mainspring of Germany's war activities. Von Hindenburg was a mere figurehead.

Meantime the Kaiser had been talking. Against his will, he was reported to have said, they sent him to Norway in July, 1914, on the eve of the opening of the war. He did not wish to take the voyage because of the seriousness of the situation after the murder of the Arch Duke Ferdinand. But the Chancellor said to him: "Your Majesty must take this voyage in order to maintain peace. If your Majesty remains here, it undoubtedly means war, and the world will lay to your charge responsibility for the war." Bethmann-Hollweg, at that time Chancellor, in an interview, denied that this was the object of the voyage.

By this time the Netherlands Government had appointed a Commission to report on the status of the Kaiser, and at a meeting in London between M. Clémenceau, Marshal Foch,

the Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando, Lloyd-George and the British War Cabinet, the question of expatriation was discussed. According to reports a demand would be made, and if the Netherlands Government refused to deliver the Kaiser without the consent of Germany, pressure would be brought to secure consent. Other matters believed to have been considered were extension of the armistice soon to end; the day when the Peace Conference should meet; what indemnities should be demanded from Germany and Austria-Hungary that once was; replacement by Germany of the shipping her U-boats had destroyed; the future of the German colonies; and the future of the newly emancipated nations, Poland, Bohemia, Jugoslavia. Whatever may have been the questions discussed, the Allies, M. Clémenceau said on his return to Paris, had unanimously agreed to them and especially as to what should be done with the Kaiser.

Much the greater part of Germany was then in the hands of the revolutionists. Red flags flew from the royal palace in Berlin and over the Brandenburg gate, the Reds were in control of the greater part of the city, and the new Chancellor Ebert appealed for law and order. German guard ships, it was reported, had left their stations in the Great Belt and the Little Belt and raised the red flag; six cruisers had joined the Reds and arrived at Hamburg, and the crews of four dreadnaughts in Kiel harbor had gone over to the revolutionists. Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils had been formed in Aix-la-Chapelle, Cassel, Nuremberg, Mannheim, Frankfurt, Münster, Stuttgart, Cologne. Order, it was said, had been restored in Hamburg, and in many other towns the authorities were working in harmony with the Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils.

In Berlin a People's Government for Germany was set up in the course of a few hours. About nine o'clock on the morning of Saturday, November 9, a general strike began and in a little while thousands of workmen carrying red flags came into the city from the factories in the suburbs. Trains from Kiel

brought several thousand sailors who, by order of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Council, went in groups and occupied the public buildings and street corners. Red flags appeared everywhere; officers, it was said, in the streets and in the barracks pulled off cockades, epaulettes, iron crosses; soldiers, sailors, workmen "fraternized," and the cry "Long live the German Republic" was heard on every hand. Towards noon a force of soldiers and sailors occupied the Government buildings along Wilhelmstrasse, and a great crowd, gathered before the Reichstag building, was addressed by Philipp Scheidemann, who said:

The Kaiser has abdicated! the dynasty has fallen! It is a great and honorable victory for the German people. Herr Ebert has received the task of forming a new Government, in which both sections of the Socialist Party will take part. Orders by the Government are only valid when signed by Herr Ebert, and those issued by the Ministry of War must be countersigned by a Socialist delegate.

A little later a red flag was raised over the Palace and another put in the window through which the Kaiser passed to the balcony to make his memorable speech on the opening of the war in August, 1914. Still later soldiers entered the building of the Wolff Bureau, took possession and put two Socialists in charge. *Vorwärts* was likewise confiscated and the building decked in red flags.

Meantime Herr Ebert was busy setting up a government, and proclamations followed in rapid succession.

As yet the terms of the armistice had not been given to the public. But, no sooner had the President, in the early hours of the morning of November 11, received official notice that the armistice had been received, than by his order it was announced that he would read the terms at a joint meeting of the Senate and House of Representatives. The hour fixed was one o'clock, and promptly on the hour the President took his stand at the speaker's desk and said:

In these times of rapid and stupendous change it will in some degree lighten my sense of responsibility to perform in person the

duty of communicating to you some of the larger circumstances of the situation with which it is necessary to deal.

The German authorities, who have at the invitation of the Supreme War Council, been in communication with Marshal Foch, have accepted and signed the terms of armistice which he was authorized and instructed to communicate to them. These terms are as follows: [Having read them the President continued.] The war thus comes to an end; for, having accepted these terms of armistice, it will be impossible for the German command to renew it.

It is not now possible to assess the consequences of this great consummation. We know only that this tragical war, whose consuming flames swept from one nation to another until all the world was on fire, is at an end and that it was the privilege of our own people to enter it at its most critical juncture in such fashion and in such force as to contribute, in a way of which we are all deeply proud, to the great result. We know, too, that the object of the war is attained; the object upon which all free men had set their hearts; and attained with a sweeping completeness which even now we do not realize. Armed imperialism such as the men conceived who were but yesterday the masters of Germany is at an end, its illicit ambitions engulfed in black disaster. Who will seek now to revive it?

The text from which President Wilson read was that prepared by the Supreme War Council at Versailles. But another version existed, for, between the day when the first was drawn up, and the day when the representatives of defeated Germany affixed their names to the second, changes, many and important, were made by Marshal Foch under authority given him so to do. Both texts called for the stoppage of fighting on land, and in the air, six hours after the armistice was signed; for the evacuation of invaded countries, Belgium, France, Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine; for the repatriation, to begin at once and be finished within a fortnight, of all inhabitants taken from these countries; and for the surrender in good condition of a vast quantity of war materials, heavy guns, field guns, machine guns, airplanes of all sorts, fighters, bombers and night bombers. Mr. Wilson's text called for the delivery of thirty thousand machine guns, three thousand minenwerfers and two thousand airplanes; the Foch text for

twenty-five thousand machine guns and seventeen hundred airplanes. All German territory from the boundaries of Holland, Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine to the west bank of the Rhine by the Wilson text was to be occupied, and the principal crossings at Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne, together with bridgeheads at these cities thirty kilometers in radius on the east bank of the Rhine were to be held. Along that bank was to run, from the frontier of Holland to the borders of Switzerland, a neutral zone bounded by a line drawn parallel to the river, and forty kilometers from it. By the Foch text the width of the zone was changed and "a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the stream and at a distance of ten kilometers." Evacuation of the Rhineland, by the Wilson text, must be within "a further period of eleven days, in all nineteen days after the signature of the armistice." Evacuation, according to the Foch text, must be finished "within a further period of sixteen days, in all thirty-one days after the signing of the armistice." Countries west of the Rhine, the Wilson text provided, should "be administered by the local authorities under the control of the Allied and United States armies of occupation." The Foch text vested the government in the "local troops of occupation." By the Wilson text five thousand locomotives, fifty thousand railway cars and ten thousand motor lorries were to be delivered in good order within fourteen days. In the Foch text the railway cars were increased to one hundred and fifty thousand; the motor lorries reduced to five thousand, and the time made thirty-one days for the cars and thirty-six days for the lorries. Each text required the German Command to reveal all mines or delayed action fuses on evacuated territory. Foch gave forty-eight hours after the signing of the armistice in which to make known where were the mines and fuses. Allied and American armies in occupied territories might exercise the right of requisition; the upkeep of troops in the Rhineland, save in Alsace-Lorraine, was to be charged to the German Government; Allied and

American prisoners of war were to be repatriated but German prisoners were not to be released.

Concerning affairs on the eastern front the Wilson text required German troops then on any territory which before the war belonged to Russia, Turkey or Roumania to withdraw within the frontier of Germany as it was on August 1, 1914. In the Foch text this was changed to Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Roumania, and German troops then on territory which before the war belonged to Russia must leave "as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of these territories, shall decide that the time for this has come." Both texts require the renunciation of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. By the Wilson text "unconditional capitulation of all German forces operating in East Africa within one month" was required. By the Foch text this became "evacuation" within "a period to be fixed by the Allies." There must be "reparation for damage done," immediate return "of the cash deposits in the national bank of Belgium, and of the Russian and Roumanian gold yielded to Germany, or taken by her, the gold to be held in trust by the Allies until the signature of peace."

Hostilities at sea must cease at once, all naval and mercantile marine prisoners in German hands must be returned without reciprocity, and according to the Wilson text, one hundred and sixty submarines, all cruisers and mine layers included, were to be surrendered. All other submarines were "to be paid off and completely disarmed and placed under the supervision of the Allied Powers and of the United States of America." Foch required that all submarines "now existing" be surrendered with full armament and equipment in ports to be designated; that such as could not go to the ports be stripped of crew and armament and left under supervision of the Allies; that submarines ready for sea leave German ports as soon as notified of the port of delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. All to be delivered within fourteen days after the signing of the armistice. Six battle cruisers, ten battle-

ships, eight light cruisers, including two mine layers, and fifty destroyers of the most modern types were to be disarmed and interned in neutral ports or, for want of them, in ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. All other surface warships must be disarmed and placed under supervision of the Allies and the United States. By the Foch text vessels to be interned must be ready to leave German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice, and take such routes as might be given by wireless.

The Allies and the United States might sweep up all mine fields laid by Germany outside her territorial waters, and where they were Germany must indicate. Naval and mercantile vessels of the Allies and Associated Powers were to have free access to and from the Baltic, and to secure this all German forts, batteries and defensive works in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic were to be occupied by the forces of the Allies and the United States, and all mines and obstructions within and without the waters of Germany swept up "without any question of neutrality being raised." The blockade set up by the Allies was to remain unchanged, all naval aircraft was to be gathered and immobilized at designated bases, and in evacuating the Belgian coast all merchant ships, tugs and lighters, material for inland navigation, aircraft, arms, armaments and stores of every sort must be abandoned by Germany. Black Sea ports were to be evacuated, Russian warships seized by Germany delivered to the Allies, neutral ships released, and all merchant ships belonging to the Allies and Associated Powers restored in ports to be designated.

Though the armistice was now in force, fighting was not ended for all our troops. The war waged by the armies of Trotsky and Lenine, and the help given them by Germany made it necessary in 1918 for us to join the Allies in sending troops to Archangel and Vladivostok. In each city were great stores of supplies made by the labor, and bought with the money of the people of Great Britain, France and the United States, and sent thither when Russia was fighting on the side of the Allies.

To protect these supplies owned by the Allies, to prevent their capture by the Bolsheviks, to check the Germans advancing through Finland to occupy the Murman coast, to keep open a way of escape for our diplomatic representatives, were the reasons why a few thousand American soldiers were sent to Murmansk, to Archangel and Vladivostok. Some five thousand with twice as many French and British occupied a front of four hundred miles drawn south of Archangel for its defense. One point on this line, held by the Americans, was Kadish, from which in November they were driven by the Bolsheviks to the Emstu River. But just after Christmas our men, dressed in furs covered by a white canvas robe and cowl, to render them indistinguishable in the snow at a distance of a few hundred yards, attacked and surprised the Bolsheviks at Kadish, retook the place and held it.

Ten thousand two hundred Americans were landed at Vladivostok to help the British, French and Japanese forces protect the stores sent from the United States, and keep open the line of communication with the Ural Mountains, a line some five thousand miles in length. Complaint was made in the Senate was "an invasion of Russia" quite as bad as "the German invasion of Belgium." "Was not Russia a neutral nation," it was asked, "when we invaded it? What complaint have we against Germany for invading helpless Belgium? Both acts are equally inexcusable." In 1919 the troops were withdrawn from Archangel and in the early months of 1920 from Vladivostok.

CHAPTER VI

THE PRESIDENT GOES ABROAD

News that the armistice had been signed was immediately followed by appeals to the President from Germany for supplies of food; by preparations for the speedy return of such of our warships and troops as were not needed abroad; by the demobilization of training camps at home, and the return of the men to the pursuits and occupations from which they had been called; by a revision of the war revenue bill; by the removal of many of the restrictions imposed on the people by our entrance into the war; by the return of our industries from a war to a peace basis; and by the announcement that the President would go abroad and sit at the table of the Peace Conference.

In the course of his speech to Congress on November 11 the President said that the Supreme War Council at Versailles had promised the peoples of Central Europe that the Allied nations would do everything in their power to supply them with food, and that steps would at once be taken to organize these efforts for relief in the same systematic manner in which they were organized in the case of Belgium. Germany was the first to call for food.

From the National Council of Women of Germany, November 12, came an appeal to Mrs. Wilson. The terms of the armistice, the Council said, called for the surrender of a very large part of the rolling stock of German railways, and at the same time required her to feed the troops of her late enemies in the occupied territory. Should these requirements remain unchanged the women and children of Germany would die of hunger. Rolling stock was needed to bring food from the farms

to the cities. Food for the occupying troops must come from overseas. The world over women and children had been innocent sufferers of the terrible war, "but nowhere more than in Germany. Let it be through you, Madam, to implore our sisters in the United States of America, who are mothers like ourselves, to ask their government and Allied Governments to change the terms of the armistice so that the long suffering of the women and children of Germany may not end in unspeakable disaster."

According to a wireless message, picked up at London, Dr. Solf, Foreign Secretary, appealed to President Wilson to intervene to mitigate "the fearful conditions existing" in Germany.

Convinced of the common aims and ideals of democracy the German Government has addressed itself to the President of the United States with the request to reestablish peace. This peace was meant to correspond with the principles the President always has maintained. The aim was to be a just solution of all questions in dispute, followed by a permanent reconciliation of all nations.

Furthermore, the President declared he did not wish to make war on the German people, and did not wish to impede its peaceful development. The German Government has received the conditions of the armistice.

After the blockade, those conditions, especially the surrender of means of transport and the sustenance of the troops of occupation, would make it impossible to provide Germany with food and would cause the starvation of millions of men, women and children, all the more as the blockade is to continue.

We had to accept the conditions, but feel it is our duty to draw the President's attention, most solemnly and in all earnestness, to the fact that enforcement of the conditions must produce among the German people feelings contrary to those upon which alone the reconstruction of the community of nations can rest, guaranteeing a just and durable peace.

The German people, therefore, in this fateful hour, address themselves again to the President with the request that he use his influence with the Allied Powers in order to mitigate these fearful conditions.

Before an official copy of this appeal reached the Department of State, the Swiss Minister presented a cable dispatch stating that the German Government requested the President to inform Chancellor Ebert, by wireless, if the Government of the United States was ready to send foodstuffs without delay, provided public order was maintained in Germany and an equitable distribution of food guaranteed. Secretary Lansing at once replied that the President was ready to consider favorably the supplying of foodstuffs to Germany, and to take up the matter immediately with the Allied Governments, provided he was assured "that public order is, and will continue to be, maintained in Germany, and that an equitable distribution of food can be clearly guaranteed."

The German Government and the German people, was the reply by wireless to London, have gratefully taken cognizance of the willingness of the President to consider favorably the sending of food to Germany. "Distress is urgent." The sender, whoever he was, Solf or Haas, believed he was not appealing in vain to the humanitarian feelings of the President, and asked Mr. Lansing, "in order to save the German people from perishing from starvation and anarchy," to send as quickly as possible "to The Hague, or some other place, plenipotentiaries." American delegates could discuss with those from the German people "the details of how the magnanimous help of America could save, in time, our Fatherland from the worst. Perhaps the matter could be put in the hands of Mr. Hoover, who has rendered such great service in Belgium." The oppressive conditions of the armistice; the necessity of supplying the armies as they streamed home; the scanty supply for such uses; the continuance of the blockade; the stoppage of navigation in the Black Sea and the Baltic; the disturbed condition in the east, the message said, made the situation in Germany daily more unbearable. "The peril can be avoided only by the most speedy help."

Another subject of complaint was a provision in the Anglo-Turkish treaty requiring German civilians to leave the Turkish

empire at once. Should this be enforced, Dr. Solf was sure, German hospitals and asylums for the blind, and for orphans, "caring principally for Armenian children, would be forced to close, thus causing new suffering among the Christian people."

This appeal was followed, the next day, by another wireless message to Secretary Lansing. The return of the troops from the west, Dr. Solf said, gave rise to the fear that in a little while Berlin, and other large cities, would be cut off from supplies of food from the interior. He, therefore, with the greatest anxiety, repeated his request of the day before, that not a moment should be lost in convening a conference, at The Hague, and further asked that a German commission might leave at once for the United States, and personally lay before the American Government the conditions in Germany, and arrange for the purchase of necessary foodstuffs. He cherished the hope "that the humanitarian feeling of the American people will not frustrate the possibility of saving thousands of women and children from death by starvation."

Ere this was received Secretary Lansing replied, through the Swiss Minister. He would be obliged if the Minister would say to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the German Government, that the Government of the United States had received the radio messages addressed to the President, relative to relief from certain requirements imposed in the armistice with the Ottoman Government, and in that with the German Government. They would be sent to the other governments with which the government of the United States is associated, and to the Supreme War Council at Paris. Communications, such as these, appertaining to terms in the armistice, the Secretary said, "should be sent to all the Governments, and not addressed, alone, to the President, or the government of the United States," and called attention "to the fact that these communications should be presented through established diplomatic channels, rather than by direct radio communication."

That the food situation might be properly handled, Mr. Hoover was now dispatched to take it in charge, and sailed

from New York on November 16. On the eve of departure, he took pains to explain that the belief, that our people would have to skimp themselves in order that the German people might have food, was a mistaken idea. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, would be required to pay in gold for whatever food they received. Nor were the needs of Germany as great as her "bread appeals" asserted. She had enough food, if her war rationing were continued, to have gone on fighting until next harvest. Her crops had not been failures.

"We are not worrying about Germany," said Mr. Hoover, when about to sail. "She can take care of herself. We are worrying about the little allies who have been under the German yoke. They are faced by famine. We must give them help, and lose no time in doing so." He was going to Europe to discuss food measures. Of the four hundred and twenty million people of Europe only those of South Russia, Hungary and Denmark, some forty millions, had food enough to last until the next harvest. We had a food surplus of eighteen million tons, if economical. All Europe was short of cattle and fats, but had enough breadstuffs and vegetables to last, under orderly governments, for two months, and more. But some two hundred million people were in social disorder, a condition which led peasants to cease marketing, and left the supply of the cities to depend on the restoration of order.

From such accounts as came to us, Bolshevism seemed to be spreading to neutral countries. In Holland, Revolutionary Socialists, even in the Parliament, were demanding the abdication of the Queen, the demobilization of the army, and that the troops refuse to surrender their arms, until assured of food supplies for themselves and their families. Newspapers, in Spain, Norway, Switzerland, expressed fear of the spread of the Red Flag movement. In Sweden, the Independent Socialist journals were demanding that Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils be everywhere established, the army demobilized, and an eight-hour day adopted.

In Germany, the old thrones were rapidly crumbling; day

after day some ruling house went down. Prince Leopold, of Lippe-Detmold, had abdicated; the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar had abdicated; King Ludwig III. of Bavaria had abdicated; the King of Saxony had been dethroned; the Grand Duke of Oldenburg had been dethroned; Hesse-Darmstadt had become a Socialist republic; and the Emperor Charles, of Austria, had ceased to rule, and on November 11 announced his abdication. Ever since his accession, he said, he had labored for peace; had not delayed the reestablishment of the Constitutional rights of his people; and, "filled with an unalterable love" for them, would not be a hindrance to their free development, and acknowledged the decision by German Austria to form a separate State. "The people, by its deputies, have taken charge of the government. I relinquish every participation in the administration of the State."

One by one, the old rulers continued to abandon their thrones. By the middle of November, the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, and the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin had abdicated; Saxe-Meiningen, and the Grand Duchy of Baden, had declared themselves republics, and the Duchess of Luxemburg had expressed her willingness to abdicate, if her people by a general vote, so demanded.

Until the new government was formed, in Germany, all power was in the hands of three Socialists, Ebert, Scheidemann and Landsberg. When formed, the new Provisional Government would consist, it was said, of members of both sections of the Socialist Party. Then would come the election of an Assembly which would determine the permanent form of Government. The Provisional Government as finally set up, at Berlin, consisted of three majority, and three minority Socialists.

The intention of these new rulers was, to fix some date in January, 1919, for elections of members of a General Assembly; but the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council met, declared against an Assembly, and for a general Soldiers' and Workmen's Congress to decide "as to the future of Germany," and

the government by telegraph invited the heads of the governments, of the different German States, to a conference at Berlin, on November 25. Meantime, the returning soldiers expressed their opinions. The Bavarian Reserve Division called for a National Assembly, had nothing in common with the Berlin Soldiers' and Workmen's resolution, and believed the existing Government would give them a share in the solution of the problems before the German people. The Soldiers' Committee, of the Fourth Army, were opposed to any form of dictatorship, and for a National Assembly. The government of Saxony was for the abolition of the old Federal Constitution, and for the union of the Saxon and German people in a Republic, including German Austria. Bavaria was reported to have sent a note to Berlin, stating that, if the extremists, the Spartacus group, continued to strive for national authority, and if the Assembly was not called at once, Bavaria, with all south Germany, would declare a republic, and make a separate peace. An agreement was finally reached, between the Government and the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council, that political power should be in the hands of the German Socialist Republic and the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council; that they should "defend and develop" what had been won by the revolution, and "suppress all counter-revolutionary" movements; that until representatives of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council were elected to an executive council of the German Republic, the executive council, in Berlin, should go on with its work; and that a convention of deputies, drawn from the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council, was to be summoned as soon as possible. A meeting of Soldiers' and Workmen's deputies from Bremen, Hanover, Hamburg, Flensburg, Wilhelmshaven, and other towns in Hanover and Schleswig-Holstein, resolved to support the Government, and called for a National Assembly. Representatives of the Tenth Army Corps at Hanover did the same, and at an election, in Dresden, for members of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council of fifty, the extremists were overwhelmingly defeated.

That an Assembly should be called, was the wish of the Federal Conference, but as to when it should meet, the Socialists were divided. The Majority was for a meeting at as early a day as possible. The Independent Socialists were for delay until the German prisoners had returned, and been given a chance to vote; until the soldiers had returned and become familiar with the political situation; until the ground gained by the revolution had been made secure by certain Socialistic reforms, carried through while the proletariat still had the power in their hands. All these things required the meeting of the Assembly to be postponed until after February. In this position they were supported by the Spartacus group.

Telegrams from Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils in many parts of Germany, to the Council, at Berlin, now demanded immediate elections for a National Assembly, whereupon the Executive Committee issued a call to all other Councils to send delegates to a general meeting, at Berlin, on December 16. The Council of the People's Commissioners then fixed February 16 for the election of members of the National Assembly and parted the old Empire into twenty-eight electoral districts with from six to sixteen representatives each, provided the Soldiers' and Workmen's Congress approved when it met, on December 16.

On the appointed day some four hundred and fifty delegates, three of whom were women, met in the building in which the Prussian Diet used to sit. Again and again, in the course of its sessions, attempts were made by the Spartacides and Independents to intimidate the Congress, if not disrupt it.

Despite these intrusions and the excitement, tumult, and hindrance they caused, the Congress went on with its work, and before it adjourned, on December 21, adopted resolutions to place legislative and executive powers in the People's Commissioners, or the Ebert Government, until the National Assembly ordered otherwise; to appoint a Central Council to exercise supervision over German and Prussian Cabinets, and appoint and remove members; elected a new National Central

Executive Committee of twenty-seven, and ordered that election of members of a National Assembly be held on January 19, 1919.

At home, the signing of the armistice was at once followed by preparation for a speedy return to a peace basis. An order from the Secretary of War cancelled a draft call for more than three hundred thousand men. Draft boards were instructed, by General Crowder, to stop the movement of two hundred and fifty thousand men to training camps between November 11 and 15; and all questionnaires were to be returned. Most of the boards were notified in time; but here and there men had already started, and were called back. At New York City, where five thousand were to mobilize early on the morning of November 11, seventeen hundred were on board a special train for Camp Totten when the orders came, just two minutes before departure. Supposing sea travel would be immediately resumed, hundreds of aliens, men and women, Russians, Hungarians, Austrians, Italians, Greeks, anxious to know the fate of relatives at home, besieged the passport office, and thronged the steamship agencies, offering to deposit money for berths on the first vessels to leave port. Agents of the neutral lines would not relax their war regulations, nor could those of the Allied nations. The Food Administrator took off his restrictions on the use of wheat flour; abolished the requirement to use substitutes; and raised the monthly allowance of sugar to four pounds per person, after December 1. Newspapers were authorized to lift their voluntary restriction not to report the arrival or departure of vessels at American ports, nor publish any shipping news, and many industries were freed from the limitations imposed on peace time production by the War Industries Board.

Five hundred and more universities and colleges, which had dropped their academic work to train units of the Student Army Training Corps, were notified that the Corps would speedily be disbanded; that members of the Corps who, having left business, wished to return to their old places, or intended

to go on with their academic work, would soon be at liberty to do so, and that the institutions would be compensated only for services actually rendered, and not for the uncompleted term of instruction called for in the contracts.

By this time the victorious armies of the Allies and the United States were on their way to the Rhine. At half past five o'clock on the morning of Sunday, November 17, the Third American Army, consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 32nd, 42nd, 89th and 90th divisions, the Army of Occupation, began its march northeastward along a front of some fifty miles, stretching from Mauzon, on the Meuse just below Sedan, southeastward to Stenay, Damvillers, Freres and Thiaucourt, flanked on the left by the French Fifth Army, and on the right by the French Tenth, and by Monday night the Belgian border was crossed, and Etalle, St. Leger, Longwy, Audun-le-Roman and Briey had been reached.

As the army advanced, the front was more and more contracted, and vigilance was never for a moment relaxed. No signs of German treachery, however, were seen. Scattered over the countryside were the implements of war the Germans had failed to carry away. The streets of nearly every village were littered with guns, helmets, belts, and here and there large guns and trucks. Along the way the advancing troops were greeted by thousands on thousands of men, women and children, hungry, half-clad refugees, civilian prisoners seeking their old homes. At Languyon the stores of ammunition were little impaired, the machine shops were in good condition, the locomotives and cars were left intact, and the roads were not damaged. The Americans were now in a country which during four years had not been the scene of war, where the towns had not been torn or destroyed by shells, and where the people had suffered only from the rigor of German rule. Scores of French and American prisoners, turned loose by their captors, and left without food, came within the lines, all showing signs of scanty rations and hard work. Thousands of Russians, brought by the Germans to work behind their lines, were also sent in

only to be turned back, for none save prisoners of the allied armies that had fought on the western front were allowed to be received.

November 20 the German border was crossed and that of the Duchy of Luxemburg, and at night the army rested in three countries, Belgium, Luxemburg and Lorraine. The march across the Grand Duchy was a triumphal procession. Cheering people, flag-decked streets, were in every village through which the troops passed. Nowhere, however, was the greeting so sincere and hearty as in Belgium, and nowhere in Belgium more hearty than in the city of Arlon. Along its streets were little trees decked with tinsel and lanterns; banners and placards inscribed: "Hail! Generous Americans"; and American flags, some painted on paper, and others home-made. On the 21st the City of Luxemburg was reached. Before entering it General Pershing, by proclamation, assured the people that the army came as friends, would stay no longer than was necessary, and would carefully observe the requirements of international law. Much the greater part of the troops did not enter, but went around the city. A few, with General Pershing at their head, entered, marched along streets gay with flags, were heartily received, and reviewed by the Grand Duchess and General Pershing. The proclamation reads:

After the four years of violation of your territory, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has happily been liberated. Your liberation from German occupation has been demanded of the invaders, by the armies of the Americans, and the Allies, as one of the conditions of the present armistice. It becomes necessary now for the American troops to pass through the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and to establish and maintain there, for a certain time, their lines of communication.

The American troops have come into the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg as friends, and shall rigorously conduct themselves according to international law. Their presence, which shall not be prolonged more than shall be strictly necessary, should not be for you a hardship. The functioning of your Government, and your institu-

tions, shall not be interfered with in any manner. Your life, and your occupations, shall not be molested. Your persons, and your welfare, shall be respected.

It will be necessary for the American Army to use certain things, railroads, telegraphs, and telephones, and, perhaps, other public establishments, for the needs of lodging and transport; furthermore, the commodities which become necessary for us shall be paid for, after just estimates.

It is presumed you will not permit any acts of aggression against the American Army, or give any information, or aid to, its enemy. You will always conform to the instructions that the American Commander, for the safety of his troops and your proper protection, may give.

When the German border was reached, along the Sauer and Moselle, the army halted. Sunday, December 1, the Moselle and the Sauer were crossed; the march across Germany to the Rhine was begun, and the city of Treves was entered. As was to be expected, the reception of our troops was cold and chilling. No flags, no friendly greetings, such as had attended their progress across Luxemburg, Belgium and Lorraine, met them; but no hostility was anywhere shown. In stolid silence the Germans witnessed the conquerors pass along their streets to quarters in the barracks; nor was any bitterness manifested later, as our soldiers strolled about the city, and entered the shops and restaurants. Headquarters was established; the Soviet guards, with white bands on their arms, were replaced by American soldiers, and General Preston Brown was made Military Governor.

Leaving a garrison of some thirty-five hundred men in Treves, the army pushed on, and by Saturday, December 7, had come within twenty miles of the Rhine. The last of the German forces were to cross the river on the eighth; but, ere they did, a request came from the German command for American troops to act as a police force in Coblenz, lest there be disorders between the withdrawal of the Germans and the arrival of the army of occupation. A battalion was at once sent on from Treves, by train, and entered Coblenz, and quietly took

over control of the city. As our troops marched slowly across German territory no disturbances of any kind occurred, nor were there any signs of lack of food, or of the necessities of life.

On the thirteenth of December, three divisions of our Army of Occupation crossed the Rhine, entered Coblenz, and began to take over the bridgehead, at that city, as provided in the armistice. This bridgehead was enclosed by a semi-circle drawn around Coblenz, with the Rhine as the diameter, and a radius of thirty kilometers. Outside of it was the ten-kilometer neutral zone drawn from the Netherlands to Switzerland. No Allied troops were to occupy this neutral zone, but the day Cologne, Coblenz and Mainz were occupied by the Allies, the armistice, which was to expire on December 17, was extended to January 17, 1919, and a new condition added. The Supreme Command of the Allies reserved the right, should it be necessary in order to obtain further guarantees, to occupy the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine from the Cologne bridgehead to the Dutch border.

While the German commanders were thus carrying out the terms of the armistice, as they related to the forces on land, the naval commanders were doing the same on the sea. Details for the surrender of the surface ships, and submarines, having been arranged, at a meeting of the officers of the British and German navies in the cabin of Vice Admiral Beatty's flagship, *Queen Elizabeth*, in the Firth of Forth, on the evening of Saturday, November 16. In accordance with the arrangements then made a squadron of five British cruisers and twenty destroyers left Harwick, in the early hours of the morning of the twentieth, and some thirty miles off that port were met by twenty German submarines moving on the surface with hatches open, crews on deck, guns pointed fore and aft, numbers obliterated, and no flag flying. Headed by a British destroyer, the U-boats followed to a spot some twenty miles off Harwick, where the German crews were replaced by British, and taken to German destroyers waiting to carry them back to the port whence they came. As the surrendered sub-

marines passed through the gates in the mine field, a white flag, with the German ensign underneath, was run up on each, and an ever memorable event in England's naval history was ended.

Far greater in importance was the event which occurred on November 21, when, in the presence of the British Grand Fleet, an American squadron and French cruisers, some four hundred warships in all, the German High Seas Fleet of twenty-one warships, and fifty destroyers, surrendered to Vice Admiral Beatty and, escorted by the allied fleets, were taken to the Firth of Forth, on their way to be interned in the Orkney Islands. That same day, another flotilla of nineteen submarines passed to British hands. The twentieth was disabled. On the following day, twenty-one were to be delivered, but only twenty came, for one sank at sea. Fifty-nine were thus surrendered. Among them was one which raided our coast early in the year. Twenty-eight, making eighty-seven in all, surrendered on the 24th. Among these was the *Deutschland*, or U-153, which twice visited our country in 1916 as a merchantman. In the course of a few days the number of submarines given up was 122.

The armistice arranged, the thoughts of the warring powers turned to peace. From Herr Solf, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, came, by wireless, to Secretary Lansing, a request for a speedy conclusion of a preliminary peace. "The armistice being now concluded," he said, "the German Government requests the Government of the United States to arrange for the opening of peace negotiations. For the purpose of their acceleration the German Government proposes, first of all, to take in view the conclusion of a preliminary peace, and asks for a communication as to what place, and at what time, the negotiations might begin. As there is pressing danger of a famine, the German Government is particularly anxious for negotiations to begin immediately."

The Allies had no intention of discussing peace with Germany. It was for them to fix the terms, and for Germany to

accept. A Peace Conference, it was announced, would be held at Paris, or Versailles, or perhaps at Berne, the details of which would be arranged, at an inter-allied conference by Premier Lloyd George, Foreign Secretary Andrew Bonar Law, Premier Orlando, and Foreign Minister Sonnino of Italy, Premier Venizelos of Greece, and Foreign Minister Pachitch of Serbia, already on their way to Paris, and Mr. House, special representative of the United States. November 15, the first meeting of the Premiers was held, and three days later it was officially announced that President Wilson would attend the Interallied Conference, and the Peace Conference when it met, and would leave the United States immediately after the assembling of Congress.

The first intimation that the President would attend the Peace Conference was a rumor spread abroad, in Washington, that he was going, and would preside at the peace table. Had not Germany appealed to him to speed the work of succor? Had he not been the first to lay down the principles to form the basis for an enduring peace? Had not Germany, and Austria, already expressly accepted these principles? Had not the Allies, in agreeing to an armistice, declared their willingness to discuss peace on the terms laid down by President Wilson? The only changes they made were, with regard to the freedom of the seas, and the reconstruction of invaded territories. Washington was sure that an invitation would soon come from the Allies, not only to attend, but to preside over the conference.

Objection was at once raised, that Congress would be in session during his absence; that important bills would be passed; that the Constitution required that every bill "shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President"; that if he approves "he shall sign it"; that if he does not he "shall return it, with his objections, to the House in which it shall have originated"; and that, if he does neither of these acts "within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law." How could these

requirements be observed if the President went abroad? The answer was, by a gentlemen's agreement important bills may not be passed until he returns; unimportant ones may become laws without his signature. This ignored the requirement that "before it becomes a law" a bill must "be presented to the President."

All doubt as to the President's intentions were put at rest when, on November 18, an official statement was made public by the Committee on Public Information.

The President expects to sail for France, immediately after the opening of the regular session of Congress, for the purpose of taking part in the discussion, and settlement, of the main features of the treaty of peace.

It is not likely that it will be possible for him to remain throughout the sessions of the formal peace conference, but his presence at the outset is necessary, in order to obviate the manifest disadvantages of discussion by cable in determining the greater outlines of the final treaty about which he must necessarily be consulted.

He will, of course, be accompanied by delegates who will sit as the representatives of the United States throughout the conference.

The names of the delegates will be presently announced.

On the expediency of this step, the press of the country was sharply divided. One journal called the President's decision to go abroad a grave error in judgment. It was unseemly "that we should have, at the conference, a representative outranking in official position any other man there present." Another believed that, if the President went as a delegate, our country would, sooner or later, be accused of seeking to dominate the conference, and of wishing to impose our will on the rest of the earth. Though other Allied Governments might yield with an outward grace, his act would rankle. A third was sure his going would be regretted throughout the land. His evident purpose was to place himself where his views could be readily impressed on the conference; but where in the world was there a rostrum for such expression equal to that in the Hall of the House of Representatives, in the presence of the representatives

of a hundred million people? True, the belligerents, said another journal, are all under obligations to us for food, for billions of dollars, for hundreds of thousands of splendid fighting men. But if we cannot call ourselves an ally, we cannot have much to say concerning the future map of Europe.

Journals, holding the opposite view, admitted that it was unprecedented for the President of the United States to cross the seas, but so also was it unprecedented to send two million of our boys to fight in France. The peace conference was unprecedented. It marked a new epoch in the political history of the world, and the presence of the man who formulated the principles on which peace must be made was most desirable.

The Senate, as the body before which our treaties of peace must come for approval, was much concerned by the President's decision. Some Senators approved; thought it wise for him to go; and were glad he was going. Others were not at all pleased, and looked with dread on his absence for an indefinite time, and on the discharge of his duties, by cable and wireless.

At this stage of the discussion a proclamation, dated November 2, and more than two weeks old, was made public for the first time. In it, the President announced that, "whereas it is deemed necessary for national security and defense to supervise, and to take possession, and assume control of, all marine cable systems," therefore, they were taken possession of, and their management placed in the hands of the Postmaster General. This sweeping order applied not only to the seventeen cables across the Atlantic, but to those across the Pacific, those to South America, to anywhere. Taking over the cables, after fighting had ceased abroad, coupled with the fact that Mr. Creel, Chairman of the Committee on Public Information, was to attend the Peace Conference, gave origin to a charge that a censorship of reports of its doings was to be established. The President, it was said, might order all members of the American delegation not to discuss the work of the Conference with newspapermen, but refer all inquiries to Mr. Creel, and so determine just what news should reach our country. All

thought of such a thing was vehemently denied. Mr. Creel pointed out that, on November 14, the newspapers had been relieved of their voluntary ban on the publication of shipping news; that on the 15th, all censorship of the cables and mails had ceased, and that no press censorship, of any kind, existed in the United States. His work in Europe would have no connection with the control of cables, censorship, or supervision over the press. The answer was that it would be an easy matter to stop unfriendly dispatches by placing them at the end of the file. It was certain the cables would be crowded; that some sort of priority would have to be established; and that, by placing unfriendly dispatches at the end of the file, they might reach New York too late for publication, and become worthless.

Turning from the act of the President in taking over the cables, to his approaching departure for France, his opponents now raised a new issue. Would he not, if he went, cease to be President, and would not the Vice-President become President while he was away? It was said, the Constitution provides that in case of removal of the President from office, death, resignation or "inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President." Were there any duties which his absence would create an "inability" to perform? There are, was the answer. There are two important duties, it was claimed, which the President has to perform when Congress is in session. He must, from time to time, "give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient," and he must consider bills passed by Congress, approve them, or veto them, or allow them to become laws without his signature; and so, also, must every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of both Houses is required, be presented to him before it can go into effect. If he is not in the country he cannot properly perform these duties, and this constitutes "inability" within the meaning of the Constitution, and his office devolves on the Vice-President, and justifies him in assuming the office. Should there be any

doubt as to how the Vice-President should proceed to assume the office, a mandamus might be used, or a joint resolution of Congress would be sufficient. When the Vice-President was questioned on these points he declared he would not, of his own volition, assume the office during the absence of the President, but would feel compelled to do so if a court, having proper jurisdiction, should mandamus him. He could not say what he would do if Congress should call on him to act.

Discussion was of no avail. The matter was settled. The President would sail, on December 3, on the transport *George Washington*, and public interest turned to guessing who the delegates would be. According to an unofficial announcement they would be: The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Agriculture, Colonel Edward House, and representing the Republicans, Mr. Henry White, formerly ambassador to France. An official announcement confirmed this statement save that not the Secretary of Agriculture, but General Tasker H. Bliss, was the fifth representative. Failure of the President to take Congress into his confidence, failure to reveal to any member of his party reasons for his European trip, failure to appoint at least one Senator on the commission, were further causes of irritation. If he felt that his presence was really needed at the peace table, at a time when Congress was about to begin important reconstruction legislation, he ought, it was said, to have taken Congress into his confidence that his views on such legislation might be known. But not a word had he uttered to a soul as to what legislation he thought necessary.

In no amicable state of mind, therefore, did the two Houses, after a short recess, meet at the opening of the regular session, on December 2, to listen to the annual message. Concerning the three matters most in the public mind at that time, and on which it was hoped he would make definite statements, the seizure of the cables, why he was going abroad, and what he expected to accomplish there, the President gave little satisfaction. At his request, he said, the French and English Governments had removed, absolutely, all censorship of cable news,

and there was now no censorship at our end, save on attempted trade communication with enemy countries. It was necessary to keep open a wire between Paris and the Department of State, and another between France and the Department of War. In order to do this, with the least interference with the use of cables for other purposes, he had temporarily taken over control of both cables that they might be used as one system. He did this under the advice of experienced officials of the cables, and he hoped that the news of the next few months would pass to and fro with the utmost freedom, and the least possible delay.

The President "welcomed this occasion to announce to Congress" his purpose to join the representatives of the Allied Governments in the peace conference at Paris. He realized the inconveniences that would attend his leaving the country, but the belief that it was his duty to go had been forced on him by considerations which he hoped Congress would regard as conclusive.

The Allied Governments have accepted the bases of peace which I outlined to the Congress on the 8th of January last, as the Central Empires also have, and very reasonably desire my personal counsel in their interpretation and application, and it is highly desirable that I should give it, in order that the sincere desire of our Government to contribute, without selfish purpose of any kind, to settlements that will be of common benefit to all the nations concerned, may be made fully manifest.

The peace settlements which are now to be agreed upon are of transcendent importance both to us, and to the rest of the world, and I know of no business or interest which should take precedence of them. The gallant men of our armed forces on land and sea have consciously fought for the ideals which they knew to be the ideals of their country; I have sought to express those ideals; they have accepted my statements of them as the substance of their own thought and purpose, as the associated Governments have accepted them. I owe it to them to see to it, so far as in me lies, that no false or mistaken interpretation is put upon them, and no possible effort omitted to realize them. It is now my duty to play my full part in making good what they offered their life's blood to obtain.

I can think of no call to service which could transcend this.

In the course of the day, two resolutions bearing on the absence of the President, and his failure to appoint a Senator a delegate to the Conference, appeared in the Senate. One called for a committee of eight Senators, four from the majority and four from the minority, to be present at the Peace Conference. The other declared that the absence of the President from the seat of government should be construed as inability to perform the duties of his office, and that they should, immediately on the departure of the President, devolve on the Vice-President, who should assume and exercise them until a President "shall be duly elected." A third resolution, almost identical in language, was introduced into the House. It differed, however, in that, instead of legislating the President out of office, it provided that the Vice-President should exercise the office of President until Mr. Wilson returned to the United States.

On the following day, December 4, the Senators went back to their attack on the President and his policies. One declared that, to his "own knowledge," it was the wish of the President to appoint members of both the Senate and the House delegates to the Peace Conference, and that "not until close investigation and reflection revealed to him the difficulties that undoubtedly would confront them, was he compelled to dismiss that consideration." Nothing was said, in the course of the long debate, concerning the President's trip abroad, but much was said about a League of Nations, and two more resolutions were offered. The reasons for that offered by Senator Frelinghuysen were, that the President had informed Congress that the Allied Powers and the Central Powers, having accepted the basis for a peace as outlined in his speech on January 8, 1918, it was his duty to see that no false or mistaken interpretation was put on it; that the President had never stated his own interpretation of his basis for a peace; that some of his points, especially those relating to a League of Nations and to the Freedom of the Seas, admitted of various interpretations, some of which might be in conflict with our established traditions. Therefore,

he should be respectfully requested to make known his own interpretation of his peace terms, as stated in his speech of January 8, 1918, "and not attempt to impose such interpretation upon the international conference until full opportunity is presented to the American public to become acquainted with the same, to the end that this nation may not be committed to policies in contravention of the traditions of the United States."

Another resolution, offered by Senator Borah, had to do with the treaty of peace when it came before the Senate. The reasons for this resolution, as stated in the preamble, were: That the President in his speech on January 8, 1918, had said that the first requisite to a durable peace was, "open covenants openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view"; that this was a clear denunciation of secret diplomacy, the chief weapon of despotism, and the most prolific source of the world's disturbances; that no covenant of peace could be binding on the United States, save through a treaty ratified by the Senate; and that the people who waged and won the war in behalf of democracy were entitled to know, in advance of their being bound, the terms of any treaty of peace. Therefore, when such a treaty came before the Senate it should at once be made public, and all discussion relative to it should be in open session. Yet another resolution, offered by Senator Borah, after citing the opinions of Washington, Jefferson, and Monroe on entangling alliances, declared that the policies thus early announced, and ever since adhered to, had greatly contributed to the peace and happiness of our people; that any material departure from those policies would be fraught with danger to the peace and happiness of our people and, it might be, would involve us in controversies with other nations. Therefore, the Senate should reaffirm its faith in the lasting worth and wisdom of those policies, and "seek in all matters coming before it touching the interest, or affairs of foreign countries, to conform its acts to these time-honored principles, so long and so happily a part of our own policy."

While the Senators thus gave vent to their feelings, the President set sail from New York for Brest. On the morning of December 4 he boarded the United States transport *George Washington*, one of the finest vessels of the old German merchant fleet, and, escorted by destroyers, and airplanes, and the superdreadnought *Pennsylvania*, and greeted by salutes and whistles, and the cheers of thousands gathered along the water front of Manhattan and Staten Island, went to sea. Across the Atlantic he was convoyed by the *Pennsylvania*, and a flotilla of destroyers.

The President having left the country without definitely stating what should be done at the coming Peace Conference, our countrymen turned their attention to the statements of the leaders of the Allies. A Parliamentary election was under way in Great Britain, and one by one the chiefs of the parties explained their views to the voters. Lloyd George was firm for the trial and punishment of every man responsible in any way for the war, however high his rank, and pledged himself to do his best to see full justice done. "The Kaiser," said he, "must be prosecuted. The war was a crime. Who doubts that?" It was a frightful, terrible crime. It was a crime in the way in which it was planned, and in the deliberate wantonness with which it was provoked. It was also a crime in the invasion of a helpless little state, and in the wicked and most brutal treatment of that little state. Remember the treaty of neutrality, "the scrap of paper." Is no one responsible? Is no one to be called to account? Is there to be no punishment? Surely, that is neither God's justice nor man's. The men responsible for this outrage on the human race must not be let off because their heads were crowned when they perpetrated the deed.

The British Government referred the question of the criminal culpability of the Kaiser and his accomplices to their law officers some weeks ago. They invited a body of jurists in England to investigate the matter, and they have unanimously come to the conclusion that the Kaiser, and his accomplices in the making of this war, ought to be tried by an international court. They also reported

strongly in favor of the punishment of those guilty of murder on the high seas, and the abominable ill-treatment of prisoners. The British Government will use its whole influence at the Peace Conference to see that justice is executed.

Mr. Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking at Rochedale, was for a league of nations, and believed it "the greatest work of the conference." He did not think the world could be made safe for democracy "merely by multiplying the number of democratic states." Passions, sure to arise between neighboring democracies, made them quite as prone to strife as if under other forms of government. A league of nations was of vital importance, if the war was to produce all the good expected to come out of it, and the United States must bear a large share of the work such a league would involve. Mr. Asquith was for punishing the guilty. "We ought to insist that justice be done, and that not only the forms, but the spirit of justice, the meting out to the wrongdoer of his due, not less and not more, should be scrupulously observed." Sir Auckland Geddes, speaking in Plymouth, insisted that Germany must pay the cost of war in such gold as she had and in such material as could be wrung from her, and pay in labor for restoring such damage as she wrought in France and Belgium, and should have no colonies left when the Allies had done with her.

Viscount Grey, Foreign Secretary, when the war began, gave his views on the freedom of the seas and the League of Nations.

I think it is a great pity that so much has been said about the freedom of the seas without being defined. It is true there is considerable prejudice against the phrase, largely due to the fact that it is believed to be a German phrase. It is not German, but American. It was made in the United States, and the Germans adopted, and used it, for their own purposes in a sense to which we have never agreed. Hence its unpopularity. But, until President Wilson defines it and comes to discuss it with our Government, there is no need to anticipate difficulty about an agreement as to what it means.

Freedom of the seas in times of peace? If so, we agree. Wherever the British navy has been in position to exercise its influence and

power on the seas in times of peace it has exercised that influence impartially for the freedom of the seas for all nations without distinction. The United States, I think, has some rule forbidding foreign ships to carry goods between the United States and the Philippines. Some other countries have rules of the same kind. We never had a regulation like that. We have been more completely for the freedom of the seas in times of peace than any other nation. However great our sea power has been, we have used it for impartial freedom of the seas for every other nation as much as for ourselves, and I think we ought to receive a little more recognition than we do for the fact that we have never used British naval power in times of peace to make the use of the seas easier for ourselves without simultaneously making it easier for others on the same terms.

If the question is one of the freedom of the seas in times of war, then I would say this: The United States, as we all most gratefully recognize, has taken part in the last two years of the war. Without the United States we could not have had the success the Allies have now won. I cannot emphasize that too much nor express too much admiration of it. But, since the United States entered the war she has not only acquiesced, but, I believe, most strongly co-operated in carrying out the blockade of Germany. In the early stages of the war the blockade was not nearly so complete because the United States raised many questions about it, but in the later years of the conflict the blockade was made complete, with the co-operation of the United States. Without that blockade success could not have been won. Indeed, without the blockade, Germany might have won.

Suppose this situation should exist again, and it is impossible to suppose that the United States would say that the blockade, which was so essential for success, should not be allowed. That would stultify everything America did in this war. It would really be an insult to the United States to suggest that she would in future advocate any course, in a war such as this, inconsistent with what she did in this war, and that was the complete blockade of an offending nation. If this be so, we come to this, that probably what is in President Wilson's mind is, that freedom of the seas should be secured to any nation observing the covenants of a league of nations, and should be denied to any nation breaking those covenants. If that is so, then a league of nations is the solution to the whole question, and cannot be discussed apart from it.

On these grounds, I believe, there may be complete agreement between the two countries only if a league of nations is formed.

I do not see why this country should not accept the formula, that if a league of nations is formed there is to be complete freedom of the seas so long as the covenants of the league are observed, but if the covenants are broken then there is to be no freedom of the seas, and every means are to be used against the power which has broken them.

If reports were to be trusted, the Netherlands Government would gladly be rid of its unbidden guests, and if pressed by the Allies would yield, but ere it did so would urge the Allies to be content with the internment of the Kaiser, and his son, on some island in the East or West Indies, where they would be guarded by a Dutch fleet. The Crown Prince was reported to have signed a paper on December 1, renouncing "formally and definitely all rights to the Crown of Prussia and the Imperial Crown," which would have fallen to him "by the renunciation of the Emperor-King, or for other reasons."

Whether he did, or did not, renounce his claims made but little difference to the Allies, for they were fully determined that none of the Hohenzollerns should ever reign again. What concerned them most was the setting up, in Germany, of a stable and responsible government, with which they could deal in making peace. No signs of such a government as yet appeared. Bavaria was insulting and defying the Berlin government, and demanding the resignation of Doctor Solf. The Cabinet was for a National Assembly. The Executive Council, of twenty-seven, of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council, was for a Congress of Soldiers and Workmen. The Spartacides were said to have fifteen thousand well-armed men, and might, at any time, break out in revolution. Break out they did, and during January, 1919, there were riots in many places, and sharp fighting in the streets of Berlin, during which the two leaders of the Spartacides, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, were killed. The Provisional Government, however, weathered all attacks; the elections for the Assembly were held on the appointed day; and February 6 was chosen as the time, and the city of Weimar as the place, for the meeting of the body

that was to do what a few months before seemed impossible, set up a Republican Government in Germany.

While our troops were marching across the Rhine the President reached Brest and landed in France. About five o'clock in the morning the convoy escorting the *George Washington* was met at sea by a division of American battleships from somewhere off the Coast of Great Britain; about eleven o'clock a fleet of twelve French cruisers came up from the South and took place in line, and thus accompanied by some forty vessels of war the *Washington* shortly after noon dropped anchor in the harbor of Brest, saluted by the land batteries, the warships in the harbor and by the cheers of the multitude gathered on the quay, the ramparts and the hills. The French Foreign Minister, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies, at once put off from shore amidst more salutes from guns, to extend an official greeting, and General Pershing, General Tasker Bliss and Mr. House came to pay their respects. After three o'clock the President and his party were escorted ashore to a gayly decorated pavilion, where the Mayor of Brest welcomed the President to his city. The event was of no common sort. The reasons which induced the President to come, the object of his visit, the fact that never before had a President of the Great Republic of the New World set foot upon the soil of the Old, all combined to make the occasion one of historical importance. Well did the Mayor say:

Mr. President: I feel the deepest emotion in presenting to you the welcome of the Breton population. The ship bringing you to this port is the symbol under the auspices of which the legions of your pacific citizens sprang to arms in the grand cause of independence. Under the same auspices to-day you bring to the tormented soil of Europe the comfort of your authorized voice in the debates which will calm our quarrels.

Mr. President, upon this Breton soil our hearts are unanimous in saluting you as the messenger of justice and peace. To-morrow it will be our entire nation which will acclaim you, and our whole people will thrill with enthusiasm over the eminent statesman who is the champion of their aspirations toward justice and liberty.

This old Breton city has the honor of first saluting you. In order to perpetuate this honor to our descendants, the Municipal Council has asked me to present you with an address expressing their joy at being privileged to incline themselves before the illustrious democrat who presides over the destinies of the great Republic of the United States.

When the engrossed address had been presented, and the ceremonies were over, the President and his party set off in automobiles, and, passing along streets gay with flags and bunting, mottoes, banners and transparencies, lined with French and American troops, and packed with a cheering crowd of citizens and Breton peasants in their picturesque dress, made their way to the railway station and departed for Paris.

It was ten o'clock on the morning of Saturday, the fourteenth, when the train entered the Bois de Boulogne Station, where the President and his wife were received by President Poincaré and Madame Poincaré, and Premier Clémenceau, and a host of officials. The formalities over, the Presidential party set forth to receive such a welcome as had never been accorded to any man. Every foot of the way was lined with troops of France, many fresh from the battle front, and for mile after mile with captured guns and trophies. Every available space was crowded with joyful people waving flags and shouting welcome to the President. Every building was decked with the Stars and Stripes. The carriage of the President was filled with flowers, thrown to Mrs. Wilson by the excited people. At one o'clock the President and Mrs. Wilson attended an official luncheon given by President and Madame Poincaré, at the close of which President Poincaré rose and said:

Mr. President: Paris and France awaited you with impatience. They were eager to acclaim in you the illustrious democrat whose words and deeds were inspired by exalted thought, the philosopher delighting in the solution of universal laws from particular events, the eminent statesman who had found a way to express the highest political and moral truth in formulas which bear the stamp of immortality.

They had also a passionate desire to offer thanks, in your person,

to the great republic of which you are the chief, for the invaluable assistance which had been given spontaneously, during this war, to the defenders of right and liberty.

Even before America had resolved to intervene in the struggle she had shown to the wounded and the orphans of France a solicitude and a generosity the memory of which will always be enshrined in our hearts. The liberality of your Red Cross, the countless gifts of your fellow citizens, the inspiring initiative of American women, anticipated your military and naval action and showed the world to which side your sympathies inclined. And on the day when you flung yourselves into the battle, with what determination your great people and yourself prepared for united success!

Some months ago you cabled to me that the United States would send ever-increasing forces until the day should be reached on which the Allied armies were able to submerge the enemy under an overwhelming flow of new divisions, and, in effect, for more than a year, a steady stream of youth and energy has been poured out upon the shores of France.

No sooner had they landed than your gallant battalions, fired by their chief, General Pershing, flung themselves into the combat with such a manly contempt of danger, such a smiling disregard of death, that our longer experience of this terrible war often moved us to counsel prudence. They brought with them in arriving here the enthusiasm of crusaders leaving for the Holy Land.

It is their right to-day to look with pride upon the work accomplished and to rest assured that they have powerfully aided by their courage and their faith.

Eager as they were to meet the enemy, they did not know when they arrived the enormity of his crimes. That they might know how the Germans make war it has been necessary that they see towns systematically burned down, mines flooded, factories reduced to ashes, orchards devastated, cathedrals shelled and fired—all that deliberate savagery aimed to destroy national wealth, nature and beauty, which the imagination could not conceive at a distance from the men and things that have endured it and to-day bear witness to it.

In your turn, Mr. President, you will be able to measure with your own eyes the extent of these disasters, and the French Government will make known to you the authentic documents in which the German general staff developed, with astounding cynicism, its program of pillage and industrial annihilation. Your noble conscience will pronounce a verdict on these facts.

Should this guilt remain unpunished, could it be renewed, the most splendid victories would be in vain.

Mr. President, France has struggled, has endured and has suffered during four long years; she has bled at every vein; she has lost the best of her children; she mourns for her youths. She yearns now, even as you do, for a peace of justice and security.

It was not that she might be exposed once again to aggression that she submitted to such sacrifices. Nor was it in order that criminals should go unpunished, that they might lift their heads again to make ready for new crimes, that under your strong leadership America armed herself and crossed the ocean.

Faithful to the memory of Lafayette and Rochambeau, she came to the aid of France because France herself was faithful to her traditions. Our common ideal has triumphed. Together we have defended the vital principles of free nations.

Now we must build together such a peace as will forbid the deliberate and hypocritical renewing of an organism aiming at conquest and oppression.

Peace must make amends for the misery and sadness of yesterday and it must be a guarantee against the dangers of to-morrow. The association, which has been formed for the purpose of war, between the United States and the Allies, and which contains the seed of the permanent institutions of which you have spoken so eloquently, will find from this day forward a clear and profitable employment in the concerted search for equitable decisions, and in the mutual support which we need if we are to make our rights prevail.

Whatever safeguards we may erect for the future, no one, alas, can assert that we shall forever spare to mankind the horrors of new wars. Five years ago the progress of science and the state of civilization might have permitted the hope that no government, however autocratic, would have succeeded in hurling armed nations upon Belgium and Serbia.

Without lending ourselves to the illusion that posterity will be forevermore safe from these collective follies, we must introduce into the peace we are going to build all the conditions of justice and all the safeguards of civilization that we can embody in it.

To such a vast and magnificent task, Mr. President, you have chosen to come and apply yourself in concert with France. France offers you her thanks. She knows the friendship of America. She knows your rectitude and elevation of spirit. It is in the fullest confidence that she is ready to work with you.

I lift my glass, Mr. President, in your honor and in honor of

Mrs. Wilson. I drink to the prosperity of the Republic of the United States, our great friend of yesterday and of other days, of to-morrow, and of all time.

To this address President Wilson replied:

Mr. President: I am deeply indebted to you for your gracious greeting. It is very delightful to find myself in France and to feel the quick contact of sympathy and unaffected friendship between the representatives of the United States and the representatives of France.

You have been very generous in what you were pleased to say about myself, but I feel that what I have said and what I have tried to do has been said and done only in an attempt to speak the thought of the people of the United States truly and to carry that thought out in action.

From the first thought of the people of the United States turned toward something more than the mere winning of this war. It turned to the establishment of eternal principles of right and justice. It realized that merely to win the war was not enough; that it must be won in such a way and the questions raised by it settled in such a way as to insure the future peace of the world and lay the foundations for the freedom and happiness of its many peoples and nations.

Never before has war won so terrible a visage or exhibited more grossly the debasing influence of illicit ambitions. I am sure that I shall look upon the ruin wrought by the armies of the Central Empires with the same repulsion and deep indignation that they stir in the hearts of the men of France and Belgium, and I appreciate as you do, sir, the necessity of such action in the final settlement of the issues of the war as will not only rebuke such acts of terror and spoliation, but make men everywhere aware that they cannot be ventured upon without the certainty of just punishment.

I know with what ardor and enthusiasm the soldiers and sailors of the United States have given the best that was in them in this war of redemption. They have expressed the true spirit of America. They believe their ideals to be acceptable to free peoples everywhere and are rejoiced to have played the part they have played in giving reality to those ideals in coöperation with the armies of the Allies. We are proud of the part they have played and we are happy that they should have been associated with such comrades in a common cause.

It is with peculiar feeling, Mr. President, that I find myself in

France joining with you in rejoicing over the victory that has been won. The ties that bind France and the United States are peculiarly close. I do not know in what other comradeship we could have fought with more zest or enthusiasm. It will daily be a matter of pleasure with me to be brought into consultation with the statesmen of France and her allies in concerting the measures by which we may secure permanence for these happy relations of friendship and co-operation, and secure for the world at large such safety and freedom in its life as can be secured only by the constant association and coöperation of friends.

I greet you not only with deep personal respect, but as the representative of the great people of France, and beg to bring you the greetings of another great people to whom the fortunes of France are of profound and lasting interest.

I raise my glass to the health of the President of the French Republic and to Madame Poincaré and the prosperity of France.

At the Sorbonne the President received from the Faculty of Letters the degree of Doctor, *Honoris Causa*, because of his writings in history, and the same degree from the Faculty of Law because of his work on jurisprudence and political science, and delivered an address. In the course of it he said:

The task of those who are gathered here, or will presently be gathered here, to make the settlements of this peace, is greatly simplified by the fact that they are the masters of no one; they are the servants of mankind. And if we do not heed the mandates of mankind we shall make ourselves the most conspicuous and deserved failures in the history of the world.

My conception of the League of Nations is just this: that it shall operate as the organized moral force of men throughout the world, and that whenever or wherever wrong and aggression are planned or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned upon them, and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world?"

Just a little exposure will settle most questions. If the Central Powers had dared to discuss the purposes of this war for a single fortnight, it never would have happened; and if, as should be, they were forced to discuss it for a year, the war would have been inconceivable.

Christmas eve the President went to Chaumont, then the main headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. Christmas Day, at Humes, not far from Chaumont, he reviewed ten thousand of our men, a part of that fine army which drove the Germans out of the St. Mihiel salient, and fought their way through the forest of Argonne to Sedan. Standing in their presence, the President told them they had done their duty and done it with a spirit which gave it distinction and glory.

From Chaumont the President hurried to England to receive such a greeting as had never been accorded to any American, and rarely to an English King. Escorted from Calais to mid-channel by four French destroyers and thence to the English coast by airplanes and British destroyers, he was greeted at Dover by the guns of the Castle, by the Duke of Connaught, and the welcoming party, by the Mayor and Corporation of that ancient city in their scarlet robes of office, and listened to the reading, by the Recorder, of a formal address.

As President Wilson [wrote a correspondent of the *Philadelphia Ledger*] walked to a train a dozen girls wearing the American colors strewed petals of roses in his path. All this time the airplanes had been hovering over the pier and the station, and as the special train bearing the President left for the capital the airmen also headed for London, accompanying the train all the way.

As the train crossed the Thames and entered the station a great cheer went up from the crowd. A salute of forty-one guns was fired from the tower of London and in Hyde Park.

From the station to Buckingham Palace the progress was such as London never witnessed save on a coronation day. Such crowds, such enthusiasm, such decorations and such cheering had never greeted any foreigner on English soil.

On the evening of the 27th a state dinner, attended with all the ceremonials and formalities which had marked such state occasions for two hundred years, was given in the banquet hall of the palace, and the President formally welcomed by King George.

This [said his Majesty] is a historic moment and your visit marks a historic epoch. Nearly 150 years have passed since your Republic began its independent life, and now, for the first time, a President of the United States is our guest in England.

We welcome you to the country whence came your ancestors and where stands the homes of those from whom sprang Washington and Lincoln. We welcome you for yourself, as one whose insight, calmness, and dignity in the discharge of his high duties we have watched with admiration. We see in you the happy union of the gifts of a scholar with those of a statesman. You came from a studious, academic quiet into the full stream of an arduous public life, and your deliverances have combined breadth of view and grasp of world problems with the mastery of a lofty diction recalling that of your great orators of the past and of our own time.

You come as the official head and spokesman of a mighty Commonwealth bound to us by the closest ties. Its people speak the tongue of Shakespeare and Milton. Our literature is yours as yours is also ours, and men of letters in both countries have joined in maintaining its incomparable glories.

To you, not less than to us, belong the memories of our national heroes from King Alfred down to the days of Philip Sidney and Drake, of Raleigh and Blake, and Hampden, and the days when the political life of the English stock in America was just beginning. You share with us the traditions of free self-government as old as the Magna Charta.

We recognize the bond of still deeper significance in the common ideals which our people cherish. First among those ideals you value and we value, freedom and peace. Privileged as we have been to be the exponents and the examples in national life of the principles of popular self-government based upon equal laws, it now falls to both of us alike to see how these principles can be applied beyond our own borders for the good of the world.

It was love of liberty, respect for law, good faith and the sacred rights of humanity that brought you to the Old World to help in saving it from the dangers that were threatening around, and that arraigned those soldier citizens of yours, whose gallantry we have admired, side by side with ours in the war.

You have now come to help in building up new States amid the ruins of those that the war has shattered, and in laying the solid foundations of a settlement that may stand firm because it will rest upon the consent of the emancipated nationalities. You have eloquently expressed the hope of the American people, as it is our

hope, that some plan may be devised to attain the end you have done so much to promote by which the risk of future war may, if possible, be averted, relieving the nations of the intolerable burden which fear of war has laid upon them.

The British Nation wishes all success to the deliberations on which you and we and the great free nations allied with us are now to enter, moved by disinterested good will and a sense of duty commensurate with the power which we hold as a solemn trust.

The American and British peoples have been brothers in arms, and their arms have been crowned with victory. We thank with all our hearts your valiant soldiers and sailors for their splendid part in that victory, as we thank the American people for their noble response to the call of civilization and humanity. May the same brotherly spirit inspire and guide our united efforts to secure for the world the blessings of an ordered freedom and an enduring peace.

In asking you to join with me in drinking the health of the President, I wish to say with what pleasure we welcome Mrs. Wilson to this country.

I drink to the health of the President of the United States and Mrs. Wilson and to the happiness and prosperity of the great American Nation.

To this the President answered and said:

Every influence that the American people have over the affairs of the world is measured by their sympathy with the aspirations of freemen everywhere.

America does love freedom, and I believe that she loves freedom unselfishly. But if she does not she will not and cannot help the influence to which she justly aspires.

I have had the privilege, Sir, of conferring with the leaders of your own Government, and with the spokesmen of the Governments of France and of Italy, and I am glad to say that I have the same conceptions that they have of the significance and scope of the duty on which we have met.

We have used great words, all of us have used the great words, "Right" and "Justice," and now we are to prove whether or not we understand these words, and how they are to be applied to the particular settlements which must conclude this war. And we must not only understand them, but we must have the courage to act upon our understanding.

Yet, after I have uttered the word, "Courage," it comes into my

mind that it would take more courage to resist the great moral tide now running in the world than to yield to it, than to obey it.

There is a great tide running in the hearts of men. The hearts of men have never beaten so singularly in unison before. Men have never before been so conscious of their brotherhood. Men have never before realized how little difference there was between right and justice in one latitude and in another, under one sovereignty and under another.

And it will be our high privilege, I believe, Sir, not only to apply the moral judgment of the world to the particular settlements which we shall attempt, but also to organize the moral force of the world to preserve those settlements, to steady the forces of mankind, and to make the right and the justice to which great nations like our own have devoted themselves, the predominant and controlling force of the world.

There is something inspiring in knowing that this is the errand that we have come on. Nothing less than this would have justified me in leaving the important tasks which fall upon me upon the other side of the sea, nothing but the consciousness that nothing else compares with this in dignity and importance.

Freedom of the City of London was bestowed in Guildhall on the afternoon of Saturday the 28th. Replying to the address of the Lord Mayor, the President spoke more definitely than he had yet spoken on the issues of peace.

When this war began the thought of a League of Nations was indulgently considered as the interesting thought of closeted students. It was thought of as one of those things that it was right to characterize by a name which, as a university man, I have always resented. It was said to be academic, as if that in itself were a condemnation, something that men could think about, but never get. Now we find the practical leading minds of the world determined to get it.

And back of us is that imperative yearning of the world to have all disturbing questions quieted, to have all threats against peace silenced, to have just men everywhere come together for a common object. The peoples of the world want peace, and they want it now, not merely by conquest of arms, but by agreement of mind.

It was this incomparably great object that brought me overseas. It has never before been deemed excusable for a President of the United States to leave the territory of the United States, but I

know that I have the support of the judgment of my colleagues in the Government of the United States in saying that it was my paramount duty to turn away even from the imperative tasks at home to lend such counsel and aid as I could to this great, may I not say final, enterprise of humanity.

Sunday was passed at Carlisle, where his grandfather, Thomas Woodrow, had preached and taught, and where his mother was born. There he received the freedom of the city, signed the freemen's roll, and standing by request in the pulpit where his grandfather had preached during thirty-seven years, made a short address.

That afternoon the President went on to Manchester, was greeted with great enthusiasm, was given the freedom of the city.

That part of the speech in which the President said that "if the future had nothing for us but a new attempt to keep the world at a right poise by a balance of power the United States would take no interest, because she will join no combination of power which is not a combination of all of us," was read with especial interest both at home and abroad, because on Sunday night, December 29th, Clémenceau, speaking in the French Chamber of Deputies, declared for a new balance of power. "There is an old system," said he, "which appears condemned to-day and to which I do not fear to say that I remain faithful at this moment. Countries have organized for the defense of their frontiers with the necessary elements and the balance of power. This system appears to be condemned by some very high authorities. Nevertheless, I will remark that if such a balance had preceded the war, that if America, England, France and Italy had got together in declaring that whoever attacked one of them must expect to see the three others take up the common defense." Here he was interrupted by applause and disorder, but when he could be heard again said: "This is the system of alliances which I do not renounce, I say it most distinctly, my guiding thought at the conference, if your body permits me to go there, and I believe that nothing should sep-

arate after the war the four great powers that the war has united. To this Entente I will make all sacrifices." Here, seemingly, was a sharp difference of opinion; but no unfavorable comment was made, though not a little surprise was occasioned.

There is, it was said, no real difference in the aims of the two men. All M. Clémenceau says of the difference, or better, the contrast, between the position of France as he states it, and the position of America as Mr. Wilson states it, is strictly true. France sees and feels what a German invasion means, and demands a sure safeguard against the recurrence of a danger she narrowly escaped, and the horrible suffering her people still endure. Mr. Wilson is equally determined to protect her against such evils for all time to come, and finds it in a League of Nations. M. Clémenceau is skeptical of such an untried League, and trustful of an Entente of the four great powers of the world. Both seek the same goal.

December 31 the President left England for Calais and Paris, and on the night of New Year's Day departed for Italy. At the frontier he was met by a distinguished party and escorted to Rome. The journey across Italy resembled a triumphant procession, for Italy was determined to be second to none of the Allies in the heartiness and sincerity of her greeting. At the station in Rome he was welcomed by the King, the Queen, members of the Government and of the municipality, was escorted thence through a gorgeously decorated city to luncheon with the Queen Mother, and was formally received by the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies. To them he made an address and again declared against another balance of power.

The distinguishing fact of this war is that great empires have gone to pieces. And the characteristics of those empires are that they held different peoples reluctantly together under the coercion of force and the guidance of intrigue.

The great difficulty among such States as those of the Balkans has been that they were always accessible to secret influence; and they were always penetrated by intrigue of some sort or another;

that north of them lay disturbed populations which were held together not by sympathy and friendship, but by the coercive force of a military power.

Now the intrigue is checked and the bonds are broken, and what we are going to provide is a new cement to hold the people together. They have not been accustomed to being independent. They must now be independent.

I am sure that you recognize the principle, as I do, that it is not our privilege to say what sort of a government they should set up. But we are friends of those people, and it is our duty as their friends to see to it that some kind of protection is thrown around them, something supplied which will hold them together.

There is only one thing that holds nations together, if you exclude force, and that is friendship and good will. The only thing that binds men together is friendship, and by the same token the only thing that binds nations together is friendship. Therefore, our task at Paris is to organize the friendship of the world, to see to it that all the moral forces that make for right, and justice, and liberty are united, and are given a vital organization to which the peoples of the world will readily and gladly respond.

In other words, our task is no less colossal than this; to set up a new international psychology; to have a new real atmosphere. I am happy to say that in my dealings with the distinguished gentlemen who lead your nation, and those who lead France and England, I feel that atmosphere gathering, that desire to do justice, that desire to establish friendliness, that desire to make peace rest upon right, and with this common purpose no obstacles need be formidable.

The only use of an obstacle is to be overcome. All that an obstacle does with brave men is not to frighten them, but to challenge them. So that it ought to be our pride to overcome everything that stands in the way.

We know that there cannot be another balance of power. That has been tried and found wanting, for the best of all reasons that it does not stay balanced inside itself, and cannot constitute a makeweight in the affairs of men.

Therefore, there must be something substituted for the balance of power, and I am happy to find everywhere in the air of these great nations, the conception that that thing must be a thoroughly united league of nations.

What men once considered theoretical and idealistic turns out to be practical and necessary. We stand at the opening of a new

age in which a new statesmanship will, I am confident, lift mankind to new levels of endeavor and achievement.

While the President was thus receiving the greetings of the Italians he found it necessary to ask Congress by cable to appropriate a hundred million dollars to relieve the suffering from want of food in Europe. Mr. Hoover's appeal, in September, for food conservation was made on the supposition that the war would end in 1919, or at the latest in 1920. The sudden collapse of Germany, and the armistice in November, led our people to suppose that with fighting over, the need for food would not be so great. The Food Administrator, however, had no sooner begun his work abroad than he realized that the need was greater than ever. A new appeal was therefore made, and December 1 a new campaign, a "food conservation week for world relief," was started. It was opened on Sunday, December 1, by the reading in churches of all denominations the country over, of a message to the people from Mr. Hoover on "America's opportunity for renewed service and sacrifice." At the food conference in London during the summer, our country, he said, was pledged to meet whatever "food program" the Allies arranged. The Allies need not consider whether we had or had not the supplies; we would find them. The ending of the war did not release us from the pledge. Freeing the seas from the submarine menace had indeed made available the wheat of India, Australia and Argentina; but the demand on our country was not lessened; on the contrary, it was increased. Besides supplying those to whom we were pledged, we now had the splendid opportunity of feeding millions of people in the once occupied territories, people who were facing starvation. Belgium, northern France, Serbia, Roumania, Montenegro, Poland, Russia, Armenia relied on us for help. Two hundred million people, besides those to whom we were pledged, "looked to us in their misery and famine." The President had asked him "to perfect and enlarge the arrangements for foodstuffs for the populations of Belgium and France then being released, and

determine the food need of the peoples of Southern Europe, that the evil days which had come to Russia might not come to them." His new appeal therefore was larger than the old, and was made not to the war conscience, but to the world conscience. Our people had an opportunity to demonstrate not only their ability to help in establishing peace on earth, but also "their consecration, by self-denial, to the cause of suffering humanity."

As Mr. Hoover continued his investigations he became more and more impressed with the gravity of his task. All Northern France he found in ruin. "The entire industrial life of the region," he reported late in December, "has been destroyed by the Germans." Scarce a factory could be operated without new equipment; the coal mines were totally destroyed; the railways could not be made usable for many months. Hand grenades had been exploded under each rail, to bend and make it useless for all time. The Grand Canal du Nord, the great artery of trade between France and Belgium, had been fought over, and could not be rebuilt for a year. After four years of business paralysis, the destruction of towns, cities, shops, trades had absolutely disappeared and the people were dependent on rations just as they had been during German occupation. Destruction of twenty important cities and hundreds of villages made the return of their former inhabitants impossible. Every effort was being made to prevent their return, but despite official warnings they were going in such numbers that the roads were "a continuous procession of these pitiable bodies." Thousands, finding every vestige of shelter gone where once their village stood, wandered back to villages without the battle area which were "already overcrowded to a heart-breaking degree." To relieve this situation the Commission for Relief in Belgium had obtained a hundred and fifty volunteers from the Navy, and with "second-hand barrack material" were building shelters close to the ruined villages. Boots and shoes and warm clothing, obtained from the quartermasters' supplies, had been distributed; the French Government was seeking cattle and horses in Switzerland, and these, with a meager supply of agricultural

implements, might enable these homeless people to plant crops in such parts of the country as were not too badly destroyed by battle.

The first cargo of foodstuffs had arrived at Trieste, and more was due to reach ports in the Adriatic early in January, all destined for Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, where the distress was "very acute." The only connection by railroad was from the Adriatic, for the Bulgarians had destroyed that from Saloniki. Relief agents had already gone to Belgrade and to Warsaw to take charge of relief work in Poland. Another was going to Vienna, where the supply of food could not last more than ten days. American and Allied ministers in Roumania had telegraphed that food supplies would not last more than thirty days. It was the situation in these countries which led the President to ask for a hundred million dollars. After several weeks of debate the money was appropriated with no little reluctance.

At Genoa, the President, standing at the foot of the statue of Columbus, spoke to a dense crowd of people of that city. At Milan where the shouting crowds surpassed any he had yet seen, five speeches were made.

CHAPTER VII

THE PEACE CONFERENCE

TUESDAY, January 7, 1919, found the President back at Paris. Eight weeks had then passed since the November morning when the armistice was signed; yet no meeting of the Peace Conference had been held. Indeed, some of the Powers had not named all their delegates. Time, however, was not wasted, for issues of great importance had been freely discussed, at home and abroad, in the press, and by statesmen, by party leaders, and by men of affairs. Some thought a general peace should be the first business of the Conference, leaving the territorial settlement of the Balkans, the freedom of the seas, and the League of Nations to be decided after peace was made. This was the wish of the French and British. Others thought the League of Nations was of the utmost importance, and should be among the first matters taken up for settlement. This was understood to be the opinion of President Wilson. Discussion of the League brought forth many plans. Lieutenant General Smuts of the British War Cabinet had one; Lord Robert Cecil another, and M. Léon Bourgeois a third, said to be the French idea. The American plan had not been announced, when, on Sunday, the twelfth of January, the Supreme War Council, composed of President Wilson, and the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, held its first informal meeting. No official statement of what happened was made public. Nevertheless, it was understood that the method of procedure for the conference about to open, how many delegates each power should be allowed, and the conditions on which the armistice, about to expire on January 17, should be extended, were all deliberately considered.

What should be done to Germany was of pressing importance, for she had been slow in delivering war material required to be given up by the terms of the armistice, and was reported to be hindering the Poles in the organization of their government, and in defending themselves against the advancing Bolshevik forces.

Proceedings on the second day, Monday the thirteenth, were in two sessions. In the morning military and naval men, financiers and economists, met and determined on what new terms the armistice should be extended. They included, the official report announced, "naval clauses, financial clauses, conditions of supply, and provisions for the restitution of material and machinery stolen from France and Belgium by the Germans," and were laid before the Council when it assembled in the afternoon. Delegates from Japan then attended. Methods of procedure were also discussed, and the decision reached, "that the first full session of the Peace Conference should take place on Saturday, January 18." "We finished first of all," said Premier Clémenceau, "with the armistice, and there, I think, we did good work. Then we continued our examination of the procedure for the conference, notably the representation of the small powers. As to the conference itself which should meet on Thursday, it had to be postponed until Saturday on account of the absence of the Italian Premier, Signor Orlando." A cabinet crisis had forced him to return to Rome. Rumor had it that the new terms for prolonging the armistice would require the punishment of the Germans for the murder and ill-treatment of Allied prisoners of war; the removal of £100,000,000 in gold to a safe place, and its protection while on the way from Bolsheviks; the surrender of all U-boats on the stocks and a guarantee that not another one should be constructed. One hundred and seventy, it was said, were under construction in German yards. No official orders having been received to stop building, the work went on automatically, despite the armistice, and the knowledge that they must in the end be delivered to the Allies.

How many delegates each nation should have was determined on Wednesday, and what was of far more immediate importance, word was given out that nothing about the doings of the Peace Conference was to be disclosed save what was contained in the daily communiqué, and that, by a gentlemen's agreement, the delegates would neither discuss, nor in any way give information about, the proceedings of the meetings of the Council. Correspondents of British journals at once drew up a protest, and put it in the hands of Lloyd George; the American newspaper men joined in a protest to President Wilson. On Friday the Supreme Council yielded, and ruled that representatives of the press should "be admitted to the meetings of the full conference," but, when necessary, deliberations might "be held in camera," and gave its reasons. Proceedings of a Peace Conference resembled more closely those of a Cabinet than those of a legislature. Nobody had ever suggested that cabinet meetings be held in public. Representatives of the Allied powers were holding conversations in order to solve questions of vital "importance to many nations, and on which they might hold many different views." These deliberations could not proceed by the method of a majority vote. No nation could be bound save by the free vote of its own delegates. Decisions must be reached by the difficult process of agreement which would be hindered if every disputed question were attended by a premature public controversy, in each nation. Give and take, on the part of delegates, so essential to successful negotiations, would become most difficult, proceedings would be protracted, and the delegates forced to concern themselves, not merely with the business before the Conference, but also with the controversies raised outside by the account of their proceedings.

At home the matter was taken up in the United States Senate, and after Senators of both parties had denounced secrecy at the peace conference as an abandonment of the first of the President's fourteen points, it was agreed that, should the Conference persist in its decision to hold secret sessions, a resolu-

tion demanding open sessions would be presented, adopted, and sent to Versailles.

On Saturday, the nineteenth, at three o'clock in the afternoon, the long desired Peace Conference was formally opened in the gorgeous *Salle de Paix* of the Foreign Ministry, and to this representatives of the press of all nations were freely admitted. Proceedings on that day were confined to an address of welcome by President Poincaré; speeches by President Wilson, Lloyd George, Baron Sonnino, and Premier Clémenceau; and to the election of a President of the Conference.

At precisely three o'clock, the delegates having assembled in the Council Chamber, a roll of drums and blare of trumpets announced the arrival of President Poincaré, who was escorted to the head of the great horseshoe-shaped table, and at once addressed the standing delegates. When he finished speaking President Wilson nominated as permanent chairman M. Clémenceau. Premier Lloyd George seconded the nomination; M. Clémenceau was unanimously elected, and in turn made a speech, which closed the session.

Daily sittings of the Conference were not to be held. The program of proceedings, M. Clémenceau stated, would cover three main subjects: Responsibility of the authors of the war; responsibility for the crimes committed during the war; legislation in regard to international labor. All powers represented would be requested to present memoranda on these subjects, and the powers specially concerned other memoranda on territorial, financial and economic questions. On these memoranda the Supreme Council of the five great powers would deliberate, decide at once, or invite the delegates of the powers most concerned to discuss the issues with the Council. The League of Nations, he said, would be the first question considered when the Peace Conference met again.

On Monday, January 21, the Supreme Council resumed its sittings and in the course of a few days, having listened to a description of conditions in Russia, by the French Ambassador just returned from Archangel, and by the Danish Minister fresh

from Petrograd, announced the policy of the Allies towards Russia. In their discussions, they said, the sole object of the Associated Powers had been to help, not to hinder, the Russian people, not to interfere in any manner with their right to settle their own affairs in their own way. The Allies had no desire to exploit or make use of Russia. They recognized the revolution without reservation, and would in no way, and under no circumstances, give countenance to a counter revolution, nor favor, nor aid any one of the organized groups contending for the leadership of Russia. The associated powers had no other purpose than to bring to Russia peace, and an opportunity to find a way out of the troubles that beset her. They were engaged in the solemn duty of establishing peace in Europe, and in the world; but there could be no peace in Europe and in the world while there was strife in Russia. To this end, therefore, they invited every organized group exercising, or seeking to exercise, political authority, or military control, anywhere in Siberia, or anywhere within the boundaries of Russia as she was before the war, Finland alone excepted, to send not more than three representatives each to meet, on February 15, delegates from the associated Powers, on the Island of Prinkipo, one of the group known as the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmora, some eight miles southeast of Constantinople. These groups were the Lenine Bolshevik Government, the Representative Constituent Assembly, the Government of Omsk, the Kieff Government, the Esthonian, Lithuanian, and Lettish Governments, Denikin's Government, the Archangel Government, the Tiflis Government, the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the League of Russian Regeneration, the Representative Central Committee of the Social Democratic Party, and certain bodies in the Caucasus. Meantime there must be a truce of arms amongst the parties invited, and all armed forces sent against any people or territory within the bounds of old Russia, against Finland, against any people or territory, "whose autonomous action" was "in contemplation in the fourteen ar-

ticles upon which the present negotiations are based," must be "withdrawn and aggressive military actions cease."

No sooner was the policy of Council towards Russia made known than there arose a storm of opposition. Sergius Sazanoff, one-time Foreign Minister under the Czar, and then representing the Government of Yskaterinodar and the Siberian Government at Omsk, declared he would not go to Prinkipo to confer with representatives of the Russian factions. He would "not sit with assassins." Prince Lvoff, former Russian Premier, condemned the action of the Council. "We never thought the Conference would begin its work for peace by renewing relations with our tyrants. The Bolsheviks have won their greatest victory in Paris. The decision of the Council is one of danger not only to us but to the whole world. It gives new impetus to anarchy."

In England the press was sharply divided on the expediency of the Marmora Conference. We hope, said one journal, the *Morning Post*, the Russian Bolsheviks will be duly grateful to the Peace Conference. They have not indeed been invited to Paris. But they have been invited to the Sea of Marmora, where the Allies propose to leave their cards on them. Our Russian friends will also be duly gratified. The Bolsheviks could not sit down to table with us. That would be a crime and a scandal. But with our Russian friends—why, with them, it is a different matter. The Bolsheviks have robbed them; murdered their fathers, or brothers, or paid Chinese coolies to murder them; committed unspeakable outrages upon their wives and daughters; murdered the Czar and the whole royal family, and, no longer ago than January 2, shot in cold blood seven hundred and fifty British officers returning home from prison camps in Germany. And now the Allies, their Allies, ask them to come and sit around a table with them, and come to a happy arrangement. If it is done the Sea of Marmora will thenceforth rank with the Sea of Galilee.

The *Daily Telegraph* believed that to have any dealings with the Bolsheviks, guilty of such acts as they were guilty of, was a

grave mistake, and extremely bad policy. Encouragement was the one thing likely to foster the growth of Bolshevism, and if the proposals of the Conference did not involve tacit acceptance of, and encouragement of, the forces of Trotsky and Lenine, "we really do not know what they do mean."

The London *Times* thought the act of the Conference was all for the best. The meeting might, or might not, take place. In either case it would be "impossible for the Bolsheviki in Russia to keep on any more." If they did not attend the Marmora meeting they would "reveal themselves as enemies of the human race." And whatever step the Conference might find it necessary to take would have popular approval behind it. If they came and behaved reasonably, the gain would be still greater. "We shall have made the peace of Europe secure without further fighting."

The Manchester *Guardian* warmly supported the proposal; the Westminster *Gazette* claimed that the reasons which favored the Marmora meeting greatly outweighed all that could be said against it.

The Council of Russian National and Democratic Political Organizations Abroad protested to M. Clémenceau. "We should be men without honor and courage if we accepted, for a single moment, a truce such as proposed to us, while all that are dear are in danger of death, violent death by execution or assassination, or slow death through hunger." According to the French Socialist newspaper, *L'Humanité*, the Bolshevik Government at Moscow was surprised that the invitation came at a time when the Bolsheviki were victorious in the field. Vasili Maklakoff, the last Russian Ambassador to France, thought it strange that France should, in December, when stating her attitude towards Bolshevism, declare she "would never have anything to do with crime," and, in January, join in the proposal to hold a conference with the Bolsheviki at Princes' Island. In our own country the Russians pointed out that the offer came at a moment most fortunate for the Bolsheviki. Beaten by the Esthonians, driven out of Perm, defeated in the

Don country, checked on the Archangel front, and with Trotsky about to abandon Petrograd, the Bolsheviki were sorely in need of just such a respite as this offer would afford. At New York, the Russian Economic League, learning from newspaper reports that it had been proposed to admit "agents of the so-called Bolshevik government" to the Peace Conference, protested bitterly against any dealings with such men. In the United States Senate, on the other hand, the offer found support. One Senator thought it a most fortunate agreement among the Powers, a start towards solving the Russian problem, an encouraging augury for the ultimate settlement of Russian affairs by the Russian people themselves. Another was thoroughly in favor of the offer. It was a hopeful and encouraging thing. Russia ought to have the right of self-determination of her own affairs. A third was opposed. With the record of the perfidy of Trotsky and Lenine before us, with the proof we have that they acted as the agents of Germany, in view of the bloody class warfare they have carried on, and because of their denunciation of our own nation, and the democratic principles on which it is founded, he failed to see how the Peace Conference could, with honor to itself, or a decent regard for the nations it represented, have any dealings with the Bolsheviki.

Having decided on its policy towards Russia, the Supreme Council called a full session of the Peace Conference for the afternoon of Saturday, January 25, to take up for consideration the plan of Lloyd George for a League of Nations.

Meanwhile the Council went on with its work. It conferred with the military leaders as to strength of the Allied forces to be kept on the western front during the armistice, and appointed a committee to consider the question. It took up "territorial readjustments," in connection with the conquest of the German Colonies, and sent out, by wireless, a warning to those using armed force to gain possession of territory "the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine."

The governments now associated in conference to effect a lasting peace among the nations are deeply disturbed by the news which comes to them of the many instances in which armed force is being made use of in many parts of Europe, and the east, to gain possession of territory, the rightful claim to which the Peace Conference is to be asked to determine. They deem it their duty to utter a solemn warning that possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use this means. It will create the presumption that those who employ force doubt the justice and validity of their claims, and purpose to substitute possession for proof of right, and set up sovereignty by coercion rather than by racial or national preference, and natural historical association. They thus put a cloud upon every evidence of title they may afterward allege, and indicate their distrust of the Conference itself.

Nothing but the most unfortunate results can ensue. If they expect justice they must refrain from force and place their claims in unclouded good faith in the hands of the conference of peace.

To the Peace Conference, when it met in full session on Saturday, President Wilson said in substance: They were assembled for two purposes, to bring about settlements made necessary by the war, and to secure the peace of the world. A League of Nations seemed necessary, for both these purposes. It might well be that many of the settlements arranged by the Conference would need to be altered later. Some machinery, therefore, by which the work of the Conference could be made final was most desirable. But there was more to be done than satisfy "governmental circles." The opinion of mankind must be satisfied. The delegates to the Conference were "not the representatives of governments, but representatives of the people," and were bidden, by these people, "to make a peace that will make them secure."

In a sense, the United States is less interested in this subject than the other nations here assembled. With her great territory and her extensive sea borders, it is less likely that the United States should suffer from the attacks of enemies than that other nations should suffer. And the ardor of the United States—for it is a very deep and genuine ardor—for the society of nations is not an ardor

springing out of fear or apprehension, but an ardor springing out of the ideals which have come in the consciousness of this war.

In coming into this war the United States never for a moment thought that she was intervening in the politics of Europe, or the politics of Asia, or the politics of any part of the world. Her thought was that all the world had now become conscious that there was a single cause of justice and of liberty for men of every kind and place.

Therefore, the United States should feel that its part in this war should be played in vain if there ensued upon it abortive European settlements. It would feel that it could not take part in guaranteeing those European settlements unless that guarantee involved the continuous superintendence of the peace of the world by the associated nations of the world.

Therefore, it seems to me that we must concert our best judgment in order to make this League of Nations a thing sometimes called into life to meet an exigency, but always functioning in watchful attendance upon the interests of the nations, and that its continuity should be a vital continuity, its functions continuing functions, that do not permit an intermission of its watchfulness and of its labor; that it should be the eye of the nations, to keep watch upon the common interest, an eye that did not slumber, an eye that was everywhere watchful and attentive.

And if we do not make it vital, what shall we do? We shall disappoint the expectations of the peoples. This is what their thought centers upon.

.

Gentlemen, the select classes of mankind are no longer the governors of mankind. The fortunes of mankind are now in the hands of the plain people of the whole world. Satisfy them, and you have justified their confidence not only, but have established peace. Fail to satisfy them, and no arrangement that you can make will either set up or steady the peace of the world.

You can imagine, I dare say, the sentiments and the purpose with which the representatives of the United States support this great project for a League of Nations. We regard it as the keynote of the whole, which expressed our purposes and ideals in this war and which the associated nations have accepted as the basis of a settlement.

If we return to the United States without having made every effort in our power to realize this program, we should return to meet the merited scorn of our fellow-citizens. For they are a

body that constitute a great democracy. They expect their leaders to speak; their representatives to be their servants.

We have no choice but to obey their mandate. But it is with the greatest enthusiasm and pleasure that we accept that mandate. And because this is the keynote of the whole fabric, we have pledged our every purpose to it, as we have to every item of the fabric. We would not dare abate a single item of the program which constitutes our instructions; we would not dare to compromise upon any matter as the champion of this thing—this peace of the world, this attitude of justice, this principle that we are the masters of no peoples, but are here to see that every people in the world shall choose its own masters and govern its own destinies, not as we wish, but as they wish.

We are here to see, in short, that the very foundations of this war are swept away. Those foundations were the private choice of a small coterie of civil rulers and military staffs. Those foundations were the aggression of great powers upon the small. Those foundations were the holding together of empires of unwilling subjects by the duress of arms. Those foundations were the power of small bodies of men to wield their will and use mankind as pawns in a game.

And nothing less than the emancipation of the world from these things will accomplish peace.

When the President had finished his speech Lloyd George rose and said:

Had I the slightest doubt as to the wisdom of this League of Nations, it would have vanished before the spectacle as I saw it last Sunday, when I visited a region which, but a few years ago, was one of the fairest in this very fair land.

We drove for hours through what was a wilderness of desolation. It did not look like a country where there were habitations of men, but it was torn and shattered and rent beyond all recognition. We visited one city, which had been very beautiful, but where we saw scenes which no indemnity can ever make good.

One of the cruellest features was the knowledge that Frenchmen, who love their land almost more than any other people, had had to assist the enemy in demolishing their own homes. I said to myself that it is surely time we set up some other method to settle quarrels than this organized slaughter.

I do not know if we shall succeed in our enterprise, but it is already a success that we have undertaken it.

Before the session closed for the day the Conference unanimously resolved: That it was necessary for the maintenance of the world settlement about to be established that a League of Nations be formed to promote international obligations, and prevent war; that the League be an integral part of the treaty of peace; that it be open to every civilized nation; that its members meet periodically; and that there be a permanent organization with secretaries to carry on business between the meetings. Having reached this decision it was determined that a committee, representative of the associated governments, be appointed to frame the constitution, and arrange the duties of the League, and draft resolutions in respect to breaches of the laws of war, for the consideration of the Peace Conference. A commission of two representatives of each of the five great powers, and five to be elected by the other powers, it was ordered, should consider and report on the responsibility of the authors of the war; on the facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war by the forces of the German Empire, and their allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the war; on the degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular members of the enemies' forces, however highly placed; on the organization and procedure of a tribunal for the trial of these offenders, and on all other matters which might arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the commission might think it useful to consider.

Another commission, composed of three representatives from each of the five great powers, and two each from Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania and Serbia, was to examine and report on the amount of reparation the enemy countries ought to pay, on what they could pay, and on the method, form and time within which the payment should be made.

A third commission of two representatives from each of the five great powers and five elected by the nations represented at

the Peace Conference was to inquire "into the conditions of employment from the international aspect," consider the "international means necessary to secure common action on matters affecting conditions of employment," and suggest "the form of a permanent agency to continue such inquiry," in coöperation "with and under the direction of the League of Nations." A fourth was "to report upon the international régime for ports, waterways and railways."

Assignments of memberships on these conference committees were far from pleasing to the small nations. Belgium objected strongly, to the small number allotted her, and one after another delegates of other small nations rose to endorse her objection. When they had finished Premier Clémenceau mildly reminded them that had it not been for the great Powers they might not have been at a peace conference. When the armistice was declared, he told them, the five powers which formed the Supreme Council, from whose program they dissented, had twelve million men under arms, and could count their dead by millions, and intimated that in all matters they should have most to say. The little powers were not convinced and Sunday was spent by the Belgians and the Serbians in framing protests to M. Clémenceau. Belgium and Serbia claimed that they had suffered, proportionally, as much as the great nations, and ought to have separate representation on the committees, and not be lumped with other small nations which had scarcely felt the horrors of the war. Three groups of nations, they suggested, should be formed: the five great powers, and Belgium and Serbia which were great sufferers; nations which fought, but had not suffered as had Belgium and Serbia; and nations which declared war but did not take part, or much part, in the fighting. Representation they held should be according to these groups.

Despite these protests no action was taken, and on Monday afternoon delegates of the nineteen small nations met under the chairmanship of M. Jules Cambon and quietly appointed their members of the Commissions, according to the decision of the

Peace Conference on Saturday. While they were so engaged the Supreme Council formed two more commissions, one to deal with matters of finance, and one with questions of "private and maritime laws"; continued the exchange of views on "the former German Colonies in the Pacific and the Far East"; and listened to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs on colonial matters in which his country was especially concerned. On Tuesday, the 28th, this exchange of views was again continued, and the delegates of Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, and the French Minister of the Colonies were heard. President Wilson contended that the German Colonies should be "internationalized," placed under the care of the League of Nations. It was his wish that each colony taken over by the League should not be given outright to any nation, but should be watched over and governed by some Power under a mandate from the League of Nations. There were many objections to this plan. Australia claimed German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago; New Zealand claimed Samoa; Japan desired the Marshall and Caroline groups, and a secret treaty of 1916 between Great Britain and Japan gave the islands north of the equator to Great Britain and those south of the line to Japan. China urged the return to her of Kiau-Chau, ceded by her under pressure to Germany, and taken from the Germans by Japan in the early days of the war. Both houses of the Federal Commonwealth of Australia, soon after the armistice, resolved that it was essential to the future safety and welfare of Australia that the captured German possessions in the Pacific, occupied by Australian and New Zealand troops, should not, under any circumstances, be returned to Germany. And it was expected that Great Britain would stand by her colonies. Indeed, a part of the British press called upon their delegates to do so. The London *Globe* declared if they did not, the one-time German Colonies would fall under the control of a League of Nations that did not exist, and which no practical statesman approved. The *Standard* considered the possession of the Pacific Islands, and German Southwest Africa, as neces-

sary to safeguard Australia and South Africa. Australia was just as much interested in the annexation of the Pacific Islands as was the United States when she annexed Hawaii. The *Morning Post* declared that if the British delegates weakly persisted in their attitude of not supporting the Dominions, they were not only surrendering British interests intrusted to them, but were sowing the seeds of discontent which some day might disrupt the Empire. The League of Nations, the world had been assured, was to be an international body for the purpose of keeping peace; but Mr. Wilson's proposal would make it the ruler of territory. The British Empire was to take its tenure from the League, and administer territories it had won in war. This would be an abrogation of sovereignty and ownership the British delegates had no right to make. The idea of making the British Government, or a Dominion Government, the servant of an international superior was one the British people would never endure. Even the London *Times* thought that, by all laws of race, geography and convenience, it was far better to hand over Southwest Africa and the South Pacific Islands to the Dominions of South Africa, New Zealand and Australia, than make them beneficiaries under reluctant trustees.

The Westminster *Gazette* did not think the Dominions need be alarmed; they were sure to be the mandatories of the territories in question. Unable to come to a final decision, the Supreme Council agreed, as a provisional arrangement, that there should be no annexations of territory taken from the enemy; that the people of civilized territory, wherever it might be, in Europe, Asia, Africa, or the Islands, should select the nations they were willing to have as mandatories, and that the League of Nations should choose the governments to administer the affairs of peoples too uncivilized for self-determination. As another step towards world pacification President Wilson now recognized the provisional government of Poland, and the Supreme Council directed the military representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers to report what military force

was necessary to maintain order in Turkey, and what proportion each should contribute.

Approach of the day set by the President for his return to Washington made the utmost speed necessary if he were to bring back with him, as he wished, the finished draft of the League of Nations. Speed accordingly was made, and in the course of a few days the Preamble and eleven of the two and twenty articles were accepted provisionally. It was then the seventh of February and the German Assembly, another body whose duty it was to frame a Constitution, was in session at Weimar.

Following the German practice of frightfulness and terrorism, Chancellor Ebert, in his speech at the opening of the Assembly on the afternoon of February 6, denounced the terms of the armistice and threatened the Allies. The occasion called for a temperate and dignified speech outlining a policy of construction, and reminding the delegates of the solemn responsibilities which rest on those who, having pulled down one form of government, are about to set up another. But the Chancellor made no such speech. We are done, said he, with Princes and Nobles by the grace of God. The German people are now ruling themselves. Need delivered the German people into the hands of their enemies, but we protest against their becoming slaves, for thirty, forty, or sixty years. He then denounced the expulsion of Germans from Alsace, and the detention of 800,000 prisoners of war; branded the terms of the armistice as "of unheard of severity," and as "carried out without shame," and warned "our adversaries not to push us too far." Like General Winterfeldt (who had resigned from the armistice commission), the whole German Government might eventually be forced to renounce collaborating in the peace discussions, and throw upon its adversaries all the weight of responsibility for the new world organization. Confident in the promises of President Wilson, "Germany lay down her arms, and we await the peace of President Wilson to which we have a right."

Having listened to Ebert, the Assembly finished its organ-

ization, and on the fifth day of its session adopted a provisional Constitution for the German Empire, and elected Ebert President of Germany. Opposition was made by Independent Socialists to the frequent use in the Constitution of the word "empire." "Republic," it was insisted, should be used instead; but opposition was of no avail and "empire" remained.

Germany was thus provided with a government with which the Allies, and the Peace Conference, could deal. How would that body deal with her? The Supreme War Council, according to report, was sharply divided as to the terms on which the armistice should be continued when it expired on February 17, and had referred the matter to a sub-committee. France demanded the dismantling of the forts on the right bank of the Rhine, continued occupation of the left bank, reduction of the German army to twenty-five divisions, control of the Essen munition works by the Allies, and no lifting of the blockade. Against this the Americans, and those who opposed the French, contended that fair treatment of the neutrals of Europe, and of Germany, required that the blockade be lifted. Germany could not be reduced to economic helplessness, and at the same time be forced to pay her heavy war indemnities. Great Britain, said the French, is protected by the sea, and by a great fleet; three thousand miles of ocean part America and Germany; but one step will take a man from Germany to France. What guarantees has France that Germany, made stronger than ever by union with Austria, will not take that step? France must be protected for all time to come against the military and industrial aggression of Germany. There must be an international army to enforce the decrees of the League of Nations. As the work of the commission appointed to frame a plan for a League of Nations drew to a close, M. Leon Bourgeois, therefore, in the name of the French Government, presented an article providing for the creation of an international army. It was not accepted, and on Friday, February 14, President Wilson read to the Peace Conference the report of the Commission on the anxiously awaited plan. Representatives of

fourteen nations, he said, had accepted it without a dissenting voice.¹ The event was epoch making. At last what had often seemed the wild dream of idealists had been realized, and the great nations of both continents were about to bind themselves to keep the peace, and, if need be, force others to do the same.

This instrument, as read by the President, consisted of a Covenant and a Constitution of the League of Nations. As set forth in the Covenant, or Preamble, the signatory powers adopted the Constitution in order to "promote international coöperation and secure international peace and security," by binding themselves "not to resort to war"; by maintaining "open, just and honorable relations"; by firmly establishing international law; and by maintaining "justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations."

The Constitution, as yet, was but a report of a Commission to the Peace Conference, and subject to such amendments and additions as that body might think proper. Not until finished and ratified was it binding on any nation. As drafted, the Constitution provided for a body of delegates and an Executive Council. The body of delegates was to consist of not more than three from each of the high contracting parties, and was to meet from time to time and deal with matters within the sphere of the League, each power having one vote. The Executive Council was to be composed of delegates from the five great powers, and four others, selected by the Council in such manner as might seem fit, and was to meet at least once a year, or as often as occasion might require, at the seat of the League, and deal with any matter within the sphere of the League, or affecting the peace of the world. There was to be a Secretary General, and a "Secretariat" appointed by him and approved by the Executive Council. Representatives of the high contracting parties and officials of the League were to have diplomatic privileges and immunities, and buildings occupied by the

¹The nations were Great Britain, France, Italy, United States, Japan, Belgium, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Serbia.

League, its officers or representatives attending its meetings, were to have the benefits of extra territoriality.

Self-governing States, not among the fourteen signatories, might be admitted to the League by a two-thirds vote of the States represented in the Council, but none should be admitted unless able to guarantee "its sincere intention to observe its international obligations," nor unless "it shall conform to such principles" as the League might prescribe for "its naval and military forces and armaments."

The League recognized that maintenance of peace required "reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement, by common action, of international obligations." On the Executive Council was laid the duty of framing a plan for such reductions, with due regard to the geographical situation and condition of each State; of determining for the consideration of the several States what military equipment, and armament, were fair and reasonable; and advising how the evils of private manufacture of munitions and implements of war might be prevented without injury to states unable to manufacture enough for their own defense. A permanent commission was to advise the League on the execution of all these provisions, and on military and naval matters generally.

Territorial integrity, and existing political independence, of all members of the League must be preserved against external aggression. War, or threat of war, was to be a matter of concern to the League which might take any action necessary to keep the peace of nations.

Should a dispute, which could not be adjusted by the ordinary process of diplomacy, arise between the high contracting parties, they were in no case to resort to war without first submitting the matters involved to arbitration, or to inquiry by the Executive Council, nor until three months after the arbitrators had made their award, or the Council its recommendation. Even then war must not be waged against a member of the League which accepted the award, or recommendation.

There was to be a permanent court of international justice to hear and determine matters which the parties in dispute might consider suitable to be submitted for arbitration. Should any member break the covenant regarding war, it was to be considered as having committed an act of war against all other members of the League, and be immediately subjected to a general boycott. What military and naval force should be raised "to protect the covenants of the League," was for the Executive Council to decide. Each member State must afford passage through its territories "to the forces of any of the high contracting parties who are coöperating to protect the covenants of the League."

There was to be general supervision, by the League, of the trade in arms and munitions with countries where control of this traffic was necessary; there were to be mandatories to administer the affairs of colonies and territories "inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves"; there was to be a permanent bureau of labor "to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women and children"; there was to be "freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States members of the League"; control of international bureaus established by treaties, if the parties consented; registration with the Secretary General and prompt publication of all future treaties made by any member of the League; and the abrogation of all obligations inconsistent with the terms of the Constitution.

The instrument was not the work of any one man. It was composite, was made of selections from several plans, and in its lack of sequence and clarity showed unmistakable signs of haste.

Having finished reading the plan, the President proceeded to discuss the document. The simplicity of the League, the body of delegates, the Executive Council, the Secretariat appealed to him. There was a universal feeling that the world would not rest satisfied if the deliberating body was composed merely of officials representing so many governments. It was impossible

to have an assembly so large as to be representative of twelve hundred million people. But, with each government free to send one, two, or, if it pleased, three representatives, though with but one vote, it might change its representation from time to time, and so gratify "the virtually universal opinion of plain men everywhere that they wanted the door left open to a variety of representation instead of being confined to a single official body."

To safeguard the popular power of this representative body it was provided that, when a subject in dispute was submitted, it was not to arbitration, but for discussion, by the Executive Council. On demand of either party it could be drawn from the Executive Council to the body of delegates "because through this instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and this is the moral force of the public opinion of the world." Armed force was in the background, but it was in the background, and if the moral force of the world did not suffice, the physical force of the world must. "But this is the last resort because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not a league of war."

He would say, therefore, of this document, "that it is not a straitjacket, but a vehicle of life."

A living thing is born, and we must see to it what clothes we put on it now. It is not a vehicle of power, but a vehicle in which power may be varied at the discretion of those who exercise it and in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time. And yet, while it is elastic, while it is general in its terms, it is definite in the one thing that we were called to make definite. It is a definite guarantee of peace. It is a definite guarantee against the things which have just come near bringing the whole structure of civilization into ruin.

Its purposes do not for a moment lie vague. Its purposes are declared and its powers are unmistakable. It is not in contemplation that this should be merely a league to secure the peace of the world. It is a league which can be used for coöperation in any international matter. That is the significance of the provision introduced concerning labor. There are many ameliorations of labor conditions which can be effected by conference and discussion. I anticipate

that there will be a great usefulness in the bureau of labor which it is contemplated shall be set up by the league. Men and women and children who work have been in the background through long ages and sometimes seemed to be forgotten while governments have had their watchful and suspicious eyes upon the maneuvers of one another, while the thought of statesmen has been about structural action and the larger transactions of commerce and of finance.

Now, if he could believe the picture which he saw, there came into the foreground the great body of the laboring people of the world, "the men and women and children upon whom the great burden of sustaining the world must from day to day fall, whether we wish it to do so or not; people who go to bed tired and wake up without the stimulation of lively hope. These people will be drawn into the field of international consultation and help, and will be among the wards of the combined governments of the world."

There was an imperative article concerning the publicity of all international agreements. "Henceforth no member of the league can claim any agreement valid which it has not registered with the secretary general, in whose office, of course, it will be subject to the examining member of the league. And the duty is laid upon the secretary general to publish every document of that sort at the earliest possible time."

There was another provision in the covenant which, to his mind, was one of the greatest and most satisfactory advances that had yet been made. "We are done with annexations of helpless peoples, meant in some instances by some Powers to be used merely for exploitation. We recognize in the most solemn manner that the helpless and undeveloped peoples of the world, being in that condition, put an obligation upon us to look after their interests primarily before we use them for our interests; and that in all cases of this sort hereafter it shall be the duty of the league to see that the nations who are assigned as the tutors and advisers and directors of these peoples shall look to their interests and their development before they look to the interests and desires of the mandatory nation itself.

"There had been no greater advance than this. If you looked back upon the history of the world you would see how helpless peoples have too often been a prey to Powers that had no conscience in the matter. One of the many distressing revelations of recent years was that the great Power which has just been, happily, defeated, put intolerable burdens and injustices upon the helpless people of some of the colonies which it annexed to itself; that its interest was rather their extermination than their development; that the desire was to possess their land for European purposes, and not to enjoy their confidence in order that mankind might be lifted in these places to the next higher level.

"Now the world, expressing its conscience in law, says, there is an end of that; that our consciences shall be settled to this thing. States will be picked out which have already shown that they can exercise a conscience in this matter, and under their tutelage the helpless peoples of the world will come into a new light and into a new hope."

Lord Robert Cecil for Great Britain, Leon Bourgeoise for France, Premier Orlando for Italy, endorsed the plan, the Conference adjourned at seven o'clock in the evening, and that night President Wilson left Paris for Brest, and on the morrow sailed for home.

It was then time to arrange the new armistice terms, for the old would expire at five o'clock on the morning of Monday, February 17. Friday afternoon, therefore, Herr Erzberger and the German delegates met Marshal Foch at Treves, and were given the new terms. Efforts made by Erzberger to obtain modifications were of no avail. Foch sternly refused, but agreed, in order that they might be sent to Weimar, to allow the Germans until six o'clock on Sunday night to decide whether they would, or would not, accept. If reports from Weimar may be trusted the Cabinet spent Saturday afternoon and night, and until dawn on Sunday morning, considering the terms, and then agreed on rejection. Before proceeding to act on this decision, however, leaders of all parties were hastily summoned, and con-

sulted, and having advised the Cabinet to accept, it did so, and, one hour before the time granted by Foch expired, the German delegates at Treves received instructions to sign. Ere they did so they were to present a note of protest to Marshal Foch. The German Government, it said, was aware of the serious consequences involved in either signing, or rejecting, the armistice, and when instructing its delegates to sign did so with the conviction that the Allied and Associated Governments were striving to restore peace to the world. Complaint was then made that the agreement wholly ignored the new German Government set up in an orderly way by the German people, and curtly ordered the evacuation, in favor of the insurgent Poles, of Birnbaum and Bentschen, and other important places. Germany promised to carry out the armistice terms she had not as yet succeeded in fulfilling, but assumed her obligations would not be interpreted in a manner incompatible with President Wilson's principles. She also protested against the provision that the Allies might end the armistice at any time on three days' notice.

Scarcely had the President sailed from Brest when his private secretary at Washington made known to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and House a message cabled from Paris the day before. Each article of the Constitution for the League of Nations, the President said, "was passed only after the most careful examination by each member of the Committee." There was good reason "for the phraseology and substance of each article." He requested, therefore, that he might go over the constitution, article by article, with the committees, before it became "the subject of debate in Congress," and invited them to dine with him as soon as possible after his arrival in the United States. The President, it was announced, would land in Boston, and the dinner would be on February 26.

Leaders in the Senate were in no frame of mind to comply. Since the receipt of the President's request, said Senator Borah, his secretary has announced that he will speak in Boston. It

seemed likely therefore that his request, that the Constitution of the League should not be debated, had been modified. There was a powerful propaganda under way in favor of the League. Ex-President Taft and his friends were traveling the country and speaking in its favor. The President would discuss it, the press, the people in clubs and hotel lobbies would discuss it, as they should. There was no reason then why the Senate, in an orderly fashion, should not debate it, and if that body had any self-respect, or mental courage, it would discuss it whenever it pleased. "The President," said Senator New, "does not want the Senate to talk, and yet talks to everybody. Now he proposes to talk in public, on his return, in Boston. But he does not want any one else to talk, neither the Senate, nor any one else."

Opposition came chiefly, though not entirely, from the Republican members, who held that the Constitution of the League, if adopted, would force us to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, give up much of our sovereignty and independence, do many things in flat contravention to express provisions in the Federal Constitution, and submit questions of foreign policy, and even of domestic policy, to the decision of a body in which there were eight foreign votes to one American. In support of this contention Articles VIII, X, XII, XVIII and XIX were cited.

By Article VIII the Executive Council was vested with authority to determine for the consideration and action of the several governments what military and naval armament was fair and reasonable for the needs of each. Would not this be an impairment of the sovereignty and independence of the United States? Was not the Government in duty bound to defend the country? What would the people on the Pacific Coast, in the Philippines, along our Mexican border, say to giving Japan and Mexico a vote in deciding how many ships, and how many soldiers we should be allowed to maintain? Neither the President, nor the Senate, nor Congress, nor all combined, could make such a transfer, to foreign powers, of that inalien-

able attribute of our sovereignty, the right to decide for ourselves what shall constitute our means of defense.

Article X bound the members of the League to preserve, against foreign aggression, the territorial integrity, and present political independence, of all States members of the League, and authorized the Executive Council to determine in what manner the obligation must be fulfilled. If, it was said, the territorial integrity of the British Empire is attacked, the United States must come to the rescue. We have no choice, for it will not be the people of the United States, nor the Congress of the United States, that is to decide, but the Executive Council, by the vote of eight foreign powers to one American. Should trouble arise on our continent, should our Republic be threatened by Mexico and her allies, are we to decide what is to be done? Far from it. This Executive Council of foreigners will take jurisdiction and decide what shall be done in this purely American affair. Where then is the Monroe Doctrine?

Articles XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XVI may be taken together, it was said. They provide that disputes shall be submitted to arbitration, that the parties shall abide by the decision, that in event of refusal the Council shall propose the steps "which can best be taken to give effect thereto"; that no party shall go to war with any other party that complies with the recommendations, that if it does the "Council shall propose measures necessary to give effect to the recommendations," and that in case of a refusal to arbitrate the offending party shall "be deemed to have committed an act of war" against all other members of the League, and the Council shall decide what naval and military force each member of the League shall contribute to coerce the refractory party. Does this mean, it was asked, that in a Magdalena Bay affair we must not only submit our case to this foreign tribunal, but abide by the decision? Where then is the Monroe Doctrine? Does it mean if we do not abide by the decision we must meet a world in arms?

Article XVIII gives to the League supervision of the trade in arms with countries which need warlike material for defense.

Our Constitution gives to Congress sole power to regulate trade with foreign countries. Article XIX would bind us to take part in the guardianship of small nations, and would inevitably force us to send ships and troops to Syria, Armenia, Africa.

There were Democratic Senators who thought the League Constitution was the greatest agency for world peace ever devised by man; was full of wise provisions; was a triumph for the President; was a great step forward in the advance of civilized nations; was a thing that would appeal to every civilized nation, and did not in the least impair the Monroe Doctrine. It was a world Monroe Doctrine with all the power of the League behind it; it was the only means by which the peace of the world could be maintained.

Despite the request of the President, discussion of the Constitution of the League was opened in the Senate on February 19. Our participation in such a league, its opponents insisted, would be a surrender of our sovereignty, a violation of our Constitution, an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine, and a disregard of Washington's advice to keep clear of permanent alliances. The Constitution of the League was described as "the greatest triumph for English diplomacy in three centuries of English diplomatic life." It had been lifted almost bodily from the Constitution proposed by General Smuts in January, and when the members of the League "finally settle down to business England will have one vote, Canada one vote, New Zealand one vote, Australia one vote, and South Africa one vote, while the American nation, created by our fathers and preserved through the centuries by the blood and sacrifice of our forebears, will have one vote. In both the Executive Council and the delegated body the same proportion obtains, and these two bodies direct, dominate, and mark out the policy of this entire program, whatever it is to be, under the League."

Great Britain was to surrender nothing. We, on the other hand, "have surrendered the traditional foreign policy of this country, which has been established for 100 years, and we have gone behind these powers and placed at their disposal our

finances, our man-power, and our full capacity to guarantee the integrity of their possessions all over the globe. Is it an even balance between these great powers and the United States?"

Mr. Taft had long been a contributor to the editorial page of the Philadelphia *Ledger*. In a recent editorial he had declared the Monroe Doctrine safe under the Constitution of the League of Nations, and for this he was now called to account by Senator Borah in an open letter:

In a statement made to the press, and which was incorporated in the *Congressional Record*, you are quoted as saying that the proposed constitution of the league of nations saves the Monroe Doctrine. On the other hand, Mr. Aranha, Brazilian diplomat, and late ambassador at The Hague, declares: "The Monroe Doctrine, as I see it, is destroyed by the new League. There is no longer any reason why the United States should attempt to protect the republics of the new world." A dispatch to the New York *Sun* from Paris states that the belief in France is that the League destroys the Monroe Doctrine. Leading journals in England have declared to the same effect. I have conversed with a number of lawyers in this country, most of whom agree that the League and the Monroe Doctrine cannot exist together, and all with whom I have spoken agree that the matter is left in great doubt. Leading journals in this country take opposite views of the question. The proposition which I submit to you is, why had so great a matter been left in doubt when three lines added to the constitution excepting this important policy of ours from the jurisdiction of the League, will place the whole subject beyond contention or cavil?

If the advocates of the League in the United States want to preserve the Monroe Doctrine will they offer any objection to writing in this proposed constitution an exception or reservation clause which will preserve it beyond question? If they are not willing to make the exception clear are we not entitled to presume that they are willing to see the Monroe Doctrine sacrificed? If England, Japan, France and Italy do not want to destroy the Monroe Doctrine they will readily consent to the reservation. If they do not consent it will be sufficient proof to all that they wish to destroy it and believe that this League constitution accomplishes that fact—a sufficient justification to warrant the American people in insisting upon unmistakable language to preserve it.

Mr. Taft was then reminded that the arbitration convention of The Hague conference of 1907 expressly reserved the Monroe Doctrine, and he was asked:

"Will you and other friends and advocates of the League endorse an exception or reservation clause to be attached to this proposed constitution in the language of the reservation attached to The Hague convention of 1907?"²

Mr. Taft was traveling over the country, speaking in city after city in the interest of the League to Enforce Peace, and urging support to the President in his efforts to secure a League of Nations, was then on the Pacific Coast, and at Sacramento made reply:

In reference to Senator Borah's question whether I would recommend an amendment to the covenant of Paris specifically reserving from its construction any limitation of the power of the United States to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, I have to say I believe the whole spirit and essence of the covenant is not only to preserve the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, but also to extend it to the world, and to give it the sanction, not of the United States alone, but also of the whole League of Nations. This is particularly and specifically shown in Article 10 of the covenant.

If it be said that Article 10 does not prevent a foreign nation from buying its way into territorial ownership and political power in the Western Hemisphere, without the consent of the United States and other American powers, then I doubt not that before the covenant is signed and embodied in the treaty of peace, the concert of nations at Paris will consent to have such a provision inserted. Of course, I would favor this; but, personally, I am confident that without this specific provision, the League would, under the covenant as it is, maintain the justice and wisdom of the whole Monroe Doctrine."

²"Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state, nor shall anything contained in the said conventions be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions."

Senator Reed opposed the League because the control of it would inevitably be in the hands of European and Asiatic nations; because the British Empire would probably control the League; because, if at any time Great Britain lost control, the German powers would be likely to succeed to her position of dominance; because in the background was the menace of world Bolshevism, whose "fangs are plainly visible in the constitution of the League"; and because whoever controls the League will control the world. He was opposed because the League abrogated the Monroe Doctrine, forced us to surrender a part of our sovereignty, would involve us in conflicts with the world, compelled us to contribute to an international force which might be used against us, required us to submit to a tribunal, the majority of which would be foreigners, matters vital to the United States. Among such were the right of aliens to enter the United States, the slaughter of American citizens along the Mexican border, the killing of Americans on the high seas, seizure and search of American vessels, imprisonment of American seamen, fortification of the Panama Canal, and the seizure of the Canal. These, and a thousand other vital questions, could be forced, by any antagonist, to a decision by the Executive Council composed of eight foreigners and one American. Even American labor, the best paid, best treated, highest class of labor in the world, was threatened, for the moment the League undertook to exercise jurisdiction over the labor of other countries, American labor would be dragged down from its place of vantage to the low level of the pauper labor of Europe.

No Senator approving the League had replied when, on Monday, February 24, the President landed in Boston, made a short speech in response to the hearty welcome given him, and hurried on to Washington.

Speaking of our duty to become a member of the League of Nations the President asked if at this juncture America were to fail the world what would become of it? No disrespect to any other great people was meant when he said, "America is the hope of the world," and if she does not justify that hope

the result is unthinkable. All nations would again become hostile camps, and the men at the Peace Conference would go home knowing they had failed, for they were bidden to do something else than sign a peace treaty. If our delegates signed the treaty of peace, though it were the best treaty that could possibly be had, and then went home, they would know that they had left on the historic table at Versailles nothing but a modern scrap of paper, with no nations united behind it, no great forces combined to make it good, no assurance given to the down-trodden people of the world that they should be safe. "Any man who thinks that America will take part in giving the world any such rebuff as that does not know America. I invite him to test the sentiments of the nation. We set this up to make men free, and we did not confine our conception and purpose to America, and now we will make men free." If America did not do this she would have "to keep her power for those narrow, selfish, provincial purposes which seem so dear to some minds that have no sweep beyond the nearest horizon."

"Think," said the President, "of the picture, think of the utter blackness that would fall on the world. America has failed! America made a little essay at generosity and then withdrew. America said, 'We are your friends,' but it was only for to-day, not for to-morrow. America said, 'Here is our power to vindicate right,' and then the next day said, 'Let right take care of itself, and we will take care of ourselves.' America said, 'We set up a light to lead men along the path of liberty, but we have lowered it; it is intended only to light our own path.' We set up a great ideal of liberty, and then we said, 'Liberty is a thing that you must win for yourself. Don't call on me.' And think of the world we would leave," the President continued. "Do you realize how many new nations are to be set up in the presence of old and powerful nations, and left, if left by us, without a friend? Are you going to set up Poland and leave her surrounded by enemies? Do you know how many enemies would pounce on the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs if the world is not behind them? You poured out your money to

help succor the Armenians, now set your strength so that they shall never suffer again. The peace of the world," the President said, "could not endure for a generation unless guaranteed by the united forces of the civilized world."

When he spoke of the nations of the world he did not mean the governments of the world; he meant the peoples who constituted the nations of the world. They were "in the saddle," they were going to see to it that if their present governments did not do their wills, some other government must, and the present governments knew it.

No official statement of what was said at the Conference with the foreign relations committees of the two branches of Congress was made public. But some intimations of the President's views found their way to the reporters. It was said, the President believed it would be very difficult to amend the Constitution of the League because fourteen nations had approved it; that nothing in the document called for an abandonment of the Monroe Doctrine; that whether the United States should, or should not, send troops to Europe if occasion arose would be for Congress to decide; that he believed the people would feel that our country should at least take a prominent part in policing Armenia until conditions there were improved, and that if we did not ratify the League there would be the deepest sorrow throughout the world, and serious consequences might arise in the future.

Debate on the Constitution was now resumed in the Senate and speeches were made in its defense. Fear that the League would be controlled by Asiatic despots, or Great Britain, or Germany, or the Bolsheviki, were derided as groundless. In the Executive Council were nine powers, five of whom were permanent members. No one of them was controlled by a monarch or a despot. France was a republic. In Great Britain the King had no more political power than the King painted on a playing card. And the same was true of Italy. Great Britain was, in fact, a great democracy. The people of Japan venerated the Mikado, but they forced him to change his min-

isters as often as they changed their political views. The age of despotic government, the age of autocrats, was gone.

The alternative before us, it was said, is war and preparations for war, or a League of Nations. Which shall it be? What if we have no League of Nations? Senators who object to this League would object to any League. They magnify the sacrifices the United States would make in joining the proposed League, as if our country was giving up everything, and receiving no benefits in return. They attack the League as a form of internationalism. The Senators are too late. It has come, and we must choose between an internationalism of justice, peace, and mutual support, or an internationalism of the Socialist, the Anarchist, the Bolshevik.

The purpose of the League, said its defenders, is to maintain international peace. To this end Article XII provides that members of the League will, in no case, resort to war without submitting the matter in dispute to arbitration, or to inquiry by the Executive Council of nine nations, nor even then until three months after the award, or recommendation, which must be made within six months. This affords a cooling off time of nine months, a great safeguard for peace. Another covenant provides that no member will ever resort to war against a member which accepts the award or recommendation. It is unthinkable that any member will violate this covenant, and thus war between members of the League is made as nearly impossible as it can be. Reduction of armament is required. If this is carried out in good faith it will not only reduce the dangers of war, but lessen the burdens of government in every country in the world.

We have been told that if we join the League we abandon the Monroe Doctrine. That Doctrine, they held, was announced when every country had to look out for itself; but the League includes the very purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, prevention of aggression by nations on each other. We are told that the League is one of those entangling alliances against which Washington warned us. Alliances in Washington's

day were to enable nations through the balance of power to maintain their rival interests. Alliances were for the very purposes of waging war. The League of Nations is a great covenant of the democracies of the world for the purpose of maintaining peace.

We are told that if we enter the League, Japan could compel us to arbitrate the immigration question, and if she won, compel us to admit her people. If Japan undertook to raise that question she could not win, because it is one we would not arbitrate. If she carried it to the Executive Council she would be opposed by Great Britain representing Canada, which is even more determined against Asiatic immigration than is the United States.

We are told that if we enter the League the requirement to limit armament will impair the sovereignty of the United States and interfere with the power of Congress. One hundred years ago the United States and Great Britain agreed to limit naval armament on the Great Lakes. Yet the Senate approved that agreement and no voice has ever been raised against it, nor has the sovereignty of the United States suffered any impairment.³

Senator Knox opposed the League. He found fault with the looseness of expression which characterized the document throughout, and made precise criticism impossible, and cited articles to prove his contention. He found fault with the use of the word "league." It was a misnomer. A league meant a confederation, and a confederation implied a right "in the several parties to withdraw at will." But there was no right of secession "within the four corners" of this covenant. Once in the union, there we must remain, no matter how onerous the burdens, no matter how distasteful to our people, until we could persuade the Executive Council to let us depart in peace, or until the League fell to pieces, or until we fought our way out against Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and all the lesser States they were able to persuade to join the League.

* Speech of Senator Hitchcock of Nebraska.

The real governing body of the League, the Senator held, was the Executive Council. Yet the document contained not a word regarding such essential matters as what shall be the number of representatives from each state, how the number shall be fixed, how the council shall be organized and vote, what shall be the tenure, compensation, manner of appointment and removal of the members of this body which has power to determine whether or not the people of the United States shall go to war, and to what extent they shall participate therein. Nor were rules or regulations laid down for the guidance of this world governing body. The covenant preamble did, indeed, provide that international peace and security were to be promoted "by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law, as the actual rule of conduct among governments." But this merely increased the difficulty, "for there is no universally recognized body of international law, and no provision is made in the instrument for even an attempt to secure one." In short, the Senator held that the Executive Council was "legislature, court, and, in large part, executive all in one;" that a body clothed with such powers was an anachronism; that it belonged "not to the enlightened age of the twentieth century, but to the days of the Medes and Persians"; and that "a union more abhorrent to our traditions, to our free institutions, to the trend of all civilized government, could not be devised."

By Article X the parties bound themselves to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of all league members. It was to be noted, the Senator said, "that this guarantee runs not alone to existing territory of nations, but to any territorial extent to which they may hereafter attain." By Article XII, the parties were bound not to resort to war against any high contracting party, over any dispute whatever, until the matter had been submitted to arbitration, or to inquiry by the Council. This, said Mr. Knox, "does not prevent, but merely delays war by the high contracting parties."

By Article XV the parties must submit to the Council any

dispute not subject to arbitration, and not go to war with any party which complies with any recommendation unanimously made by the Council. "Seemingly," said the Senator, "they may go to war over a recommendation which is not unanimously agreed to by all members of the Council, except the parties in dispute." By Article XVI the parties were pledged to support one another in financial and economic measures taken under the provisions of the article. "What our contributions will be under this," said Mr. Knox, "how much our citizens must be ground down by taxes to take care of wild and extravagant expenditures which we did not and would not originate, initiate, and over which we would have no control, only an all-wise Providence can foresee."

Are the mandatory states, he asked, to be chosen by the high contracting parties, by the members of the League, by the body of delegates, or by the Executive Council? But no matter who picked the mandatory, it was clear that some other power than ourselves would determine whether, and when our boys, and how many should be sent to the arid regions of Armenia, to the sleeping death region of Central Africa, to the wilderness of Southwest Africa, or to the inhospitable South Pacific Isles. And when they got there somebody else than ourselves would determine how long they should remain, and by what laws they should govern the people. The Senator claimed that there were no provisions in the covenant which abolished war and made it hereafter impossible; that it struck down most vital provisions in our Constitution, that it was destructive of our sovereignty, and threatened our national independence and our national life.

In the closing hours of the session, Senator Lodge offered a resolution setting forth that it was the sense of the Senate that the constitution of the League of Nations in its present form should not be accepted, and calling for the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace. It bore the signatures of thirty-seven Republican Senators who would sit in the next Congress, was intended as a protest to be read

into the minutes, and no final action was expected. Both the resolution and the names were entered on the journal, and two more signatures were subsequently obtained.⁴

Later in the day the Sixty-fifth Congress adjourned *sine die* leaving, stranded in the Senate, many bills of great public importance. Their passage had been prevented by a Republican filibuster against a general deficiency bill, carrying an appropriation of \$750,000,000 for the railroads, in the hope of forcing a special session of the Sixty-sixth Congress, and preventing the return of the President to France. The President met the issue squarely, held to his plans, and, before leaving Washington for a second trip to Paris, made a statement.

A group of men in the Senate have deliberately chosen to embarrass the administration of the government, to imperil the financial interest of the railway system of the country, and to make arbitrary use of powers intended to be employed in the interests of the people. It is plainly my present duty to attend the Peace Conference at Paris. It is also my duty to be in close contact with the public business during a session of the Congress. I must make

*"WHEREAS, Under the constitution it is a function of the Senate to advise and consent to or dissent from the ratification of any treaty of the United States, and no such treaty can become operative without the consent of the Senate expressed by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Senators present; and

"Whereas, Owing to the victory of the arms of the United States and of the nations with whom it is associated a Peace Conference was convened and is now in session in Paris for the purpose of settling the terms of peace; and

"Whereas, A committee of the conference has proposed a constitution for a League of Nations and the proposal is now before the Peace Conference for its consideration; now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the Senate of the United States in the discharge of its constitutional duty of advice in regard to treaties, That it is the sense of the Senate that while it is their sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament, the constitution of the League of Nations in the form now proposed to the Peace Conference should not be accepted by the United States; and be it

"Resolved further, That it is the sense of the Senate that the negotiations on the part of the United States should immediately be directed to the utmost expedition of the urgent business of negotiating peace terms with Germany satisfactory to the United States and the nations with whom the United States is associated in the war against the German Government, and that the proposal for a League of Nations to insure the permanent peace of the world should be taken up for careful and serious consideration."

my choice between these two duties, and I confidently hope that the people of the country will think I am making the right choice. It is not in the interest of public affairs that I should call the Congress in special session while it is impossible for me to be in Washington, because of more pressing duty elsewhere, to coöperate with the two houses. I take it for granted that the men who have obstructed, and prevented, the passage of necessary legislation have taken all this into consideration, and are willing to assume the responsibility of the impaired efficiency of the government, and the embarrassed finances of the country during the time of my enforced absence.

No sooner had Congress adjourned than the President set off for New York, and on the evening of March 4 both he and Mr. Taft spoke in defense of the League from the same platform in that city. Just before the President rose to speak the band played, "We Won't Come Back Till It's Over Over There." "I accept," said he, "the intimation of the air just played. I will not come back 'till it's over over there.'" One of the first things he should tell the people over there was, "that an overwhelming majority of the American people" was in favor of the League of Nations. "I know that," he said, "to be true. I have had unmistakable intimations of it from all parts of the country." He was happy to be associated with Mr. Taft in this cause. Such association meant that the League of Nations was not a party issue. No party had "a right to appropriate this issue, and no party will, in the long run, dare to oppose it." The League had not arisen in the Council of Statesmen. It had come from the need, and the aspiration, and the self-assertion, of great bodies of men who meant to be free. He could explain some of the criticism leveled against it, only by supposing "that the men who uttered the criticism have never felt the great pulse of the heart of the world." He was amazed, not alarmed, but amazed, that there should be in some quarters such ignorance of the state of the world. "These gentlemen do not know what the mind of men is just now. Everybody else does." He did not know where they had been closeted; by what influences they had been

blinded; but did know they had been separated from the general currents of the thoughts of mankind, and wished "to utter this solemn warning, not in way of threat, for the forces of the world do not threaten, they operate. The great tides of this world do not give notice that they are going to rise and run; they rise in their majesty and overwhelm might, and those who stand in the way are overwhelmed." Unrest in Europe did not spring from merely economic causes. The peoples saw that their governments had never been able to defend them from aggressions, that the modern Cabinet had neither the foresight nor the prudence to stop war, and they said there must be some fundamental cause for this, and found it "to be that nations have stood singly, or in little groups jealous against each other," and that "if there is right in the world, if there is justice in the world, there is no reason why nations should be divided in the support of justice." Nations were meant to make the men and women and children in them secure and happy and prosperous, and no nation had "a right to set up its special interests against the interests and benefits of mankind, least of all this great nation which we love."

There was another thing the critics of this covenant had not observed. They had not "observed the temper of those splendid boys in khaki" that they sent across the seas. When we entered the war we went in on the "basis of declarations" made by him because he "believed them to be an interpretation of the purpose and thought of the people of the United States."

And those boys went over there with the feeling that they were sacredly bound to the realization of those ideals; that they were not only going over there to beat Germany; that they were not going over there merely with resentment in their hearts against a particular outlaw nation, but that they were crossing those three thousand miles of sea in order to show to Europe that the United States, when it became necessary, would go anywhere where the rights of mankind were threatened.

They would not sit still in the trenches. They would not be restrained by the prudence of experienced continental commanders. They thought they had come over there to do a particular thing,

and they were going to do it and do it at once. And just as soon as that rush of spirit as well as rush of body came in contact with the lines of the enemy, they began to break, and they continued to break until the end. They continued to break, my fellow citizens, not merely because of the physical force of those lusty youngsters, but because of the irresistible spiritual force of the armies of the United States. It was that they felt. It was that that awed them. It was that that made them feel, if these youngsters ever got a foothold, they could never be dislodged, and therefore every foot of ground that they won was permanently won for the liberty of mankind.

And do you suppose that having felt that crusading spirit of these youngsters, who went over there not to glorify America, but to serve their fellowmen, I am going to permit myself for one moment to slacken in my effort to be worthy of them and their cause? What I said at the opening I said with a deeper meaning that perhaps you have caught. I do mean not to come back until it's over over there, and it must not be over until the nations of the world are assured of the permanency of peace.

Not a man at the Conference, the President continued, but felt that he could not "in conscience return to his people from Paris" unless he had done his utmost to do something more than put his name to a treaty of peace. Every one of them knew that such a treaty would be inoperative without the constant support of a great organization such as would be supplied by the League of Nations, and when the treaty of peace came back gentlemen on this side of the water would find "the covenant not only in it, but so many threads of the treaty tied to the covenant" that they could not "dissect the covenant from the treaty without destroying the whole vital structure." The peace would "not be vital without the League of Nations, and no man is going to bring back a cadaver with him."

Washington, in his Farewell Address to his countrymen, published in a Philadelphia newspaper in September, 1796, said: "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. * * * Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, en-

tangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor or caprice? It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any proportion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagement." The Treaty of Alliance made with France in 1778 was then in force. The words "entangling alliances" were not used by Washington, but by Jefferson in his first inaugural speech, March 4, 1801. Stating what he deemed "the essential principles of our government, and consequently those which ought to shape its administration," Jefferson named some sixteen. One of them was "peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none." Mr. Taft had said that Washington's warning was against "offensive and defensive alliances with one nation against another," and that "if Washington lived to-day he would be one of the most earnest and pressing sponsors for the covenant." Referring to this remark the President said Mr. Taft "put the exactly right interpretation upon what Washington said. * * * and the thing he longed for was just what we are now about to supply; an arrangement which will disentangle all the alliances in the world." Nothing entangled, hampered, bound a nation save entrance "into a combination with some other nation against the other nations of the world, and this great disentanglement of all alliances is now to be accomplished by this covenant, because one of the covenants is that no nation shall enter into any relationship with another nation inconsistent with the covenants of the League of Nations."

The President had declared, in the course of his speech, that when the treaty of peace came back gentlemen on this side of the water would find the covenant not only in the treaty, but so interwoven that the two could not be parted. While, however, the President was still on the sea, reports from Paris set forth that the preliminary treaty would be presented to the German commission about March 20th, and that the

League of Nations would not be a part of it. All sorts of meanings were put on those reports by opponents of the League. Some did not believe them. Others thought that reference was made to the preliminary, and not to the final treaty. Still others believed that the warning given by the thirty-nine Senators had opened the eyes of the European delegates and that they would heed it. But, no sooner had the President reached Paris, than his private Secretary at Washington cabled, asking "if there was any truth in these reports," and announced that he was "in receipt of a cable from the President stating that the Plenary Council has positively decided that the League of Nations is to be part of the peace treaty; that there is absolutely no truth in any report to the contrary." Several Senators thereupon declared that if the President submitted the proposed league plan so linked with any treaty that it could not be separated, they would vote against both. They would not be intimidated by attempts at coercion.

M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his weekly statement to representatives of foreign newspapers, explained that the treaty, to be submitted to the Germans in the course of ten days, was the preliminary treaty; that it would put an end to the state of war, but would not be the final treaty; and that it could not contain the League of Nations. As yet the plan was a mere scheme and unfinished. Views of neutral nations which had been invited to the Conferences, and amendments which might be offered could not be considered before the preliminary treaty was signed. A declaration of the underlying principles of the League might be inserted, but nothing more.

Nevertheless, reports from Paris continued to contain assurances that the President had not changed his stand, that the Constitution of the League would at least be an appendix to the preliminary treaty in order that Germany might sign the treaty, and yet not become a member of the League, and that the documents would be ready before the end of March. Speaking for the British delegation, Lord Cecil said the covenant

would be part of the treaty. The preliminary treaty would "settle the broad principles of the pacification of the world." Of such a treaty the Covenant should be a part. Indeed, he doubted if it would "be possible to proceed to the terms of the final treaty without the covenant in the preliminary one." Putting it in would not delay the treaty. Aside from those who wanted no league at all, and those who demanded a humanly impossible perfect league, there were few critics of the covenant as it stood. The Monroe Doctrine was no obstacle. If it meant no interference in American affairs, by Europe, without the consent of the United States, then the covenant strengthened that Doctrine because the League could act only through its own organs, the Council, and the body of delegates; because the United States would always be a member of each; and because, as no international action could be taken without unanimous consent, they could do nothing in America to which the United States was opposed.

Such neutral nations as had accepted the invitation to attend the Conference now presented their amendments, said to be some thirty in number, and on Saturday, March 22, the Peace Conference met and began the work of revising and amending. Among the amendments reported to have been presented was one by Japan providing for just racial treatment, one by Switzerland concerning sovereignty, four drafted by Mr. Taft with the knowledge and encouragement of the President, and one concerning the Monroe Doctrine drawn by President Wilson. That offered by Japan was not pressed for it met with strong opposition. Australia, said Mr. Hughes, Premier of that Commonwealth, to the representatives of the Associated Press, cannot accept this proposal. It strikes at the very root of the policy we have so long maintained, a policy vital to our existence and guarded as zealously as America has guarded her Monroe Doctrine. If the League may compel a State to amend its immigration, naturalization, and franchise laws, there remains to that State but the shadow of sovereignty. The substance is gone. No free people could submit

to dictation in such matters. Internal problems must remain under the control of each nation. We are told, by advocates of this amendment, that nothing more is desired than the mere recognition of the principle; that no action is contemplated. Either the principle means something, or nothing. If nothing, then why insert it? If something, then this something will not be achieved by mere words, by stopping short of action. The people of Australia, he said, felt keenly on this matter; they felt as did those of California who, he believed, would be as much opposed to the amendment as were the people of Australia.

The Swiss amendment forbade the League to interfere with the internal affairs of any of its members, and declared that the covenant should not be interpreted to contain anything contrary to the sovereignty of States, save in so far as any State might consent. Mr. Taft would have the Monroe Doctrine safeguarded; a definite statement of the right of any State in the League to control matters solely within its domestic jurisdiction; a definite statement that any action taken by the Executive Council of the League must be determined by unanimous vote; and a definite statement of the right of a member of the League to withdraw; a definite term for the existence of the League, and for the fulfillment of the obligation to restrict armament within the limits required.

March 27 the Covenant, as revised and amended, was sent to a Drafting Committee whose duty it was to change the wording wherever necessary, and report to the Commission as soon as possible. Then it was announced that the amendments concerning the Monroe Doctrine, and that providing for racial equality, were not to be found in the Covenant, but among those embodied was one requiring any State which wished to withdraw from the League to give notice of its intent two years before leaving, and another opening all offices of the League to women as well as to men.

What was sometimes called the "Super-Council," the "Big Four," composed of President Wilson and the Premiers of

Great Britain, France and Italy, had long been busy drafting the treaty of peace. Again and again it had been asserted that their work had been delayed by the conferences on the covenant of the League of Nations. To these critics the President now made answer and said:

In view of the very surprising impression which seems to exist in some quarters that it is the discussions of the commission on the League of Nations that are delaying the final formulation of peace, I am very glad to take the opportunity of reporting that the conclusions of this commission were the first to be laid before the plenary conference.

They were reported on February 14, and the world has had a full month in which to discuss every feature of the draft covenant then submitted.

During the last few days the commission has been engaged in an effort to take advantage of the criticisms which the publication of the covenant has fortunately drawn out. A committee of the commission has also had the advantage of a conference with representatives of the neutral states, who are evidencing a very deep interest, and a practically unanimous desire to align themselves with the League.

The revised covenant is now practically finished. It is in the hands of a committee for the final process of drafting, and will almost immediately be presented, a second time, to the public.

The conferences of the commission have invariably been held at times when they could not interfere with the consultation of those who have undertaken to formulate the general conclusions of the conference with regard to the many other complicated problems of peace. So that the members of the commission congratulate themselves on the fact that no part of their conferences has ever interposed any form of delay.

Since the end of the session of Congress discussion of the draft covenant had become country wide. Senators, and members of the House, had appeared before Chambers of Commerce, before Clubs, social and political, before public meetings, and in joint debates. "Straw votes" had been taken in many cities, and the voters sometimes asked for the reasons which prompted them to vote as they did. Some who declined to vote declared

they did not feel competent to give an opinion. Those who approved the covenant gave various reasons. The President ought to be upheld in his endeavor to secure a lasting peace; his acts in the past justified confidence in his present plan; any step toward lessening the chances of future wars was in the right direction; any League of Nations without the United States was doomed to failure; the Monroe Doctrine was outgrown; internationalism was a good thing, and the League was a long step toward it. Such as opposed the covenant thought that the United States should mind its own business; that what it needed was not internationalism, but strong nationalism; that the plan was of British origin; that the President should have consulted the Senate and appointed Senators on the Peace Commission; that any plan for policing the world would draw the United States into conflict with other world powers, and that the covenant had all the defects pointed out by men qualified to criticize.

At Boston, there was a debate between Senator Lodge and President Lowell of Harvard University. The Senator began by saying, that he had been accused of being against any League of Nations. He was not. Far from it. He was anxious to have the nations, the free nations of the world united in a League, but united to all that was possible to bring about disarmament. Everybody desired the security of the peace of the world. He was not going to argue such a question as that. He should no more think of arguing that peace was better than war than he should think of insulting the intelligence of his hearers by arguing that virtue was better than vice. The real question was, will the covenant, as drafted, secure the peace of the world, is it just and fair to the United States of America?

There were, Mr. Lodge said, four drafts presented to the Conference; one by Italy, one by France, one by the United States and one by Great Britain. The British draft was the one chosen. His hearers would find, if they compared the covenant with the plan put forth by General Smuts in January, that some paragraphs were taken from his plan with but slight

changes. The other drafts had not been discussed although, he said, "We are living in an era of open covenants openly arrived at." To him, the draft seemed to have been loosely and obscurely drawn. This was of great importance because it was necessary that there should be as few differences of opinion as to the meaning of the articles of the covenant as human ingenuity could provide against. But those who were for the covenant as drafted, and those who were against it, differed about the meaning of nearly every article, and those who were for it differed among themselves. "Mr. Taft said on the 7th of March, 'Undoubtedly the covenant needs revision. It is not symmetrically arranged, its meaning has to be dug out, and the language is ponderous and in diplomatic patois!'" To this Mr. Lodge heartily agreed.

Lately, the phrase, "criticism must be constructive not destructive," had become current. His first constructive criticism, therefore, was "that this League ought to be redrafted and put in language that everybody can understand." His second had to do with the Executive Council. That body was given authority to recommend, or advise, or propose measures, but the covenant often failed to say by what vote the Council should do so. Sometimes it must be by a two-thirds vote; in one case the vote must be unanimous, but in most cases it was not stated. He, therefore, would have a provision inserted that, "where not otherwise stated the decision of the Executive Council shall be by a majority vote." The Senator's third constructive criticism was "a larger reservation of the Monroe Doctrine"; his fourth, the exclusion of "international questions of the character of immigration, and the tariff, from the jurisdiction of the League," and his fifth, in the words of Mr. Taft, that "the covenant should also be made more definite as to when its obligations may be terminated."

President Lowell began his reply by stating what he considered "the minimum essentials of an effective League of Nations to prevent war." They were, compulsory arbitration, no appeal to arms after "an award which is universally believed

to be right and just"; any nation going to war before arbitration to be "regarded as a criminal against mankind, and treated instantly as an outlaw, and common enemy by the rest of the world"; this penalty not to be "decreed by a council of the League," but to apply "automatically" not only to disputes between members of the League, but also to nations not members of the League, "because war, like fire, tends to spread." He would have two Councils, one, "large and comprehensive for the discussion of general problems," and one, smaller, "to work out in detail the recommendations to be submitted to the members of the League for action, modifications, or rejection."

The present covenant President Lowell found defective in drafting. In places it was so obscure that its meaning was often inaccurately expressed, and sometimes doubtful. It was easily misunderstood, and had been widely misunderstood. Another article, therefore, should be added, setting forth that "the obligations assumed by the members of the League are only those which they agree to assume by this covenant, and not others which they do not agree to assume," and that "the powers possessed by the League are those, and only those, conferred upon them by this covenant."

Mr. Lowell then answered at length the many objections made to the covenant; that we should be ruled by a body in which we should have but one vote in nine; that Great Britain would have six to our one; that our entrance into the League would be an abandonment of the policy laid down in Washington's Farewell Address; that there was no provision for withdrawal from the League; that Asiatic immigration and the tariff might become subjects of dispute with some other nation; that the Monroe Doctrine was not safeguarded; and finally, that some of its provisions were contrary to the Constitution of the United States. The United States, he believed, ought to ask "for a clause in the covenant that no foreign power shall hereafter acquire by conquest, purchase, or in any other way, any possession on the American continents, or the islands adjacent thereto." The covenant was imperfect and poorly drawn,

but it was framed on the right lines. The substance of the plan, and the principles on which it was founded were correct, and should be accepted and improved.

Mr. Charles E. Hughes, Republican candidate for President in 1916, in a speech before the Union League Club at New York, proposed seven amendments to the Covenant. He would have an explicit provision for unanimity in decision; such limitation of the field of the League's inquiries as should leave no doubt that the internal concerns of States, as immigration, or tariff laws, are not included; no foreign power hereafter acquired by conquest, purchase, or in any other way, any possessions on the American continents, or the islands adjacent thereto; settlement of purely American questions remitted primarily to the American nations, and no European nation intervene unless American nations invited them so to do. He would have the guaranty of Article X left out. He would have no member of the League made a mandatory without its consent, and no European, or Asiatic power, a mandatory over an American people; and he would have any member of the League free to withdraw whenever it pleased, after due notice.

Mr. Elihu Root, having been invited by the Chairman of the Republican National Committee to "present his views upon this vital subject," the proposed covenant for a League of Nations, offered six amendments.

Determined to vigorously oppose the covenant as drafted, a number of men of prominence formed a League for the Preservation of American Independence. They insisted that the treaty of peace should at once be concluded. "In the interest of world peace" they were opposed to the covenant "in its present form," because it legalized "war in seven cases," and made it "compulsory in three"; because, by binding us to protect distant nations from aggression, it might, in case of trouble between two members of the League, force us to default in our pledge, or again send our boys to fight overseas; because, by forcing us to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, it bound us to submit to the decision of an international council

should a foreign nation acquire Mexico, or Cuba, or threaten our Pacific coast by securing a naval base at Matagorda Bay; because it provided for "such a delegation of power to an international council as is inconsistent with the sovereignty of the United States;" and because this delegation of power might force us to fight without the right to decide on which side we should fight. The covenant gave the League power to decide questions concerning American labor; gave the League such authority over commercial intercourse as might prevent us protecting ourselves against undesirable immigrants, and the importation of foreign labor; made no provision for such publicity as would destroy secret diplomacy; and contained no specific recognition of the right of a member to withdraw at pleasure. A League based on a constitution open to such objections was typical of the permanent and entangling alliances "against which Washington and Jefferson pronounced their solemn warnings." If the covenant were intended to mean what fair interpretation found in it, then its "ambiguity, vagueness, and uncertainty are such as to require its thorough reconstruction or prompt rejection."

Friends of the covenant formed The League of Free Nations Association. They held that a League of Nations was "absolutely indispensable to the avoidance of future wars on a large scale," was indispensable to a quick return to normal conditions, and that President Wilson's fourteen points formed a proper basis for such a league, and the honor of the Nation was pledged to uphold these points. The covenant was not perfect, but was a beginning of such promise that its rejection was not warranted under any circumstances whatever, and its rejection by the Senate would turn the world towards anarchy. Everybody holding this belief was asked to give support. Writers and students were urged "to contribute articles, poems, stories supporting and explaining the League idea." "Posters and cartoons" were needed. But money was needed "first and last."

Criticism had not been lost on the framers of the League.

When at last, on April 27, the revised Covenant was given to the World it appeared that many, and important, changes had been made, and most of those suggested by Mr. Taft and Mr. Hughes adopted. The phraseology had been improved, and the meaning of many sections made clearer; there was an "annex" in which were named the thirty-three powers that were to be "the original members of the League of Nations," and the thirteen neutral powers to be invited to accede to the covenant; there was provision for the withdrawal of any member after two years' notice; there was a requirement that, unless otherwise expressly stated, all "decisions at any meeting of the Assembly, or of the Council, shall require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meeting." The words "Executive Council" and "body of delegates" were changed to "Council" and "Assembly." Geneva was chosen as the seat of the League, and all positions under the League were opened to women equally with men. Any League member violating the Covenant might be evicted by the unanimous vote of the other members of the League represented on the Council; no member of the League was to be made a mandatory against its will; and all members were pledged to "encourage and promote the establishment" of National Red Cross organizations. Amendment could be made to the covenant by the Council, and by a majority, instead of three-fourths, of the members of the Assembly. The Monroe Doctrine was safeguarded by an Article which reads, "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration, or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." In another article are the words, "if the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which, by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement." These words were understood to remove from the jurisdiction of the League such domestic ques-

tions as Japanese immigration. Plans for the reduction of armament must first be approved by the Governments concerned before going into effect, and were made subject to revision, "at least every ten years."

April 28, at a plenary session of the Peace Conference, on motion of President Wilson, the Covenant, as revised, was unanimously adopted. That it had been greatly improved and many of the old objections satisfied was generally admitted. The amendments inserted in the text, in spite of the President's determination that none should be made, have, it was said, improved the document so far as American interests are concerned. Revision has materially improved it both in diction and arrangement. Many of the objections to the original have wholly, or in part, been removed. An honest endeavor has been made to meet every reasonable objection raised by the opponents of the old draft. The Monroe Doctrine is safe. A nation once in may get out without a fight. The United States is in no danger of becoming involved in a war without her consent. Ambiguities have been cleared up, and provisions that seemed to open the way to misunderstandings have been made clear. It is an attempt to get the nations of the World together in a gentlemen's agreement to do just what all honest nations wish to see done. Defects there are, but they are curable by the provisions of the Covenant itself.

There were those, also, who failed to see any improvement. In the main, according to them, it was the same old Covenant. The matter of immigration to this country was not definitely left in our control. The voting trust of nine nations dominated, by five, would have final decision on all matters in international dispute. A vote of seven to two would bind the United States, and prevent it using force to sustain a position vital to its sovereignty. The right to withdraw, it was said, is valueless because it is wiser to stay on the steam roller than to get off, and stand in front of it. As now drawn the Covenant runs counter to the Constitution of the United States. It does so in Article XVI, which empowers the Council to force members

to take up arms against a power declaring war, and thereby abrogates the right of Congress to make war. It does so in Article X, still unchanged, which assures the territorial and political integrity of members of the League, and drags the United States into the petty broils of European nations against the will of Congress. The Monroe Doctrine, some of the Senators who signed the "round-robin" pointed out, was not "a regional understanding," and was not announced for the purpose of "securing the maintenance of peace." It was an announcement intended to protect American control of the Western hemisphere even to the point of war. Senator Lodge, now majority leader in the Senate, telegraphed to Republican Senators: "We suggest that Republican Senators reserve final expressions of opinion respecting the amended League Covenant until the latest draft has been carefully studied, and until there has been an opportunity for conference."

The League to Enforce Peace now announced, that from a poll of the Senators, based on statements made by them in newspaper interviews, letters to the League, and personal talks, it appeared that sixty-four were for the Covenant, twelve opposed, and twenty doubtful, and that the covenant was sure of ratification. Said the emergency campaign committee of the League in an appeal urging ratification:

The covenant for a League of Nations, in the amended form adopted by the Paris Peace Conference should satisfy all except those who oppose any League whatever. It is now a thoroughly American instrument, thoroughly American and thoroughly non-partisan. Recent amendments include the more important changes proposed by the leaders of the Republican party.

The covenant asks the American people to surrender neither their honor, nor their independence, nor their dominant position in the new world. It involves no obligation that we should not be ready to assume to lessen the danger of future wars.

Opponents must now show their colors. The old argument, "We are for a League, but not this League," will no longer serve, the issue now is, "The League or none."

On the eighth of May there appeared in the newspapers a proclamation of the President summoning the members of Congress to meet in extraordinary session on May 19, and also the official summary of the Treaty of Peace, in which the covenant was embodied as Article I. The President had made good his assurance that it would be found in the treaty so interwoven that the two could not be parted. The country now waited to see what the Senate would do.

CHAPTER VIII

THE TREATY OF PEACE

LONG ere the delegates to the Peace Conference began to assemble at Paris, in December, 1918, the magnitude of the work they must perform, and the difficulties they must overcome, before even a preliminary treaty of peace could be framed, were quite apparent. More than one of the nations that fought Germany and her allies were already preparing to lodge claims more in accord with their national ambitions than with the fourteen points that were to be made the basis of peace. Belgium was looking forward to the restoration of Luxemburg, and to obtaining a part of Lemburg and the left bank of the Scheldt. Alsace-Lorraine was, of course, to go to France, but she would also demand a surrender of the Saar coal fields. Denmark, it was understood, would insist on a return of Northern and Central Schleswig. Poland must be free, but how to draw her frontiers, and how to give her, in the words of President Wilson, an assured "direct outlet to the great highways of the sea," would be most difficult to determine. Such an outlet was down the valley of the Vistula to Danzig. But Danzig was a German town, and could a settlement which cut communication between East and West Prussia last long? What was to become of Russia, of Turkey, of German Austria, of the late Emperor, of the German Colonies, and what restitution and reparation Germany must make, were but a few of the problems awaiting solution by the Peace Conference.

Towards the close of January, 1919, the Conference settled down to the work before it, and immediately took up the case of Russia, adopted a proposal of President Wilson to summon

representatives of the many groups or governments in Russia to a conference at Prinkipo; decided to send a civil and military commission to Poland; appointed a number of commissions to consider important and pressing questions and report back to the Conference, and deliberated on the future of the German Colonies.

Czechs and Poles, in the Principality of Teschen, having come to blows over the ownership of a mining district, the Conference decided to send delegates to quiet matters until it definitely fixed the frontiers in the contested zone. A hearing was given to representatives of Roumania on the one hand, and of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the other, concerning their respective claims in the Banat, and to M. Venizelos on the claims of Greece to territory in Asia Minor, and to the city of Constantinople. He spoke of the injury done all Europe by the Turkish possession of the Bosphorus; claimed Constantinople because the majority of its population was Greek; claimed northern Epirus because, since 1913, the majority of its population was Greek; claimed Thrace and the shores of the Ægean Sea, given to Bulgaria after the war of 1913; claimed the Viloyets of Balikeser and Aidin, the Islands of the Dodecanese, and the Island of Cyprus ceded to Italy in 1912, at the close of the Italo-Turkish war. In all these regions, he said, there dwelt a Greek population numbering 3,256,000 souls. In Asia Minor lived 1,700,000 Greeks.

February 5 the Council of Ten discussed the boundaries of the Czechoslovak Republic which demanded all Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovak-Silesia, the internationalization of the Danube, the Elbe, and the Vistula, and of the railway line between Pressburg, Trieste and Fiume. Emil Feisal, in behalf of the King of the Hedjaz, asked recognition of the Arab nation and of their rights to the great region inclosed by a line drawn from Alexandretta to the Persian frontier, Persia, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean. Belgium presented her claims, and M. Klotz,

French Minister of Finance, offered a detailed analysis of a work, published in 1916 by the German Great General Staff, proving the deliberately premeditated and systematic character of the destruction of French industry by the Germans. February 15, the Albanian delegation presented a memorandum asking acknowledgment of the rights of Albania, sacrificed by the Congress of Berlin, 1878, and by the Conference at London, 1913, and claiming all the territory given to Montenegro, Serbia and Greece by that Conference.

All these boundary disputes were difficult enough to handle, but none approached in bitterness the dispute between Italy and the Yugoslavs over Istria, Fiume, Dalmatia. Italy longed to make a closed sea of the Adriatic. She claimed that in the days of the Venetian Republic the eastern shore of the Adriatic was inhabited and governed by her people; that Gorizia and Istria, the Dalmatian coast and its Islands, were Italian possessions, and Trieste, Pola and Fiume were Italian cities; that in the early years of the nineteenth century Austria conquered northern Italy, and Trieste, Pola, Fiume and the eastern shore of the Adriatic passed to the dominion of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and that the time had now come when Italy should have them back. Sharing in this view Great Britain, France and Russia, in 1915, made with her, at London, a secret treaty by which she was promised, if she joined the Allies and entered the war, the eastern shore of the Adriatic as her share of the spoils. When that treaty was signed nobody supposed that Austria, and Russia and Germany, would be broken up, and new nations formed on the then unheard-of principle of the self-determination of democratic peoples. But the unforeseen had happened. Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Herzegovina and Dalmatia had united and formed Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia now claimed that the eastern shore of the Adriatic belonged to her, and have it she would, peaceably if the Conference would so rule, forcibly if she must. Gorizia, and western Istria and Pola, she was willing should go to Italy, because the people of these cities were chiefly Italian. But

the Dalmatian coast and all the Islands, and Fiume and Avlona, must be under the government of Yugoslavia because, in race and affiliations, the people are Yugoslav.

In hope of reaching an amicable settlement, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia appealed to President Wilson, invited him to act as arbitrator, and believing the proposal was favorably received, asked the Government at Belgrade for authority to make an official request. He was duly empowered, and addressed to President Wilson a formal note, and sent a copy of it to M. Clémenceau as President of the Peace Conference. "Inspired by the fullest confidence in the lofty spirit of justice which you have displayed in regard to all questions appertaining to the peace settlement, and desirous of contributing to the friendly solution of territorial differences pending between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croates and Slovenes and the Kingdom of Italy, the Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croates and Slovenes desires to bring to your knowledge its readiness to submit those differences to your arbitration. It has received full authority to this effect from its Government."

The Italian delegates would not arbitrate. As all the territorial claims of nations were being submitted to the Peace Conference, this case, they held, should not be made an exception. Thereupon the Yugoslav Delegation, a few days later, laid before the Conference the claims of their country and demanded that the Isonzo River be made the Italian boundary and that Istria, with Trieste and Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, be annexed to Yugoslavia. The Armenians asked for liberation from the Turkish yoke; for the formation of a new Armenia composed of the six Armenian provinces of Turkey, the territory of the Armenian Republic in the Caucasus and the port of Alexandretta; and for protection, for twenty years, by a great Power under a mandate from the League of Nations.

Territorial and boundary disputes were not the only matters to which the Conference had given attention. A Supreme Economic Council was appointed to consider the distribution of shipping, lifting the blockade, distribution of raw materials,

and such financial matters as required a speedy settlement. An Economic Drafting Commission, and a Financial Drafting Commission, were appointed to deal with the demand of several nations for the pooling of their credit, debts, and resources, and to gather information as to the financial condition of the enemy countries for use by the Commission on Reparation.

On the question of reparation, it now appeared, Great Britain, France, and the United States held different views. The British insisted that Germany should pay the Allies the cost of raising, equipping, transporting, and maintaining their armies, and make reparation for wanton damages caused by airplane and Zeppelin raids, and destruction of merchant shipping, in short, the whole cost of the war. To this the French agreed, but demanded that Germany should first pay for all the damage she had done in violation of international law, and later make good the costs of war, if she were able to do so. The Americans held that reparation should be limited to damage done wantonly, and in violation of the laws of war and of nations, a proposition which would leave Great Britain without recompense, save for injury done by airplanes, Zeppelins and submarines, and would restrict that done to her colonies, and to the United States to losses suffered by the sinking of merchant vessels.

The armistice now expired, February 17, and was continued without limit, and terminable at the pleasure of the Allies on seventy-two hours' notice. To some of the new terms the Germans objected, and protested. For reasons unknown the terms delivered to the Germans at Treves on Friday, February 14, did not reach Weimar until late on the evening of Saturday, when a meeting of the Cabinet was immediately held, great indignation expressed at the terms, and a decision reached not to sign. Responsibility for this decision, however, the Cabinet was so unwilling to assume alone, that early on Sunday the party leaders were summoned, and the question of signing laid before them. They advised acceptance; the Cabinet yielded; and late on Sunday afternoon a telegram was sent to Herr Erz-

berger bidding him sign, which he did shortly after six o'clock on February 16. Before doing so, acting under instructions, he handed to Marshal Foch a written statement that the German Government protested, because the agreement entirely ignored the new German Government; imposed, in the form of curt orders, the requirement to evacuate, in favor of the Poles, a number of places; and made the armistice terminable on three days' notice. On Monday, after Herr Erzberger read the terms to the National Assembly, that body at once adjourned, as a mark of their sorrow because of the humiliating terms forced on Germany.

As the month of March approached, announcement was made that the Council intended to embody the terms of the final armistice in the preliminary treaty of peace, and that the Supreme War Council had settled the naval terms and provided for complete disarmament of the enemy. All German submarines, docks for submarines, and the Kiel tubular dock were to be surrendered or destroyed; German war vessels interned in Allied ports were to be seized, and broken up or destroyed; warships under construction in Germany must be destroyed; eight battleships, eight light cruisers, forty-two modern destroyers and fifty modern torpedo boats, with guns and torpedoes, must be handed over by Germany in condition to go to sea under their own steam; Heligoland fortifications must be destroyed by the Germans at their own expense; all fortifications defending access to the Baltic must be razed, and the Kiel Canal open at all times to the war vessels and merchant ships of every nation. German Cable systems, European, Transatlantic and Asiatic, would not be returned to former owners, and the wireless stations at Nauen, Hanover and Berlin were to be used for none but commercial purposes.

France, it was reported, reserved acceptance of the provisions requiring destruction of warships surrendered by Germany and interned in Allied harbors. She needed some, for her fleet had suffered losses which, because of army requirements, her yards had not been able to make good. There were,

it was said, three ways of disposing of the surrendered German ships; sink them in the ocean, as Great Britain wished; convert them into transports, which was impracticable because of cost; distribute them between France, Italy and Japan, for neither Great Britain nor America wanted them. This last plan was objectionable because, in the face of the League of Nation's requirement for disarmament, it would be adding to the navies of three powers.

Military terms to be imposed, it was reported, would force Germany to reduce her army to one hundred thousand men, recruit this force by volunteer enlistment, and make the term of enlistment twelve years lest, by training a new body of a hundred thousand men each year, she should, in time, train a great army. The Imperial General Staff must be abolished, artillery and military equipment, over and above the needs of the new army, must be surrendered, and the forts along the Rhine destroyed. The terms of aerial disarmament forbade Germany to use airplanes, or dirigibles, for military purposes, and required her to hand over her airplanes to the Allies, and build no more until after peace was concluded.

The Supreme Council, it was further reported, indeed, it was so stated by Premier Delacroix in the Belgian Chamber of Deputies, had decided that the old treaty of April 19, 1839, must be revised, and would insert in the peace treaty a requirement that Germany relinquish her leasehold on Tsingtau and all concessions on the Shantung peninsula. The Polish Commission on the Eastern Boundary of Germany now reported, and proposed to give Poland direct access to the Baltic by a corridor leading to Danzig, thus cutting off East Prussia from Germany; to allow Germany communication across this corridor; and to demilitarize East Prussia. From the sub-commission of the Commission on Responsibility for the War came a report listing thirty-one classes of crimes for which Germany should be held responsible. Civilians had been massacred, tortured, starved, deported, interned under brutal conditions, forced to labor in connection with military opera-

tions. Girls and women had been abducted, women violated, and hostages put to death. Towns and villages had been pillaged, property confiscated, the currency debased, penalties imposed and collected. Property, religious, charitable and educational, and historic buildings and monuments had been wantonly destroyed. Exorbitant and illegal contributions had been exacted, undefended places and hospitals had been bombarded, relief ships, hospital ships, fishing boats had been destroyed, and merchant ships sunk without warning. Asphyxiating and poisonous gases, and explosive and expanding bullets, had been used. No quarter had been given; prisoners had been ill-treated; flags of truce misused; wells poisoned, and the rules relating to the Red Cross utterly disregarded. Even this list, the sub-commission stated, did not exhaust the record of enemy crimes.

From an official of the French Foreign Office came a statement of the disposition France wished to have made of the country west of the Rhine. Never again should the people and their territory be made a military menace and vantage ground for invasion of France, as in the past. France had not the least desire to make these people a part of her own; they should have an independent status. But the Rhine should be a military and political boundary. West of that river there should never again be any German troops, German fortifications, German munition works. Every railroad, every bridge across the Rhine must be in French hands, or those of the Allies, until the territory was politically independent. The whole German population must be forever rid of all military obligations to Germany, never subject to service in German armies, or allowed to volunteer, and no taxes should ever be levied on them for military purposes.

Making the Rhine a political boundary meant, that during the period of occupation, which must continue until Germany had paid her reparation bill in full, local administration of the towns and villages should remain in the hands of the native population, with no political connection with any Central Ger-

man Government. Reparation made, and the period of occupation ended, this Rhine country should at once become an independent State, for the good of itself, and for the protection of France and the rest of the world against the Germany of the future.

Public opinion in Rome, it was now reported from Paris, was irritated by reports that the Italian territorial claims would not be decided together with those of France, before the treaty of peace, but afterwards with those of the new nations sprung from the ruins of Austria. If this report be true, said an Italian newspaper, we do not hesitate to assert that the Italian delegates will be in duty bound to oppose the proposition "even at the cost of packing their trunks and leaving Paris." But we refuse to believe that President Wilson, or any one else, can have thought of such a thing. It would be a grave offense to Italy. At Rome all eyes were turned towards Paris. Demonstrations were made in favor of the Irredenta, and Fiume in particular, and the question, What attitude will America take? was asked on every hand.

So high did feeling run that on March 21 the Italian delegation to the Peace Conference announced that they had unanimously agreed to withdraw from the Conference unless Fiume were assigned to Italy, before the conclusion of peace. Such, it was said, was the state of the public mind in Italy, that failure of the delegation to secure title to Fiume and the Dalmatian coastal islands would surely be attended by grave political results. Neither the Parliament, nor the people, would think of ratifying an agreement which abandoned what they considered necessary "to the completion of the mother country." President Wilson, report said, had the matter before him and would, it was hoped, find a way to overcome this obstacle in the path of peace.

All the Allied peoples by this time were crying out for less secrecy and more speed. Most of the issues, it was said, that have arisen could be settled easily in a few days by two or three determined men. There must be a truce to the constant refer-

ence of these claims to committees, sub-committees and sub-sub-committees. It was foolish to put off the day when the Council must make up its mind, and that day must not be far away, for the audience "will soon get tired of waiting for the curtain to be drawn." The whole world is impatient for peace. Trade and industry demand it as a first step towards a return to normal conditions. The ruined countries demand it, that they may take up the work of reconstruction. Civilization demands it, that the forces of Bolshevism may not break through in the East. Even the Council of Ten seemed at last to be convinced of the need of haste, and March 24, decided, that a Super-Council of Four, composed of President Wilson and the three Allied Prime Ministers, should proceed at once to gather up the decisions already made, settle the issues on which no decision had been reached, and draw up the Treaty of Peace.

At the end of a week the Council of Four gave no more satisfaction than the Council of Ten. They, too, it was charged, were wasting time. At the moment when clear-sighted resolution was most needed, they were showing neither vision nor courage. Victory was not yet assured, and might even be lost unless the politicians, who so misrepresented their people, were driven to do their duty or replaced by others who would do it. Their secrecy was even more hateful than their sloth.

President Wilson now issued a statement denying that conferences on the League of Nations had anything whatever to do with delay in framing the treaty. Rumor then found other causes. The "Big Four" were said to be "deadlocked" on the question of reparation, and the demands of M. Clémenceau for the cession, outright to France, of the whole Saar valley; the "Big Four" were said to have indulged in some very plain talk; President Wilson was said to have threatened to go home unless greater progress was made in settling the peace of the world; to have told his associates that the world was awaiting the finishing of their task, and had a right to expect a speedy conclusion; to have said that the slowness of the negotiation

was not the fault of the representatives of any nation; that he willingly accepted his share for the delay in framing the Treaty; that the time for talk was over, and that the time for results had come.

After several days had passed and no results were announced, the editor of the *Paris Matin* had an interview with Lloyd George, and told him that the public was troubled not so much by the delay, as by the secrecy which surrounded the meetings of the Council of Four, and the fear that serious differences of opinion existed. To this Lloyd George replied:

I affirm absolutely that there is no divergence among the negotiators. They are often confronted with technical difficulties which can only be settled after close study. Take the question of reparation. In substance the Allies have one common principle, which I once set forth thus: "Germany must pay up to the last farthing of her power."

But is it sufficient to draw up a bill and hand it to the enemy? Must we not require guarantees, and must we not study the terms, methods, and forms of delayed payments? Must we not be able to say to our adversary when he pleads inadequacy of resources: "Yes, you can go as far as that and you must do it." In a word, shall we simply present a bill, or collect the money, all the money possible? Well, that is where the work comes in, slow and difficult work complicated by the fact that technical experts of the highest capabilities and greatest experience are not in agreement among themselves, either as to the method of liquidation, or as to the assets to be realized.

No, there is no divergence among the negotiators, but, alas, there are inevitable ones among the experts, often among those from the same country.

The editor remarked that the public could not understand why, before everything, Germany has not been handed a full bill, no matter what the amount, and forced to admit full liability.

"And who says we shall not do so?" cried Premier Lloyd George. "Who says we have not decided that?"

"No one," the interviewer interrupted, "has said that you have not decided it."

The British Premier resumed:

Cannot the people wait until we have finished our work instead of always wanting to judge our intentions? This Conference had to meet, and discuss things, under conditions unprecedented in history. All eyes are turned toward it, and, what is more grave, all ears are glued at its keyhole. Enemy ears tremble with joy when they detect some hesitation. Friendly ears half hear confused rumors which are peddled far and quickly. The day does not pass but what some false news, here and there, takes its flight. Nevertheless, no day passes but that we in silent deliberation feel approaching nearer the great aim, and experience for each other more esteem, confidence, and affection. Let public opinion wait a few days. It will then be able to pronounce on facts, not rumors.

Results, and assurances of results to come, were now announced. Agreement had been reached on the principle of indemnities to be paid by Germany. The Danzig question had been adjusted, progress had been made by all commissions, save that on Reparations, and complete agreement would be reached by Easter Sunday, which, in 1919, was April twentieth. But the statement of Lloyd George that "there is no divergence among the negotiators" was received with doubt. A strong impression existed that European politics had produced sharp divergence of opinion, at least in the case of Fiume, and that Italy was likely to quit the Conference unless her demand was granted. Italy's quarrel, it was pointed out, had never really been with Germany, but with Austria. Were she to withdraw, she could easily make a separate peace with Germany, and as her army had not been demobilized, as her two and a half millions of men were still under arms, it would be easy for her to seize Fiume and Dalmatia in the old fashioned European way. That Fiume was not mentioned in the treaty of London made no difference. Have it she must, and would. If we do not get it from the Conference, said an Italian, we must assume that our delegation has reached the limit of its authority to act on its own responsibility, and must appeal to the Italian people for new instructions. Italy has an

Adriatic Doctrine as dear to her as the Monroe Doctrine is to America. Orlando can no more return to Rome with a peace treaty depriving us of Fiume, than President Wilson can return to the United States with a League of Nations which destroys the Monroe Doctrine, or in any way menaces the political welfare of his country.

Color was now given to the belief that "divergence" did exist "among the negotiators," by a sudden call from President Wilson, on April 6, for the return of the steamship *George Washington* to Europe. Why he did so no one knew; but that made no difference, for rumors supplied the reasons. It was well known, according to one, that in American quarters there was great disappointment at the delay in settling the claims of the Allies among themselves, and it might be that the President felt it a waste of time to sit at the Conference table listening to fruitless discussions of questions in which America had no concern. It was a hint, according to another, that unless differences were speedily adjusted, Mr. Wilson would sail for America, order the American army out of Europe, and leave Great Britain, France and Italy to end their squabbles in their own way. It was a sign, according to others, that the peace treaty would be finished before the *George Washington* could reach France, and that the President would be free to go home.

Spurred on, it may be, by this action of the President, the Council of Four now agreed on the terms of reparation for war damages, on the responsibility of the German Emperor for the war, and on the means of bringing him to trial. Losses and damages to civilians were to be determined by an inter-allied commission, and Germany was to be notified of the amount due not later than May 1, 1921, was to pay in full within thirty years, and was to begin with a payment, within two years, of twenty billion marks, or five billion dollars. To determine the responsibility of William Hohenzollern for his offenses against international law and the sanctity of treaties, his surrender was to be asked of Holland, and a special tribunal set up to fix the punishment to be imposed.

Despite these signs of progress, distrust and displeasure was made manifest in many ways. Three hundred and seventy-four members of the House of Commons signed a telegram to Lloyd George calling on him to make good his preëlection promises to exact the utmost indemnity from Germany. The national executive of the British Labor Party demanded that the Paris Conference put an end to discussion, and make peace in accordance with President Wilson's fourteen points. Every member of the French Senate signed a resolution expressing the hope that full restitution would be exacted from the enemy, and that full reparation for damages to persons and property, and the full cost of the war would "be imposed on those responsible for the greatest crime in history." All restraints were at once broken down, and the press of Paris, led by *Le Matin*, joined in savage denunciation of Lloyd George, President Wilson, and the Americans.

At last the treaty was nearing completion. One by one the great questions, even that of the Rhine boundary, were settled and, on April 14, the President in behalf of the Council of Four put forth a statement that the German plenipotentiaries would be "invited to meet the representatives of the associated belligerent nations" at Versailles on the 25th of April.

The summons, or invitation, as the President called it, having been received, the German Government showed its contempt by announcing that three men of no importance would be sent to Versailles as messengers, or couriers, to receive the treaty and bring it to Weimar. This, the Council of Four would not permit. Germany was promptly informed that no delegates would be received by the associated Governments unless vested with the same plenary powers to negotiate as the representatives of the Allied and Associated Governments possessed; the insulting decision of the German Cabinet was at once reversed and assurance given that six delegates, headed by Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, the Foreign Minister, would go to Versailles.

Meantime, the Council of Four had been earnestly striving to come to terms with the delegates from Italy. All efforts

were vain. Nothing short of Fiume would be accepted, and when the Council met on April 22 Premier Orlando did not attend. To the Italian newspaper men he was reported to have said:

We have withdrawn. From this morning none of our delegation will take any part in any Conference work. We are simply standing firm in our position, and all further initiative must come from the other side. If we learn that an adverse decision is reached by them, we shall go home at once. In any case, unless we receive full satisfaction, the day of the arrival of the German delegates will be the limit of our stay. If we go, it will not mean a rupture of diplomatic relations, but an expression of lack of solidarity between Italy and the other members of the Conference.

On the following day, April 23, Premier Orlando again failed to attend the Council; President Wilson issued a statement on the Adriatic question, and the Italian delegation at once announced that it would leave Paris on the 24th. In substance, the President said that when Italy entered the war she did so "upon the basis of a definite private understanding with Great Britain and France now known as the Pact of London"; that Austria-Hungary, at whose expense the Pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, had gone to pieces and no longer existed; that from its several parts were to be set up independent states to be associated, in the League of Nations, with Italy and all the powers that stood with Italy in the great war; that these new nations would be among the small states whose interests must be safeguarded as scrupulously as the interests of the most powerful states; that in the armistice with Germany it was promised that peace should be founded on certain clearly defined principles; that the same principles must be applied to the settlement of peace in what was once the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Balkan States, as with Germany; that if these principles were not to be abandoned, "Fiume must serve as the outlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the land to the north and northeast of that port, of Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania and the States of the Jugoslav

group." To assign Fiume to Italy, the President said, would be to create a feeling that the port on which all these countries chiefly depend for access to the Mediterranean had been deliberately put into the hands of a power of which it did not form an integral part, and which was not identified with the commercial and industrial life of the regions which the port must serve. "It is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included in the Pact of London, but there definitely assigned to the Croatsians."

The reason why the line drawn in the Pact of London swept about among the islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, and a portion of the Dalmatian coast, undoubtedly was, the President believed, that Italy must have a foothold amidst the channels of the eastern Adriatic that she might make her coasts safe against naval aggression by Austria-Hungary. But Austria-Hungary no longer existed; the fortifications which she erected were to be destroyed, and the limitation of armaments, required by the League of Nations covenant, put aggression out of the question. Italy was safe without Fiume.

Premier Orlando at once made a long reply. He admitted that Fiume was assigned by the Pact of London to the Croatsians, but defended, as best he could, Italy's claim to the city on the basis of its Italian population and the right of self-determination. What enraged him, and brought forth his reply, was what he considered a violation of diplomatic procedure, and an affront to the Italian Government by the President, who had passed over the heads of the Italian delegation and appealed to the Italian people and the whole world.

While [said Orlando] the Italian delegation was discussing counter propositions which had been received from the British Prime Minister, and which had for their aim the conciliation of contradictory tendencies which were manifested concerning Italian territorial aspirations, the Paris newspapers published a message from the President of the United States, in which he expressed his own thought on one of the gravest problems which has been submitted to the judgment of the Conference.

The practice of addressing nations directly constitutes, surely, an innovation in international relations. I do not wish to complain, but I wish to record it as a precedent, so that at my own time I may follow it, inasmuch as this new custom doubtless constitutes the granting to nations of larger participation in international questions, and, personally, I have always been of the opinion that such participation was the harbinger of a new order of things.

Nevertheless, if these appeals are to be considered as addressed to nations outside of the Governments which represent them (I might say even against the Governments), I should feel deep regret in recalling that this process, heretofore applied to enemy Governments, is to-day applied for the first time to a Government which has been, and intends to remain, a loyal ally of the Great American Republic, namely, to the Italian Government.

Above all, I should have the right to complain if the declarations of the Presidential message have the purpose to oppose the Italian people to the Italian Government, because it would misconstrue and deny the high degree of civilization which the Italian people has attained, and its democratic and liberal régime, and I should be forced to protest strongly against suppositions unjustly offensive to my country.

That a grave crisis had arisen in the Peace Conference, and that nothing should be left undone to find a remedy, was generally admitted in Paris; but on the act of the President public opinion was divided. By some journals it was deplored as likely to do more harm than good; as an attempt to transfer to the market place, discussions better carried on in privacy; as a display of stubbornness, and of a haughty, uncompromising spirit. Socialist newspapers approved his course. Tired of confidential wire pulling and secret diplomacy the President had rent the veil and appealed to public opinion. He had applied the surgeon's knife to a painful wound. The patient had cried out, but the wound would heal.

In the London Press the statement was described as a "thunderbolt," a "bombshell," "an appeal to Cæsar." The President had taken an impossible attitude; his appeal was an insult to Italy; he ought to retire gracefully from a discussion which concerned neither him nor the American continent. He

had created a most serious situation, the development of which would be watched with anxious interest. Italy, some journals held, had gone beyond the Pact of London in claiming Fiume, which, in the treaty, had been assigned to Croatia. If an appeal were made to the treaty, was not the Conference as much bound not to give Italy Fiume, as it was to give her the territories promised? If Italy claimed Fiume under the principle of self-determination, that principle also applied to the Slav regions assigned to Italy under the treaty. Italy was claiming fulfillment of the treaty where she was the gainer, and its abrogation where it stood in the way of her demands. The President had "plunged the Conference into a profoundly stupid tragedy, by rushing into the arena waving a red flag"; his "name among the Allies is like that of the rich uncle, and they have accepted his manners out of respect for his means." "Premier Orlando has gone home and we commend his example to President Wilson."

England and France will not hesitate to act if necessary. They will not permit Italy to pick out clauses of the Treaty of London which favor her designs, and reject those which favor the Jugoslavs. If she insists on the treaty she must have the whole treaty, and the whole treaty will leave her without Fiume.

A wireless message from Rome reported intense feeling against the Peace Conference and President Wilson. Crowds marched through the streets demanding Fiume and Dalmatia, and cheering Orlando and Sonnino. The newspapers were unanimous in approving the withdrawal of the delegation, and the reply of Orlando to the President. Political disputes were laid aside; in a score of cities demonstrations were made; and in some the streets were decorated with Dalmatian and Fiume flags. A report from London announced that the Italian Embassy had given out the statement that in many towns the shops were closed while crowds of demonstrators paraded shouting, "Long live America! Down with Wilson!" Whether the statement were true or false, the sentiment found expression

in the Italian press. "The American people," said the *Corriere d'Italia*, "cannot be in agreement with a man who so haughtily arrogates to himself the right to decide the fate of Europe against the desires of its Governments and its peoples. We trust, however, in the sense and justice of the English and French, and, above all, of the American people." "What happened in Paris is monstrous," said the *Giornale d'Italia*. "Against it we appeal to the common sense of the American people. We do not consider the generous American people responsible for the eccentricities of its President." When Orlando reached Rome the people went wild in their effort to show how heartily they approved his course of action. Despite these demonstrations Paris was sure both he and Sonnino would be back again at the Conference within ten days. The prediction came true for, on May 5, it was announced that Orlando and Sonnino would at once return to Paris. While these things were happening at Paris and Rome the German peace delegation was gathering at Versailles. The first party, councilors and secretaries of the Foreign Office, clerks, typists, interpreters, a doctor and a barber, numbering some thirty women and more than fifty men, reached the little station of Vaucresson, at dusk, on the evening of April 29, and were taken in motor cars and omnibuses to Versailles, three miles away. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau and the rest of the delegates arrived the evening of the thirtieth. Exchange of credentials was made, with no formal ceremony, on May 1.

Some little delay now followed, for all the details of the treaty were not yet finished. A Belgian delegation came to Paris to express dissatisfaction with the terms granted her in the treaty. The Limburg region, Maastricht, and the left bank of the Scheldt, were not given her; only Malmedy in Rhenish Prussia. No provision had been made for the recall, by Germany, of the six billion marks left in Belgium and lying useless in the banks, for the circulation of the mark was forbidden in that country. Of the five hundred million-dollar immediate indemnity awarded her more than half, it was reported, had

been placed to her credit in Allied Countries as part payment for war loans. The Comité Politique Nationale, representing some three hundred communes, petitioned the King of the Belgians not to sign the treaty. The Burgomaster of Antwerp sent a telegram to the Belgian delegation to insist on complete indemnity, and immediate introduction of raw materials. The town council of devastated Termonde sent a like request. China protested against the action of the Council of Three awarding the Peninsula of Shantung to Japan. Italy having returned to the Conference, her credentials were presented to the Germans on May 6.

The Treaty finished, the protests heard, and harmony restored, it was announced that the document so long in the making would be handed to the German delegation on the afternoon of the seventh of May, just four years to a day since a German submarine commander perpetrated the *Lusitania* crime. Shortly before four o'clock, in the great hall of the Trianon Palace Hotel, in the presence of the representatives of the five Allied and the twenty-two Associated Powers, M. Clémenceau, as President of the Peace Conference, delivered the treaty to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau. In opening the ceremony, M. Clémenceau said:

Gentlemen, Plenipotentiaries of the German Empire: It is neither the time nor the place for superfluous words. You have before you the accredited plenipotentiaries of all the small and great powers united to fight together in the war that has been so cruelly imposed upon them. The time has come when we must settle our account.

You have asked for peace. We are ready to give you peace. We shall present to you now a book which contains our conditions. You will be given every facility to examine these conditions, and the time necessary for it. Everything will be done with the courtesy that is the privilege of civilized nations.

To give you my thought completely, you will find us ready to give you any explanation you want, but we must say at the same time that this second treaty of Versailles has cost us too much not to take on our side all the necessary precautions and guarantees that the peace shall be a lasting one.

I will give you notice of the procedure that has been adopted by the conference for discussion, and if any one has any observations to offer he will have the right to do so. No oral discussion is to take place, and the observations of the German delegation will have to be submitted in writing.

The German plenipotentiaries will know that they have the maximum period of fifteen days within which to present in English and French their written observations on the whole of the treaty. Before the expiration of the aforesaid period of fifteen days the German delegates will be entitled to send their reply on particular headings of the treaty, or to ask questions in regard to them.

After having examined the observations presented within the aforementioned period, the Supreme Council will send its answer in writing to the German delegation, and determine the period within which the final world-wide answer must be given by this delegation.

The President wishes to add that when we receive, after two or three, or four, or five days, any observations from the German delegation on any point of the treaty, we shall not wait until the end of the fifteen days to give our answer. We shall at once proceed in the way indicated by this document.

Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau, speaking in German, said:

Gentlemen: We are deeply impressed with the sublime task which has brought us hither to give a durable peace to the world. We are under no illusion as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our want of power. We know that the power of the German army is broken. We know the power of the hatred which we encounter here, and we have heard the passionate demand that the vanquishers may make us pay as the vanquished, and punish those who are worthy of being punished.

It is demanded from us that we shall confess ourselves to be the only ones guilty of the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie. We are far from declining any responsibility that this great war of the world has come to pass, and that it was made in the way in which it was made. The attitude of the former German Government at The Hague Peace Conference, its actions and omissions in the tragic twelve days of July, have certainly contributed to the disaster. But we energetically deny that Germany and its people, who were convinced that they were making a war of defense, were alone guilty.

Insulting as were the words of the Count, his manner was more so, for he made his speech seated. It was said in his defense that he was ill and unable to stand and make even so brief a speech. In reply it was pointed out that he need not have made a speech and that, if really unable to stand, he should in common decency have asked permission to be seated. That he intended to be insulting was firmly believed by those present.

The Treaty thus delivered contained some eighty thousand words and made a book of no small dimensions. Only a summary, therefore, was given to the public. From this summary it appeared that the first section consisted of the revised covenant of the League of Nations. The second defined the frontiers of Germany in Europe. Alsace and Lorraine went to France. The Saar was temporarily internationalized; the coal mines went to France, and Belgium was given Malmedy and the Eupen districts of Prussia. The inhabitants were allowed six months in which to protest, and the League of Nations to make the final decision. Luxemburg was set free from the German customs union. Danzig was internationalized for all time. Germany must recognize the independence of Poland, and cede to her most of Upper Silesia, the province of Posen and all of West Prussia lying west of the Vistula. The fate of the southeastern part of East Prussia, and of the area between it and the Vistula north of latitude $53^{\circ} 3'$ must be decided by popular vote. So also must that of a part of Schleswig. All fortifications and military establishments on the islands of Heligoland and Dune must be destroyed, under supervision of the Allies, by German labor, and at Germany's cost, and no fortifications or military establishments were to be maintained within fifty kilometers of the east bank of the Rhine. Germany recognizes, said the treaty, the total independence of German-Austria, the total independence of the Czecho-Slovak state, and the "Free City of Danzig"; renounces all right and title to her overseas possessions; all privileges and indemnities resulting from the Boxer Protocol of 1901; agrees to return all astronomical instruments seized in 1900 and 1901; renounces all

concessions at Hankow and Tien-tsin, China; recognizes the British protectorate over Egypt; renounces all rights, titles, and privileges under the act of Algesiras and the Franco-German agreements of 1909 and 1911, and all rights under the international agreement regarding Liberia in 1911 and 1912.

Within two months after signing the Treaty, Germany must reduce her army to not more than one hundred thousand officers and men, and within three months close all her establishments for designing, making, and storing munitions of war, save such as were specified, and discharge all workmen therein employed; import no arms or munitions of war, nor import nor manufacture any poisonous, asphyxiating or other gases. Conscription was forbidden. No military schools, save such as were absolutely necessary for the units allowed, and no associations, such as societies of discharged soldiers, shooting, or touring clubs, should exist in Germany two months after the peace.

Within the same space of time the navy must be demobilized, the personnel reduced to fifteen thousand men, the fleet reduced to six small battleships, six light cruisers, twelve destroyers, twelve torpedo boats. No submarines were allowed her. The largest armored battleship must not exceed ten thousand tons. Forty-two modern destroyers, fifty modern torpedo boats, and all submarines must be surrendered.

Until October 1, 1919, Germany might use not over one hundred unarmed seaplanes to search for submarine mines. But no dirigible could be kept. The entire air personnel must be demobilized within two months, save a thousand officers and men to serve until October 1. There must be no military or naval air force after that date, and no aviation grounds or dirigible sheds within one hundred and fifty kilometers of the Rhine.

"The Allied and Associated Powers," so runs the Treaty, "publicly arraign William II, of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, not for an offense against criminal law, but for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanc-

tity of treaties." Demand for his surrender was to be made on Holland, that he might be tried before a tribunal composed of one judge from each of the five great powers. Persons accused of acts done in violation of the laws and customs of war were to be tried and punished by military tribunals under military law. If the charges affected people of but one State, they were to be tried before a tribunal of that state; if persons of several States, before a joint tribunal of the States concerned.

Germany must make full reparation for all losses and damages caused to civilians, by personal injury, by acts of cruelty, by maltreatment of prisoners, by forced labor, by levies and fines, and damages to property other than military and naval, and damages to the Allies, represented by pensions and separation allowances. An Allied Reparation Commission was to determine the amount of such damages; but within two years Germany must pay twenty billions of marks in gold, goods, or ships, or other forms of payment.

All merchant ships and fishing boats, lost because of the war, must be replaced, ton for ton, and class for class. The Reparation Commission was authorized to require Germany to replace, in the devastated area, destroyed articles by the delivery of animals, machinery, and manufactured material required for reconstruction purposes. During ten years she must deliver to France coal equivalent to the difference between the pre-war output of the Nord and Pas de Calais mines, and their annual production during the ten-year period. Within six months Germany must restore the Koran of the Caliph Othman to the King of the Hedjaz; the skull of the Sultan Okwawa to his Britannic Majesty's Government; and to France, certain papers taken by the Germans in 1870, and the French battle flags captured during the war of 1870 and 1871. Reparation must be made for the destruction of the Library at Louvain; and the wings of the altar piece, "The Adoration of the Lamb," the center of which was in the Church of St. Bevon at Ghent, and the wings of the altar piece of "The Last Supper," the

center of which was in the Church of St. Peter at Louvain, must be delivered to Belgium.

That Czecho-Slovakia might have access to the sea, Germany must lease her, for ninety-nine years, spaces in Hamburg and Stettin. Towards the Adriatic she was to be permitted to run her own trains to Fiume and Trieste. The Kiel Canal was to be free to the war and merchant ships of all nations at peace with Germany. The Elbe and the Oder were to be placed under international commissioners, and the Rhine under a commission appointed by Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands. There were sections relating to finance, to tariffs and shipping, to the opium trade, aerial navigation, railways and international labor.

Severe as was the Treaty it did not, France claimed, give sufficient guarantees against attacks upon her by Germany. Lloyd George and President Wilson, therefore, entered into an agreement to endeavor to bind their countries to come to the aid of France, if attacked, and made their pledge public on the day on which the Treaty was handed to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau.

In addition to the securities afforded in the treaty of peace, the President of the United States has pledged himself to propose to the Senate of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain has pledged himself to propose to the Parliament of Great Britain, an engagement, subject to the approval of the Council of the League of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France in case of unprovoked attack by Germany.

While the German plenipotentiaries were perusing the Treaty at Versailles the terms were made known in Berlin, and brought forth a storm of protests, threats and abuse. The president of the imperial ministry, in a telegram to the governments of the German States, said:

In deep distress and weighed down by cares, the German people have waited through the months of the armistice for the peace conditions. Their publication has brought the bitterest disappointment

and unspeakable grief to the entire people. A public expression ought to be given these feelings of all Germans. The Imperial Government requests that the free states have public amusements suspended for a week and allow, in the theaters, only such productions as correspond to the seriousness of these grievous days.

Speaking to the Prussian Assembly, Premier Hirsch called the terms offered a "mailed fist peace" that meant slavery to the Fatherland.

"The Government appeals to you," he said, "to close your ranks, preserve your calm, and avoid indiscretion in case of dissensions. We are faced by the question of to be, or not to be. The entire nation must stand behind the government to convert this projected peace of violence into a peace of right. That is possible only if the nation which is expected to sign its own death warrant firmly supports the government. This, the most mournful day in our history, must find us strong."

In the opinion of the Berlin press the treaty was an instrument of robbery, and offered a peace of annihilation. Said the *Tages Zeitung*: "One thing is certain; there can be no question of this being a peace of justice. What a peace of justice after the Entente pattern, and in accordance with French desires, looks like is shown by the conditions which leave nothing of Germany but a torn and tattered territory."

The *Tageblatt*, although "prepared for a good deal, even for everything," could "only say that the treaty surpasses our worst expectations. It does not show a trace of statesmanship, or of President Wilson's principles, but is a brutal, thoughtless product of thoughtless, intoxicated brutality." "We are at the graveside of right," said the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. "The only doubt is whether it also means the graveside of the German nation. Never has murder been committed in more courteous form, or with more cynical equanimity. The German reply will have to consider that the draft deviates from Mr. Wilson's 'fourteen points' as far as the East is from the West."

Vorwaerts saw in the treaty "a peace of annihilation," a "ruthless desire to lay Germany permanently low by force. If

we sign this peace it is because we are bound by force, but in our hearts we resolutely reject it. Such a peace is an attempt to exterminate a nation, not by force of arms, but by a means more brutal, economic slavery."

The National Assembly having gathered at Berlin, instead of at Weimar, to discuss the terms of peace, Chancellor Scheidemann brought members and spectators to their feet when he said:

This treaty is, from the viewpoint of the Government, unacceptable, so unacceptable I am unable to believe that this earth could bear such a document without a cry issuing from millions and millions of throats in all lands, without distinction of party. Away with this murderous scheme.

The representatives of the nation [he continued] meet here as the last band of the faithful assemblies when the Fatherland is in the greatest danger. All have appeared except the representatives of Alsace-Lorraine, who have been deprived of the right to be represented here, just as you are to be deprived of the right to exercise in a free vote, the right of self-determination.

And I see among you the representatives of all the German races and lands, the chosen representatives of the Rhineland, the Saar, East Prussia, West Prussia, Posen, Silesia, Danzig and Memel. Together, with the deputies of the unmenaced regions, I see the deputies of the menaced provinces, who, if the will of our enemies becomes law, are to meet for the last time as Germans among Germans.

The thing which is at the basis of our discussion is this thick volume, in which 100 sentences begin "Germany renounces." This dreadful and murderous volume, by which confession of our own unworthiness, our consent to pitiless disruption, our agreement to helotry and slavery, are to be extorted—this book must not become the future code of law.

The world has once again lost an illusion. The nations have in this period, which is so poor in ideals, again lost a belief. What name on thousands of bloody battlefields, in thousands of trenches, in orphan families and among the despairing and abandoned, has been mentioned during these four years with more devotion and belief than the name of Wilson? To-day the picture of the peace-bringer, as the world pictured him, is paling beside the dark forms

of our jailers, to one of whom, Premier Clémenceau, a Frenchman, recently wrote: "The wild beast has been put in a cage on bread and water, but is allowed to keep his teeth, while his claws are hardly cut."

Germany has ceased to exist abroad, but if that were not sufficient, her cables have been taken from her and her wireless stations can send only commercial telegrams, and then only under control of the Allies. This would separate us from the outer world, for what business can be done under the control of competitors need not to be described.

I ask you what honest man will say that Germany can accept such conditions. At the same time, as we shall have to bestir ourselves to perform forced labor for the benefit of the entire world, our foreign trade, the sole source of our welfare, is destroyed and our home trade is rendered impossible. Lorraine iron ore, Upper Silesian coal, Alsatian potash, the Saar Valley mines and the cheap foodstuffs from Posen and west Prussia are to lie outside our frontiers. We are to impose no higher tariff or protection than existed on August 1, 1914, while our enemies may do as much as they like at every point in strangling us at home. All German revenues must be held at the disposal of our enemies for payments, not for war invalids and widows—all as forced labor for products the prices of which will be fixed by our customers.

What is a people to do which is confronted by the command that it is responsible for all losses and damages that its enemies suffered in the war? What is a people to do which is to have no voice in fixing its obligations?

Enough. More than enough. These are some examples of the treaty stipulations in establishing which, as Premier Clémenceau yesterday informed our delegation, the Entente will be guided completely by the principles according to which the armistice and peace negotiations were proposed.

President Ebert declared that the German people had been hypnotized by President Wilson and his fourteen points, but still had faith that the American people would not permit such a peace to be made. "The German people," he said, "is only beginning to awake from the hypnosis into which it has been

lulled because of its solid faith in the sincerity and truth of the fullness of Mr. Wilson's program, and his fourteen points. The awakening will be terrifying, and we all look forward to it with gravest apprehensions. In the face of the cold, naked realities we still consciously cling to the faith which found its epitome in the names of Wilson and the United States, and the conception of the democracy of the League of Nations.

We cannot believe that this has all been an illusion, and that the confidence and hopes of a whole people have been duped in a manner unknown to history. Even now optimists are saying, "Wilson will not permit it; he dare not possibly permit it."

I and my colleagues, upon whom rests the terrific burden of the forthcoming decisions, hope and pray the German people who staked all on President Wilson and the United States shall not find themselves deceived. If, however, the American democracy actually accepts the present peace terms as its own, it becomes an accomplice and an abettor of political blackmailers; it surrenders the traditional American principle of fair play and sportsmanship and trails the ideals of true democracy in the dust.

Notwithstanding the night now covering it, I have abiding faith in the future of the German people, and in the unconquerability of its soul. This people, which has given the world so much in science, learning and industry, must not go down to oblivion. It still has a cultural mission to perform, and ethical treasures to bestow.

Mathias Erzberger, head of the German commission that signed the armistice, gave his views to a correspondent of the *New York Times*.

I have not lost hope. I believe that a new basis will be found on which to build up quite a new treaty. I put my trust in the victory of the right. I was one of the first, if not the first, to stand up for the right in Germany during the war, when it was dangerous. Shall we say that no Government can possibly agree to the thing as it stands? By the treaty Germany is garroted, bound hand and foot, gagged and blinded. We will have less freedom than Egypt under it. Germany sacrificed all except one hope. That hope was that within the range of President Wilson's fourteen points a bearable peace might be reached. Now, even that remnant of our hopes has received a mortal blow. We cannot sign the treaty as it stands, for

it condemns us to death. Not to sign would mean the same, most likely; but if we are to go under, let us go quickly at least.

We are ready to give the coal France requires, every ton of it, but we cannot give up German land with it. We cannot consent to be ruled like an African colony. Look at what our coal position is to an industrial nation and what it would be under the terms of the treaty. We produced in peace times about 160,000,000 tons of coal. Well, then, we should lose 15,000,000 tons from the Saar region, and 60,000,000 tons in addition, which is the output of Upper Silesia. We require 40,000,000 tons for our railways and for household purposes, while another 40,000,000 tons must go to France and Belgium. Thus we shall not have a ton of coal left for German industries. Surely no reasonable person can expect us to sign our death warrant in that way.

I find that under the armistice terms we have already paid 11,000,000,000 marks. That still leaves us 9,000,000,000 to pay. It is simply impossible in two years.

We have no money to pay for all the food we need, and butter, meat, and potatoes are rapidly becoming scarcer. If we could get all the supplies which we were permitted to buy, then we could manage to live, though on scanty rations, until the next harvest.

But, despite all, Germany stands by her aim to achieve friendship with the whole world, even with those countries which to-day hate us with deadly hatred. Therefore she will put forth all her remaining strength in order to sweep out of the way those obstacles which the fanatics of hate have placed in the way of a real League of Nations.

The world is one whole. A sick and dying Germany, which this treaty would mean, would be a source of unrest and danger for the whole world.

We refuse to plead and beg. We ask for our rights under the fourteen points, which our opponents made binding on themselves. We ask precisely on the basis of those fourteen points that stern justice of which Lloyd George has spoken.

If we are denied that, then the consequences will be upon the heads of those who made the promises which they never intended to keep, even with the new Germany, and who have therefore brought us to this desert of hopelessness in which we look around in vain for an oasis where springs the well of humanity.

As the German plenipotentiaries studied the terms of peace, note followed note of protest. The essential points of the basis

of peace, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau wrote, had been abandoned, demands had been made which no nation could endure, and according to experts many things required to be done could not possibly be performed. The German peace delegates were not prepared to find that the promise, explicitly given to the German people and the whole of mankind, "is in this way to be rendered illusory." They would substantiate these statements in detail, and transmit to the Allies and associate governments "their observations and their material continuously."

The representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers, was the reply of M. Clémenceau, wish to remind the German delegation that they have formulated the terms of the treaty with constant thought of the principles on which the armistice and the negotiations for peace were proposed; that they can admit no discussion of their right to insist on the terms of the peace substantially as drafted; and that they can consider only such practical suggestions as the German plenipotentiaries may have to submit.

In a second note Count Brockdorff-Rantzau complained that the delegation was required to sign the covenant of the League of Nations as part of the treaty, yet were not mentioned among the nations invited to join the League, and begged "to inquire whether, and, if so, under what circumstance, such invitation is intended." German plenipotentiaries would find on a re-examination of the covenant of the League of Nations that the matter of the admission of additional member states had not been overlooked, but was "explicitly provided for in the second paragraph of Article I."

A third note, delivered on the evening of May 10th, had to do with labor, and suggested the holding of a labor convention at Versailles. A fourth suggested a special commission to see to all the details of repatriation of German prisoners of war and interned civilians. A fifth asked permission to send a delegation to meet the Austrian plenipotentiaries when they came. A sixth, dealing with economic conditions, and declaring they meant the ruin of Germany; a seventh protesting

against the Saar Valley settlement, the transfer of Malmedy, Moesnet and Eupen districts to Belgium, and the forced evacuation of a part of Schleswig, and an eighth complaining of the forced payment by Germany for the devastation of Belgium and Northern France, reached M. Clémenceau on May 14.

Count Brockdorff-Rantzau now went to Spa, and at once it was asserted that he would not return, that he had requested to be replaced. He returned, however, on the morning of May 19th, bringing some forty experts with him, and on the next day addressed another note to M. Clémenceau, stating that he intended "during the next few days to submit communications to the Allied and associated governments on the following points, which, in the eyes of the delegation, fall under the definition of suggestions of a practical nature:

"First, a note concerning territorial questions in the East; second, a note concerning Alsace-Lorraine; third, a note concerning the occupied territories; fourth, a note concerning the extent and discharge of the obligations undertaken by Germany in view of reparation; fifth, a note concerning the further practical treatment of the question of labor laws; sixth, a note concerning the treatment of German private property in enemy countries." The problems involved were so complicated that it had been necessary to discuss them extensively with the experts in Versailles, as well as with those in Berlin. To dispose of them within the time limit of fifteen days would not be possible, "although the delegation will take pains to transmit as many notes as possible within the limit." Therefore he begged "in the name of the German peace delegation, to move that the contents of the intended notes be regarded as having already been made the subject of discussion in writing, and that the requisite time be granted to us for a more detailed exposition." The time was extended until May 29.

Reports from Berlin were all to the effect that Germany would not sign the treaty. In Paris they were looked on as propaganda, and the notes as having been prepared in Berlin before the treaty was delivered to the Germans. In none, it was

pointed out, was the text of the treaty quoted, and the matter complained of was such as everybody knew would be contained in the treaty. Nevertheless, the Allies made ready for the worst, prepared plans for quick action, and sent Marshal Foch to the front. General Pershing cancelled an engagement to visit London.

May 20, the day when the time within which the Germans must finish their observations on the treaty was carried forward, the German Cabinet gave out, through the Associated Press, a bitter attack on the treaty.

Germany declines to sign the peace terms laid before it because they spell the economic destruction, political dishonor and moral degradation of the entire German nation, not only for the present but also for still unborn generations.

That these consequences must logically follow acceptance of the peace conditions, the American press itself has recognized without question. Toward them, Germany took the standpoint that acceptance of such conditions could not be demanded, and that the Entente was unjustified in imposing such demands.

Germany has not only a moral right to compliance with the general promises made it but a firmly grounded, definite, clearly defined claim, according to the basic rules of international law, on all the Entente powers and, especially, on the United States. A specific recognition of the right of Germany and of the German peoples to a peace of right, justice and reconciliation, instead of the paragraphed song of hate, which was written at Versailles, is contained in the note of the American secretary of state, Lansing, of November 5, 1918.

In it, the secretary of state notified the Swiss minister in Washington, unconditionally, that the established basis of President Wilson's fourteen points should be authoritative for the peace conditions. Secretary Lansing announced further that the Entente governments, after careful consideration, also were prepared to recognize the conditions set up by President Wilson as the basis for the conclusion of peace.

The declaration of rights, emanating from these specific declarations of all the Entente powers and the United States, constitutes Germany's sole asset in the general moral breakdown of all international politics, which has found unsurpassable expression in the Versailles terms.

Germany answers them with its clearly juristic right in international law. Toward the politico-moral bankruptcy of Versailles the German nation stands as a creditor with undeniable rights, and it is not in position to yield on this chief point. Germany concluded peace on the basis of President Wilson's fourteen points, which all America had made its own, and all America, every individual, is responsible for the fulfillment of its claims.

It is not the German people's business to indicate how its rights shall be realized by the fourteen points, or especially by the note of Secretary Lansing. That, rather, is the task of those who constructed the fourteen points, and brought them to acceptance, thereby inducing Germany to lay down her weapons. We do not believe that President Wilson, Secretary Lansing, and the American people, can take other than this German standpoint, if they do not wish to do that which President Wilson, in his message of December 4, 1917, condemned categorically, when he said: "We would dishonor our own cause if we treated Germany any other than justly, and in a non-partisan manner and did not insist upon justice toward all, no matter how the war ended. We demand nothing which we are not ready ourselves to admit."

And the German people demand nothing more than that which President Wilson announced in this declaration. We demand nothing more than that Americans place the fourteen points opposite the peace terms. We do not believe that any one in the United States will then have the courage to claim that there can be found in the peace conditions one single trace left of President Wilson's program.

And here begins America's definite duty to step in. America either must put its fourteen points through, or it must declare that it is unable to do so, or that it does not want to do so, so that in no case may the world be led to believe that America desires to have the peace conditions count as President Wilson's fourteen points.

That is our demand, to which we cling, and we cannot imagine what arguments from the American side would be effective against it.

Chancellor Scheidemann, Bernhard Dernburg, Count von Bernstorff, and Mathias Erzberger now met Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, at Spa, to go over the final draft of the counter proposal to be submitted to the Allies at Versailles. On his return, three more notes treating of reparation and responsi-

bility, German property in allied countries, and German religious missions in foreign parts, were sent to the Peace Conference.

The time set by the Conference within which the German peace delegates must finish their work, and make their decision, had almost expired when, on May 28th, an unofficial summary of the reply was published in Berlin, the day before its official delivery to President Clémenceau. This reply was, in fact, a long counter proposal, and opened with the assertion that Germany was entitled to a peace based on President Wilson's fourteen points, because the Entente Power had agreed to peace on that basis, and neither Mr. Wilson nor any of the Allied Governments had since demanded peace on any other basis. Germany had replaced an imperialistic and irresponsible government by a strictly democratic government. Yet it would be hard to see what different conditions could be imposed were she under a government of the old imperialistic form. The solemn assurances of Great Britain, France, and Mr. Wilson, that the peace should be a peace of justice and right, and not one of violence, had not been kept.

Germany would disarm all her battleships if a part of her merchant marine were restored; but proposed that there be no territorial changes, save with the consent of populations concerned. Germany demanded that Danzig be made a free port, and the Vistula River neutralized; rejected the cession of Upper Silesia and the claims to East Prussia, West Prussia and Memel; objected to the disposition of the Saar region, Eupen, Malmedy, Morosnet and Alsace, and demanded an impartial settlement of all colonial claims as promised by the fifth of President Wilson's fourteen points. Should a League of Nations be formed, and Germany be immediately admitted, she was ready to administer her colonies in accordance with the principles of the League, and "in given circumstances as its mandatory." The treaty, in her opinion, was a full repudiation of the idea that every nation has a right to existence, and violated the right of self-determination. Germany, as a nation,

was to be destroyed. The treaty meant the ruin of German economic life, and doomed the German people to financial slavery. Germany would pay, as indemnity, 20,000,000,000 marks by 1926, and from 1927 onward would make annual payments to a total of not more than 100,000,000,000 marks in gold. Objection was made to the demand that Germans be surrendered for trial in enemy courts, and to the requirement that Germany acknowledge that she, and her allies, were responsible for all damage suffered by the opposing nations. It could not be disputed that some of the Allies, as Italy and Roumania, entered the war for territorial conquests.

A covering note from Count Brockdorff-Rantzau contained observations of the German delegation on the Treaty of Peace. We came to Versailles, it said, expecting to receive a peace proposal based on agreed principles, firmly resolved to do all in our power to fulfill the grave obligations we had undertaken, and hoping for that peace of justice which had been promised to us. We were aghast when we read the demands made by the victorious violence of our enemies. The more deeply we study the spirit of the treaty the more convinced we are that to carry it out is not possible. The demands of the treaty are more than the German people can bear. Territory, beyond question German, nearly all West Prussia, which is preponderantly German, Pomerania, Pomerania-Danzig, which is German to the core, must be given up to Poland, and that ancient Hanse town transformed into a free state under Polish suzerainty. We must agree that East Prussia shall be cut from the body of the State, condemned to a lingering death, and robbed of its northern portion, which is pure German. Upper Silesia must be renounced for the benefit of Poland and Czechoslovakia, though it has been bound in close political connection with Germany for more than seven centuries and a half, and is instinct with German life and customs. Circles preponderantly German must be ceded to Belgium, and the purely German district of the Saar must be severed from our Empire, and the way paved for its subsequent annexation to France.

Thus cut to pieces and weakened, Germany must declare herself ready to bear all the war expenses of her enemies, exceeding many times over the total German state and private assets. No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people to meet the demands of their enemies by their labor. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slavery.

We must surrender our merchant fleet, we must renounce our foreign securities, we must give over to our enemies all German enterprises abroad, we must renounce our colonies, and not even German missionaries shall have the right to follow their calling therein. Germany's chief waterways are subjected to international control. She must build, in her territory, such canals and railways as her enemies wish, and agree to treaties, the contents of which she does not know, to be made by her enemies with the new states on the east. She is excluded from the League of Nations to which is entrusted all work of common interest to the world, and must sign the decree for her own proscription, nay, her own death sentence.

Against all these things certain counter-proposals were made. Germany would proceed with her own disarmament in advance of all other peoples in order to show her willingness to help usher in the new era of the peace of justice; would give up universal compulsory service, reduce her army to 100,000 men, and even surrender the warships which her enemies were willing to leave in her hands. But she must stipulate that she be admitted forthwith, as a state with equal rights, into the League of Nations, which should be a genuine League of Nations, embracing all peoples of good will, even her enemies of to-day, and must be inspired by a feeling of responsibility toward mankind, and have at its disposal a power to enforce its will sufficiently to protect the frontiers of its members.

"Second. In territorial questions Germany takes up her position unreservedly on the ground of the Wilson program. She renounces her sovereign right in Alsace-Lorraine, but wishes a free plebiscite to take place there. She gives up the great part of the province of Posen, the district incontestably

Polish in population, together with the capital. She is prepared to grant to Poland, under international guarantees, free and secure access to the sea by ceding free ports at Danzig, Königsburg and Memel, by an agreement regulation, the navigation of the Vistula and by special railway conventions. Germany is prepared to ensure the supply of coal for the economic needs of France, especially from the Saar region, until such time as the French mines are once more in working order.

"The preponderantly Danish districts of Schleswig will be given up to Denmark on the basis of a plebiscite. Germany demands that the right of self-determination shall also be repeated where the interests of the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are concerned.

"She is ready to submit all her colonies to administration by the community of the League of Nations if she is recognized as its mandatory.

"Third. Germany is prepared to make payments incumbent on her in accordance with the agreed program of peace up to the maximum sum of 100,000,000,000 of gold marks (\$25,000,000,000)—20,000,000,000 by May 1, 1926, and the balance (80,000,000,000) in annual payments without interest. These payments shall in principle be equal to a fixed percentage of the German imperial and state revenues. The annual payment shall approximate to the former peace budget. For the first ten years the annual payments shall not exceed 1,000,000,000 of gold marks a year. The German taxpayer shall not be less heavily burdened than the taxpayer of the most heavily burdened state among those represented on the reparation commission.

"Germany presumes in this connection that she will not have to make any territorial sacrifices beyond those mentioned above and that she will recover her freedom of economic movement at home and abroad.

"Fourth. Germany is prepared to devote her entire economic strength to the service of reconstruction. She wishes to co-operate effectively in the reconstruction of the devastated

regions of Belgium and northern France. To make good the loss in production of the destroyed mines in northern France, up to twenty million tons of coal will be delivered annually for the first five years and up to eight million tons for the next five years. Germany will facilitate further deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy and Luxemburg.

"Germany is, moreover, prepared to make considerable deliveries of bensol, coal tar and sulphate of ammonia, as well as dyestuffs and medicines.

"Fifth. Finally Germany offers to put her entire merchant tonnage into a pool of the world's shipping, to place at the disposal of her enemies a part of her freight space as part payment on reparation, and to build for them for a series of years in German yards an amount of tonnage exceeding their demands.

"Sixth. In order to replace the river boats destroyed in Belgium and northern France, Germany offers river craft from her own resources.

"Seventh. Germany thinks that she sees an appropriate method for the fulfillment of her obligation to make reparation by conceding prompt participation in industrial enterprises, especially in coal mines to insure deliveries of coal.

"Eighth. Germany, in accordance with the desires of the workers of the whole world, wishes to see the workers in all countries free and enjoying equal rights. She wishes to insure to them in the treaty of peace the right to take their own decisive part in the settlement of social policy and social protection.

"Ninth. The German delegation again makes its demand for a neutral entry into the responsibility for the war and culpable acts in conduct. An impartial commission should have the right to investigate on its own responsibility the archives of all the belligerent countries and all the persons who took an important part in the war.

"Nothing short of confidence that the question of guilt will be examined dispassionately can have the people lately at war

with each other in the proper frame of mind for the formation of the League of Nations.

"These are only the most important among the proposals which we have to make. As regards other great sacrifices, and also as regards details, the delegation refers to the accompanying memorandum and the annex thereto.

"The time allowed us for the preparation of this memorandum was so short that it was impossible to treat all the questions exhaustively. A fruitful and illuminating negotiation could only take place by means of oral discussion. This treaty of peace is to be the greatest achievement of its kind in all history. There is no precedent for the conduct of such comprehensive negotiations by an exchange of written notes only. The feeling of the peoples who have made such immense sacrifices makes them demand that their fate should be decided by an open, unreserved exchange of ideas on the principle, 'Quite open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view.'

"Germany is to put her signature to the treaty laid before her and to carry it. Even in her need, justice for her is too sacred a thing to allow her to stoop to achieve conditions which she cannot undertake to carry out. Treaties of peace signed by the great powers have, it is true, in the history of the last decades again and again proclaimed the right of the stronger. But each of these treaties has been a factor in originating and prolonging the world war. Whenever in this war the victor has spoken to the vanquished, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, his words were but the seeds of future discord. The lofty aims which our adversaries first set before themselves in their conduct of the war, the new era of an assured peace by justice, demand a treaty instinct with a different spirit. Only the coöperation of all nations, a coöperation of hands and spirits, can build up a durable peace. We are under no delusions regarding the strength of the hatred and bitterness which this war has engendered, and yet the forces which are at work for

a union of mankind are stronger now than ever they were before. The historic task of the Peace Conference of Versailles is to bring about this union."

In good time the Allied and Associated Powers, through Premier Clémenceau, made reply. In their opinion the war "was the greatest crime against humanity and freedom of the people that any nation calling itself civilized has ever consciously committed." For many years the rulers of Germany had striven to "dictate and tyrannize over a subservient Europe as they dictated and tyrannized over a subservient Germany." To attain their ends, they never ceased to expand German armament by land and by sea, propagated the falsehood that it was necessary because Germany's neighbors were jealous of her power, sowed hostility and suspicion between nations, kept Europe in a ferment by threats of violence, and when their neighbors "resolved to resist their arrogant will," "asserted their predominance in Europe by force."

When all was prepared they encouraged a subservient ally to declare war on Serbia, on forty-eight hours' notice, a war which they knew involved the Balkans, could not be localized, and was bound to bring on a war of all European nations, refused every attempt at conciliation and conference until too late, and until the world war, for which they had plotted, and for which they alone were prepared, was inevitable.

Germany, the note charged, was not merely responsible for starting the war. She was also responsible for the savage and inhuman manner in which it was conducted. She violated the neutrality of Belgium, carried out a series of promiscuous shootings and burnings with the sole object of terrifying the people into submission, drove thousands of men, women and children, with brutal savagery, into slavery in foreign lands, and practised against prisoners of war, barbarities from which the most uncivilized people would have recoiled. She was the first to use poisonous gas, despite the frightful suffering it entailed, began the bombing and long distance shelling of towns for no military object whatever, but for the sole purpose of

destroying the morale of their opponents by striking at their women and children. She was the first to begin the submarine campaign with its defiance of international law, and its destruction of great numbers of innocent passengers and sailors in mid-ocean, far from succor, at the mercy of wind and wave, and yet more ruthless submarine crews.

"The conduct of Germany is almost unexampled in human history. The terrible responsibility which lies at her doors can be seen by the fact that not less than seven million dead lie buried in Europe, while more than twenty million others carry upon them the evidence of wounds and suffering, because Germany saw fit to gratify her lust for tyranny by resort to war."

Were the Allied and Associated Powers to consent to treat war as other than a crime against humanity and right, they would be false to those who gave their all to save the freedom of the world. This was made perfectly clear to the Germans during the war by President Wilson in his speeches, by Premier Lloyd George, by Premier Orlando, each of whom declared that compromise as to the terms of peace was impossible, and that just punishment should be meted out.

"Justice, therefore, is the only possible basis for the settlement of the accounts of this terrible war. Justice is what the German delegation asks for, and says that Germany has been promised. But it must be justice for all. There must be justice for the dead and wounded, and for those who have been made orphans and bereaved that Europe might be free from Prussian despotism. There must be justice for the peoples who now stagger under war debts, which exceed \$30,000,000,000, that liberty might be saved. There must be justice for those millions whose homes and lands, ships and property, German savagery has spoliated and destroyed.

"That is why the Allied and Associated Powers have insisted as a cardinal feature of the treaty that Germany must undertake to make reparations to the very uttermost of her power, for reparation for wrongs inflicted is of the essence of justice.

"That is why they insist that those individuals who are most

clearly responsible for German aggression, and for those acts of barbarism and inhumanity which have disgraced the German conduct of the war, must be handed over to justice, which has not been meted out to them at home.

"That, too, is why Germany must submit for a few years to certain special disabilities and arrangements. Germany has ruined the industries, the mines and the machinery of neighboring countries, not during battle, but with deliberate and calculated purpose of enabling her own industries to seize their markets before their industries could recover from the devastation thus wantonly inflicted upon them.

"Germany has despoiled her neighbors of everything she could make use of or carry away. Germany has destroyed the shipping of all nations on the high seas, where there was no chance of rescue for their passengers and crews.

"It is only justice that restitution should be made, and that these wronged peoples should be safeguarded for a time from the competition of a nation where industries are intact and have even been fortified by machinery stolen from occupied territories. If these things are hardships for Germany, they are hardships which Germany has brought upon herself. Somebody must suffer for the consequences of the war. Is it to be Germany, or the peoples she has wronged?

"Not to do justice to all concerned would only leave the world open to fresh calamities. If the German people themselves, or any other nation, are to be deterred from following the footsteps of Prussia; if mankind is to be lifted out of the belief that war for selfish ends is legitimate to any state; if the old era is to be left behind and nations, as well as individuals, are to be brought beneath the reign of law; even if there is to be early reconciliation and appeasement, it will be because those responsible for concluding the war have had the courage to see that justice is not defeated for the sake of a convenient peace.

"It is said that the German revolution ought to make a difference and that the German people are not responsible for the policy of the rulers whom they have thrown from power. The

Allied and Associated Powers recognize and welcome the change. It represents a great hope for peace and a new European order in the future.

"But it cannot affect the settlement of the war itself. The German revolution was stayed until the German armies had been defeated in the field, and all hope of profiting by a war of conquest had vanished. Throughout the war as before the war, the German people and their representatives supported the war, voted the credits, subscribed to the war loans, obeyed every order, however savage, of their government. They shared the responsibility for the policy of the government, for at any moment, had they willed it, they could have reversed it. Had that policy succeeded, they would have acclaimed it with the same enthusiasm with which they welcomed the outbreak of the war. They cannot now pretend, having changed their rulers after the war was lost, that it is justice that they should escape the consequences of their deeds.

"The Allied and Associated Powers, therefore, believe that the peace they have proposed is fundamentally a peace of justice. They are no less certain that it is a peace of right on the terms agreed. There can be no doubt as to the intentions of the Allied and Associated Powers to base the settlement of Europe on the principle of freeing oppressed peoples and redrawing national boundaries as far as possible, in accordance with the will of the peoples concerned, while giving to each the facilities to live an independent national and economic life.

"These intentions were made clear not only in President Wilson's address to Congress of Jan. 8, 1918, but in the principles of settlement enumerated in his subsequent addresses, which was the agreed basis of the peace. A memorandum on this point is attached to this letter."

True to these principles, the Allied and Associated Powers had made Poland an independent state with "free and secure access to the sea," and Danzig a free city severed from Germany because in no other way was it possible to provide for that "free and secure access to the sea" which Germany had prom-

ised to concede. The German counter proposals conflicted with the agreed basis of peace. They required that great majorities of Polish populations be kept under German rule. They denied secure access to the sea to a nation of over twenty million people, whose nationals were in the majority all the way to the coast, and did so in order to keep territorial connection between East and West Prussia, whose trade has always been mainly carried by sea. Whether upper Silesia should be part of Germany or Poland, the Allied and Associated Powers were willing should be decided by the vote of the people concerned.

The Saar Basin terms were necessary to the general scheme of reparation, and to give France immediate compensation for the wanton destruction of her northern coal fields. The colonies were not to be returned; there were to be no changes in the reparation terms; nor was Germany to be admitted at once into the League of Nations. It was unreasonable "to expect the free nations of the world to sit down immediately in equal association with those by whom they have been so grievously wronged."

The letter, and the memorandum attached, must be considered the last word of the Allied and Associated Powers. Therefore, they required the German delegation to declare, within seven days, whether they would, or would not, sign the treaty as amended. If they did not declare a willingness to sign, the armistice would end, and the Powers would take such steps as they thought "needful to force their terms."

Members of the German Government having, again and again, declared that the treaty, even in its amended form, must not be signed, the Cabinet, on June 20, resigned in a body. A new Cabinet was at once put in office, a mere dummy government, it was believed, set up to carry through the signing of the treaty, and then be swept from office to make way for the very officials who had resigned rather than approve the signing.

Meantime, preparations were under way in the occupied territory and bridgeheads for an immediate advance of the armies, should Germany fail to declare her intention to sign before seven o'clock on June 23, the end of the seven-day period.

On Sunday, June 22, the National Assembly, by a majority of ninety-nine, voted that the treaty be signed. Herr Bauer, the new premier, thereupon declared that the treaty would be signed without acknowledging the responsibility of the German people for the war, and without agreeing to the articles which required the extradition of certain German personages, and the trial of the former Emperor.

The momentous question of signing the treaty having thus been settled, the new German Government at once requested an extension of the seven-day limit, and at three o'clock on Monday morning, June 23, a note from Dr. Haniel von Haimhausen, of the peace delegation, was delivered to M. Clémenceau.

The minister for foreign affairs instructs me to beg the Allied and Associated Governments to prolong for forty-eight hours the time limit for answering your excellency's note communicated yesterday evening, and likewise the time limit for answering the note of June 16, 1919.

It was only on Saturday, after great difficulties, that a new cabinet was formed which, unlike its predecessor, could come to an agreement to declare its willingness to sign the treaty as regards nearly all its provisions. The national Assembly has expressed its confidence in this cabinet by a large majority of votes. The answer only arrived here just before midnight, as the direct wire from Versailles to Weimar was out of order.

The government must come into contact anew with the National Assembly in order to take the grievous decision which is still required of it in such a manner as it can only be taken in accordance with democratic principles and with the internal situation in Germany.

The Allied and Associated Governments, was the prompt reply, regret that it is not possible to extend the time within which "to make known your decision relative to the signature of the treaty, without any reservations."

The German government thereupon declared its willingness to sign with certain reservations. It asserted that the conditions imposed were greater than Germany could perform; protested against the taking away of the colonies; declared it could

not accept Article 230 requiring Germany to admit she was the sole author of the war, and did not cover the article by her signature; could not reconcile it with dignity and honor to execute articles 227 to 230, requiring Germany to give up for trial certain persons accused of committing acts contrary to the usages and customs of war, and proposed that:

Within two years, counting from the day when the treaty is signed, the Allied and Associated Governments will submit the present treaty to the high council of the powers, as constituted by the League of Nations, according to Article 4, for the purpose of subsequent examination. Before this high council the German plenipotentiaries are to enjoy the same rights and privileges as the representatives of the other contracting powers of the present treaty. This council shall decide in regard to those conditions of the present treaty which impair the rights to self-determination of the German people and also in regard to the stipulation whereby the free economic development of Germany on a footing of equal rights is impeded.

The government of the German public accordingly gives the declaration of its consent as required by the note of June 16, 1919, in the following form:

"The government of the German republic is ready to sign the treaty of peace, without, however, recognizing thereby that the German people was the author of the war and without undertaking any responsibility for delivering persons in accordance with Articles 227 to 230 of the treaty of peace."

The Allied and Associated Powers, was the reply, find in the present note of the German delegation no arguments or considerations not already examined, and feel constrained to say that the time for discussion is past. They can accept no qualification or reservation and must require of the German representatives an unequivocal decision as to their purposes to sign and accept as a whole, or not to sign and accept the treaty as finally formulated, and after signature must hold Germany responsible for the execution of every stipulation of the treaty.

And now, at last, Germany yielded, and late in the day von

Haimhausen wrote that the Minister of Foreign Affairs had instructed him to say:

It appears to the government of the German republic, in consternation at the last communication of the Allied and Associated Governments, that these Governments have decided to wrest from Germany by force acceptance of the peace conditions, even those, which, without presenting any material significance, aim at divesting the German people of their honor.

No act of violence can touch the honor of the German people. The German people, after frightful suffering in these last years, have no means of defending themselves by external action.

Yielding to superior force, and without renouncing in the meantime its own view of the unheard of injustice of the peace conditions, the government of the German republic declares that it is ready to accept and sign the peace conditions imposed.

News of the German acceptance of the treaty terms was received in London and Paris with manifestations of great joy. That the Germans would keep the treaty obligations was generally doubted in Washington. They will sign, it was said, with their tongues in their cheeks, and their fingers crossed, and the whole world, for a long time to come, will have to stand guard against German treachery sure to be practised. No one supposes, for a minute, that the peace terms will be carried out in good faith, if the Germans can find a loophole for escape. They have submitted because of the helplessness to which the Allied armies have reduced them, and because longer delay would bring heavier conditions. Indeed, at the very time these expressions of distrust were made, a fine example of German treachery was afforded by the sinking of the German war ships at Scapa Flow. As required by the armistice, ten battleships, six battle cruisers, eight light cruisers and fifty destroyers were interned with skeleton crews of Germans as caretakers, and no British guards aboard. Suddenly, about noon on June 21, the crews began to leave them, and one by one battleships, cruisers and destroyers keeled over and sank, until but one battleship, two light cruisers and eighteen destroyers remained, most of

these beeched by tugs. Rear Admiral von Reuter, in obedience to orders given him that no German armed vessel should be surrendered, had ordered the seacocks opened, supposing that the armistice had ended.

By the terms of the peace treaty, Germany was to restore all flags taken from the French in 1870 and 1871. To prevent the fulfillment of this provision the battle flags in Berlin were removed from the place where they were kept and burned in public. These acts of treachery brought from M. Clémenceau a long note to the German peace delegation. He called attention to Article 23 of the armistice terms, which reads: "The German surface warships which shall be specified by the allies and the United States shall forthwith be disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports, or, failing them, in the allied ports designated by the Allies and the United States. They shall there remain under supervision by the Allies and the United States, only care and maintenance parties being left on board"; claimed that Germany, by signing the terms, entered into an undertaking that the ships handed over by her should remain in the ports indicated by the Allied and Associated Powers, and that care and maintenance parties should be left on board with such instructions and under such orders as would ensure that the armistice should be observed; and charged that the "sinking of these ships, instead of their preservation, as had been provided for, and in breach of the undertaking embodied in Article 31 of the armistice against all acts of destruction, constituted at once a violation of the armistice, the destruction of the pledge handed over, and an act of gross bad faith toward the Allied and Associated Powers."

The German admiral in command of the care and maintenance parties, while recognizing that the act was a breach of the armistice, had attempted to justify it by alleging his belief that the armistice had come to an end. This alleged justification was not well founded, as, under the communication addressed to the German delegation by the Allied and Associated Powers on the 16th of June, 1919, the armistice would only

terminate on refusal to sign the peace or if no answer were returned on the 23d of June at 11 o'clock." In international law, "particularly in articles 40 and 41 of the regulations annexed to the fourth Hague convention of 1907, every serious violation of the armistice by one of the parties gives the other party the right to denounce it and even in case of urgency to recommence hostilities at once."

A violation of the terms of the armistice by individuals, acting on their own initiative, only confers the right of demanding the punishment of these offenders and, if necessary, indemnity for the losses sustained. It will therefore be open to the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before a military tribunal, the persons responsible for these acts of destruction, so that the appropriate penalties may be imposed. Furthermore, the incident gives the Allied and Associated Powers a right to reparation for the loss caused and in consequence a right to proceed to such further measures as the said powers may deem appropriate.

Lastly, the sinking of the German fleet is not only a violation of the armistice, but can only be regarded by the Allied and Associated Powers as a deliberate breach in advance of the conditions communicated to Germany, and now accepted by her.

Furthermore, the incident is not an isolated act. The burning or permission for the burning of the French flags which Germany was to restore constitutes another deliberate breach in advance of these same conditions.

In consequence, the Allied and Associated Powers declare, that they take note of these signal acts of bad faith, and that when the investigations into all the circumstances have been completed, they will exact the necessary reparation. It is evident that any repetition of acts like these must have a very unfortunate effect upon the future operation of the treaty which the Germans are about to sign. They have made complaint of the fifteen years' period of occupation which the treaty contemplates. They have made complaint that admission to the League of Nations may be too long deferred. How can Germany put forward such claims if she encourages, or permits, deliberate violations of her written engagements? She cannot complain should the allies use the full powers conferred on them by the treaty, particularly Article 429, if she, on her side, deliberately violates its provisions.

June 28, the fifth anniversary of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his morganatic wife at Serajevo, was the day chosen for the signing of the treaty. The place was the famous Hall of Mirrors, in the Château at Versailles, where, forty-eight years before, the Franco-Prussian peace treaty was signed and Frederick William proclaimed Emperor of Germany. Nor was this event suffered to go unnoticed, for six senators who had fought in that war were especially invited to be present. According to the program of ceremonies, the German delegation was to enter the Hall by a door other than that to be used by the representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers. Against this Haniel von Haimhausen protested. "We cannot admit," he said, "that the German delegates should enter the Hall by a different door than the Entente delegates; nor that military honors should be withheld. Had we known there would be such arrangements the delegates would not have come." It was finally settled that military honors should be paid the Germans as they left the Hall. A few minutes after three o'clock Dr. Hermann Mueller, the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Dr. Johannes Bell, the Colonial Secretary, were shown into the Hall, and having taken their seats at the long horseshoe-shaped table, M. Clémenceau rose and said: "The session is open. The Allied and Associated Powers on the one side, and the German Reich on the other, have come to an agreement on the terms of peace. The treaty has been completely drafted, and the President of the Conference has stated, in writing, that the text now about to be signed is identical with the two hundred copies that have been delivered to the German delegation. The signatures will now be affixed, and they constitute a solemn pledge, faithfully and loyally to carry out the conditions embodied in this treaty of peace. I now invite the delegates of the German Reich to sign the treaty."

After a few moments' pause, the master of ceremonies escorted them to the table whereon lay the treaty, and they affixed their names. President Wilson and the American delegates were the next to sign. Then came Lloyd George and the British

delegates, and then the representatives of the British Dominions. When those from South Africa were about to sign, General Jan Christian Smuts announced that he did so under protest, and filed a document setting forth that in some respects the treaty was unsatisfactory. M. Clémenceau and the French delegates were the next to sign; then came the Japanese, then the Italians, and after them the delegates from the small Powers. The seats assigned the Chinese delegates were vacant; they did not attend because of the provisions in the treaty regarding the peninsula of Shantung. At a quarter before four o'clock all was over, and the Germans left the Hall.

My fellow countrymen [said President Wilson in an address to the People of the United States]: The Treaty of Peace has been signed. If it is ratified and acted upon in full and sincere execution of its terms, it will furnish the charter for a new order of affairs in the world. It is a severe treaty in the duties and penalties it imposes upon Germany, but it is severe only because great wrongs done by Germany are to be righted and repaired; it imposes nothing that Germany cannot do, and she can regain her rightful standing in the world by the prompt and honorable fulfillment of its terms.

And it is much more than a treaty of peace with Germany. It liberates great peoples who have never before been able to find the way to liberty. It ends, once for all, an old and intolerable order, under which small groups of selfish men could use the peoples of great empires to serve their ambition for power and dominion. It associates the free governments of the world in a permanent league, in which they are pledged to use their united power to maintain peace by maintaining right and justice. It makes international law a reality, supported by imperative sanctions. It does away with the right of conquest, and rejects the policy of annexation, and substitutes a new order under which backward nations, populations which have not yet come to political consciousness, and peoples who are ready for independence, but not yet quite prepared to dispense with protection and guidance, shall no more be subjected to the domination and exploitation of a stronger nation, but shall be put under the friendly direction, and afforded the helpful assistance of governments which undertake to be responsible to the opinion of mankind in the execution of their task by accepting the direction of the League of Nations.

It recognizes the inalienable rights of nationality, the rights of minorities, and the sanctity of religious belief and practice. It lays the basis for conventions which shall free the commercial intercourse of the world from unjust and vexatious restrictions, and for every sort of international coöperation that will serve to cleanse the life of the world, and facilitate its common action in beneficent service of every kind. It furnishes guarantees such as were never given, or even contemplated, for the fair treatment of all who labor at the daily tasks of the world.

It is for this reason that I have spoken of it as a great charter for a new order of affairs. There is ground here for deep satisfaction, universal reassurance, and confident hope.

His work done, the President, on the evening of the 28th, left for Brest to board the *George Washington* waiting to carry him home. Before leaving Paris he bade a formal farewell to France:

As I look back over the eventful months I have spent in France my memory is not of conferences and hard work alone, but also of innumerable acts of generosity and friendship which have made me feel how genuine the sentiments of France are toward the people of America, and how fortunate I have been to be the representative of our people in the midst of a nation which knows how to show us kindness with so much charm, and so much open manifestation of what is in its heart.

Deeply happy as I am at the prospects of joining my own countrymen again, I leave France with genuine regret, my deep sympathy for her people, and belief in her future confirmed; my thought enlarged by the privilege of association with her public men, conscious of more than one affectionate friendship formed, and profoundly grateful for unstinted hospitality, and for countless kindnesses which have made me feel welcome and at home.

I take the liberty of bidding France godspeed as well as good-by, and of expressing once more my abiding interest and entire confidence in her future.

That same day King George sent a message to the President saying:

In this glorious hour, when the long struggle of nations for right, justice and freedom is at last crowned by a triumphant peace, I

greet you, Mr. President, and the great American people in the name of the British nation.

At a time when fortune seemed to frown, and the issues of the war trembled in the balance, the American people stretched out the hand of fellowship to those who on this side of the ocean were battling for a righteous cause. Light and hope at once shone brighter in our hearts, and a new day dawned.

Together we have fought to a happy end, together we lay down our arms in proud consciousness of valiant deeds nobly done.

Mr. President, it is on this day one of our happiest thoughts that the American and British people, brothers in arms, will continue forever to be brothers in peace. United before by language, traditions, kinship, and ideals, there has been set upon our fellowship the sacred seal of common sacrifice.

CHAPTER IX

THE TREATY REJECTED

THOUGH the treaty was signed and ratified by Germany, no official copy had been seen by the public. Again and again attempts were made to secure one. The French Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the French budget committee had each requested copies from M. Clémenceau, but the Premier had firmly refused to send them. Meantime the Germans were spreading printed copies broadcast, and giving this as a reason the French Chamber of Deputies called for the treaty and were informed that the request could not be granted. Thereupon a Paris journal, *Bon Soir*, secured six hundred copies of the book from Switzerland, and presented them to the Chamber, whose authorities posted a notice informing members that each could obtain one at the questor's office, as a present from *Bon Soir*. Copies found their way from Denmark to private parties in New York, and were seen by Senators. Mr. Lodge stated on the floor of the Senate that when in New York he had in his hand, and looked over for an hour and a half, a copy of the treaty, and heard of the existence in that city of three more. Senator Borah said they were in the possession of certain interests particularly concerned in the treaty. Here was a matter to be investigated. How did they get their copies? Who gave them out? Had our representatives in Paris allowed interests in New York to secure them for their own selfish uses?

A resolution was accordingly introduced, and adopted unanimously without a roll call. It set forth that Mr. Borah, the Senator from Idaho, has stated in the Senate that certain interests in New York City have secured copies of the peace

treaty with Germany, while the American people have not been able to procure one; that the Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Lodge, has stated in the Senate that he knew of four copies in New York; that the only place where it is not allowed to come is the United States Senate; and that the Senator from Idaho has stated that the interests in possession of copies are particularly interested in the treaty. Therefore, the Committee on Foreign Relations is directed to investigate and report to the Senate the names of the persons, corporations, or interests, which have secured copies of the treaty, from whom and by what means they were secured, and to what extent the interests are particularly concerned in the treaty. By another resolution the Secretary of State was requested to furnish the full text of the document, if not incompatible with the public interest.

A few days later Senator Borah rose in the Senate and said that he had in his possession a copy of the treaty; that he was about to ask permission of the Senate to print it as a Senate document; that he was permitted to offer it by the consent of those who gave it to him; that the particular copy he was offering was brought to this country by a staff correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune*, and was delivered to him as a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He entertained no doubt that it was a true and correct copy, and asked unanimous consent that it be printed as a Senate document.

Unanimous consent having been refused, the Senator moved that the document be printed in the *Record*. A hot debate followed; but the motion was carried by forty-seven yeas to twenty-four nays. Nine Democrats voted for printing; one Republican voted against it. A motion to reconsider was soon made and the debate was renewed more hotly than before. In the midst of it Senator Borah, having obtained the floor, said that the authenticity of his copy had been questioned. Therefore he would prove it genuine by reading it. A storm of opposition arose at once from Democratic Senators. It was contrary to all precedent to present a treaty in open session;

it was a confidential document to read which was contrary to the Senate rules; he was exceeding his right by speaking too often on the same subject. To read it would require some fifteen hours; nevertheless the Senator began, and had gone on for an hour when the party leaders, having secured unanimous consent to interrupt the reading and come to a vote, it was taken. The yeas were forty-two, the nays twenty-four. The motion to reconsider was lost; the treaty was rushed to the Government printing office, and the next day, June 10, it appeared in the *Congressional Record*, and the important newspapers of the country.

That same day Senator Knox offered a resolution intended to serve notice on the Peace Conference that the Senate would not ratify the treaty if it contained the Covenant of the League of Nations. The treaty, the resolution set forth, might easily be so drawn as to permit the making of immediate peace, leaving for later determination the establishment of a League of Nations. The treaty, as drawn, contained "principles, guarantees and undertakings obliterative of legitimate race and national aspirations, oppressive of weak nations and peoples," and destructive of human progress and liberty. Therefore the Senate would regard as fully adequate to our national needs, to the obligations we owed to our co-belligerents, and to humanity, a treaty which assured to the people of the United States "the attainment of those ends for which we entered the war," and would "look with disfavor upon all treaty provisions going beyond those ends."

The Constitution provides the only ways in which it may be amended. Amendment by treaty is not one of these ways, therefore the treaty making power "has no authority to make a treaty which in effect amends the Constitution of the United States," and the Senate "cannot advise and consent to any treaty provision which would have such effect if enforced;" but does advise that "the paramount duty of the Peace Conference" is quickly to bring peace to all the belligerents; that to this end the treaty shall be so drawn as to reserve to any nation,

for future separate consideration by its people, the question of any League of Nations; "that neither such an article nor the exercise of the rights reserved thereunder" shall at any time "affect the substance of the obligations of Germany and its co-belligerents under the treaty," and that, until the United States shall enter the League, the "indispensable participation by the United States in matters covered by the League Covenant" shall be through diplomatic commissions.

Finally, it shall be the declared policy of our government that "the freedom and peace of Europe being again threatened by any power or combination of powers, the United States will regard such a situation with grave concern as a menace to its own peace and freedom," and, if necessary, will coöperate with our chief co-belligerents for the defense of civilization.

The resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and with the last paragraph, declaring the policy of the government towards peace in Europe stricken out, was reported back to the Senate.

That the resolution would never be passed was certain. All that could be hoped was to obtain enough votes in its favor to show that at least one-third of the Senate was firmly opposed to joining the Covenant of the League of Nations with the treaty. By the end of a fortnight even this seemed doubtful and the resolution was never brought to a test vote.

As the prospect of failure to secure even one-third of the Senators in support of the resolution grew darker each day, Mr. Lodge, in hope of checking the waning support of the Republicans, made public a letter from Mr. Elihu Root. He would be glad, Mr. Root said, to see the Covenant of the League of Nations separated from the terms of the treaty of peace. If this could not be, then the Senate ought to include in its resolution of consent such reservations and understandings as would remedy the defects he pointed out. The defects were serious. Nothing had been done by the revisionists for the re-establishment of arbitration of questions of legal right; nor for the revision or development of international law; nor to

limit the vast and incalculable obligations imposed by Article X. The clause regarding the Monroe Doctrine was erroneous in its description and ambiguous in its meaning. The clause authorizing withdrawal from the League after two years' notice might make it possible for the Council on "a mere charge that we had not performed some international obligation" to take jurisdiction "of the charge as a disputed question and keep us in the League indefinitely against our will."

Mr. Root suggested as reservations and understandings to be made a part of the instrument of ratification, that the Senate in advising and consenting to the ratification of the treaty exclude from its consent Article X of the League of Nations; that in giving its consent the Senate should do so with the understanding that whenever two years' notice of withdrawal shall have been given, "no claim, charge or finding" that international obligations under the Covenant have not been fulfilled, will be deemed to render the notice ineffectual, or keep in the League the power giving the notice after the lapse of the specified time; and that, as the United States, in joining the League of Nations is moved by no wish to meddle with the political policy of any foreign State, and by no existing or expected danger in the affairs of the American Continents, "but accedes to the wish of the European States that it shall join its power to theirs for the preservation of general peace," the Senate consents to the ratification of the treaty, save Article X, with the understanding that nothing therein contained shall be construed to imply the relinquishment by the United States of America in its traditional attitude towards purely American questions, or to require the submission of its policy regarding questions which it deems to be purely American questions, to the decision or recommendation of other powers.

After the treaty was ratified with the reservations and understandings suggested, Mr. Root thought the Senate should adopt a resolution asking the President to open negotiations with the other powers for the reestablishment and strengthening of a system of arbitration of disputes on questions of legal right,

and for meetings, from time to time, of representatives of the powers for the revision and development of international law.

Inclusion of these reservations and understandings in the instrument of ratification would not require further negotiation. If none of the other signatories expressly objected, the treaty stood as limited.

Four courses of action now lay before the Senate. Reject the treaty, an act which nobody expected would be perpetrated. Follow the advice of Senator Knox and separate the Covenant from the treaty. Ratify the treaty with reservations as suggested by Mr. Root. Ratify the treaty as it stood. Of the ninety-six Senators some forty-three were for the Covenant with reservations, and some forty for the Covenant without reservations. Eight were against the Covenant in any form. The rest were in doubt. The Republicans had a majority of two votes, but were divided in opinion, without leadership, and without a party policy. If, as some held, the resolution to ratify could be amended, and the reservations added, by a majority vote, the Republicans could carry their reservations by a united party vote. Could they be united? If, as others held, a two-thirds vote was necessary to amend, because that vote was necessary to pass the resolution to ratify, even a united Republican party could do nothing without the aid of Democratic Senators. Would they accept the Republican reservations? Neither with nor without reservations could the treaty be ratified without votes from both parties.

Such was the situation when the President reached New York on July 8, and two days later laid the treaty before the Senate and made an address. He would not, he said, attempt to explain the questions which arose during the conference, but report to Congress the part played by himself and his colleagues as representatives of the government of the United States. That part was determined by the rôle we had played, and by the expectations aroused in the minds of the peoples with whom we had been associated in the great war. We entered it, not because our material interests were threatened, not

because of any special treaty obligations, but because we saw the supremacy of right everywhere put in jeopardy, and free governments threatened by the aggression of a Power which respected neither right nor obligation. We entered the war as the champion of right, and were concerned in the peace terms in no other capacity.

When our soldiers, he said, began to pour across the sea, the hopes of the Allied nations were at a low ebb. Save in their stoutest spirits there was everywhere a sombre foreboding of disaster. Senators had only to recall what the Allies feared in mid-summer of 1918, and what "our timely aid accomplished alike for their morale and their physical safety. That first, never-to-be-forgotten action at Château-Thierry had already taken place. Our redoubtable soldiers and marines had already closed the gap the enemy had succeeded in opening for their advance upon Paris, had already turned the tide of battle back towards the frontiers of France, and begun the rout that was to save Europe and the World.

"Thereafter the Germans were to be always forced back, back, and never to thrust successfully forward again. And yet there was no confident hope." The men and women who came to the celebration of July 4th, 1918, in Paris, came with no heart for festivity. They came out of courtesy, but they went away with something new in their hearts. The sight of our men, of their stalwart vigor, their confidence, their swinging march, made all who saw them realize that something that was no mere incident had happened. "A great moral force had flung itself into the struggle." These soldiers were crusaders, and as their numbers "swelled into millions their strength was seen to mean salvation." They were for all "the visible embodiment of America. What they did made America, and all that she stood for, a living reality in the thoughts, not only of the people of France, but also of tens of millions of men and women throughout all the toiling nations of a world standing in peril of its freedom."

"And the compulsion of what they stood for was upon us

who represented America at the peace table." It was the duty of those who represented America to realize the hopes of the nations brought by our assistance to their freedom. Old entanglements, promises made by one government to another in the old days when might and right were confused, stood in the way. It was not easy to graft the new order of ideas on the old. "The atmosphere in which the conference worked seemed created not by the ambitions of strong governments, but by the hopes and aspirations of small nations, and of people hitherto held under bondage to the power that victory had shattered and destroyed." "There could be no peace until the whole order of Central Europe had been set right." This meant that new nations, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, must be created; that a new Roumania as well as a new Slavic state clustering about Serbia must be made at the peace table. The German Colonies were to be disposed of; they had been exploited, but never governed. The Turkish Empire had a part, and its peoples cried out for release from unspeakable distress, "for all that the new day of hope seemed at last to bring within its dawn." These were not tasks the conference looked about to find, and went out of its way to perform. They were thrust upon it by the war, and were not to be accomplished by prescribing in a treaty what should be done. A league of free nations became a practical necessity. Statesmen of all belligerent countries agreed that such a league must be formed to sustain the settlements they were to effect. As the task of adjusting the world's affairs progressed from day to day, it became evident that what they sought would be little better than something written on paper, if they did not create a means of common counsel which all must accept, a common authority which all must respect.

The fact that the Covenant of the League was the first part of the treaty worked out, made all the rest easier. The Conference was not to be ephemeral. The concert of nations was to go on under a covenant which all had agreed on; the League of Nations was the practical statesman's hope of success. The

League "was not merely an instrument to adjust and remedy old wrongs under a new treaty of peace, it was the only hope of mankind. Again and again had the demon of war been cast out of the house of the peoples, and the house swept clear by a treaty of peace, only to prepare a time when he would enter it again with spirits worse than himself. The house must now be given a tenant who could hold it against all such."

Convenient as the statesmen found the League to be for carrying out their plans of peace and reparation, they saw in it, before their work was done, the hope of the world, and did not dare to disappoint that hope. "Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty? Dare we reject it, and break the heart of the world?"

Our entrance into the war established our position among the nations. "Nothing but our own mistaken action can alter it." It is not by accident, or by a "sudden choice that we are no longer isolated and devoted to a policy which has only our own interests and advantage for its object. It is our duty to go in, if we are indeed the champions of liberty and right." "The stage," the President concluded, "is set, the destiny disclosed. It has come about by no plan of our conceiving, but by the hand of God, who led us into this war. We cannot turn back. We can only go forward, with lifted eyes and freshened spirits to follow the vision. It was of this that we dreamed at our birth. America shall in truth show the way. The light streams upon the path ahead, and nowhere else."

No sooner had the President left the Senate chamber, than the treaty was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and in a few minutes was on its way to the public printer. In the course of a few days the Committee reported, and the Senate adopted three resolutions. One called for a copy of a treaty, said to have been made by Germany and Japan in October, 1918, which bound the two Powers to enter into a separate peace, pledged Japan to help Germany to secure commercial advantages in Russia, and share with Germany the interests of Japan in the Shantung peninsula. Another asked the Presi-

dent to send a copy of any protest filed by members or officials of the American peace commission against the Shantung award. The third called for copies of all drafts of proposed league covenants, reports of arguments relative to the League, and of all papers which in any way had to do with the treaty of peace.

Attack upon the treaty was now shunted from the Covenant to Shantung, and the opponents fell upon the provisions giving the control of that peninsula to Japan.

Because of the killing of two German missionaries in China, the German Government in 1897 seized the port of Tsingtao in the bay of Kiaochau, forced the Manchu Government in 1898 to lease the port to Germany for ninety-nine years, obtained railway and mining rights in the Province of Shantung, and the right of passage for troops in a zone around the bay of Kiaochau. Germany might build two railroads, one of which, some two hundred and fifty miles long, was to extend from Tsingtao to Tsinanfu, and she might work mines within ten miles of the railroads.

When Japan, in 1914, entered the war and attacked Kiaochau, China marked out a war zone; but after the Germans surrendered the zone was abolished. Japan thereupon made twenty-one demands on China, some of which related to Kiaochau, and finally arranged the treaty of May, 1915, by which China agreed to recognize any settlement Japan might make with Germany, when peace was concluded, concerning the rights and concessions Germany possessed in Shantung.

February 3, 1917, our diplomatic relations with Germany were severed, and the President invited all neutral nations to follow our example. China was the first to do so. But, between the day when she broke with Germany and the day when she declared war, Great Britain, France, Italy and Russia by a secret agreement with Japan promised, when peace was made, to support her claims to the privileges which Germany held in Shantung, provided Japan used her influence to persuade China to enter the war on the side of the Allies. When, at last, China declared war, she at the same time announced that all treaties

with her enemies were thereby abrogated, and so put an end to that which granted Germany privileges in Shantung. Nevertheless, when Italy withdrew from the Peace Conference because of the Fiume incident, when it seemed likely China might withdraw because of the Shantung claims of Japan, and the League of Nations fail, President Wilson felt compelled to side with Great Britain, France and Italy, who stood by the secret agreement, and the privileges which Germany once held in the Shantung peninsula were transferred to Japan.

It was to this transfer, this treatment of an ally, that Senators were opposed. A great wrong, it was said, had been done China. She had been wheedled out of her territory at the peace table. Shantung was the price paid for Japan's acceptance of the League of Nations. The price paid for Great Britain's support of the claims of Japan, it was alleged, was the promise of Japan early in 1917 to support the claims of Great Britain to Pacific islands south of the equator. The price paid for the support of France was the pledge of Japan, early in 1917, to help draw China into the war that German ships in her ports might be interned and then requisitioned and placed at the disposal of the Allies, as had been done by Italy and Portugal. China came into the war, the ships were seized, and at the peace table the secret agreements were made good. "In all the annals of history," said a Senator, "I do not believe there is recorded a more disgraceful and dishonorable agreement to carve up the territory, not of an enemy, but of an allied friend. And if we approve this wicked decree, is it any defence to say that we were the only member of the court that was not bribed?"

Japan, said another Senator, is building up a vast power in China, and we are helping her to do it. England had stood by and looked on while Germany took Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, destroyed Austria and made it a vassal state, and wrecked France in 1870. England gave Heligoland to Germany, and had been paying the bills for these awful mistakes during the last four years. "There is another great Power

being built up on the other side of the ocean, and we who are not a party to any secret treaty, an independent nation with no personal ends to serve, are asked to put our approval at the bottom of that treaty which provides for the robbing of China, handing over this great province to the control of Japan." He, for one, did not want to see his country's name at the bottom of any document of that sort.

That the President would, or could, send the papers, and documents, and stenographic reports demanded by the Senate was generally doubted, nor was the doubt lessened when he began inviting Republican Senators to come to the executive office at various times to discuss with him the provisions of the treaty of peace and the League of Nations. By some the action of the President was viewed as an attempt to win over members of the opposition who seemed inclined to favor the treaty and the League. Others looked on it as a sensible proceeding, for not only could he impart information not to be found in any document, but he could hear from the Senators the reasons for their firm determination that reservations must be made, and just what those reservations must be.

Ignoring the radical Republican leaders of the opposition, the President began by inviting Senators whose opposition was milder, men in what he was said to have called "the twilight zone of the opposition." On such information as could be gathered concerning these interviews the President was reported to have no objections to "interpretations" if they did not change the terms of the treaty, no objection to the Senate stating in the resolution of ratification just what the United States understood to be the meaning of certain provisions in the treaty, but was opposed to any amendment that would send it back to the Peace Conference. It was reported that he had decided to make an explanation of the Shantung settlement; that he would not consent to the cutting out of Article X, because it did not take from Congress the right to decide whether the country should, or should not, be plunged into war; that he had assured his associates at the Peace Conference that he could not bind

the country to make war. On another day the President told the "twilight zoners" who came on invitation that the Shantung question was referred to him by the Conference, and that he recommended that the secret agreement made with Japan be carried out. The President, however, in an official statement issued at the White House, denied that he had originated the settlement. "The President," so ran the statement, "authorizes the announcement that the statement carried in several of the papers this morning (July 23), that he originated or formulated the provisions with regard to Shantung in the treaty of peace with Germany, is altogether false. He exerted all the influence he was at liberty to exercise in the circumstances to obtain a modification of them, and believed that the ultimate action of Japan, with regard to Shantung, will put the whole matter in its true light."

And now Mr. Taft, in a letter to the chairman of the Republican National Committee, proposed six reservations "with the hope that they will suggest a basis of agreement between the Democrats and sufficient Republicans to ratify the treaty and secure us the inestimable benefit of a League of Nations." The proposed interpretations were:

That after two years' notice the United States could withdraw from the League without having it pass on the question whether she had, or had not, fulfilled all her obligations under the Covenant.

That self-governing colonies and dominions be not represented on the Council at the same time with the mother government.

That the action of the Council under Article X be advisory only, that each member be free to decide questions of war in its own way, and that the decision of the United States rest with Congress.

That differences between nations regarding immigration, the tariff and other domestic issues be not left with the League for settlement.

That the Monroe Doctrine is reserved for administration by the United States.

That the United States reserves the right to withdraw, unconditionally, after two years, or at least end its obligations under Article X.

The letter Mr. Taft now declared in a message to the Associated Press was "personal and confidential," and was published without the knowledge of the chairman of the National Committee, or himself.

Senator Hale, of Maine, having written to Mr. Hughes for a statement of such reservations as, in his opinion, would safeguard the interests of the country, Mr. Hughes suggested four. When a Power gave notice of its intention to quit the League it should cease to be a member at the time specified in the notice, but should not be released from any debts or liabilities theretofore contracted.

Questions solely within domestic jurisdiction should not be subject to consideration or action by the League.

Our attitude towards purely American questions should not be abandoned, should not be subject to jurisdiction by the League. We should be free to oppose acquisition of territory in the western hemisphere by any non-American Power.

The United States should assume no obligations, under Article X, to use its forces on land or sea, or fit out military expeditions, unless such action was authorized by Congress.

Opposition Senators now found fault with the President because he had not submitted to the Senate the Anglo-American-French treaty. That such a compact for the defense of France from German aggression was in existence had long been known. The text of the treaty had been published in the *Paris Figaro* of July 3rd, in the *London Times* of July 4, and in *Harvey's Weekly*, a New York periodical. The President in his address to the Senate when presenting the treaty of Versailles said: "I shall presently have occasion to lay before you a special treaty with France whose object is the temporary protection of France from unprovoked aggression by the power with whom

this treaty of peace has been negotiated. Its terms link it with this treaty. I take the liberty, however, of reserving it because of its importance for special explication on another occasion." An article in the French treaty provided that it should be "submitted to the Senate of the United States at the same time as the treaty of Versailles." This the President did not do. Therefore, in the opinion of the opposition Senators, he had violated the article in question, and what was almost as bad, he had not submitted it at all, though two weeks had passed since he laid before the Senate the treaty of Versailles. Because of these things Senator Lodge moved that the President be requested to transmit the proposed treaty with France to the end that the Senate might consider it "in connection with the treaty of peace with Germany."

The motion was laid over, but a few days later the President sent the document and said the object of the treaty "is to provide for immediate military assistance to France by the United States, in case of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her by Germany, without waiting for the advice of the Council of the League of Nations that such action will be taken." He was moved to sign it by considerations which he hoped would seem as persuasive, as irresistible to the Senate as they did to him. We are bound to France by sacred ties of friendship. She had helped us win our freedom. It might well be doubted if we could have won it without her timely aid. Recently we had assisted in driving her enemies, who were also enemies of the world, from her soil. But this did not pay our debt to her, a debt nothing could pay. Now she wished us to promise to help defend her against the Power she had most reason to fear. Another great nation had volunteered the same promise, and it was "one of the fine reversals of history that the other nation should be the very Power with whom France fought to set us free."

The treaty consisted of a long preamble and four articles. The first called attention to Articles 42, 43 and 44 of the treaty of Versailles, articles which had to do with fortifications on

the left bank of the Rhine, and provided that "in case these stipulations did not assure immediately to France appropriate security and protection," the United States "shall be bound to come immediately to her aid in case of any unprovoked act of aggression directed against her by Germany." The second set forth that the treaty would not be in force until a similar one between France and Great Britain was ratified. The third required that the treaty be laid before, and recognized by, the Council of the Society of Nations and should remain in force until, on demand of one of the parties to it, the Council, by a majority if occasion arise, decided that the League of Nations assures ample protection.

After a delay of nearly a month the President answered the calls of the Committee on Foreign Relations for papers and documents. He had been asked for all drafts of plans for a League of Nations laid before the Conference, and especially for that prepared by the commissioners of the United States. The President now replied that he had no such drafts save that of the United States, and this he sent. He had been asked for all proceedings, arguments, debates, transcripts of the stenographic reports of the Peace Commission, relating to the League of Nations, and all data bearing on the treaty of peace. No stenographic reports of debates, the President replied, were taken. Such memoranda as were made, it was agreed, should be confidential.

The President now answered the calls of the Senate for papers and documents. To the first resolution asking for a copy of a treaty said to have been concluded between Germany and Japan, for any information regarding it, in the possession of the Department of State, and for information concerning any negotiations between Germany and Japan during the war, the President answered that he knew of no such negotiations.

By the second resolution request was made for a copy of any letter, or written protest, by the members of the American Peace Commission, or any officials attached thereto against the Shantung settlement, and especially a copy of a letter written

by General Tasker H. Bliss on behalf of himself, the Secretary of State, and Henry White, members of the peace commission, protesting against the provisions of the treaty with reference to Shantung. General Bliss, was the reply, did write a letter in which he took strong grounds against the proposed Shantung settlement, and his objections were concurred in by the Secretary of State and Mr. White. But the letter was not a protest, because it was written before the decision was reached, and because it was in response to a request for their opinions. It could not be sent to the Senate because references were made to other Governments, quite proper in a confidential letter, but not to be repeated "outside our personal and intimate exchange of views." No protest from any official had been received. To the request for any memorandum or information regarding an attempt of Japan or her Peace Delegates to intimidate the representatives of China, the President was happy to say that he had no such memorandum or information.

The positions of the President and the Senators may now be briefly stated. President Wilson was against any reservations likely to cause changes in the text. The majority of the Committee was for a direct amendment on the Shantung award, and for putting in the resolution of ratification such changes as they proposed to make in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Senator Lodge and the extremists wished the reservations made subject to the approval of the four principal allied Powers. The mild reservationists denied that the changes they had in mind would send the treaty back to the signatory Powers. Senator Hitchcock demanded that the treaty be reported to the Senate by the Committee and promptly ratified. It had, he said, been presented to the Senate July 10. Five weeks had passed with nothing done, with no vote taken. The Senate was waiting, the country was waiting, and impatience was increasing. Everybody knew that enemies of the treaty and opponents of the League of Nations controlled the Committee. Everybody knew they did not control the Senate. It was of little importance what the Committee did, if it only did some-

thing. Should it recommend amendments, the Senate would reject them. Should it mutilate the treaty, the Senate would repair the damage.

In hope of reaching some sort of understanding the President invited the Committee to a conference at the White House, on the morning of August 19. He began by urging a speedy ratification because problems in the readjustment of our national life were pressing for solution, and could not be solved until the country knew what sort of a peace it was to have. The copper mines of Montana and Alaska were kept in operation only at a great loss. The zinc mines of Missouri, Tennessee and Wisconsin were working to about one-half their capacity. The lead of Idaho, Illinois and Missouri reached but a part of their old market. There was an immediate need for cotton belting and lubricating oil, which could not be met, all because the channels of trade were barred by war when there was no war. Hardly a single raw material, hardly a single class of manufactured goods, but was affected in the same way. Our military plans, our national budget waited on peace. Nations which ratified the treaty, such as Great Britain, Belgium, France, would control the markets of Central Europe if we did not act quickly. We had no consuls, no trade representatives to look after our interests.

Nothing, the President believed, stood in the way of ratification save certain doubts as to the meaning of certain articles in the Covenant of the League of Nations. He respectfully submitted that there was nothing doubtful in their wording. The Monroe Doctrine was expressly mentioned as in no way impaired. The words "regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine" were used because it seemed "best to avoid the appearance of dealing with the policy of a single nation. Absolutely nothing is concealed in the phrase." Domestic questions were not enumerated because to do so, "even by sample, would have involved the danger of seeming to exclude those not mentioned." The right to withdraw had been taken for granted. Article X was in no respect doubtful, if read in the light of

the Covenant as a whole. Nothing could have been made clearer to the Conference than the right of Congress to decide on matters of war or peace. Under Article X the United States did indeed undertake to "respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League." "But it is a moral, not a legal, obligation, and leaves Congress absolutely free to put its own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action."

The President closed his remarks with a statement of his attitude towards interpretations and reservations. "It has," he said, "several times been suggested, in public debate and in private conference, that interpretations of the sense in which the United States accepts the engagements of the Covenant should be embodied in the instrument of ratification." There could be no reasonable objection to such interpretations accompanying the act of ratification provided they did not form a part of the formal ratification itself. Most of the interpretations which had been suggested to him embodied what seemed the plain meaning of the instrument itself.

But if such interpretations should constitute a part of the formal resolution of ratification, long delays would be the inevitable result, because all the many Governments concerned would have to accept, in effect, the language of the Senate as the language of the treaty before ratification would be complete. The assent of the German Assembly at Weimar would have to be obtained, and he must frankly say that he could "only with the greatest reluctance approach that Assembly for permission to read the treaty as we understand it, and as those who framed it quite certainly understood. If the United States were to qualify the document in any way, moreover, I am confident from what I know of the many conferences and debates which accompanied the formulation of the treaty that our example would immediately be followed in many quarters, in some instances with very serious reservations, and that the

meaning and operative force of the treaty would presently be clouded from one end of its clauses to the other."

The President having finished, three hours were spent by the Senators asking questions and the President answering them. When the questioning was over each side claimed the victory. The Democrats held that the frankness of the President had disarmed his opponents and left them nothing to do but ratify. The Republicans asserted that he had not been frank, had concealed all that happened at the meetings of the Council of Five, because to divulge their proceedings would be open to serious objections, and that they were confirmed in their opinions, and justified in their opposition to the treaty and the Covenant. "In our opinion," said Senators Borah and Johnson, in a statement issued in behalf of themselves and others, "the significant facts developed by the interview with the President to-day are these:"

"1. There yet remain treaties of peace to be made with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Those treaties deal with subjects as important, territory as extensive, and matters as intimately affecting the United States as the treaty with Germany. The obligations of the United States, therefore—what our country assumes in the future—cannot be determined until these treaties are completed and presented to the United States Senate.

"2. That the President regards the obligations which will be assumed under the League of Nations, and particularly under Article X and XI, as moral obligations. These, however, are of 'compelling' force and would require action upon our part. For instance, the President conceded that in an undoubted case of aggression from the Balkans upon the newly acquired territory of Italy, it would be our duty to come to the assistance of Italy and prevent such aggression. The President's construction of Article X is at variance with the construction of the Democratic attorneys of the Senate.

"3. A moral obligation, the President insists, rests upon us to carry out the terms of the various treaties of peace. This

moral obligation, the President states, requires us under the German treaty for fifteen years to maintain American troops in France.

"4. The President did not know, nor had he heard of the secret treaties for territorial acquisition and partitioning various territories until he reached Paris. Specifically, he had not heard of and did not know, until he went to Paris:

"A. Of the Treaty of London, or the basis on which Italy entered the war in 1915.

"B. Of the agreement with Rumania of August, 1916.

"C. Of the various agreements in respect to Asia Minor.

"D. Of the agreements consummated in the winter of 1917 between France and Russia, relative to the frontiers of Germany, and particularly in relation to the Saar Valley and the left bank of the Rhine.

"E. Of the agreements between Japan, England, France and Italy by which Shantung substantially was given to Japan.

"The United States was neither officially nor non-officially informed of any of these treaties or agreements, nor was any request made by the United States for information submitted to any of the allied Governments.

"5. The President opposed the Shantung decision. It was officially conveyed to him that the Japanese would not sign unless the Shantung rights were given to Japan. The United States experts advised the President that Japan's verbal promise to return the sovereignty of the territory in Shantung, while retaining the economic concessions, was a return of the shell of the nut by Japan while she retained the kernel. The Chinese insisted the retention of the economic privileges meant practical sovereignty, but the President says he disagrees with this view.

"6. England, France and Italy adhered at the Peace Conference to their secret treaties disposing of peoples and territories in the Shantung case; therefore, the President was the only disinterested judge. The decision, however, was made unanimously.

"7. The United States asked China to enter the war.

"8. The American commission at Paris urged that a definite sum of reparations be fixed in the treaty. Why this view did not prevail, the President felt he could not state without divulging matters respecting other Governments he felt he should not divulge.

"9. The President felt that he could not divulge the details of what transpired in the meeting of the commissioners, and could not, therefore, afford information respecting these matters. For this reason, he could not divulge the vote upon racial equality, nor how the United States commissioners voted.

"We very greatly appreciated the opportunity of talking with the President personally upon what we deem the most important subject which has come to the people since the civil war. We appreciate this opportunity the more because upon the facts developed, as stated by us, the position we have maintained in respect to this Covenant of the League of Nations is justified and confirmed.

"It is obvious that, if we are to assume only a moral obligation, that moral obligation will deal at the instance of foreign nations with American treasure and American blood, and send American troops, whenever necessity arises, throughout the world.

"It is equally plain that the decisions of the Peace Conference, made in accordance with secret treaties concealed from us, we must guarantee indefinitely.

"The League of Nations as construed by the President leaves it clear and unmistakable that when we enter it we are under compelling moral obligation, to say nothing of the legal obligation which other supporters contend we are under, to take part in the disturbances, the conflicts, settlements and the wars of Europe and Asia, if any should arise, and it is equally true, under his construction, Europe would necessarily be under the same impelling force to take part in the settlement of American affairs."

Before the conference broke up to attend a luncheon given

by the President, Senator Fall presented twenty written questions which he asked the President to answer at some future time. The day after the conference Senator Pittman, a Democrat, offered four interpretive reservations in hope of meeting Republican objections to the Covenant. When a government served the two years' notice of withdrawal from the League, it should be the sole judge as to whether or not its obligations had been fulfilled. That suggestions of the Council under Article X as to the use of military force or economical measures could only be carried out by the voluntary separate action of each member of the League, and failure of any member to adopt the suggestions, or provide military or naval forces, or economic measures, should be a moral or legal violation. Domestic and political questions relating to the internal affairs of a League member, immigration, coastwise traffic, the tariff and commerce, were solely within the jurisdiction of such member and not subject to arbitration, or consideration of the Council or Assembly. If a dispute arose over a matter other than those specified as domestic issues and exempt, and one party claimed it to be a domestic and political question relating to internal affairs, then the Council should make no recommendation save by the unanimous vote of the Council other than the representatives of the disputants. No question which involved or depended on the Monroe Doctrine should ever be submitted to arbitration or inquiry by the Council, or Assembly.

These reservations were introduced without the knowledge of the President, and, disowned by him, were dropped by the Democrats, and served but to increase the determination of the Republicans, strengthened by the Conference at the White House, to have nothing but "strong amendatory reservations."

The first fruit of this determination was the adoption by the Committee on Foreign Relations, of an amendment which deprived Japan of the German rights in the Shantung peninsula and awarded them to China. Then came another striking from the treaty the words "and associated" wherever they

occur in the treaty in the phrase "Allied and Associated Powers," which was used some thirty-five times. The effect was to cut out the "associated Power," that is to say the United States. One exception was made, that of American membership on the Reparations Commissions. All other commissions, that on the Belgian boundary, on the frontiers of Poland, and of East Prussia, on Danzig, on the Saar Basin, on the Schleswig-Holstein boundary, on the enforcement of military and naval and air provisions, the United States was to have no representative, for these commissions, it was said, were to deal with matters which were no concern of ours.

A third amendment, adopted a few days later, provided that whenever a matter referred to the Assembly involves a dispute between two members of the League, one of which has self-governing dominions, colonies, or part of empire also represented in the Assembly, "neither the disputant member," nor any of its dominions, colonies or parts of empires "shall have a vote on any phase of the question." This was a blow at Great Britain, who, with her self-governing dominions, colonies, and India, a part of her empire, had six votes. A fourth amendment gave to the United States as many votes in the Council, or Assembly, as the aggregate vote of any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies and parts of empire, also members of the League. That is to say, the United States should have as many votes as Great Britain. A fifth amendment deprived the representative of the United States on the reparations committee of a right to vote on general questions, and limited it to those on which he had been specifically instructed, and to those concerning international shipping.

September fourth the Committee at last voted to report the treaty with four reservations and thirty-eight direct amendments. The resolution of ratification set forth "that the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of a treaty of peace with Germany, signed by the plenipotentiaries of the United States and Germany, and by the plenipotentiaries of the twenty-seven

Allied and Associated Powers, at Versailles, on June 23, 1919, with the following reservations and understandings to be made a part and a condition of such ratification, which ratification is not to take effect, or bind the United States, until the said following reservations and understandings have been accepted as a part and a condition of said instrument of ratification by at least three of the four principal Allied and Associated Powers, to wit: Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan:

"1. The United States reserves to itself the unconditional right to withdraw from the League of Nations upon the notice provided in Article 1 of said Treaty of Peace with Germany.

"2. That the United States declines to assume, under the provisions of Article X, or under any other article, any obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between other nations members of the League or not, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States in such controversies, or to adopt economic measures for the protection of any other country, whether a member of the League or not, against external aggression or for the purpose of coercing any other country, or for the purpose of intervention in the internal conflicts or the controversies which may arise in any other country, and no mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article XXII, Part 1, of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

"3. The United States reserves to itself, exclusively, the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating to its affairs, including immigration, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty submitted in any way either to arbitration, or to the consideration of the council or of the assembly of the League of Nations, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

"4. The United States declines to submit for arbitration

or inquiry by the assembly or the council of the League of Nations, provided for in said Treaty of Peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said Doctrine to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said Treaty of Peace with Germany."

These were the reservations. The direct amendments were that giving the United States six votes in the Council and in the Assembly; that excluding the United States from representation on all commissions save that on reparations, which would have to do with the indemnities Germany must pay and with commerce with Germany; the Shantung amendment; and that to prevent nations concerned in any dispute before the League from taking part in the consideration of its settlement, and those striking out the words "and associated."

September 4 the committee ordered the treaty with the reservations and amendments to be reported to the Senate. The majority report began with a reply to the charge of slowness of action; asserted that the "demand for haste" was "largely the work of the administration and its newspaper organs and was so far artificial;" that "artificial also was the demand for haste disseminated by certain great banking firms which had a direct pecuniary interest in securing an early opportunity to reap the harvest which they expected from the adjustment of the financial obligations of the countries which had been engaged in the war;" and that "the third element in the demand for haste was furnished by the unthinking outcry of many excellent people who desired early action, and who for the most part had never read the treaty, or never got beyond the words 'league of nations,' which they believed means the establishment of eternal peace." The responsibility of the Senate was equal to that of the Executive "who, although aided by a force of thirteen hundred assistants, expert and otherwise, consumed six

months in making it, and the Senate and its committee on foreign relations cannot dispose of this momentous document with the light-hearted indifference desired by those who were pressing for hasty and thoughtless action upon it."

Complaint was made that the committee was hampered by the impossibility of getting information to which it was entitled; that the clamor for speedy action was directed against the Senate and its committee; that although the treaty is to go into effect when ratified by Germany and three of the great Powers, Great Britain alone had acted. "Persons afflicted with inquiring minds have wondered not a little that the distressed mourners over delays in the Senate have not also aimed their criticism at the like short-comings on the part of France, Italy and Japan."

To the argument that prompt ratification was necessary in order to renew trade with Germany, the answer was made that the emptiness of this plea for haste "is shown by the fact that we have been trading with Germany ever since the armistice," and that "between that event and the end of July we have exported to Germany goods valued at" more than twelve million dollars.

Coming to the amendments, the report set forth that the purpose of the first was to give the United States a vote in the Assembly equal to that of any other Power; that "amendments thirty-nine to forty-four inclusive, transfer to China the German lease and rights, if they exist, in the Chinese province of Shantung, which are given by the treaty to Japan." The majority of the committee were unwilling to have their votes recorded in favor of the consummation of a great wrong. The other amendments were dismissed in a few words and the four reservations were explained. The second, concerning Article X "is intended to meet the most vital objection to the league covenant as it stands." Under no circumstances must there be any moral or legal obligation on the United States to enter into war or send its army or navy abroad, or without the unfettered action of Congress. "No American soldiers or sailors

must be sent to fight in other lands at the bidding of a league of nations."

The fourth reservation is intended to preserve the Monroe Doctrine from interpretation by foreign powers. "As the Monroe Doctrine has protected the United States, so" the committee believed "will this reservation protect the Monroe Doctrine from the destruction by which it is threatened by Article XXI."

The committee believed that the covenant of the League of Nations is an alliance, not a league, that as it stands it will breed wars instead of securing peace; that it demands sacrifices of American independence and sovereignty that would in no way promote the world's peace, and "are fraught with the gravest dangers to the future safety and well being of the United States."

The committee had frequently heard it said "that the United States 'must' do this and do that in regard to this league of nations and the terms of the German peace. There is no 'must' about it. 'Must' is not a word to be used by foreign nations or domestic officials to the American people or their representatives." Nor was the attempt to frighten the unthinking by suggesting that if the Senate adopted amendments or reservations the United States would be shut out of the League. That would never happen. The nations of the World well knew that no threat of retaliation was possible with us, because we asked nothing and received nothing, no guarantee, no territory, no commercial benefits, no advantages. Other nations would take us on our own terms, for without us their league would "be a wreck and all their gains from a victorious peace imperiled."

While the Committee was still considering the amendments and reservations, the President, early in September, left Washington on a tour of the West, to explain and defend the treaty and the Covenant before the people. His route led to Columbus, Ohio, where the first speech was made; then to Indianapolis, St. Louis, Kansas City, Des Moines, Omaha and Sioux

Falls; to Minneapolis and St. Paul and Bismarck, to Billings, Helena, Coeur d'Alene, Spokane, Tacoma and Seattle, where the President reviewed the Pacific fleet. There the route turned southward to Portland, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles, where it turned eastward to Reno, Salt Lake City, Cheyenne, Denver and Pueblo. At Wichita, worn out by mental and physical strain, the President was forced to abandon the trip, and return to Washington. He was "suffering from nervous exhaustion," his physician announced, and must "have rest and quiet for a considerable time."

The first speech was given up to explaining the intent and meaning of the treaty, and to a justification of many of its important articles. The terms, he admitted, were severe, but not unjust. No indemnity of any sort was claimed, merely reparation, merely pay for the destruction done, merely a making good by Germany of the losses she had wantonly inflicted, not on governments, but on the peoples whose rights she had trodden upon without even the semblance of pity. No national triumph was recorded in the treaty, no glory was sought for any particular nation. The treaty was intended to end the war and prevent any similar war. That was what the League of Nations was for, and it was the only thing that could do it. Redemption of weak nations, Hungary, the Jugo-Slavs, Bohemia, Poland, the Slavic people down in the great Balkan peninsula, was another thing accomplished by the treaty which destroyed old alliances, old balances of power, and recognized the right of these peoples to live their own lives under such governments as they themselves saw fit to establish. The heart of the treaty is not that it punishes Germany, but that it rights the age-long wrongs which characterized the history of Europe. The treaty is an attempt to right the history of Europe and, in his opinion, is a measurable success. He said measurable because it was difficult to draw international lines. There were regions where you could not draw a line and say "there are Slavs on this side and Italians on that." "When we came to draw the line between the Polish people and the German

people, not the line between Germany and Poland—there wasn't any Poland strictly speaking,—the line between the German people and the Polish people, there were districts like that upper part of Silesia, or rather the eastern part of Silesia, which is called 'Upper Silesia' because it is mountainous and the other part is not. High Silesia is chiefly Polish, and when we came to draw a line to represent Poland, it was necessary to include High Silesia, if we were really going to play fair, and make Poland up of the Polish peoples wherever we found them in sufficiently close neighborhood to one another." But it was not certain that Upper Silesia wanted to be part of Poland. Hence a referendum, a plebiscite was provided that the people might decide. "I even had to remind my Italian colleagues that if they were going to claim every place where there was a large Italian population we would have to cede New York to them because there are more Italians in New York than in any Italian city."

The treaty moreover contained "a magna charta of labor, a thing unheard of until this interesting year of grace. There is a whole section of the treaty devoted to arrangements by which the interests of those who labor with their hands all over the world, whether they be men or women or children, are all of them to be safeguarded." There were no annexations.

At St. Louis the President pointed out that the treaty "is a charter and constitution of a new system for the world," that its essential object "is to establish the integrity of the weak peoples of the world," discussed the Shantung agreement and affirmed his belief that Japan would keep her promise. Article X, he said, "cuts at the very heart and is the only instrument that will cut to the very heart of the old system." We are partners with the rest of the world in respecting the territorial integrity and political independence of the others. They are all under solemn bond to respect those things and if they do not, the League then advises what to do. Some one might say, "Suppose we are a party to a quarrel." He could not suppose such a thing because the United States is not going to disregard

the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. But suppose for the sake of argument we were. What the opponents of the article would then be afraid of is, that we would get into trouble. "If we are a party we are in trouble already. If we are not a party we control the advice of the council by our own vote." Opponents of the treaty held that we should either reject it, or make such changes as would render it necessary to reopen negotiations with Germany. "We cannot do the latter alone, and other nations will not join us in doing it. The only alternative is to reject the peace treaty and to do what some of our fellow countrymen have been advising us to do; stand alone in the world." The organization contemplated by the League of Nations without the United States would be an Alliance and not a League of Nations, an alliance of the chief European powers and Japan. The United States would then be the disassociated party, standing aloof, and to be watched by the Alliance. In that event, we must be physically ready for anything to come, must have a large standing army, must have every man trained to arms, must have munitions and guns enough, in short, must become a mobilized nation, and have that kind of organization which is necessary to handle such an army, a militaristic organization. You cannot, he said, handle an armed nation by vote.

Speaking at Kansas City, the President said that to reject the treaty, to alter the treaty is to impair one of the first charters of mankind. Yet there were men who approached the question with passion, with private passion, with party passion, who thought only of immediate advantage to themselves, or to a group of their fellow countrymen, who looked at the thing with the jaundiced eyes of those who have some purpose of their own. He did not mean those who had conscientious objections. He took off his hat to such. He had no intolerant spirit in the matter, but from the bottom of his feet to the top of his head he had "a fighting spirit about it." Those who dared to defeat this great experiment must bring together the councillors of the world and do something better.

If there were a better scheme he would subscribe to it; but he wished to say, as he had said before, that "it is a case of put up or shut up. Negation will not save the world. Opposition constructs nothing. Opposition is the specialty of those who are bolshevistically inclined." He was not likening any of his respected colleagues to Bolsheviks, but merely pointing out that the bolshevistic spirit lacked every element of constructive opposition. He had not come to fight or antagonize any individual or body of individuals. He had the greatest respect for the Senate of the United States, but he had come out to fight for a cause, and that cause was greater than the Senate, greater than the Government, as great as the cause of mankind, and he intended "in office or out to fight that battle as long as" he lived.

When Omaha was reached the President, who had hitherto been expounding the League of Nations and the treaty, turned to the reservations. "A reservation," he said, "is an assent with a 'but' to it. We agree, but." The first article of the Covenant provides, that a nation may withdraw from the League on two years' notice, if at the end of the two years, all its international obligations under the League have been fulfilled. "But some of our friends are very uneasy about that. They want to sit close to the door and with their hands on the knob, and they want to say, 'we are in this thing, but we are in it with infinite timidity, and we are in only because you over-persuaded us, and want us to come in, but we are going to sit here and try this door once in a while, and see it isn't locked, and just as soon as we see anything we don't like we are going to scuttle.'" What was the trouble? Were they afraid that if the United States ever wished to withdraw it would not have fulfilled its obligations? Did they want him to ask the Germans if he might "read the treaty to them expressed in the words the United States Senate thinks it ought to have been written in? So you see the reservations come down to this, that they want to change the language of the treaty without changing its meaning, and let me say there are

indications, I am not judging from official dispatches but from the newspapers, that people are not in as good humor over in France now as they were when I was there, and it is going to be more difficult to get a new agreement from them than it was before."

Concerning the Shantung agreement the President declared that he had frankly said to his Japanese colleagues that he was deeply dissatisfied with that part of the treaty. But Japan agreed "that she would relinquish every item of sovereignty that Germany had enjoyed in China, and would retain what other nations have elsewhere in China, certain economic concessions with regard to the railways and the mines." But suppose, as some had suggested, that we dissent from that clause of the treaty? We cannot sign all of a treaty but one part. We cannot sign the treaty with the Shantung provision out of it, and if we could what sort of service would that be doing China?

At the Twin Cities there were three speeches. In the morning the President addressed the Minnesota Legislature in Special session. In the afternoon he spoke to the people gathered in the Auditorium at St. Paul, and in the evening to a meeting in Minneapolis. Again he told of the old balance of power, and of people who nowhere dared speak out against autocracy; how one object of the war was to destroy autocracy; how the League of Nations provided for the destruction of autocracy by admitting only self-governing nations to the League; how the treaty proposed to substitute arbitration and discussion for force, and an absolute boycott against covenant breakers; how the peace of the World was everybody's business; how the Covenant was the first international document to recognize that fact, and how it put an end to all secret treaties. They were, he said, a constant source of embarrassment at Versailles. Yet they were treaties, and the war having been fought on the principle of the sanctity of treaties, they had to be respected. As to ourselves, we must be either provincials or statesmen, ostriches or eagles. "I see gentlemen bury their heads in some-

thing and think that nobody sees that they have submerged their thinking apparatus. That is what I mean by being an ostrich. Now what I mean by being an eagle, I need not describe. I mean leaving the mists lying close to the ground, getting up on strong winds into those spaces where you can see all the affairs of mankind, all the affairs of America, seeing how the world appears."

The Covenant of the League, the President told the people at Bismarck, had been greatly misrepresented. He did not recognize it when he heard some men talk about it. He had spent hours in the presence of the representatives of thirteen nations, examining every sentence, trying to keep out of it anything that infringed the sovereignty of any member of the League. When he went back in March, 1918, he took with him every suggestion made by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. All were accepted. Nevertheless, on his return he found he did not understand what the document means. Plain sentences written, as he thought, in unmistakable language, meant, he was told, something he never heard of, and that nobody else entertained as a purpose. Turning to Article X, he said, it had no operative force unless we voted that it should have force. The first sentence provides that every member of the League shall respect and preserve the territorial integrity of every other member of the League. "The second sentence provides that in case of necessity the council shall take such steps as may be necessary to carry out the suggestions of the conference—that is to say, what force is necessary. Now the Council cannot give that advice without a unanimous vote. It can't give the advice without the affirmative vote of the United States, unless the United States is a party to the controversy in question." What did this mean?

Did anybody think the United States was likely to seize somebody else's territory? And if she is not likely to begin aggression, who is likely to begin it against her? But suppose somebody does attempt to seize some of our country, or we somebody else's, then the war is ours anyway, so what dif-

ference does it make what advice the Council gives? Unless it is our war we cannot be dragged into it without our consent. Whatever might be thought of Article X, it is the heart of the treaty. We must take it or throw the world back into the old contest over land titles.

It was true, he said at Spokane, that under Article X, if the United States is a party to a dispute, it cannot vote. But in that case we had the fight on our hands anyhow, because, if we are one of the parties to the dispute the war belongs to us. Therefore, we cannot be forced into the war by the vote. The only thing the vote can do is to force us out of the war. And what was meant by the suggestion that the United States might be a party? Party to what? A party to seize somebody else's property, infringe the political independence of some other country? Ah! but somebody may seek to seize our territory, impair our political integrity. Well, who? Who has an arm strong enough, who has an audacity great enough to try to take a single inch of American territory, or seek to interfere for one moment, with the political integrity of the United States?

The President had no objections to interpretations if they did not change the meaning of the document, but that would be saying that the United States understood the treaty to mean what it says. "You will say, why not go in with reservations?" Because if textual changes were made, or the resolution of ratification qualified, the treaty must go back to the German Assembly at Weimar. We cannot, said he, put anything into the treaty which Germany has signed without her consent. But we might put interpretations on the treaty which its language clearly justified, and notify the other governments of the world that we so understood the treaty. Anything that qualifies the treaty, anything that is a condition of ratification will make its submission to the other Powers necessary and it must all be gone over again.

Not one of the qualifications suggested for the Covenant was warranted. Under the withdrawal clause, the nation before

leaving must fulfill all the international obligations. Gentlemen objected that it is not said who shall determine whether or not the obligations have been fulfilled. Having sat at the table where the Covenant was drawn he knew that this was not accidental, for no nation could sit in judgment on another. It was left to the conscience of the withdrawing nation and to the only jury it had to fear, the great embodied jury expressing the opinion of mankind. As to the proposed Monroe Doctrine reservation, the President said the Conference tried to define the doctrine as clearly as possible. That sentence, he believed, was the most extraordinary in the document, because up to that time not a nation in the World was willing to admit the Doctrine was valid.

To the Women's League at San Francisco the President spoke concerning Shantung, and Article X, and the moral duty of our country to accept the treaty. In the matter of the cession to Japan of the interests of Germany in Shantung, he said to his Japanese colleagues, "I am not satisfied with this settlement. I think it ought to be different. But when gentlemen propose to cure it by striking that clause out of the treaty, or by ourselves withholding our adherence to the treaty, they propose an irrational thing." But coupled with the Shantung arrangement, the President said, is the League of Nations under which Japan solemnly undertakes with the rest of us to respect the territorial integrity of China, and back of her promise is that of every other member of the league. It is the first time in the history of the world that anything has been done for China. "And sitting around our Council board in Paris, I put this question: 'May I expect that this will be the beginning of the retrocession to China of the exceptional rights which other governments have enjoyed?' And the responsible representatives of other great governments said: 'Yes, you may expect it.'"

Your attention, he continued, is constantly drawn to Article X. But there is also Article XI, which gives the right to every member of the league to draw attention to anything, anywhere,

that is likely to disturb the peace of the world. Under this the representative of the United States has the right to stand up and say: "This is against the covenant of peace. It can't be done." And, if occasion arises, we may add, "It shall not be done." Never before have weak, oppressed and wronged nations had a forum to which they could bring their enemies into the presence of the judgment of mankind.

As the President came eastward from the Pacific coast he dwelt more and more on the reservations in general, and on that concerning Article X in particular. In the Mormon Tabernacle at Salt Lake City he assured his hearers that reservations were the same thing as amendments. They would send the treaty back to Paris, and to reopen the treaty would be to reopen the issue with Germany. One by one, he said, the fears of the reservationists had been swept away. Doubt as to whether some superior power could supersede the Constitution had been removed. Doubt that the Covenant protected the Monroe Doctrine had been removed. The right to withdraw is plainly stated. Domestic questions are specifically exempt from action by the league. Driven from one point after another the forces of objection had been directed at the heart of the League, at Article X, under which the members agree to protect one another's territory from aggression.

This, he told his audience at Cheyenne, cut at the tap root of war, because nearly all wars started from aggression. Were the reservation on this Article adopted the United States would assume no obligation to preserve the territorial rights of other nations unless Congress so decided. It would be saying we will not promise anything, but from time to time we may assist. It meant rejection of the treaty. Unless we went in now and assumed full responsibility, we would have to come in later with Germany. Germany is not anxious for the United States to be among the nations of the League. It means a separate treaty with Germany and this would be against the United States. "The men who fought at Château-Thierry, the men who fought in Belleau Wood, and in the Argonne, never

thought of turning back. They never thought of making reservations on their service. They never thought of saying, 'We are going to do this much of the job, and then leave you to do the rest.' And I am here on this journey to do what I can to complete the task which the men who died upon the battlefields of France began. And I am not going to turn back any more than they did. I am going to keep my face just as they kept theirs, forward, towards the enemy."

At Denver, and again at Pueblo, the President had much to say on the objection that the British Empire had six votes in the Assembly and the United States but one. Those six votes, he said, "are not in the Council, they are in the Assembly, and the interesting thing is that the Assembly does not vote. I must modify that statement a little, but essentially it is absolutely true. In every matter in which the Assembly is given a vote (and there are only four or five) its vote does not count unless concurred in by all the representatives of all the nations represented on the Council, so there is no validity to the vote of the Assembly unless approved by the United States, so the vote of the United States is as big as the six votes of the British Empire." This was his last speech, for the next morning, September 26th, at Wichita, the President was forced to abandon his trip.

The Senators meantime had been listening to the reading of the treaty, and early in October reached Article 35, which provides for a commission of seven persons to be appointed, five by "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers," one by Germany and one by Belgium, "to settle on the spot the new frontier" of Belgium. This was the first case to which the amendment of Senator Fall applied and by unanimous consent it was brought to a vote on October 3. The amendment was intended to deprive the United States of representation on some thirty-five commissions to be established under the treaty. The first amendment, depriving the United States of membership on a commission "to settle on the spot the new boundaries between Belgium and Germany" was voted down and two

more, relating to our participation in the affairs of Luxemburg, were lost by a *viva voce* vote. Under the treaty the Commission for the government of the Saar Basin is to consist of "one citizen of France, one native inhabitant of the Saar Basin, not a citizen of France, and three members belonging to three countries other than France or Germany." Senator Fall proposed to add the name of the United States to the restriction "other than France or Germany," but this amendment also was lost. Twenty-six amendments excluding the United States from representation on commissions to settle on the spot the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Upper Silesia, the Free City of Danzig, East Prussia, Denmark, and on many other matters were taken together and defeated by a *viva voce* vote. An amendment forbidding the United States to be a party to a treaty Czechoslovakia was pledged to make with the Allied and Associated Powers "to protect the interests of the inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion," and two amendments barring the United States from membership on an International Commission to control the plebiscite area of Upper Silesia, and preventing it sending troops to occupy that area, were lost by a vote of forty-six yeas to thirty-one nays, and an amendment preventing the United States from joining in a treaty binding Poland to protect the interests of her inhabitants who differed from the majority of the population in race, language or religion, and another excluding our country from representation on a commission to govern the area of a plebiscite in East Prussia were each lost by a *viva voce* vote.

Debating and speech making now went on for nearly a fortnight, before an agreement was reached to come to a vote on the amendments offered by Senator Lodge relating to Shantung. They were six in number, were voted on as one and defeated. On the following day the two remaining amendments offered by Senator Fall were rejected without the formality of a roll call. The one deprived the United States of permanent membership on the Reparations Commission. The

other limited the American representative to voting only when instructed, except on matters concerning shipping.

Reading the treaty article by article now continued to the end. By that time the Republican majority had ready a new set of reservations, which were reported as substitutes for those reported in September and were put to vote on October 22nd. They were thirteen in number. Three were passed over; but the first, often called the preamble, setting forth that the reservations would not go into force until accepted by three of the Principal Allied Powers, and ten of the reservations were agreed upon by the Committee.

By the first, the United States was to be free to leave the League as provided in Article I, and free to decide whether her obligations had or had not been fully discharged. By the second the United States assumed no obligation to guarantee the territorial integrity or political independence "of any other country, or interfere in controversies between other nations,—whether members of the League or not"—unless Congress so ordered. The third left it with Congress to decide whether we would or would not become a mandatory over any nation. The fourth reserved absolute jurisdiction over domestic questions, and the fifth declared that questions under the Monroe Doctrine were not to be submitted to arbitration, and that the United States is its sole interpreter. The sixth set forth that the United States did not assent to the Shantung award to Japan and reserved full liberty of withholding assent to the award as made under the treaty. The seventh was passed over for the moment. The eighth provided that the regulation of trade between Germany and the United States by the Reparations Commission must be subject to the approval of Congress. The ninth gave Congress the right to decide whether the United States should contribute to the expenses of the Secretariat, or any members of the commissions created by the treaty. The tenth reserved to Congress the right to increase the armament of the United States when threatened with invasion, or engaged in waging war. The eleventh was

laid aside. Article XVI of the Covenant provided that, should a member of the League break its covenants under Articles XII, XIII, and XVI, and wage war, all other members must prohibit "all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State." The twelfth reservation applied to this Article and reserved to the United States the right to continue trade and financial relations and intercourse with the covenant-breaker. The thirteenth was passed over.

Reservation seven, one of the three passed over, declared that Congress will provide for the appointment of representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council, of the League of Nations, and may at its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof, and that until such participation and appointment have been so provided for, and the powers and duties of such representative defined, no person shall represent the United States under the League of Nations or the treaty, and no citizen shall be appointed a member of any commission, committee, court, council, or conference save with the approval of the Congress of the United States.

Reservation eleven, also passed over, set forth that the United States understood subdivision C of Article XXIII, which gave the League general supervision over the execution of agreements concerning the traffic in women and children, opium and dangerous drugs, to mean that the League shall refuse to recognize agreements relating to this traffic and use every means in its powers to accomplish its abolition.

Reservation thirteen, the third to be passed over, declared that nothing in Articles 296 and 297 or the annexes thereto, or in any other part of the treaty, "shall, as against the citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States."

When the Committee met again these three were adopted, but reservation eleven was incorporated in number four, and num-

ber 13 thus became number 12. A thirteenth, stating that the United States declines to have any part or lot in the administration of the colonies transferred by Germany to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers was then adopted, and Senator Lodge instructed to prepare a fourteenth withholding from decision by the League of Nations any question affecting the vital rights and national honor of the United States.

The triumph of the enemies of the covenant on the Committee now seemed complete. Amendment had failed; but by reservations they had cut off the United States from all responsibility under the treaty and under the Covenant of the League of Nations. The treaty, it was said, will be Americanized. That the reservations exactly as drafted will pass the Senate, is certain. Even the preamble will go through. The position of the President is indeed embarrassing. He must either accept the reservations, or bid his partisans join with the Republicans who are opposed to the treaty in any form, and defeat the resolution of ratification. In the first case he is brought to the humiliating situation of beholding his seven months' work in Paris go for naught. In the second case, he is forced to go, hat in hand, to Germany and ask for a separate treaty of peace, an exceedingly unpleasant thing to do. Nevertheless, the decision as to the final vote rests with him.

After a short delay the Johnson amendment to give to the United States a vote in the Assembly equal to that of any other Power was defeated by a vote of yeas thirty-eight, nays forty. Senator Johnson thereupon offered another, and the Republicans whose votes made possible the defeat of that reported by the Committee announced, that to hasten the ratification of the treaty they would vote against all amendments but not against effective reservations. They kept their word and two days later aided in defeating the last of the amendments from the Committee on Foreign Relations and three more offered by as many Senators. One providing for the insertion, in the preamble, of the words, "invoke the consider-

ate judgment of mankind and the gracious favor of Almighty God," was laid upon the table. Another was that offered by Senator Johnson after the defeat of his first amendment. The third provided that Great Britain, her colonies, dominions and parts of Empire should have collectively but one vote and three delegates in the Assembly. The Republicans were manifestly impatient of the delay and eager to reach the reservations.

Abroad the debates in the Senate had been followed with deep interest, had been made the subject of comment by newspapers of influence, and brought from thirty-two professors of the University of Louvain an appeal to the American people. Belgium, they said, was following with anxiety the debates on the ratification of the treaty. The assistance lent by the United States in the war gave victory to the Entente. This help, moral, financial, military, was the magnificent expression of the generosity and spiritual greatness of a great people. It was hard, therefore, for Belgium to understand how, after contributing so much to victory, our country could "think of compromising the great results that victory obtained." The peoples of the Entente were looking anxiously towards the United States Senate, and after sacrificing so many hopes, after giving up so many of the guarantees and reparations they had expected, they could not understand "this long hesitation, this tenacious opposition to the signing of the treaty." Should America refuse to ratify, the fruits of victory so dearly bought would be lost, all the restitutions and guarantees promised by Germany would be brought again under discussion, and the friendship, sealed on the battlefield, between the great American nation and the democratic Powers of the Entente, would inevitably be ended. Belgium, the country for which America made such splendid sacrifices, would be bitterly disappointed. Like most works of man, the treaty was undoubtedly defective. Nevertheless, it was the best effort ever made to assure peace in the world. Belgium had undergone great trials. The treaty failed to realize not only her hopes, but even the promises made to her of complete restoration. Yet she "has not bar-

gained over the question of ratification," and begged "her great American friend to take pity on the Old World and particularly on Belgium," ratify the treaty of peace, and enable the Belgians "to return with energy to the labor of repairing their ruins."

Towards the close of October the chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations proposed that by unanimous consent the Senate come to a final vote on ratification on the twelfth of November. When the proposal came up for consideration early in November, Senator Hitchcock, leader of the Democratic minority, opposed it, and made a proposition of his own. He opposed because, if the Senate were bound to come to a vote on a certain day the majority might continue the debate up to that day, and so prevent the minority from having "a reasonable chance to make material changes in the reservations supported by the majority." His counter proposal was:

That after unanimous consent was given the Senate should meet each day at eleven o'clock in the forenoon to consider the treaty, and all amendments, reservations, or resolutions of ratification that might be offered, and that no Senator should speak more than once, nor for more than fifteen minutes on any pending question.

That during the calendar day of Monday, November third, before adjournment or recess, the Senate should vote on the pending amendments and on any others that might be offered.

That during the calendar days of Tuesday and Wednesday, November fourth and fifth, the Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, should consider committee reservations and might continue to do so until three o'clock on the afternoon of Thursday, November sixth; that before, or at that hour, a vote should be taken on the Committee reservations, and that the treaty should then be reported to the Senate by the Committee of the Whole.

That in the Senate the vote on the resolution of ratification, embracing such reservations as had been adopted in Committee

of the Whole, should be taken before adjournment, or recess, on the calendar day of November sixth.

That if the treaty received the necessary two-thirds vote the President be notified at once.

That if it did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote, the Senate, on Friday, November seventh, and on Saturday, November eighth, consider any resolution of ratification proposed by the minority of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and vote on it not later than three o'clock on the afternoon of November eighth. Should no such resolution receive the necessary two-thirds vote then, during the calendar day of November eighth, any Senator might offer a resolution of ratification which should be voted on without debate. If no such resolution received the necessary two-thirds vote, then it should be in order for any Senator to move to take up the railroad bill or any other business, and this question should be decided without discussion.

Neither side would accept the proposal of the other; whereupon Senator Lodge, on November fourth, secured unanimous consent to vote on the remaining amendments the following day. He then offered an amendment to strike from the treaty the three articles relating to Shantung. It was voted down.

On Wednesday, November fifth, accordingly, the La Follette amendment, striking from the treaty Part XIII, relating to Labor, was taken up and defeated. On Thursday the Gore amendment, providing that the United States should not make war until the question had been submitted to popular vote, was defeated, two others striking from the Covenant Articles X and XI, were withdrawn, and all proposed amendments having thus been swept aside, the way was prepared for consideration of the preamble to the resolution of ratification and the fifteen reservations reported by the Committee.

Senator Lodge now moved consideration of the reservations; a debate arose, and in the course of it Senator Underwood argued that to consider the reservations before disposing of the preamble was an unparliamentary proceeding. Mr. Lodge

then asked why the Senator did not request unanimous consent for a vote, at once, on unconditional ratification. He was willing, Mr. Underwood replied, to do so, but no sooner had he said this, than Senator Hitchcock, the minority leader, rose and protested. Mr. Underwood admitted he could not make such a proposal without consent of the Senator who had charge of the treaty for the minority, and asked him to make it. Senator Hitchcock agreed and after some discussion a proposal was read. "It is agreed by unanimous consent that the Senate immediately pass to the parliamentary stage of the Senate and shall vote upon the following resolution:

"Resolved, two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, concurring therein, that the Senate advises and consents to the ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles, France, June 28, 1919.

"And it is further agreed, that if the treaty shall fail of ratification it shall immediately pass to the parliamentary stage of the Committee of the Whole."

Senators who were in the cloak room now hurried into the chamber, and the Secretary was about to call the roll when Senator Jones put an end to the whole proceeding by exclaiming, "I object."

Unanimous consent having been refused, the Senate took up the reservations, beginning with the first or preamble, but no vote was reached that day. On Friday when it again came up, attempts were made to amend, to strike out the requirements that written acceptances be obtained from three Powers; to provide that acceptance of the reservations might be by an exchange of notes; and to strike out "three" in order that they must be accepted by the four Powers mentioned; but in the end the preamble was adopted without change by a vote of forty-eight yeas to forty nays.

The withdrawal reservation came next; but no vote was taken until Saturday, when, after efforts to substitute the word "joint" for "concurrent," and even to strike out all mention of a concurrent resolution, it was adopted as drafted by a vote of

fifty yeas to thirty-five nays. Friends of the President represented this action. A joint resolution must be submitted to the President; a concurrent resolution is not submitted. The retention of the word concurrent, therefore, his friends claimed, was a deliberate affront to the President by depriving him of his constitutional power to veto. Supporters of the resolution denied that it in any way reflected on the President. They could see no reason why any President should have a veto over a decree of Congress respecting the withdrawal of the United States. Nay, if the question ever arose it would be when some other man was President, for Mr. Wilson assuredly would not occupy the White House after March fourth, 1921. There was, therefore, nothing personal in the reservation.

And now came up for consideration the reservation touching Article X of the Covenant, the reservation which the President had denounced as "striking a knife thrust at the heart of the treaty." The attack by the administration party began by offering a substitute setting forth that the suggestions of the Council of the League concerning the carrying out of the obligations imposed by the Article were advisory; that any undertaking calling for the use of land or naval forces or economic measures by the United States could be put into effect only by the action of Congress, and that failure to adopt the suggestions of the Council, or provide military or naval forces or economic measures, "shall not constitute a violation of the treaty." It was defeated by a vote of forty-eight against, to thirty-six in favor. Not one Republican Senator voted for it, and but four Democratic against it. The "irreconcilables" thereupon offered a reservation to the effect that the United States assumed no legal or moral obligation under Article X. The roll call showed that sixty-eight voted nay, and but eighteen yea. A reservation offered by Senator Walsh was then taken up, as an amendment, providing that the words declaring against the use of the armed forces of the United States, save with the consent of Congress, be stricken from the reservation reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations. It was

defeated, whereupon the Senator offered another, setting forth that the United States "releases the other members of the League of Nations from any obligation under Article X, and declines to participate in any proceedings in the Council authorized thereby." He was charged with not acting in good faith, with meddling with the affairs of other nations, with putting the United States in the position of dictating to other countries. The Committee's reservation, was the reply, releases the United States from all obligations under Article X. It is only fair, therefore, to release the other nations.

No vote was reached that day nor, indeed, on the morrow. Should the Walsh amendment be adopted it would be equivalent, so far as the United States was concerned, to cutting out of the treaty Article X. Seeing this opportunity to destroy the detested Article, a number of radical Republican Senators agreed to vote for the Amendment, and only a motion to adjourn made at the close of a long debate prevented a vote being taken. Had the amendment been adopted, the "middle ground" Senators would have refused to support the reservation as amended and would have been joined by the administration Senators in voting it down, for the sole object in offering the amendment was to divide the majority and so bring about the defeat of the reservation.

On the following day petitions to invoke the cloture rule and limit debate on the treaty were passed around for signatures by Democratic Senators and by Republicans of the middle ground group, for it was believed that five of the irreconcilables were engaged in a filibuster, in a plan to prolong debate to the end of the session and so prevent a final vote on the resolution of ratification.

November thirteenth, before debate was resumed on the Walsh amendment, the leader of the minority offered his petition signed by twenty-three Democrats. Limitation of debate, it was stipulated, should apply to the reservations, and not to the entire treaty. Against this a point of order was raised that it must cover the entire treaty. The point was sustained

by the chair. Senator Hitchcock appealed from the ruling. Senator Lodge moved to lay the appeal on the table, the motion was carried and the petition was thus ruled out. The Walsh amendment, and every other amendment and substitute, and there were many of them, were voted down, and the reservation to Article X, as reported by the Committee, was finally carried by a vote of forty-six yeas to thirty-three nays. This done, Senator Lodge offered his petition for cloture signed by thirty Republicans.

On Friday the fourteenth, owing to the death of a Senator from Virginia, the Senate was not in session. On Saturday the fifteenth, before the petition was put to vote, Senators of both parties, fearing that cloture might prevent them from offering other reservations, sent a flood of them to the clerks' desks before the vote was taken. After some explanation by the Vice-President the vote was ordered. Seventy-eight Senators answered yea, and sixteen nay. Under the rule thus adopted each Senator might speak for one hour. He might use his allotted time in one speech, or he might speak many times, but the sum total of the minutes so spent must not exceed sixty.

Cloture having thus been invoked, Senator Lodge moved the adoption of reservation No. 4, and before the Senate adjourned reservations 4 to 13 inclusive were adopted. When reservation No. 5 was under debate Senator Hale, of Maine, offered an amendment providing that "all questions relating to the present boundaries of the United States and its insular possessions" should be determined solely by the United States. This was necessary, he explained, in order that the boundary between Maine and Canada might not be violated by any attempt by Canada to obtain an outlet to the Atlantic. A Senator from California made the meaning of this more clear by reading from a newspaper a statement that Canada supported the League of Nations Covenant because under it she would be able to obtain an outlet to the Atlantic across American territory. The amendment was adopted. All other amendments offered

to the reservations were defeated. On Monday, November seventeenth, the two remaining reservations, 14 and 15, were rejected, and nothing remained but the flood of amendments sent in by the Senators before cloture was adopted.

To the newspaper men, Senator Hitchcock said he had seen the President and found that he still regarded the Lodge reservations as nullifying the treaty and impossible of acceptance. "President Wilson will pocket the treaty if the Lodge program of reservations is carried out in the ratifying resolution. The President did not say, however, that all the Lodge reservations were unacceptable." The first reservation, often called the preamble, the President regarded as killing the treaty. That affecting Article X was also objectionable. What reservations the President might accept, the Senator would not disclose. If the Lodge resolution of ratification were defeated the Senator was sure the President would withdraw the treaty unless the deadlock promised "a means of compromise." It was the expectation of the Senator that the resolution of ratification would be voted down. Once out of the way, the administration Senators would seek to obtain the adoption of their substitute resolution with the reservation as to Article X. After this was rejected, and he expected it would be, then the Senate would be ready to consider a compromise.

Tuesday, the eighteenth, the Senate sat for twelve hours considering a score and more of reservations offered by individual Senators. Two were adopted. One withheld the assent of the United States to Part 13, Articles CCCLXXXVII to CDXXVII inclusive, unless Congress, by act or joint resolution, shall make provision for representation in the organization set up by Part 13. The other set forth that "the United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report or finding of the Council or the Assembly in which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies and parts of empire in the aggregate have more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report or finding of the Council or Assembly arising

out of any dispute between the United States and a member of the league if such member or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire or part of empire united with it politically has voted." All others were defeated.

About nine o'clock at night the Committee of the Whole finished its work and the treaty was formally reported to the Senate. An attempt to strike from the preamble the requirement that the reservations must be accepted by at least three of the four principal Allied Powers failed; the Hale amendment was stricken from reservation No. 5, and the fifteen reservations were adopted.

When the Senate assembled on Wednesday, the nineteenth, it was known that at the request of the Administration Senators, the President had written their leader a letter expressing his wishes. "You were good enough to bring me word that the Democratic Senators supporting the treaty expected to hold a conference between the final votes on the Lodge resolution of ratification, and that they would be glad to receive a word of counsel from me.

"I should hesitate to offer it in any detail, but I assume that the Senators only desire my judgment upon the all-important question of the final vote on the resolution containing the many reservations of Senator Lodge. On that I cannot hesitate, for in my opinion the resolution in that form does not provide for ratification, but rather for nullification of the treaty.

"I sincerely hope that the friends and supporters of the treaty will vote against the Lodge resolution of ratification.

"I understand that the door will then be open for a genuine resolution of ratification.

"I trust all true friends of the treaty will refuse to support the Lodge resolution."

The wish of the President was gratified. The Lodge resolution, which required a two-thirds vote, was defeated by thirty-nine yeas to fifty-five nays. A motion to reconsider was then carried; a motion to adjourn was lost, and the Vice-President

ruled that the treaty was now back in the Committee of the Whole. Senator Lodge raised a point of order against the ruling, and the Senate sustained it.

Senator Hitchcock then attempted to offer a substitute resolution of ratification without any reservations whatever. Against this a point of order was raised, was overruled by the Vice-President, and an appeal sustained. Attempts were made to amend reservation No. 1; to reconsider the vote by which it was adopted; to refer the treaty and the majority resolution of ratification to a Committee of Conciliation; to recommit the treaty to the Committee on Foreign Relations with instructions to report it with a compromise resolution proposed by Senator Hitchcock, but they were all defeated, as was the Lodge resolution when put to a final vote. By unanimous consent a vote was then taken on ratification without reservations. The nays had it and the long struggle for ratification ended.

No sooner was the final vote taken than Senator Lodge offered a concurrent resolution that the "state of war between Germany and the United States is hereby declared to be at an end." But the House having adjourned *sine die* it went over to the next session which opened on the first of December.

While the Senate was wrangling over amendments and reservations the treaty was ratified by Great Britain, France and Italy, and all that remained to be done was to take the steps necessary to put it in force. These were four in number: a formal exchange of ratifications by the three Powers; a deposit of the instruments of ratification in the French Foreign Office at Paris; the drafting of a *proces-verbal*, or record of the deposit of the instruments of ratification, and the formal promulgation of the treaty. But Germany, month after month, had deliberately and defiantly violated article after article of the Armistice. She had not delivered all the locomotives and cars required. She had not withdrawn within her boundaries all her troops in Russia. She had not stopped requisitions, seizures, coercive measures in Russia. She had not delivered complete statements of all specie and securities removed, collected, or con-

fiscated in the invaded countries. She had not delivered all German submarines. One had been destroyed off Ferrol by her commander. Others had been sunk in the North Sea while on their way to England. At Scapa Flow, battleships she was under obligations to maintain, had been sunk. She had not returned the works of art and artistic documents taken from France and Belgium, nor the industrial and agricultural material stolen from French and Belgian territory, and she had exported aerial material to Holland, Denmark and Sweden.

Because of these and other violations of the terms of the armistice and protocols signed at Spa and Brussels, the Supreme Council on November 6 addressed to Germany a note and a special protocol.

The note set forth that three Powers had ratified the treaty and that "there will take place at Paris, a *proces-verbal* at which the German Government is requested to participate." But the principal Allied and Associated powers had decided that the treaty should not go into force until Germany had fully executed her obligation under the armistice convention.

The German Government therefore was invited to send to Paris on November 10 representatives duly authorized to sign the *proces verbal*, and the proposed protocol. The protocol set forth each requirement of the armistice violated by Germany and bound her to fulfill her obligations. By way of reparation for the ships destroyed at Scapa Flow she must, within sixty days after signing, deliver five light cruisers, and within ninety days deliver in good condition such a number of floating docks, cranes, tugs, and dredges as would amount to four hundred thousand tons displacement, pay the Allies the value of the exported aerial material, and do many other things by way of restitution.

November 10 came; but no German representatives. Indeed, a week passed before they arrived, and on November 22 they returned to Berlin leaving the protocol unsigned. Germany was defiant and for this the diplomats and publicists of France

blamed our Senate. Resistance, it was said, would never have been made had not the Senate failed to ratify the treaty. It is useless to look further for the origin of the movement of chicanery and revolt beyond the Rhine. It is the natural result of the sabotage of the Senate at Washington against the treaty of Versailles. Germany is seeking to prolong the protocol negotiation in order to secure a revision of the treaty. She objected, it soon became known, to paying for the ships destroyed at Scapa Flow, and to the requirement in the treaty that Germans charged with crimes against the usages of war be surrendered, and offered to submit to The Hague tribunal the question of indemnity for the ships. The Supreme Council in a note equivalent to an ultimatum refused to change the treaty terms, warned Germany that the denunciation by her of the armistice would leave the allied armies free to act, and that it expected the protocol to be signed and the ratification to be exchanged without delay. A second note dealt with the Scapa Flow incident and charged Germany with full responsibility for the sinking of the ships.

The German Government, was the reply, "desires to dissipate the misunderstanding that, owing to the momentary absence of American delegates from the commission provided for by the treaty of peace," Germany claimed modifications of the treaty concerning the extradition of persons charged with acts contrary to the laws of war. Before the Allied note was received she had explained the reasons for the desired change, but she never made her assent to putting the treaty into force conditional "on a previous solution of that question." She still believed that the best way to settle the Scapa Flow incident was to submit the matter to The Hague Tribunal. But, desirous to do her utmost to secure the speedy reestablishment of peace, she was ready to make reparation for the damage done to the Allied and Associated Governments by the sinking of the ships. This she could not do in the manner demanded by the protocol. It would ruin her economic life and make it impossible to carry out the enormous

obligations which the treaty imposed. She would, therefore, through experts, draft propositions showing a mode of reparation which, though it added a new and heavy burden to Germany, would not be incompatible with her vital interests.

Weeks were now spent in negotiation before the protocol was signed and ratification of the treaty exchanged at Paris on January 10, 1920. France, Great Britain, Belgium, Japan and such other Powers as had ratified were now at peace with Germany; but the United States was technically still at war.

Since the day when the resolution of ratification failed of adoption in the Senate, nothing had been accomplished. By the people the rejection of the treaty was received with surprise, indignation and indifference. Senator Lodge declared there was "no room for further compromise." He wanted "to carry those reservations into the campaign." He wished "the people to see them, understand them, and think of them in every household, on every farm, in every shop and factory throughout the land. Then let them decide." Senator Hitchcock was for compromise. The President kept silent. He was, indeed, reported to have said that he considered responsibility for the fate of the treaty to have been shifted from his shoulders to those of others, and there he was disposed to let it rest. But he took no official action, made no official statement. Rumors that he would take some action to end the deadlock, that he was convinced some compromise must be reached were set at rest about the middle of the month by an official statement from the White House. "It was learned from the highest authority at the executive offices to-day (December 14) that the hope of the Republican leaders of the Senate that the President would presently make some move which will relieve the situation with regard to the treaty is entirely without foundation.

"He has no compromise or concession of any kind in mind, but intends, so far as he is concerned, that the Republican leaders of the Senate shall continue to bear the undivided re-

sponsibility for the fate of the treaty, and the present condition of the world in consequence of that fate."

In the opinion of the Democratic Senators the position taken by the President was a justification of that taken by them. It was not the duty of the President to suggest a compromise. His duty was done when he presented the treaty. It was the duty of the Senate to dispose of it by final action. Until then it was before the Senate. Senator Lodge held that it should be withdrawn by the President and resubmitted with any proposals for compromise reservations he might see fit to make. It was now suggested that the Democrats should submit proposals to the mild reservationists; that the mild reservationists prepare a set of reservations; that a committee on conciliation be appointed; that the Republicans make concessions; that a bi-partisan round table be held during the holidays to take the treaty out of politics. Senator Knox offered two resolutions which finally were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. One declared the war at an end; the other proposed the ratification of the treaty without the covenant of the League of Nations. Senator Underwood attempted to obtain consideration of a resolution for the appointment by the President of the Senate of ten Senators to consider ways and means of securing the ratification of the treaty and report such a form of ratification as they believed would secure the approval of not less than two-thirds of the Senate; but Mr. Lodge prevented consideration.

During the holidays many informal conferences were held, but the old year ended and the new came with nothing accomplished. Everybody was waiting for the party dinner on Jackson Day, January 8, the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans. Never before had the public and the party interest in this annual dinner been so great, for the issues soon to be faced were many and serious, would-be candidates for the Presidency were to speak, Mr. Bryan was to attend, and it was well known that from the President would come a letter on the treaty. So great was the attendance that the diners were di-

vided into two groups. One, said to number some eight hundred, sat down at the Willard Hotel; the other, almost as large, at the Washington. The twelve speakers were also divided, and while six spoke at one hotel, six spoke at the other. Each group then took the other's place.

"Germany," said the President in his letter, "is beaten, but we are still at war with her, and the old stage is reset for a repetition of the old plot. It is now ready for a resumption of the old offensive and defensive alliances which made settled peace impossible.

"Without the covenant of the League of Nations there may be as many secret treaties as ever.

"None of the objects we professed to be fighting for has been secured, or can be made certain of, without this nation's ratification of the treaty and its entrance into the Covenant.

"The maintenance of the peace of the world and the effective execution of the treaty depend upon the whole-hearted participation of the United States. I am not stating it as a matter of power. The point is that the United States is the only nation which has sufficient moral force with the rest of the world to guarantee the substitution of discussion for war. If we keep out of this agreement, if we do not give our guarantee, then another attempt will be made to crush the small new nations of Europe.

"I do not believe that this is what the people of this country wish or will be satisfied with. Personally I do not accept the action of the Senate of the United States as the decision of the nation.

"I have endeavored to make it plain that if the Senate wishes to say what the undoubted meaning of the League is, I shall have no objection. There can be no reasonable objection to the interpretations accompanying the act of ratification itself. But when the treaty is acted upon, I must know whether it means that we have ratified or rejected it.

"We cannot rewrite this treaty. We must take it without changes which alter the meaning, or leave it, and then after

the rest of the world has signed it, we must face the unthinkable task of making another and separate treaty with Germany.

"If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think on this vital matter, the clear and only way out is to submit it for determination at the next election to the voters of the nation, to give the next election the form of a great and solemn referendum, a referendum as to the part the United States is to play in completing the settlement of the war and in the prevention in the future of such outrages as Germany attempted to perpetuate."

Mr. Bryan did not agree with the President. The party could not go to the country on such an issue. It was in the minority in the Senate and could not dictate the terms on which the treaty should be ratified.

"The Democratic Senators stood with the President for ratification without reservation, and I stood with them believing that it was better to secure within the league, after it was established, any necessary changes, than to attempt to secure them by reservations in the ratifying resolutions.

"But our plan has been rejected and we must face the situation as it is."

"We must either secure such compromises as may be possible, or present the issue to the country. The latter course would mean a delay of at least fourteen months and then success only in case of our securing a two-thirds majority in the Senate.

"We cannot afford, either as citizens or as members of the party, to share with the Republican Party responsibility for further delay; we cannot go before the country on the issue that such an appeal would present. The Republicans have a majority in the Senate, and, therefore, can by right dictate the Senate's course. Being in the minority, we cannot demand the right to decide the terms upon which the Senate will consent to ratification.

"Our Nation has spent 100,000 precious lives and more

than \$20,000,000,000 to make the world safe for democracy and the fundamental principle of democracy is the right of the majority to rule. It applies to the Senate and to the House as well as to the people. According to the Constitution a treaty is ratified by a two-thirds vote, but the Democratic Party cannot afford to take advantage of the constitutional right of a minority to prevent ratification.

"A majority of Congress can declare war. Shall we make it more difficult to conclude a treaty than to enter a war?"

"Neither can we go before the country on the issue raised by Article X. If we do not intend to impair the right of Congress to decide the question of peace or war when the time for action arises, how can we insist upon a moral obligation to go to war which can have no force or value except as it does impair the independence of Congress? We owe it to the world to join in an honest effort to put an end to war forever, and that effort should be made at the earliest possible moment."

The advice fell on dull ears. The old-fashioned doctrine that the majority should rule did not seem applicable. Only a few Senators approved the plan to carry the issue into the campaign. The President was reminded that the Constitution explicitly provided in what manner a treaty should be ratified, that no provision was made for "a great and solemn referendum," and the work of conciliation went on more earnestly than ever. Rumor had it that there would soon be a round table conference of Democrats and Republicans. Now and then some action by popular organizations showed the drift of public opinion. Delegates representing twenty-six organizations, farm, labor, educational, religious and civic, at a meeting in Washington adopted resolutions and sent them by a committee to the President, and to Senators Hitchcock and Lodge. Peace, so ran the resolutions, is declared and the United States is not a party to it. As the representatives of twenty-six national organizations which had expressed the judgment of their millions of members that the treaty should

be immediately ratified in such wise as not to require renegotiation, they had come to Washington to convey to the President the overwhelming sentiment that supported the demand for ratification. They unhesitatingly affirmed that the country desired peace at once and urged "immediate ratification with such reservations as may secure in the Senate the necessary two-thirds, even though this may require from the treaty making power the same spirit of self-denying sacrifice which won the war." The World should not wait longer for America to make peace.

In more than four hundred Universities and Colleges scattered over the country a poll was taken on six propositions sent out by the Intercollegiate Referendum Committee. When all returns were in it was found that 158,078 votes were cast. The propositions were: the League and the Treaty without reservations or amendments, for which there were 48,653 votes; no League or Treaty in any form which received 13,933; the League and the Treaty with the Lodge reservations which found 27,970 supporters; such a compromise as would hasten ratification for which 49,653 ballots were cast; the Treaty of Peace without the covenant of the League of Nations for which 6,949 persons voted, and the League and the Treaty with the reservations demanded by Mr. Hitchcock which received 11,841 votes.

By this time the oft suggested round table had taken the form of an unauthorized, unofficial bipartisan conference of five Democrats and four Republicans under the lead of Senators Hitchcock and Lodge. Conference after conference was held in secret. Agreement was reached, tentatively, on the preamble, on all sections of the reservations save those concerning Article X, the Monroe Doctrine, and a few minor matters. That agreement would be reached even on Article X seemed quite possible when the Republican "irreconcilables" served notice that if any changes were made in the reservations touching Article X and the Monroe Doctrine the treaty would be rejected. On Monday, January 26, accordingly,

Senator Lodge announced to the Democratic members of the conference that no compromise on Article X, nor on the Monroe Doctrine reservation was possible. They at once left the meeting to consider their reply which was delivered the following day. They had, they said, entered on the conference "without any reservations or restrictions" in the hope that differences might be compromised not only on Article X, but on all other reservations, and assumed that the other side had a like purpose. "The unexpected interruption of the conference and the decision to refuse any compromise on Article X" was all the more surprising because it seemed that they were close to an agreement on this very reservation by means of another which they now made public.¹

Gloomy as was the prospect of compromise one more meeting, the last, was held on January 30. The Democratic Senators began by offering a reservation on Article X proposed in the Philadelphia *Public Ledger*² by Mr. Taft. Senator Lodge rejected it, and when asked to submit some other, declared that the original reservation must stand. Thereupon the conference ended.

Nothing now remained to do save bring the treaty again before the Senate or allow the questions of ratification of the Covenant of the League of Nations to be carried into the Presidential Campaign. There were three ways by either of

¹"The United States assumes no obligation to employ its military or naval forces or the economic boycott to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide. Nothing herein shall be deemed to impair the obligation in Article XVI concerning the economic boycott."

²"The United States declines to assume any legal or binding obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or geographical independence of any other country under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose; but the Congress, which under the constitution has the sole power in the premises, will consider and decide what moral obligation, if any, under the circumstances of any particular case, when it arises, should move the United States, in the interest of the world peace and justice, to take action therein, and will provide accordingly."

which the treaty might again be brought before the Senate. The President might withdraw and resubmit it, an act nobody expected he would do. It might be taken up by unanimous consent which nobody expected could be obtained. It might be brought up under a suspension of Rule 13 relating to the reconsideration of questions the Senate had once refused to reconsider. This would require a two-thirds vote. The Democrats decided to make the attempt and on January 31 formal notice was given that on Tuesday, February 10, Senator Hitchcock would move that the Senate proceed to consider the treaty of peace with Germany. Thereupon on February 2 Mr. Lodge served notice that on February 9 he would ask unanimous consent to the suspension of Rule 13, and failing in that would move its suspension.

And now help came from a most unexpected source, a letter written by Viscount Grey to the editor of the *London Times*.^a

Nothing, he began by saying, is more desirable in international politics than a good understanding between the United States and Great Britain. Nothing more disastrous than misunderstanding. Some aspects of the position of the United States on the League of Nations were not understood in Great Britain, and it was in hopes of making that position better understood that he wrote his letter. One misunderstanding should be cleared away at the outset. No charge, he said, of bad faith or repudiation of signatures can be brought against the United States. The Senate is an independent element in the treaty making power and its refusal to ratify must not be construed as repudiation. Nor is it fair to charge the United States with holding up the treaty from motives of party politics. Nor is it true to say that the United States "is moved solely by a selfish interest to a disregard of high ideals." There is in the United States a strong feeling for the traditional policy of keeping clear of European alliance. The League of Nations is not merely a plunge into the unknown, but a plunge

^a The letter was published in full in the *Philadelphia Public Ledger* February 1, 1920.

into something which the traditions of the United States have hitherto disapproved. Hence the desire for reservations. Should the Covenant stand unchanged it will be possible for a President, some time in the future, to commit the United States to a policy which the Congress at that time may disapprove. Such a contingency cannot arise in Great Britain but it may in the United States which is quite right, if it so desires, to provide against it.

The help of the United States is most essential to secure peace. Without her the League will be little better than an alliance for armed self defense. It will have behind it neither physical nor the moral force it should have. It will be a European, not a world organization, the old order of things will be revived, and the fretful nations will have power to disturb the peace. It would be a mistake to suppose that because the United States wished to limit its obligations it intended to play a little part in the League of Nations. If she enters as a willing partner with limited obligations it may well be that her influence in the League will be more forceful than if she comes as a reluctant partner "who felt her hands had been forced."

Concerning one reservation, the fourteenth, Lord Grey wrote at length, and closed with these words: "Our object is to maintain the status of the self-governing dominions, not to secure a greater British than American vote, and we have no objection in principle to an increase of the American vote."

Great was the impression made by the letter. On both sides of the water it was hailed as candid, high-minded, statesman-like, as a letter to which no one could object. It was held to mean that he would accept the Lodge reservations, and that undoubtedly the British Government would do likewise if given the opportunity. Though addressed to the *Times* it had all the force of a state paper, was a powerful appeal to the United States to enter the League, and cleared the way for the adoption of the Lodge reservations. Let us meet the United States so liberally, said a London paper, as to leave her not an ex-

cuse for standing out. Let her send over a shipload of reservations. Lord Grey, it was said, spent his ninety days in Washington to good purpose. He was gathering information, absorbing American opinion. He was in conference, informally, with leaders of both parties and persons holding all shades of opinion on the League and the Covenant.

There were those, on the other hand, who expressed astonishment that Lord Grey while still special Ambassador, though absent on leave, should write a letter expressing opinions on political affairs in the United States, and above all on a matter which was the subject of bitter debate. It was true that in the letter he said concerning his observations, "they represent only my own personal opinion and nothing more, and they are given simply as those of a private individual." But was he, so far as the United States was concerned, a private individual? He had not been recalled. He had not resigned his post. He was still a special Ambassador though at home, and ought not in any way give public expression to his thoughts on American politics. Lloyd George, when asked by a correspondent of the *New York Times* what he thought of the Grey letter, said: "It was in the nature of a report to the British public on what he had observed during his stay in America, and to give them a clearer understanding of conditions over there."

And now, as the day on which it was hoped the treaty would be taken up in the Senate drew near, a letter from the President was made public. On the evening of January 22, when the bipartisan conference seemed about to agree on Article X, Senator Hitchcock wrote to the President: "On Article X the effort to reach a compromise has now reached a stage where both sides are seriously considering a proposition as indicated by the enclosed clipping."⁴ The letter now given to the press was the answer of the President bearing date January 26.

The form of the reservation the President thought very un-

⁴ Note, page 438.

fortunate. Any statement that "the United States assumes no obligation under such and such an article unless or except," would, he was sure, "chill our relationship with the nations with which we expect to be associated" in keeping the world at peace. He was happy to say that he accepted the five reservations offered by Senator Hitchcock "as they stand."⁵

The President did not see the slightest reason to doubt the good faith of our associates in the war, nor the slightest reason to believe they would seek to commit us to a line of action on which Congress alone could decide; thought it would be wise that notice of withdrawal should be by a joint, not by a concurrent resolution; doubted whether the President could be deprived of his veto even with his own consent; and saw "no objection to a frank statement that the United States can accept

⁵ Reservations proposed by Senator Hitchcock, and rejected by the Senate November 19:

"That any member nation proposing to withdraw from the League on two years' notice is the sole judge as to whether its obligations referred to in Article I of the League of Nations have been performed as required in said article.

"That no member nation is required to submit to the league, its council or its assembly for decision, report or recommendation any matter which it considers to be international law, a domestic question such as immigration, labor, tariff or other matter relating to its internal or coastwise affairs.

"That the national policy of the United States, known as the Monroe Doctrine, as announced and interpreted by the United States, is not in any way impaired or affected by the Covenant of the League of Nations and is not subject to any decision, report or inquiry by the council or assembly.

"That the advice mentioned in Article X of the covenant of the league which the council may give to the member nations as to the employment of their naval and military forces is merely advice which each member nation is free to accept or reject according to the conscience and judgment of its then existing government, and in the United States this advice can only be accepted by action of the Congress at the time in being, Congress alone, under the constitution of the United States, having the power to declare war.

"That in case of a dispute between members of the league if one of them has self-governing colonies, dominions or parts which have representation in the assembly, each and all are to be considered parties to the dispute, and the same shall be the rule if one of the parties to the dispute is a self-governing colony, dominion or part, in which case all other self-governing colonies, dominions or parts, as well as the nation as a whole, shall be considered parties to the dispute, and each and all shall be disqualified from having their votes counted in case of any inquiry on said dispute made by the assembly."

a mandate" under any provision of the treaty "only by the direct authority and action" of Congress.

On the appointed day unanimous consent to the suspension of Rule 13 was asked and refused; the Rule was suspended by vote; the treaty was recommitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and instruction was given to report it immediately together with the reservations adopted by the Senate and the ratifying resolution. The report was made as ordered; notice was given that it would be called up on February 16; the mild reservationists proceeded to frame another reservation on Article X; ⁶ the changes in the original reservations as tentatively agreed to, or considered in the bipartisan conference were presented, and the struggle for ratification was once more under way.

Towards the close of the week a "round robin" signed by twenty-eight Democrats, and said to have the approval of at least twelve more, was presented to Senator Lodge to be laid before the Republicans. It was an offer to accept either the reservation framed in the bipartisan conference, or that proposed by Mr. Taft.⁷ Senator Lodge promised to submit it without recommendation.

⁶ Proposed by the "mild reservationists":

"The United States assumes no obligation to preserve, by the use of its military or naval forces, or by the economic boycott or by any other means, the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or to interfere in controversies, between nations; whether members of the league or not, under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the constitution, has the sole power to declare war, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide."

⁷ The "round robin" is as follows:

"The undersigned Democratic senators, as a means of securing ratification of the treaty, will support as a reservation on Article X either of the following reservations, the first one being the reservation as framed in the bipartisan conferences recently held, and the second one being the last proposed reservation by former President Taft.

"Bipartisan conference reservation:

"The United States assumes no obligation to employ its military or naval forces or the economic boycott to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any other article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under

With the stage thus set for reconsideration discussion began anew, but no progress towards ratification was made when an incident occurred which threatened to put an end to the treaty forever.

On December 9, 1919, Great Britain, France and the United States came to an agreement on the Adriatic question, which was not accepted by Italy. Great Britain and France thereupon, without consulting the United States, drew up a revised proposal which Italy accepted on January 12, 1920, and which M. Clémenceau delivered to the Yugoslav delegation on January 14. This was not accepted, whereupon Great Britain and France submitted another and notified both Italy and Yugoslavia that if it were not accepted the Treaty of London would go into force.

To all this the President objected and a memorandum on the Adriatic question was handed by the American Ambassador at Paris to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the same day like memoranda were delivered at London and Rome. It was not made public, yet the French press declared the President held to the plan of December, 1919, disapproved that of January, objected to forcing the Yugoslavs to choose between it and the Treaty of London, and threatened, if the Allied Powers settled the matter without consulting the United States, our country would concern itself no further in European affairs. For this he was soundly berated by the Paris press.

the constitution, has the sole power to declare war, shall, by act or joint resolution, so provide. Nothing herein shall be deemed to impair the obligation in Article XVI concerning the economic boycott.'

"Mr. Taft's suggested reservation:

"The United States declines to assume any legal or binding obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose; but the Congress, which under the constitution has the sole power in the premises, will consider and decide what moral obligations, if any, under the circumstances of any particular case, when it arises, should move the United States in the interest of world peace and justice to take action therein, and will provide accordingly.'

"Whichever of the above reservations is preferred by Republican supporters of the treaty will as a compromise be acceptable to us."

Combated, it was said, in his own country, unable to secure the ratification of the treaty, he comes to counteract the efforts of the great European powers to remedy the present confusion. Closed in his proud isolation, irritated by his malady, out of contact with the Allied Cabinets and his own ministers, the unreasonable President of the United States pretends to direct the affairs of Europe, of which he has not the slightest conception. Another thought it inadmissible that Wilson, an autocrat, but one about to fall, should be allowed to impose his political ideas on Europe when within a year a Republican would rule in the White House. Another supposed, as the United States possessed a great mass of pounds sterling, francs and lire, the diplomats at London would not wish to unchain the thunderbolts of the American King.⁸ What is this memorandum? asked another. Is it an ultimatum to all Europe? Who is its real author? Mr. Wilson or the United States? It is absurd that when America voluntarily takes no part in the conferences, her President should intervene.

Such was the news the day the treaty was taken up in the Senate. In Washington it was asserted by some who claimed to know that the memorandum was not an ultimatum, not a threat to withdraw from European affairs. It was a warning that the President might withdraw from further consideration of the Adriatic problem. Nor was it true, as asserted in Paris, that in a postscript the President threatened to withdraw not only the treaty of Versailles, but also that pledging aid to France if attacked by Germany. This in turn was denied in Paris when the afternoon journals published what they claimed was the exact text of the postscript. "The President would take into serious consideration the withdrawal of America from the treaty of Versailles and from the treaty between the United States and France."

The reply of the Allies to the President was kept secret. But what was said to be the gist of it was cabled from Rome by

⁸ *La Liberté, Echo de Paris, Intransigeant*, quoted by *New York Times*, February 16, 1920.

a correspondent to his newspaper in Buenos Aires. To the charge of bad faith they were said to have answered that the President was unable to prove it. The President's plan for a buffer state had been rejected by Yugoslavia. The little strip of territory necessary to join Fiume with Italy was too insignificant to justify delay in settling peace in Europe. Italy had entered the war at a moment as critical as that when the United States came in, and had made sacrifices in blood and money far greater than had the United States. Threatening withdrawal of the treaty of Versailles gravely injured French policy for which the President invited protection.

During the excitement aroused by this new dispute over Fiume, the Senate did nothing with the treaty. On the twenty-first of the month, however, after some hours of debate, on the treaty as a campaign issue, the Lodge reservation on withdrawal from the League was readopted, by a large majority.

Nothing more was done for a week. Meantime the memoranda exchanged on the Fiume issue were given to the public. It then appeared that the President stood firmly by the proposal of December 9. The Adriatic issue raised the question, he said, as to whether the American Government could, on any terms, coöperate with its European associates in the great work of maintaining the peace of the world by removing the primary causes of war. "If substantial agreement on what is just and reasonable is not to determine international issues; if the country possessing the most endurance in pressing its demands rather than the country armed with a just cause, is to gain the support of the powers; if forcible seizure of coveted areas is to be permitted and condoned, and is to receive ultimate justification by creating a situation so difficult that decision favorable to the aggressor is deemed a practical necessity; if deliberately incited ambition is, under the name of national sentiment, to be rewarded at the expense of the small and the weak; if, in a word, the old order of things which brought so many evils on the world is still to prevail, then the time is not yet come when this Government can enter a concert

of powers the very existence of which must depend upon a new spirit and a new order." "If it does not appear feasible to secure acceptance of the just and generous concessions offered by the British, French and American Governments to Italy in the joint memorandum of those powers of December 9, 1919, which the President has already clearly stated to be the maximum concession that the Government of the United States can offer, the President desires to say that he must take under serious consideration the withdrawal of the treaty with Germany and the agreement between the United States and France of June 28, 1919, which are now before the Senate and permitting the European settlement to be independently established and enforced by the associated governments."

France and Great Britain in their joint reply defended their action; argued the points raised by the President; viewed "with consternation the threat of the United States Government to withdraw from the comity of nations because it does not agree to the precise terms of the Adriatic settlement"; earnestly trusted the United States "will not wreck the whole machinery for dealing with international disputes," and could not "believe that it is the purpose of the American people to take a step so far-reaching and terrible in its effects on a ground which has the appearance of being so inadequate."

The Senate on February 26 having resumed consideration of the reservations put off discussion on Article X until all others were acted on, adopted that concerning mandates by an almost unanimous vote, and were debating the fourth when a motion to adjourn was carried. Nearly a week passed before reservations four, five, six and eight and the bipartisan substitute for the seventh were adopted. Five more were adopted early in the second week of March and none save Article X remained to be considered. All this, however, would be of no avail, would be but a new threshing of old straw, unless the President would accept some form of compromise on the much debated article. As a last effort to obtain his views on the critical situation of the treaty, the Democrats chose a Senator to be their spokes-

man, and the party leader requested for him an audience with the President. The request was denied; but the President gave his views in a long letter to Senator Hitchcock.

He did not think it necessary to stipulate in connection with Article X, the constitutional methods we should use in fulfilling our obligation under it. Nothing would be gained by such stipulations, nothing would be secured not already secured. There could be no objection to explaining our constitutional methods, to declaring that Congress alone can declare war. But it would be a work of supererogation. Reservations which had come under his notice were, almost without exception, not interpretations but virtual nullifications of the articles to which they were attached. "Any reservation which seeks to deprive the League of Nations of the force of Article X, cuts at the very heart and life of the Covenant itself." A League of Nations which did not guarantee the political independence of each of its members might be hardly more than a futile scrap of paper. If we were to reject Article X, or take the force out of it, we would show a desire to go back to the old world of jealous rivalry and misunderstandings from which our gallant soldiers had rescued us. "If we have awakened, as has the rest of the world, to the vision of a new day in which the mistakes of the past are to be corrected, we will welcome the opportunity to share the responsibilities of Article X."

It was far from certain that imperialistic policies and militaristic ambitions were dead in the councils of our late Allies. "Throughout the sessions of the conference in Paris it was evident that a militaristic party under the most influential leadership was seeking to gain ascendancy in the councils of France. They were defeated then but are in control now. The chief arguments advanced in Paris in support of the Italian claims on the Adriatic were strategic arguments, that is to say militaristic arguments which had at their back the thought of naval supremacy on the sea." "Every imperialistic influence in Europe was hostile to the embodiment of Article X in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and its defeat now would

mark the complete consummation of their efforts to nullify the treaty."

Every so-called reservation was in effect "a rather sweeping nullification of the terms of the treaty itself. I hear of reservationists and mild reservationists, but I cannot understand the difference between a nullifier and a mild nullifier."

And now a new reservation ⁹ to Article X was prepared and the announcement made that when the time came it would be laid before the Senate, and still another, a substitute for that so long the cause of bitter contention, was offered by Senator Lodge.¹⁰ That the President would not accept it was fully believed. Nevertheless after the insertion of an amending clause ¹¹ it was adopted by the aid of votes cast by Democratic Senators.

Not content with this another reservation was introduced. "It shall be the declared policy of this Government that the freedom and peace of Europe, being again threatened by any power or combination of powers, the United States will regard such a situation with grave concern, and will consider what, if any, action it will take in the premises." It was rejected, and then followed a series of the most astonishing reservations

* "The United States assumes no obligations to employ its military or naval forces, its resources or any form of economic discrimination to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country, or to interfere in controversies between nations whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, in the exercise of full liberty of action, shall by act or joint resolution so provide."

¹⁰ "The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country by the employment of its military or naval forces, its resources, or any form of economic discrimination, or to interfere in controversies between nations, whether members of the League or not, under the provisions of Article X, or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall, in the exercise of full liberty of action, by act or joint resolution so provide."

¹¹ "Or to interfere in any way in controversies between nations, including all controversies relating to territorial integrity or political independence, whether members of the League or not," &c.

yet laid before the Senate. The United States understood the British protectorate over Egypt was a war measure intended to preserve the integrity of Egypt during the war; the United States understood the Allied Powers would adhere to the principles set forth by the President in the letter on which the armistice was based; the United States expected the British protectorate over Egypt would cease as soon as notice of ratification by the United States was deposited in Paris. These and several others were laid upon the table or rejected. Then came one declaring that "In consenting to the ratification of the Treaty with Germany the United States adheres to the principle of self-determination and to the resolution of sympathy with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own choice adopted by the Senate June 6, 1919, and declares that when self-government is attained by Ireland, a consummation it is hoped is at hand, it should promptly be admitted as a member of the League of Nations."

During the debate on the following day it was said England would never accept such a reservation; the treaty made no mention of Ireland, and did not treat of self-determination as a general doctrine; the Senate was going beyond its powers in putting into the resolution consenting to ratification something to which no reference was made in the treaty; the world would regard it as a declaration of American sympathy with revolutions of subject peoples everywhere; it was wrong to take a fundamental principle and apply it to a particular case; we had no business to dispose of the property of Great Britain while we did nothing for the Philippines. Efforts were made to strike from the reservation acceptance by the United States of the principle of self-determination, to limit it to Ireland, to so amend that it would include Korea; but in the end it was adopted unchanged.

The Senate concurred in all the reservations adopted in Committee of the Whole and when it adjourned at eleven o'clock on the night of March 18, the so-called preamble to

the resolution advising and consenting to ratification alone remained to be considered.

As it then stood this resolution provided that "ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes" by at least three of the four Powers, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. When the Senate met on the nineteenth this was changed, and shortly after six o'clock, by a vote of forty-nine yeas to thirty-five nays, the resolution for ratification was rejected.

Having no further use for the treaty it was ordered returned to the President. The resolution reads:

"That the Secretary of the Senate be instructed to return to the President the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on the twenty-eighth day of June, 1919, and respectfully inform the President that the Senate has failed to ratify said treaty, being unable to obtain the constitutional majority required therefor."

APPENDIX A

TEXT OF THE ARMISTICE

One—Cessation of operations by land and in the air six hours after the signature of the armistice.

Two—Immediate evacuation of invaded countries: Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, Luxemburg, so ordered as to be completed within fourteen days from the signature of the armistice. German troops which have not left the above-mentioned territories within the period fixed will become prisoners of war. Occupation by the Allied and United States forces jointly will keep pace with evacuation in these areas. All movements of evacuation and occupation will be regulated in accordance with a note annexed to the stated terms.

Three—Repatriation beginning at once to be completed within fifteen days of all the inhabitants of the countries above enumerated (including hostages, persons under trial or convicted).

Four—Surrender in good condition by the German Armies of the following war materials: Five thousand guns (2,500 heavy, and 2,500 field), 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 minenwerfer, 1,700 airplanes (fighters, bombers—firstly, all of the O 7's and all the night bombing machines). The above to be delivered in situ to the Allied and United States troops in accordance with the detailed conditions laid down in the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Five—Evacuation by the German armies of the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. The countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be administered by the local troops of occupation. The occupation of these territories will be carried out by Allied and United States garrisons holding the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne), together with the bridgeheads at these points of a thirty-kilometer radius on the right bank and by garrisons similarly holding the strategic points of the regions. A neutral zone shall be reserved on the right bank of the Rhine between the stream and a line drawn parallel to the bridgeheads and to the stream and at a distance of ten kilometers from the frontier of Holland up to the frontier of Switzerland. The evacuation by the enemy of the Rhinelands (left and right bank) shall be so ordered

as to be completed within a further period of sixteen days, in all, thirty-one days after the signing of the armistice. All the movements of evacuation or occupation are regulated by the note (annexure No. 1) drawn up at the moment of the signing of the armistice.

Six—In all territories evacuated by the enemy there shall be no evacuation of inhabitants; no damage or harm shall be done to the persons or property of the inhabitants. No person shall be prosecuted for offenses of participation in war measures prior to the signing of the armistice. No destruction of any kind shall be committed. Military establishments of all kinds shall be delivered intact, as well as military stores of food, munitions, and equipment, not removed during the time fixed for evacuation. Stores of food of all kinds for the civil population, cattle, etc., shall be left in situ. Industrial establishments shall not be impaired in any way and their personnel shall not be removed.

Seven—Roads and means of communication of every kind, railroads, waterways, main roads, bridges, telegraph, telephones, shall be in no manner impaired. All civil and military personnel at present employed on them shall remain. Five thousand locomotives and 150,000 wagons in good working order, with all necessary spare parts and fittings, shall be delivered to the associated powers within the period fixed in annexure No. 2, and total of which shall not exceed thirty-one days. There shall likewise be delivered 5,000 motor lorries (camione automobiles) in good order, within the period of thirty-six days. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine shall be handed over within the period of thirty-one days, together with pre-war personnel and material. Further, the material necessary for the working of railways in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine shall be left in situ. All stores of coal and material for the upkeep of permanent ways, signals and repair shops shall be left in situ. These stores shall be maintained by Germany insofar as concerns the working of the railroads in the countries on the left bank of the Rhine. All barges taken from the Allies shall be restored to them. The note, annexure No. 2, regulates the details of these measures.

Eight—The German command shall be responsible for revealing within the period of forty-eight hours after the signing of the armistice all mines or delayed action fuses on territory evacuated by the German troops and shall assist in their discovery and destruction. It also shall reveal all destructive measures that may have been taken (such as poisoning or polluting of springs and wells, etc.). All under penalty of reprisals.

Nine—The right of requisition shall be exercised by the Allied and United States armies in all occupied territories, subject to regulation of accounts with those whom it may concern. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (excluding Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

Ten—The immediate repatriation without reciprocity, according to detailed conditions which shall be fixed, of all Allied and United States prisoners of war, including persons under trial or convicted. The Allied Powers and the United States shall be able to dispose of them as they wish. This condition annuls the previous conventions on the subject of the exchange of prisoners of war, including the one of July, 1918, in course of ratification. However, the repatriation of German prisoners of war interned in Holland and in Switzerland shall continue as before. The repatriation of German prisoners of war shall be regulated at the conclusion of the preliminaries of peace.

Eleven—Sick and wounded who cannot be removed from evacuated territory will be cared for by German personnel, who will be left on the spot with the medical material required.

Twelve—All German troops at present in the territories which before belonged to Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Turkey, shall withdraw immediately within the frontiers of Germany as they existed on August First, Nineteen Fourteen. All German troops at present in the territories which before the war belonged to Russia shall likewise withdraw within the frontiers of Germany, defined as above, as soon as the Allies, taking into account the internal situation of these territories, shall decide that the time for this has come.

Thirteen—Evacuation by German troops to begin at once, and all German instructors, prisoners, and civilians as well as military agents now on the territory of Russia (as defined before 1914) to be recalled.

Fourteen—German troops to cease at once all requisitions and seizures and any other undertaking with a view to obtaining supplies intended for Germany in Rumania and Russia.

Fifteen—Renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk and of the supplementary treaties.

Sixteen—The Allies shall have free access to the territories evacuated by the Germans on their eastern frontier, either through Danzig, or by the Vistula, in order to convey supplies to the populations of those territories and for the purpose of maintaining order.

Seventeen—Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed by the Allies.

Eighteen—Repatriation, without reciprocity, within a maximum

period of one month in accordance with detailed conditions hereafter to be fixed of all interned civilians, including hostages, (persons?) under trial or convicted, belonging to the Allied or Associated Powers other than those enumerated in Article 3.

Nineteen—The following financial conditions are required: Reparation for damage done. While such armistice lasts no public securities shall be removed by the enemy which can serve as a pledge to the Allies for the recovery of reparation for war losses. Immediate restitution of the cash deposit in the national bank of Belgium, and in general immediate return of all documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, together with plan for the issue thereof, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries. Restitution of the Russian and Rumanian gold yielded to Germany or taken by that power. This gold to be delivered in trust to the Allies until the signature of peace.

Twenty—Immediate cessation of all hostilities at sea and definite information to be given as to the location and movements of all German ships. Notification to be given to neutrals that freedom of navigation in all territorial waters is given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers, all questions of neutrality being waived.

Twenty-one—All naval and mercantile marine prisoners of the Allied and Associated Powers in German hands to be returned without reciprocity.

Twenty-two—Surrender to the Allies and United States of all submarines, (including submarine cruisers and all mine-laying submarines), now existing, with their complete armament and equipment, in ports which shall be specified by the Allies and United States. Those which cannot be taken to these ports shall be disarmed of the personnel and material and shall remain under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The submarines which are ready for the sea shall be prepared to leave the German ports as soon as orders shall be received by wireless for their voyage to the port designated for their delivery, and the remainder at the earliest possible moment. The conditions of this article shall be carried into effect within the period of fourteen days after the signing of the armistice.

Twenty-three—German surface warships which shall be designated by the Allies and the United States shall be immediately disarmed and thereafter interned in neutral ports or in default of them in Allied ports to be designated by the Allies and the United States. They will there remain under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States, only caretakers being left on board. The follow-

ing warships are designated by the Allies: Six battle cruisers, ten battleships, eight light cruisers (including two mine layers), fifty destroyers of the most modern types. All other surface warships (including river craft) are to be concentrated in German naval bases to be designated by the Allies and the United States and are to be completely disarmed and classed under the supervision of the Allies and the United States. The military armament of all ships of the auxiliary fleet shall be put on shore. All vessels designated to be interned shall be ready to leave the German ports seven days after the signing of the armistice. Directions for the voyage will be given by wireless.

Twenty-four—The Allies and the United States of America shall have the right to sweep up all mine fields and obstructions laid by Germany outside German territorial waters, and the positions of these are to be indicated.

Twenty-five—Freedom of access to and from the Baltic to be given to the naval and mercantile marines of the Allied and Associated Powers. To secure this the Allies and the United States of America shall be empowered to occupy all German forts, fortifications, batteries, and defense works of all kinds in all the entrances from the Cattegat into the Baltic, and to sweep up all mines and obstructions within and without German territorial waters, without any question of neutrality being raised, and the positions of all such mines and obstructions are to be indicated.

Twenty-six—The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea are to remain liable to capture. The Allies and the United States should give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice to the extent recognized as necessary.

Twenty-seven—All naval aircraft are to be concentrated and immobilized in German bases to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America.

Twenty-eight—In evacuating the Belgian coast and ports Germany shall abandon in situ and in fact all port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material and supplies, and all arms, apparatus and supplies of every kind.

Twenty-nine—All Black Sea ports are to be evacuated by Germany; all Russian war vessels of all descriptions seized by Germany in the Black Sea are to be handed over to the Allies and the United States of America; all neutral merchant vessels seized are to be released; all warlike and other materials of all kinds seized in those

ports are to be returned and German materials as specified in Clause Twenty-eight are to be abandoned.

Thirty—All merchant vessels in German hands belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers are to be restored in ports to be specified by the Allies and the United States of America without reciprocity.

Thirty-one—No destruction of ships or of materials to be permitted before evacuation, surrender, or restoration.

Thirty-two—The German Government will notify the neutral Governments of the world, and particularly the Governments of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, that all restrictions placed on the trading of their vessels with the Allied and Associated Countries, whether by the German Government or by private German interests, and whether in return for specific concessions, such as the export of shipbuilding materials, or not, are immediately canceled.

Thirty-three—No transfers of German merchant shipping of any description to any neutral flag are to take place after signature of the armistice.

Thirty-four—The duration of the armistice is to be thirty days, with option to extend. During this period if its clauses are not carried into execution the armistice may be denounced by one of the contracting parties, which must give warning forty-eight hours in advance. It is understood that the execution of Articles 3 and 18 shall not warrant the denunciation of the armistice on the ground of insufficient execution within a period fixed, except in the case of bad faith in carrying them into execution. In order to assure the execution of this convention under the best conditions, the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted. This commission will act under the authority of the Allied Military and Naval Commanders in Chief.

Thirty-five—This armistice to be accepted or refused by Germany within seventy-two hours of notification.

[This armistice has been signed the Eleventh of November, Nineteen Eighteen, at 5 o'clock French time.]

F. FOCH.
R. E. WEMYSS.
ERZBERGER.
A. OBERNDORFF.
WINTERFELDT
VAN SALOW.

APPENDIX B

TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION TO CREATE A WORLD LEAGUE AS UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE

January 25, 1919.

The conference, having considered the proposals for the creation of a League of Nations, resolved that:

It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement which the associated nations are now met to establish that a League of Nations be created to promote international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

This league should be created as an integral part of the general treaty of peace and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects.

The members of the league should periodically meet in international conference and should have a permanent organization and secretaries to carry on the business of the league in the intervals between the conferences.

The conference therefore appoints a committee, representative of the associated Governments, to work out the details of the constitution and the functions of the league and the draft of resolutions in regard to breaches of the laws of war for presentation to the Peace Conference.

That a commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five great powers and five representatives to be elected by the other powers, be appointed to inquire and report upon the following:

First—The responsibility of the authors of the war.

Second—The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.

Third—The degree of responsibility for these offenses attaching to particular members of the enemy's forces, including members of the General Staffs and other individuals, however highly placed.

Fourth—The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offenses.

Fifth—Any other matters, cognate or ancillary to the above, which may arise in the course of the inquiry and which the commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration.¹

¹ *New York Times*, January 26, 1919.

APPENDIX C

TEXT OF THE PROPOSED COVENANT AND DRAFT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS READ BY PRESIDENT WILSON TO THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 14, 1919

COVENANT

PREAMBLE—In order to promote international co-operation and to secure international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized people with one another, the powers signatory to this covenant adopt this constitution of the League of Nations:

ARTICLE I

The action of the high contracting parties under the terms of this covenant shall be effected through the instrumentality of a meeting of a body of delegates representing the high contracting parties, of meetings at more frequent intervals of an Executive Council, and of a permanent international secretariat to be established at the seat of the League.

ARTICLE II

Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at stated intervals and from time to time, as occasion may require, for the purpose of dealing with matters within the sphere of action of the League. Meetings of the body of delegates shall be held at the seat of the League, or at such other places as may be found convenient, and shall consist of representatives of the high contracting parties. Each of the high contracting parties shall have one vote, but may have not more than three representatives.

ARTICLE III

The Executive Council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America, The British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, together with representatives of four other States, members of the League. The selection of these four States shall be made by the body of delegates on such principles and in such manner as they think fit. Pending the appointment of these representatives of the other States, representatives of ——— shall be members of the Executive Council.

Meetings of the council shall be held from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at whatever place may be decided on, or, failing any such decision, at the seat of the League, and any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world may be dealt with at such meetings.

Invitations shall be sent to any power to attend a meeting of the council, at which such matters directly affecting its interests are to be discussed, and no decision taken at any meeting will be binding on such powers unless so invited.

ARTICLE IV

All matters of procedure at meetings of the body of delegates or the Executive Council including the appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the body of delegates or the Executive Council, and may be decided by a majority of the States represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the body of delegates and of the Executive Council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 7

The permanent secretariat of the League shall be established at ———, which shall constitute the seat of the League. The secretariat shall comprise such secretaries and staff as may be required, under the general direction and control of a Secretary General of the League, who shall be chosen by the Executive Council. The secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General subject to confirmation by the Executive Council.

The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the body of delegates or of the Executive Council.

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the States members of the League, in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

ARTICLE VI

Representatives of the high contracting parties and officials of the League, when engaged in the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, and the buildings occupied by the League or its officials, or by representatives attending its meetings, shall enjoy the benefits of extra-territoriality.

ARTICLE VII

Admission to the League of States, not signatories to the covenant and not named in the protocol hereto as States to be invited to adhere to the covenant, requires the assent of not less than two-thirds of the States represented in the body of delegates, and shall be limited to fully self-governing countries, including dominions and colonies.

No State shall be admitted to the League unless it is able to give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations and unless it shall conform to such principles as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its naval and military forces and armaments.

ARTICLE VIII

The high contracting parties recognize the principle that the maintenance of peace will require the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, and the enforcement by common action of international obligations, having special regard to the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, and the Executive Council shall formulate plans for effecting such reduction. The Executive Council shall also determine for the consideration and action of the several Governments what military equipment and armament is fair and reasonable in proportion to the scale of forces laid down in the program of disarmament; and these limits, when adopted, shall not be exceeded without the permission of the Executive Council.

The high contracting parties agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war lends itself to grave objections, and direct the Executive Council to advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those countries which are not able to manufacture for themselves the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The high contracting parties undertake in no way to conceal from

each other the condition of such of their industries as are capable of being adapted to warlike purposes or the scale of their armaments, and agree that there shall be full and frank interchange of information as to their military and naval programs.

ARTICLE IX

A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the League on the execution of the provisions of Article VIII, and on military and naval questions generally.

ARTICLE X

The high contracting parties shall undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Executive Council shall advise upon the means by which the obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE XI

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the high contracting parties or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the League, and the high contracting parties reserve the right to take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.

It is hereby also declared and agreed to be the friendly right of each of the high contracting parties to draw the attention of the body of delegates or of the Executive Council to any circumstance affecting international intercourse which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE XII

The high contracting parties agree that should disputes arise between them which cannot be adjusted by the ordinary processes of diplomacy they will in no case resort to war without previously submitting the questions and matters involved either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Executive Council and until three months after the award by the arbitrators or a recommendation by the Executive Council, and that they will not even then resort to war as against a member of the League which complies with the award of the arbitrators or the recommendation of the Executive Council.

In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the recommendation of the Executive Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE XIII

The high contracting parties agree that whenever any dispute or difficulty shall arise between them, which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole matter to arbitration. For this purpose the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties or stipulated in any covenant existing between them. The high contracting parties agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered. In the event of any failure to carry out the award the Executive Council shall propose what steps can best be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE XIV

The Executive Council shall formulate plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice, and this court shall, when established, be competent to hear and determine any matter which the parties recognized as suitable for submission to it for arbitration under the foregoing article.

ARTICLE XV

If there should arise between States, members of the League, any dispute likely to lead to rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the high contracting parties agree that they will refer the matter to the Executive Council; either party to the dispute may give notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof. For this purpose the parties agree to communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Executive Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

Where the efforts of the council lead to the settlement of the dispute, a statement shall be published, indicating the nature of the dispute and the terms of settlement, together with such explanations as may be appropriate. If the dispute has not been settled, a report by the council shall be published, setting forth with all necessary facts and explanations the recommendation which the council think just and proper for the settlement of the dispute. If the report is

unanimously agreed to by the members of the council, other than the parties to the dispute, the high contracting parties agree that they will not go to war with any party which complies with the recommendations, and that, if any party shall refuse so to comply the council shall propose measures necessary to give effect to the recommendations. If no such unanimous report can be made it shall be the duty of the majority and the privilege of the minority to issue statements, indicating what they believe to be the facts, and containing the reasons which they consider to be just and proper.

The Executive Council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the body of delegates. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided that such request must be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute. In a case, referred to the body of delegates, all the provisions of this article, and of Article XII., relating to the action and powers of the Executive Council, shall apply to the action and powers of the body of delegates.

ARTICLE XVI

Should any of the high contracting parties break or disregard its covenants under Article XII. it shall thereby ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the League, which hereby undertakes immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking States and the nationals of any State, whether a member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the Executive Council in such case to recommend what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The high contracting parties agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which may be taken under this article in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State and that they will afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the high contracting parties who are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

ARTICLE XVII

In the event of disputes between one State member of the League and another State which is not a member of the League, or between States not members of the League, the high contracting parties agree that the State or States, not members of the League, shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Executive Council may deem just, and upon acceptance of any such invitation, the above provisions shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the League.

Upon such invitation being given the Executive Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances and merits of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

In the event of a power so invited refusing to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of the League, which in the case of a State member of the League would constitute a breach of Article XII., the provisions of Article XVI., shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purpose of such dispute, the Executive Council may take such action and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE XVIII

The high contracting parties agree that the League shall be intrusted with general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest.

ARTICLE XIX

To those colonies and territories which, as a consequence of the late war, have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution of the League.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that

the tutelage of such peoples should be intrusted to advanced nations, who by reason of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities, formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire, have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory, subject to conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League.

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Isles, which, owing to the sparseness of the population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory State and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory States as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory State shall render to the League an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration, to be exercised by the mandatory State, shall, if not previously agreed upon by the high contracting parties in each case, be explicitly defined by the Executive Council in a special act or charter.

The high contracting parties further agree to establish at the seat of the League a mandatory commission to receive and exam-

ine the annual reports of the mandatory powers, and to assist the League in insuring the observance of the terms of all mandates.

ARTICLE XX

The high contracting parties will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend; and to that end agree to establish as part of the organization of the League a permanent bureau of labor.

ARTICLE XXI

The high contracting parties agree that provision shall be made through the instrumentality of the League to secure and maintain freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all States members of the League, having in mind, among other things, special arrangements with regard to the necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918.

ARTICLE XXII

The high contracting parties agree to place under the control of the League all international bureaus already established by general treaties, if the parties to such treaties consent. Furthermore, they agree that all such international bureaus to be constituted in future shall be placed under control of the League.

ARTICLE XXIII

The high contracting parties agree that every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any State member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretary General and as soon as possible published by him, and that no such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE XXIV

It shall be the right of the body of delegates from time to time to advise the reconsideration by States members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and of international conditions of which the continuance may endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE XXV

The high contracting parties severally agree that the present covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations inter se which are in-

consistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly engage that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. In case any of the powers signatory hereto or subsequently admitted to the League shall, before becoming a party to this covenant, have undertaken any obligations which are inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such power to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE XXVI

Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the States whose representatives compose the Executive Council and by three-fourths of the States whose representatives compose the body of delegates.

APPENDIX D

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS EMBODIED IN THE TREATY OF PEACE (SENATE DOCUMENT NO. 49, 66TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION)

PART I

The high contracting parties, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the prescription of open, just and honorable relations between nations, by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another, agree to this covenant of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 1.—The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories which are named in the annex to this covenant and also such of those other States named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this covenant. Such accession shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the secretariat within two months of the coming into force of the covenant. Notice thereof shall be sent to all other members of the League.

Any fully self-governing State, Dominion or Colony not named in the annex may become a member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and armaments.

Any member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and all its obligations under this covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its withdrawal.

ARTICLE 2.—The action of the League under this covenant shall

be effected through the instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent secretariat.

ARTICLE 3.—The Assembly shall consist of representatives of the members of the League.

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion may require at the seat of the League or at such other places as may be decided upon. The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

At meetings of the Assembly each member of the League shall have one vote, and may have not more than three representatives.

ARTICLE 4.—The council shall consist of representatives of the principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with representatives of the four other members of the League. These four members of the League shall be selected by the assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until the appointment of the representatives of the four members of the League first selected by the assembly, representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and Greece shall be members of the Council.

With the approval of the majority of the assembly, the Council may name additional members of the League whose representatives shall always be members of the Council; the Council, with like approval, may increase the number of members of the League to be selected by the assembly for representation on the Council.

The council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least once a year, at the seat of the League or at such other place as may be decided upon.

The council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world.

Any members of the League not represented on the council shall be invited to send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the council during the consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member of the League.

At meetings of the council, each member of the League represented on the council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative.

ARTICLE 5.—Except where otherwise expressly provided in this covenant or by the terms of the present treaty, decisions at any meeting of the assembly of the council shall require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meeting.

All matters of procedure at meetings of the assembly of the council, including the appointment of committee to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated by the assembly or by the council and

may be decided by a majority of the League represented at the meeting.

The first meeting of the assembly and the first meeting of the council shall be summoned by the President of the United States of America.

ARTICLE 6.—The permanent secretariat shall be established at the seat of the League. The secretariat shall comprise a Secretary General and such Secretaries and staff as may be required.

The first Secretary General shall be the person named in the annex. Thereafter the Secretary General shall be appointed by the council with the approval of the majority of the assembly.

The Secretaries and staff of the secretariat shall be appointed by the Secretary General with the approval of the council. The Secretary General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the assembly and of the council.

The expenses of the secretariat shall be borne by the members of the League in accordance with the apportionment of expenses of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.

ARTICLE 7.—The seat of the league is established at Geneva.

The Council may at any time decide that the seat of the League shall be established elsewhere.

All positions under or connecting with the League, including the secretariat, shall be open equally to men and women.

Representatives of the members of the League, and officials of the League when engaged on business of the League, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by representatives attending its meeting shall be inviolable.

ARTICLE 8.—The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several Governments, the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council.

The members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave

objections. The Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented, due regard being had to the necessities of those members of the League which are not able to manufacture the munitions and implements of war necessary for their safety.

The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their naval and military programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to the warlike purposes.

ARTICLE 9.—A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military and naval questions generally.

ARTICLE 10.—The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

ARTICLE 11.—Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary General shall, on the request of any member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

ARTICLE 12.—The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council.

In any case under this article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after the submission of the dispute.

ARTICLE 13.—The members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall exist between them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration.

Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty as to any question of international law as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among these which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration.

For the consideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any convention existing between them.

The members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

ARTICLE 14.—The Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. The court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly.

ARTICLE 15.—If there should arise between members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration in accordance with Article 13, the members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute to the Secretary General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof.

For this purpose the parties to the dispute will communicate to the Secretary General, as promptly as possible, statements of their case with all the relevant facts and papers, and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof.

The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful a statement shall be made public giving such facts and explanations regarding the dispute and the terms of settlement thereof as the Council may deem appropriate.

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

Any member of the League reported on the Council may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of its conclusions regarding the same.

If a report by the council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report.

If the council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice.

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the council shall so report and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement.

The council may in any case under this article refer the dispute to the assembly. The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute provided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the dispute to the council.

In any case referred to the assembly all the provisions of this article and of Article 12, relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the League represented on the council and of a majority of the other members of the League, exclusive in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute.

ARTICLE 16.—Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Articles 12, 13, or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a member of the League or not.

It shall be the duty of the council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military or naval force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League.

The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this article, in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

Any member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a member of the League by a vote of the council concurred in by the representatives of all the other members of the League represented thereon.

ARTICLE 17.—In the event of a dispute between a member of the League and a State which is not a member of the League, or between States not members of the League, the State or States not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of Articles 12 to 16, inclusive, shall be applied with such modifications as may be deemed necessary by the Council.

Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such action as may seem best and most effectual in the circumstances.

If a State so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member of the League, the provisions of Article 16 shall be applicable as against the State taking such action.

If both parties of the dispute when so invited refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the council may take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and will result in the settlement of the dispute.

ARTICLE 18.—Every treaty or international engagement entered into hereafter by any member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat, and shall as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered.

ARTICLE 19.—The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

ARTICLE 20.—The members of the League severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.

In case any member of the League shall, before becoming a member of the League, have undertaken any obligations inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it shall be the duty of such members to take immediate steps to procure its release from such obligations.

ARTICLE 21.—Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.

ARTICLE 22.—To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this covenant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such people should be intrusted to advanced nations who, by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration

of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic, and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of the other members of the League.

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centers of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the mandatar, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatar as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous populations.

In every case of mandate, the mandatar shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the mandatar shall, if not previously agreed upon by the members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the mandar and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.

ARTICLE 23.—Subject to and in accordance with the provisions of international conventions existing or hereafter to be agreed upon the members of the League:

(A) Will endeavor to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labor for men, women, and children, both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend and for that purpose will establish and maintain the necessary international organizations;

(B) Undertake to secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control;

(C) Will intrust the League with the general supervision over the execution of agreements with regard to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous drugs.

(D) Will intrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in the common interest;

(E) Will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce

of all members of the League. In this connection, the special necessities of the regions devastated during the war of 1914-18 shall be borne in mind;

(F) Will endeavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and control of disease.

ARTICLE 24.—There shall be placed under direction of the League all international bureaus already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All such international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of the League.

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions but which are not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions, the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if desired by the parties collect and distribute all relevant information and shall render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable.

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the secretariat the expenses of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League.

ARTICLE 25.—The members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment and co-operation of duly authorized voluntary national Red Cross organizations having as purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of suffering throughout the world.

ARTICLE 26.—Amendments to this covenant will take effect when ratified by the members of the League whose representatives compose the council and by a majority of the members of the League whose representatives compose the assembly.

No such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its dissent therefrom but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the League.

ANNEX I

ORIGINAL MEMBERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS SIGNATORIES OF THE TREATY OF PEACE

United States of America, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, British Empire, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Hedjaz, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Serb-Croat and Slovene State, Siam, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay.

STATES INVITED TO ACCEDE TO THE COVENANT

Argentine Republic, Chili, Colombia, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, Salvador, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela.

ANNEX II

FIRST SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The Honorable Sir James Eric Drummond, K. C. M., G. C. B.

APPENDIX E

RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION REJECTED BY THE SENATE, NOVEMBER 19TH, 1919

Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the treaty of peace with Germany concluded at Versailles on the 28th day of June, 1919, subject to the following reservations and understandings, which are hereby made a part and condition of this resolution of ratification, which ratification is not to take effect or bind the United States until the said reservations and understandings adopted by the Senate have been accepted by an exchange of notes as a part and a condition of this resolution of ratification by at least three of the four principal allied and associated powers, to wit, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan:

1. The United States so understands and construes Article I. that in case of notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations, as provided in said article, the United States shall be the sole judge as to whether all its international obligations and all its obligations under the said covenant have been fulfilled, and notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.

2. The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country or to interfere in controversies between nations—whether members of the League or not—under the provisions of Article X., or to employ the military or naval forces of the United States under any article of the treaty for any purpose, unless in any particular case the Congress, which, under the Constitution, has the sole power to declare war or authorize the employment of the military or naval forces of the United States, shall by act or joint resolution so provide.

3. No mandate shall be accepted by the United States under Article XXII., Part I., or any other provision of the treaty of peace with Germany, except by action of the Congress of the United States.

4. The United States reserves to itself exclusively the right to decide what questions are within its domestic jurisdiction and declares that all domestic and political questions relating wholly or in part

to its internal affairs, including immigration, labor, coastwise traffic, the tariff, commerce, the suppression of traffic in women and children, and in opium and other dangerous drugs, and all other domestic questions, are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States and are not under this treaty to be submitted in any way either to arbitration or to the consideration of the Council or of the Assembly of the League of Nations, or any agency thereof, or to the decision or recommendation of any other power.

5. The United States will not submit to arbitration or to inquiry by the Assembly or by the Council of the League of Nations, provided for in said treaty of peace, any questions which in the judgment of the United States depend upon or relate to its long-established policy, commonly known as the Monroe Doctrine; said doctrine is to be interpreted by the United States alone and is hereby declared to be wholly outside the jurisdiction of said League of Nations and entirely unaffected by any provision contained in the said treaty of peace with Germany.

6. The United States withholds its assent to Articles CLVI., CLVII., and CLVIII., and reserves full liberty of action with respect to any controversy which may arise under said articles between the Republic of China and the Empire of Japan.

7. The Congress of the United States will provide by law for the appointment of the representatives of the United States in the Assembly and the Council of the League of Nations, and may in its discretion provide for the participation of the United States in any commission, committee, tribunal, court, council, or conference, or in the selection of any members thereof and for the appointment of members of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences, or any other representatives under the treaty of peace, or in carrying out its provisions, and until such participation and appointment have been so provided for and the powers and duties of such representatives have been defined by law, no person shall represent the United States under either said League of Nations or the treaty of peace with Germany or be authorized to perform any act for or on behalf of the United States thereunder, and no citizen of the United States shall be selected or appointed as a member of said commissions, committees, tribunals, courts, councils, or conferences except with the approval of the Senate of the United States.

8. The United States understands that the Reparations Commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.

9. The United States shall not be obligated to contribute to any expenses of the League of Nations, or of the secretariat, or of any commission, or committee, or conference, or other agency, organized under the League of Nations or under the treaty or for the purpose of carrying out the treaty provisions, unless and until an appropriation of funds available for such expenses shall have been made by the Congress of the United States.

10. If the United States shall at any time adopt any plan for the limitation of armament proposed by the Council of the League of Nations under the provisions of Article VIII., it reserves the right to increase such armaments without the consent of the council whenever the United States is threatened with invasion or engaged in war.

11. The United States reserves the right to permit, in its discretion, the nationals of a covenant-breaking State, as defined in Article XVI. of the covenant of the League of Nations, residing within the United States or in countries other than that violating said Article XVI., to continue their commercial, financial, and personal relations with the nationals of the United States.

12. Nothing in Articles CCXCVI., CCXCVII., or in any of the annexes thereto or in any other article, section, or annex of the treaty of peace with Germany shall, as against citizens of the United States, be taken to mean any confirmation, ratification, or approval of any act otherwise illegal or in contravention of the rights of citizens of the United States.

13. The United States withholds its assent to Part XIII. (Articles CCCLXXXVII. to CCCCXXVII. inclusive) unless Congress by act or joint resolution shall hereafter make provision for representation in the organization established by said Part XIII. and in such event the participation of the United States will be governed and conditioned by the provisions of such act or joint resolution.

14. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any election, decision, report or finding of the Council or Assembly in which any member of the League and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast more than one vote, and assumes no obligation to be bound by any decision, report, or finding of the Council or Assembly, arising out of any dispute between the United States and any member of the League if such member, or any self-governing dominion, colony, empire or part of empire united with it politically has voted.

INDEX

- Abdication of the Kaiser demanded, must he go? 212-213; abdication announced, 213; his signed abdication, 219; of rulers of German States, 233; of Queen of Netherlands demanded, 232.
- "Adoration of the Lamb," Germany to restore, 347.
- Agawam*. Speed in building, 52.
- Age of draftees extended, 35-37.
- Albania, Claims of, 326.
- Albemarle, Lord and Lady, present portrait of Washington, 104.
- Alexander, King of Greece. Fourth of July greetings, 105.
- Alien Property Custodian, his duties, 63; property seized by, 64; extension of his powers, 63, 64.
- Alliances, entangling, 309-310.
- Allies, the, call for troops, 36
- Lloyd George on the call, 49-50; food supply for, 54; Hoover's appeal, 54, 56; voluntary rationing, 54-57; amount of food sent, 56.
- Allies, the, feeding, 56, 57.
- Alsace-Lorraine, 324, 345.
- Amendments proposed to League of Nations by neutral powers, 312; by Mr. Taft, 312, 313, 320, 390-391; by Senator Borah, 297-298; by Japan, 312; by Switzerland, 313; by Mr. Hughes, 318, 320; Committee on Foreign Relations, 401, 403; majority report, 404-405; lost, 419-420.
- American Defense Society, 67.
- American Library Association, 84.
- American Protective League, 44, 47, 48.
- American troops in Russia, 227.
- Andrassy, Count Julian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 199; appeals to Lansing, 202; resigns, 205.
- Anniversary of landing of American troops in France. Poincaré to President Wilson, 99; Poincaré to General Pershing, 100; Clémenceau to General Pershing, 100; General Petain to Pershing, 100.
- Arab nation, 325.
- Archangel, American troops in, 227.
- Armistice with Bulgaria, 168-169, 170; excitement in Germany, 173-174; in Vienna, 175; Austria asks peace, 176; Germany asks peace, 176-179; the Kaiser announces peace offer to his army, 182; President's reply to Germany's offer, 183; answer of Germany, 187; reply of the President, 190-192; Turkey asks peace, 192-193; President answers Austria, 195; reply of Germany, 196-197; answers of the President, 198-199; Germany answers the President,

200; Austria asks him to act, 200; appeal to Lansing, 202; rumors of collapse of Austria and Germany, 202-205; General Diaz delivers terms to Austria, 205; Austria accepts, 206; War Council drafts terms for Germany, 206-207; Foch to deliver them, 206; Memorandum on the terms, 206-207; the first German delegation, 207; false rumor of an armistice, 208; Foch notified by the Germans, 209-210; explanation of the false announcement, 210-212; Germany signs the Armistice, 215; the President reads the terms to Congress, 222; the two texts compared, 222-226; Ebert denounces, 285; extended, 286; effort to obtain modification, 292-293; Foch refuses, 292; protest to Foch, 293; again extended, 328; anger of Germany, 329.

Armistice, false report of, 208; explanation of, 210-212.

Army—Registration, June, 1918, 32, 33; Crowder's address, 32-33; number registered, 33; classification, 34; draft age extended, 36, 37; proclamation by the President, 38; registration, August 36, 37; registration in September, 38, 40, 41; number registered, 41; Student Army Training Corps, 41-43; Allies' call for troops, 49; Lloyd George on the call, 49-50; movement of troops, 50; number sent, 50, 51; Germans press on, 51; Vice Admiral von Capelle on, 51; French ports used by army, 85; placed

at disposal of Marshal Foch, 85, 86; the First Division at Cantigny, 88; the Marines at Château-Thierry, 89; foreign newspapers on the fight, 89-94; Lloyd George on American soldiers, 94; Second Division on the Marne, 88, 89; Marines take Belleau Wood, 94-99; Celebration of anniversary of landing of our troops in France, 99-101; the German fifth offensive, 108; Third Division at the Marne, 108-110; battle line, July 16th, 110; Allied offensive, July 18th, 111; First Division, 111-112; Second Division, 111-112; Fourth Division, 112, 115; 26th Division captures Torcy, Belleau, Givry, 113; Germans evacuate Château-Thierry, 113; Epieds, 113; Allied front, 114; 42d Division crosses the Ourcq, 114; Sergy, 114; Fismes, 115; and Vesle crossed, 115; St. Mihiel salient, 116-121; King George sends congratulations, 121; Lloyd George and General Haig, 122; Poincaré, 122; fighting in Flanders, 124-126; Gen. Degoutte on, 126; near Rheims, 129; moved to Meuse-Argonne, 130; first phase of the battle, 130-132; the "lost Battalion," 132; the second phase, 132-134; second American Army, 135; the Armistice, 135-136; the march to the Rhine, 237-240; number of troops in Europe, 136; in Russia, 227.

Article VIII., 294.

Article X. of the Covenant, objections to, 295, 298, 304,

- 318, 322; 382; 390; 391; 396; a moral obligation, 397-398; U. S. not to assume obligations under, 402; the President on, 407, 411, 412, 413, 414, 424, 425, 426, 427; bipartisan conference on, 437-438 and note; Mr. Taft, 438, note; the "round robin," 443 and note; the Senate, 447; the President on, 448; new reservations on, 449 and note.
- Article XII., 302.
- Assembly, German National, 234, 235, 236, 253, 285, 329, 350-352.
- Asquith, Herbert Henry, favors punishing of German war criminals, 251.
- Atrocities, German, Allied note on, 364-366.
- Attorney-General, explains raid on slackers, 46-49.
- Australia, claims of, 283; on League of Nations, 312-313.
- Austria, peace speech of Baron Burian, 148-150; his speech to German newspaper men, 151-152; Austrian peace note, 156-160; American newspapers on the note, 160-163; British journals on the note, 163-164; Balfour, 164; Germany on the note, 165; Lansing's reply, 165, 166; German press on the reply, 166; Bulgarian Armistice, 168-170; excitement in Vienna, 174-176; Armistice asked, 176; Emperor to his people, 194; President's answer to Austrian peace offer, 195; Austria accepts, 200; Count Andrássy appeals to Lansing, 202; revolution in, 204-206; Armistice signed, 206.
- Automobile owners, Voluntary conservation of gasoline, 62-63.
- Balfour, Arthur J., 110, 144, 147, 157; on Austrian note, 164-165; favors League of Nations, 251.
- Barrage, The mine barrage in the North Sea, 30-31.
- Barrett, Dorothy, sinking by a submarine described, 25.
- Baseball, game on Chelsea field, The King present, 104.
- Bastille Day, Americans celebrate, 107-108.
- Bastin, R. H., prisoner on UK-140, 15, 16; describes attack on *Diamond shoal Light Ship*, 19-20; experiences on the UK-140 described, 20-21.
- Battles—Cantigny, 88; Château-Thierry, 89; Belleau Wood, 94-99; on the Marne, 108-110; advance to the Vesle, 113-115; St. Mihiel, 116-121; in Flanders, 124-126; Meuse-Argonne, 129-135.
- Battle lines in France, April, May, June, 1918, 86, 87, 89.
- Belgian Army, Fourth of July greetings to Pershing, 106.
- Belgium, von Kuhlmann on, 142; von Hertling on, 145, 146; Berlin *Tageblatt* on, 147; *Vossische Zeitung* on, 147; *Germania* on, 147; Vice-Councillor Preyer on, 155; reported German peace offer to, 160; German Chancellor on, 179; protests against representation, 282; on abrogation of treaty of 1839, 330.
- Belleau Wood, 94-99; called "Bois de la Brigade de Marine," 99.

- Bentinck, Count, Kaiser finds refuge in his castle, 216, 217.
- Bernstorff, Count von, 66.
- Bipartisan Conference, The, 437-438; reservations, 443 and note.
- Boards, War Industries, 58; War Labor, 60, 61, 62; Sugar Board, 55.
- "Bois de la Brigade de Marine" order of General Degoutte, 99.
- Borah, William Edgar, Senator from Idaho, resolution on treaty of peace before it was made, 249; resolution on Monroe Doctrine, questions Mr. Taft, 297-298; receives copy of the treaty, 378; attempts to read it, 379; Borah-Johnson statement of conference with the President, 397-399.
- Boundaries, 324, 325, 326-327, 330; in the treaty, 345.
- Bourgeois, Leon, 270, 286.
- Bread, Victory bread, 54; rationing, 54, 56.
- Brest, reception to the President, 254-255.
- Brest-Litovsk treaty, 175.
- British Army in Picardy and Flanders, 1918, 85. General Haig "With our backs to the wall," 88; the German drives, 85-87.
- Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count von, German plenipotentiary, 337; receives the treaty, insulting speech, 344; protest against treaty, 353-354; against exclusion from League, 354; note on labor and repatriation, 354; against economic boundary reparation terms, 355; more notes, 355; Cabinet declines to sign, 356-357; counter proposal, 358-359; sends protest of delegation, 359-364.
- Bryan, William J., appeal for Fourth Liberty Loan, 79-80; speech at Jackson dinner, 435-436.
- Bulgaria asks an armistice, 168-169; German press on, 169; armistice signed, 170; German press on Bulgaria, 173-174; excitement in Vienna, 175, 176; King Boris abdicates, 205-206.
- Burian, Baron, on terms of peace, 148-150; 151-152.
- Cabinet, The German, will not sign treaty, 356-357; counter proposal, 358-359; resign, 368.
- Cables, The, taken over, 244, 245.
- Cantigny, captured by First Division, 88.
- Cape Cod, vessels off, sunk by submarine, 13.
- Capelle, Admiral von, belittles troop movement, 51.
- Charles, Emperor of Austria, to his people, 194.
- Château-Thierry, Third Division at, fight of the Marines, 89; foreign newspapers on, 89-94; Lloyd George on, 94.
- Chicago, raid on slackers, 45.
- Chinese, refuse to sign treaty, 375.
- Classification of registrants, 33-34.
- Clémenceau, Georges, appeal for Fourth Liberty Loan, 80; congratulates Pershing, 100; on a new balance of power, 264; chairman of Peace Conference, 273; small nations

- protest to, 282; speech on delivering treaty, 343-344; answer of Brockdorff-Rantzau, 344; German notes to, 354, 355; sends Allies' review of German atrocities, 364-368; Scapa Flow note, 372-373; speech at signing of the treaty, 374.
- Cloture, 425, 426.
- Clubs, rationed, 54, 55.
- Coal, war economy in use of, 58; President appeals to miners, 58, 59.
- Coblentz, American army enters, 238-239.
- Colleges, the Student Army Training Corps, 41-43; vote on reservations to League, 437.
- Colonies, the German Claims of the Allies to, 283; British press on, 284-285.
- Commons, the House of, Mr. Bonar Law announces American victory, 110.
- Congress, Bill to extend draft age, 37; "work or fight" amendment, 37-38; Mr. Gompers objects, 38; the Act signed, 38; gives power to take over telephone, cable and telegraph lines, 62; President addresses on finance, 69-71; amount of money needed, 71; President reads text of Armistice, 222-226; The Annual Message, December, 1918, 246-247; the President announces he will attend Peace Conference, 247; Senators oppose, 248-249; Senator Frelinghuysen on League of Nations, 248; President requests Congress not to discuss League, 293; adjourns leaving business undone, protest of the President, 306-307; called in extra session, 322.
- Conscription, Industrial, "work or fight" order, 34, 35.
- Conservation of food, 54; Victory bread, 54; sugar, 54, 55; meat, 54, 55; scarcity of sugar, 55; amount of food saved for the Allies, 56; Hoover's second appeal, 56-57; of fuel, 58, 59; of gasoline, 62-63; of travel, 63.
- Counter-proposal of Germany, 358-359.
- Creel, George, 244-245.
- Crowder, Provost Marshal General. Address to registrants, 32-33; "Work or fight" order, 34-35; asks extension of draft age, 36, 37; on August registration, 37; on slackers, 44.
- Crown Prince of Germany, observation tower captured, 131; flees to Holland, 217.
- Czecho-Slovakia, 325, 345, 348, 359.
- Daniels, Josephus, Secretary of Navy, on the submarine raid, 8; telegram to London *Times*, 8.
- Danzig, 324, 345.
- Degoutte, General, Belleau Wood to be called "Bois de la Brigade de Marine," 99; on Americans in Flanders, 126.
- Denmark, 324. Schleswig, 345.
- Devastation by the Germans, St. Quentin, 136; the French Government protests Reparations Committee, 136-137; United States protests, 138.
- Diaz, General, receives Bulgaria's offer of peace, 168-170; delivers terms to Austria,

- 205; signs Austrian Armistice, 206.
- Director General of Railroads, asks people not to travel, 63.
- Domestic and political issues reserved, 403, 417.
- Dover, welcome to President, 260.
- Draft of June, 1918, 32; General Crowder's address to registrants, 32-33; number registered, 33; classification, 34; "work or fight" order, 34-35; age limit extended, 36; proclamation by the President, 38; registration, August 24th, 39; registration, September 12th, 38, 39, 40; the drawing, 41.
- Earle, Ralph, Rear Admiral, 31.
- East Prussia, 330, 345.
- Ebert, Frederick, 222; appeals for food, 230; in power, 233; denounces Armistice, 285; President of Germany, 286; denounces the treaty, 351-352.
- Eightieth Division in the Argonne, 130.
- Eighty-Second Division, 119; in the Argonne, 130.
- Eighty-Ninth Division, 119.
- "Emblem and Conscience Day," 81.
- Emergency Fleet Corporation, 51, 52.
- Emmanuel, King of Italy, Fourth of July greetings, 105.
- Employment Service, The United States, 60, 61.
- Erzberger, Mathias, heads armistice commission, 209; signs Armistice, 214-215; seeks modification of, 292; protests to Foch, 292-293.
- Exemption from war service, 34.
- Fabricated ships, 52.
- Fall, Albert B., Senator—New Mexico, 400; amendment excluding U. S. from representation on commissions, 415, 416.
- Farewell Address, Washington's, 309-310, 317.
- Fifth Division, 119.
- Fifty-Second Division, 113; forced passage of the Ourcq, 114; takes Sergy, 114; at St. Mihiel, 119; in the Argonne, 135.
- Finances, The President addresses Congress on, 70-71; amount of money needed, how to be raised, 71; Red Cross drive, 71-74; War Chest in Philadelphia, 71-74; War Savings Stamps, 74; the President's appeal, 74-75; amount sold, 76; Fourth Liberty Loan, 76-77; the President's appeal, 78, 79; Mr. Bryan's appeal, 79-80; Clémenceau's appeal, 80; drive in Philadelphia, 81-82; oversubscription, 83; United War Work Campaign, 84; Victory Loan, 84.
- Finland, 274.
- First Division, training in France, 87; captures Cantigny, 88; London *Times* on, 88; move to west of Soissons, 111; fighting, July 18-21, 111-112; at St. Mihiel, 119; in the Argonne, 130.
- Fiume, 326-327; the President asked to arbitrate, 327; irritation in Italy, 332; delegates to conference threaten to withdraw, 332, 335, 336; delegates leave, 338; the President on the issue, 338-339; Orlando

- replies, 339-340; London press on, 340-341; feeling in Rome, 341-342; President's memorandum, 444-445; the press on, 444-446.
- Flags, French battle flags to be restored, 347; burned, 372.
- Flanders, American Army in, 126.
- Fleet, surrender of the German, 240-241.
- Foch, Marshal, American Army placed at his disposal, 85-87; German delegation to receive terms of Armistice, 208; begins offensive, 110; received, 208-209; Armistice signed, 214-215; Germany protests to, 292-293.
- Food conservation week, 267; Congress asked for money to feed Europe, 267; Europe's need of, 267-269.
- Food, Hoover on supply, 54; conservation of, 54; rationing of clubs, hotels, restaurants and homes, 54, 55; causes of scarcity of sugar, 55; saving of food effected, 56; shipments to the Allies, 56; restrictions lifted, 56. Hoover's second appeal, 56, 57.
- Foreign-born citizens, sign a Declaration of Independence, 103.
- "Four Point Speech" of the President, 101-102.
- Fourth Division, fighting with the French, 112, 115; at St. Mihiel, 119; in the Argonne, 130.
- Fourth of July, great launching, 53, 54; Wilson's Four Point Speech, 101-102; celebration in Philadelphia, 102-103; Lloyd George to Pershing, 103; greetings from the British army, 103; King George at Chelsea, 104; Washington's portrait, 104; greetings from Poincaré, 104; from King of the Belgians, King of Italy, King of Greece, 105; Joffre, the Belgian Army, Lord Reading, Mayor of Meux, 106; Tardieu, 106; celebrations at Rome, Turin, Florence, Genoa, etc., 107.
- "Fourteen Points," 351, 352, 356, 357, 358.
- France, our troops carried in French ships, 50, note; ports used by our army, 85; American Army at disposal of Foch, 85-86; German drives, 86-87, 108; fighting in, 85-140; German devastation in, 136-139; Foch and the armistice, 208-212, 214-215; recovers Alsace-Lorraine, 224; troops in Russia, 227; the President reaches Brest, 254; speech of the Mayor, 254-255; reception in Paris, 255; speech of President Poincaré, 255-257; reply, 258; Sorbonne confers degrees, 259; Peace Conference opens, 273; disposition of territory west of the Rhine, 331; German war ships, 329-330; treaty not severe enough, 348; Lloyd George and Wilson to seek to pledge their countries to aid, 348; Wilson's farewell to, 376; Clemenceau refuses to make treaty public, 378; *Bon Soir* sends copies to Chamber, 378; ratifies treaty, 429; violated by

- Germany, 429-430; Germany to sign new protocol, 431-432.
- Freedom of the Seas, Viscount Grey on, 251-252.
- Fuel, voluntary war economy, heatless nights, 58; President appeals to coal miners, 59; conservation of gasoline, 62-63.
- Gasoline, voluntary conservation of, 62-63.
- Geddes, Sir Auckland, punishment of Germany, 251.
- German Colonies, Claims of the Allies to, 283.
- German language, opposition to its use, libraries withdraw books, 67; names disused, 67; opposition to publication of newspapers, to teaching, 67.
- German property confiscated, 63-64.
- Germans interned, 69.
- Germany, peace speeches of von Kuhlmann and von Hertling, 141-147; newspapers on the Belgian issue, 147; Kaiser's speech at Essen, 152-153; Vice-Chancellor Praeger on peace, 154-156; on Austria's peace note, 165; von Hertling on U. S. answer to peace note, 166-168. Press on Bulgarian Armistice, 173-174; von Hertling and von Hintze resign, 174; the Kaiser to the Fatherland Party, 174; new cabinet, 174; asks armistice, 176; peace speech of Maximilian, 177-179; the Kaiser announces offer to the army, 182; reply of the President, 183; answer of Germany, 187; Turkey asks an armistice, 192-193; Germany answers the President, 196-197; reply of the President, 198-199; answer, 200; conditions of, 203; demand for abdication of the Kaiser, 203; War Council drafts terms, 206-207; Foch to deliver them, 206; memorandum on the terms, 206-207; feeling in Germany, 207; Foch notified of coming of delegation, 209-210; must the Kaiser go? 212-213; his abdication announced, 213; sailors' meeting, 214; Workmen and Soldiers' Council, 214; the revolution spreads, 214; the Armistice signed, 214-215; Kaiser flees to Holland, 215-216; story of the flight, 216-217; demand for extradition, 218-219; signed abdication, 219; the Crown Prince, 220; the Kaiser talks, 220; revolution in Berlin, 221; a government set up, 221-222; terms of the Armistice, 222-226; National Council of Women of Germany appeal to Mr. Wilson, 228-229; Solf appeals, 229; Ebert asks for food, 230; answer of the President, 230; appeals from Solf, 230, 231; abdication of German Dukes, 233; the Provisional Government, 233; Workmen and Soldiers' Councils, 234, 235; Congress of Councils meets, 235; surrender of submarines and High Seas Fleet, 240-241; Allies enter, 237-240; Lloyd-George on punishment of the Kaiser, 250; Mr. Asquith on, 251; Sir A. Geddes on, 251; political disorder,

- 253; Assembly to meet at Weimar, 253; Ebert denounces Armistice, 285; Provisional Constitution adopted, 286; Ebert, President, 286; continuation of Armistice, 286; 292-293; 328-329; anger of the Assembly, 329; Naval terms in the treaty, 329; reparation, 328, 336; extradition of the Kaiser, 336; plenipotentiaries to go to Versailles, 337; insulting action, 337; treaty delivered, speech of Clemenceau, 343-344; reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau, 344; terms of the treaty, 345-348; the Emperor arraigned, 346-347; reparation, 347; merchant ships, 347; coal, 347; the Koran, skull of the Sultan, French battle flags to be restored, 347; Library at Louvain, 347; Kiel Canal, 348; dismay over treaty, 348-350; Scheidemann denounces treaty, 350-351; Ebert on treaty, 352; Erzberger on, 352-253; Brockdorff-Rantzau notes on the treaty, 353-355; Cabinet will not sign, 356-357; counter proposal, 358-359; observations of the delegation on the treaty, 359-364; Allies review her war conduct, 364-368; must sign within seven days, 368; Cabinet resign, 368; Assembly vote to accept treaty, 369; time asked and refused, 369; will sign with reservations, 369-370; accepts the treaty, 371; fleet at Scapa Flow sunk, 371-372; French battle flags burned, 372; Clemenceau's note on sinking, 372-373; treaty signed at Versailles, 374-375; Chinese delegates do not sign, 375; Smuts signs under protest, 375; violates treaty, 429-430; summoned to sign new protocol, 431; reply, 431-432; ratifications exchanged, 432.
- Germany sends submarines to our coast, 1-31. Propaganda, 64-66; demands release of Franz von Rintelen, 67-68; answer of Lansing, 68-69; German drive, March, 1918, 85-86; second offensive, 86; third offensive, 86-87; fourth offensive, 87; fifth offensive, 108.
- Great Britain. Lloyd George on the movement of American troops by, 49-50; number carried by, 50 note; the German drives, 86-87; "With our backs against the wall," 86; French and British attack along Albert-Montdidier front, 115-116; battle front at end of August, 116; British in Macedonia, 123; Bulgarian Armistice, 123; attack between Dixmude and Ypres, 123; take Cambrai, 139; surrender of German fleet to, 240-241; delegates to Peace Conference, 242; Lloyd George on punishing the Kaiser, 250; Mr. Balfour on League of Nations, 251; Mr. Asquith on punishing the guilty, 251; Sir A. Geddes on reparation, 251; Viscount Grey on Freedom of the Seas, 251-253; the President at Dover, 260; at London, 260; welcomed by King George, 261; President's reply, 262;

- Guildhall speech, 253-264; at Carlisle, 264; press opposes Prinkipo Conference, 275-276; secret treaty with Japan, 283; the German colonies, 283-284; on reparation, 328; secret treaty with Italy, 327; to aid France if attacked, 348.
- Greece, claims of, 325.
- Grey, Viscount, on Freedom of the Seas and League of Nations, 251-252; letter on action of the U. S. 439-440.
- Hague tribunal, The, Germany proposes to refer Scapa Flow incident to, 431.
- Haig, Field Marshal, Sir Douglas, "With our backs to the wall," 88; Fourth of July greetings, 103; on St. Mihiel, 122.
- Haimhausen, Haniel von, asks extension of time limit, 369; treaty will be signed, 371.
- Hale, Frederick, Senator, Maine, offers amendment, 426, 428.
- Heligoland, 329, 345.
- Hertling, Count von, peace speech, 143-147; Belgium, a "pawn," 145, 146; on the President's Fourteen Points, 166-168; resigns, 174.
- Hindenburg line, 124, 125.
- Hintze, Admiral von, 144; on Bulgarian armistice, 169; resigns, 174; armistice, 208, 210.
- Hirano Maru*, sunk by submarine, 190.
- Hirsch, Premier, "mailed fist peace," 349.
- Hitchcock, Gilbert M., Senator from Nebraska, plan for voting on the treaty, 421-423; states views of the President, 427; seeks ratification without amendments, 429; asks suspension of Rule 13, 439.
- Hog Island, 52.
- Holland, German Kaiser flees to, 215-217; explains his status, 218; appoints commission, 220; the Crown Prince in, 217; abdication of Queen demanded, 232.
- Hoover, Herbert C., on food conservation, 54; second appeal, 56, 57; on the food situation in Europe, 57; new appeal, 56-58; the food situation, 58; in charge of food supply for Europe, 231; explains the situation, 232; asks aid for Europe, 267; the President appeals to Congress, 267; describes condition of Europe, 267-269; food cargoes, 269.
- Hotels and Restaurants rationed, 54.
- Hungary, 202-203; Karolyi's plan for independence, 204; revolution in, 204-205.
- Interpretations, the President on, 412.
- Interpreters for registrants, 40.
- Ireland—Senate reservation on, 450.
- Isaacs, Lieutenant, 2.
- Italian front, 140; Austrian Armistice, 140.
- Italy, fighting in, 140; visit of the President at Rome, 264-266; dispute over Fiume, 326-327; the President asked to arbitrate, 327; feeling over Fiume, 332, 335, 336; delegates leave Paris, 338; the

- President on the Adriatic question, 338-339; reply of Orlando, 339; feeling in Rome, 341-342.
- Jackson Day dinner, 433-434; the President's letter, 434-435.
- Japan—delegates at Peace Conference, 271; claims Marshal and Caroline Islands, 283; secret treaty with England, 283; offers amendment to Covenant, 312; Shantung treaty, 387-389.
- Jefferson, Thomas, "entangling alliances," 310.
- Jennings, The O. B.*, sunk by UK-140, 14-15.
- Jewish Welfare Board, 84.
- Joffre, General, 106.
- Johnson, Hiram, W. 419, 420.
- July, Fourth of, great launching, 53, 54; Wilson's "Four point speech," 101-102; Foreign Countries observe, 103-107.
- June 13, observed abroad, 99-101.
- Kadish, American troops, 227.
- Karolyi, Count, on Wilson's peace terms, 151.
- Kiel—sailors' mutiny, 214-222.
- Kiel Canal, 329.
- King of the Belgians. Greetings on July 4, 105.
- Knights of Columbus, 72, 84.
- Knox, Philander C., Senator from Pennsylvania opposes League, 303-305; opposed to the Covenant, 380; resolution offered by, 433.
- Koran, Germany to restore, 347.
- Kuhlmann, Dr. Richard von, peace speech, 141-143; on Belgium, 142; resigns, 144.
- Labor. Scarcity of unskilled, 60; proclamation forbidding recruiting unskilled, 60-61; United States Employment Service, 61, 62.
- La Follette, Robert, M. offers amendment to Covenant, 422.
- Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, reply to Germany's demand for release of von Rintelen, 69; protests against German devastation, 138; the Austrian peace offer, 176; the German offer, 176-177, 179; answers German offer, 183; Solf replies, 187; answers Germany, 191-192; receives Turkey's request, 192-193; answers Austria, 195; receives Germany's answer, 196-197; replies to German note, 198-199; Germany's answer, 200; receives Austria's reply, 200; appeal from Andrassy, 202; notifies Germany Foch will arrange armistice, 206; memorandum on armistice, 206-207; Solf appeals for food, 230, 231; reply to Solf, 231.
- "Last Supper," Germany to restore, 347.
- Launchings on July 4, 53.
- Law, Andrew Bonar, 110; delegate to Peace Conference, 242.
- League for the Preservation of American Independence, on the Covenant, 318.
- League of Nations. President Wilson, 259, 263, 278-279; urges in Peace Conference, 281; Lloyd George urges, 280; action of the Conference, 270, 286; Preamble adopted, 285; President reads

draft of to Peace Conference, 287; provision of, 287-289; President's speech on, 289-292; President requests Congress not to debate, 293; feeling in the Senate, 293-296; discussed in Senate, 296-297; Senator Borah and Mr. Taft, 297-298; Senator Reed on, 299; President speaks in Boston, 299-301; White House conference, 301; Senate debate, 301-303; Senator Knox opposes, 303-305; Senator Lodge's "Round Robin," 305-306; speeches of the President and Mr. Taft at New York, 307-310; will be part of treaty, 310, 311, 312; Lord Cecil on, 311-312; neutral nations offer amendments, 312; racial equality, 312-313; Mr. Taft's amendments, 313; complaint of delay, 314; answer of the President, 314; Lodge-Lowell debate, 315-318; Covenant badly drawn, 303, 316, 317; Mr. Hughes proposes seven amendments, 318; Mr. Root proposes six, 319; revised, 320; article on Monroe Doctrine inserted, 320; League to Enforce Peace approved, 322; revised by Conference, 321; adopted, 321; Mr. Lodge asks Senators to withhold expressions of opinions, 322; League to Enforce Peace, 322; The League of Nations part of peace treaty, 345; Germany on her exclusion, 354, 358, 360, 361, 368; the President on, 385, 386; Mr. Taft proposes six amendments, 390-391; conference

with the President, 395-397; Senators Borah and Johnson report on conference, 397-399; treaty reported with reservations and amendments, 401-405; debate on, 416-428; ratification lost, 429; the President stands firm, 432; Knox resolutions, 433; the Jackson Day dinner, 433; the President's letter, 434-435; Bryan's speech at the dinner, 435-436; resolutions of twenty-six organizations, 436-437; vote in the Universities and colleges, 437; the bipartisan Conference, 437-438; and note; Rule 13 to be suspended, 439; Viscount Grey's letter, 439-440; Senator Hitchcock to the President, 441; his five reservations, 442, note; the President's reply, 441-443; Rule 13 suspended, 443; the Covenant again before the Senate, 443; the "Round Robin," 443 and note; action of the Senate, 447; the President on Article X., 448-449; new reservations, 449 and notes, 450; on Ireland, 450; treaty rejected and returned to the President, 451.

League of Free Nations, on the Covenant, 319.

Leinster, sunk by submarine, 190.

Leopold, Prince of Lippe-Detmold abdicates, 233.

Liberty Loan. The fourth, the drive in New York City, 76-78; difficulties in raising, 79; the President's appeal, 78, 79. Mr. Bryan's appeal, 79-80; Clemenceau's appeal, 80;

- Philadelphia's drive, 81; "Flag Day," "Preparation Day," 81; "Emblem and Conscience Day," "Pershing Day," 81; "For Your Boy and Mine," 82; amount raised, 83; second appeal of the President, 83; oversubscription, 83; President's speech, 170-173.
- Library, Germany to make reparation for destruction of University of Louvain, 347.
- Libraries, withdraw German books, 67.
- Lightless nights, 58.
- Limit Clubs, 75.
- Lloyd George, David, On call for our troops, 49-50; on our ship building, 53; on American troops, 94; Fourth of July Greetings, 103; on St. Mihiel, 122; on indictment of the Kaiser, 219; on punishment of, 250; speech before Peace Conference, urges League, 280; on slowness of the Peace Conference, 334-335; pledges aid to France, 348.
- Lodge, Senator Henry Cabot. Defends Navy Department, 7-8; Resolutions on League of Nations, 305-306; debate with Lowell, 315-318; asks Senators to withhold expression of opinion on League, 322; sees copy of treaty, 378; presents report of majority of Committee with reservations and amendments, 401-403; secures cloture, 425, 426; resolution declaring state of peace, 429; on rejection of treaty, 432, 433; asks suspension of Rule 13, 439.
- London, Welcome to President Wilson, 260; Speech of King George, 261; answer of the President, 262; freedom of the city, 263.
- "Lost Battalion," 132.
- Louvain, University professors appeal, 420-421; Germany to make reparation for destruction of library, 347.
- Lowell, Abbott Lawrence, debates Covenant with Senator Lodge, 315-318.
- Ludwig II. of Bavaria, abdicates, 233.
- Luxemburg, Duchess of, will abdicate, 233; American Army enters, Pershing's proclamation, 238; free from German customs Union, 345.
- Macedonia, Allied offensive, 123; Bulgarian armistice, 123.
- Mail*, The New York Evening, bought by German Government, 64.
- Manchester, gives President freedom of city, 264.
- March, Gen. Peyton C., address to Student Army Training Corps, 43.
- Marines at Château-Thierry, 89; foreign newspapers on the fight, 89-94; Lloyd George on, 94; take Belleau Wood, 94-99; "Bois de la Brigade de Marine," 99.
- Marne Salient, the fight of Marines at Château-Thierry, 89; foreign newspapers on the battle, 90-94; Lloyd George on, 94; Second Division on the Marne, 94; the battle of the Marne, 108-111; Pershing on, 109; London

- press on, 109-110; the advance of the Americans from the Marne to the Vesle, 108-115; Vesle crossed, 115.
- Maximilian of Baden, 173; Speech on Germany's peace note, 177-179.
- Meat, rationing, 54, 55.
- Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 233.
- Merak*, sunk by U.K.-140, 16, 19.
- Merchant marine, 51.
- Meuse-Argonne battle, the ground and defenses, 129; Argonne forest, 129-130; position of the army, 130; first phase, 130-132; Montfaucon, 130, 131; the Crown Prince's tower, 131; prisoners, 131; obstructions, 131; "Lost Battalion," 132; end of first phase, 132; Kriemhilde Line, 132; advance east of Meuse, 133; Argonne forest cleared, 133; Grand Pré, 134; end of second phase, 134; Freya Stellung, 134; Meuse crossed, 135; opposite Sedan, 135; number of enemy divisions and prisoners, 135; Armistice, 136.
- Meux, greetings from, 106.
- Military terms to Germany, 330, 346.
- Mirlo*, sunk by U-117, 26-27.
- Monroe Doctrine, Senator Borah's resolution, 249; questions Mr. Taft on Monroe Doctrine, 297-298; the League and the Doctrine, 294, 295, 296, 299, 301, 302-303, 311, 312, 313, 315, 317, 318; inserted in revised Covenant, 320, 321, 322, 381, 391, 395; U. S. not to submit for arbitration any question under, 402-403, 405, 413, 414, 438, 442 note.
- Murmansk, American troop at, 227.
- National Assembly, The German meets, 234, 235, 236, 253, 285, 329. Treaty of peace denounced before, 350-353.
- National Council of Women of Germany to Mrs. Wilson, 228.
- Naval Terms to Germany, 329, 330, 346.
- Navy Department, The submarine raid off our coast, 7-8; Senator Lodge defends, 7-8.
- Navy, The German, surrendered, 240-241.
- Navy, vessels of, 30; where used, 30; the mine barrage in North Sea, 30-31; movement of troops by, 31; vessels lost, 31.
- New York City. The draft, 40-41; foreign languages spoken in, 40; Round up of slackers, 45-49; Germans buy *Evening Mail*, 64; "Soldiers in France Day," 76; Fourth Liberty Loan Drive, 76-77; President opens drive, 78; his "five point" speech, 170-173; receives Solf's peace note, 187.
- Newspaper, The German—on submarine sinkings, 8-10; story of a German submarine captain, 10-13.
- Newspapers. Voluntary war economy, 58; Germans buy N. Y. *Evening Mail*, 64; Association of Foreign Language, 65, 66; *Fair Play* 66; foreign on Château-Thierry,

- 89-94; on the Marne victory, 109-110; German on Belgium, 147; Count Karolyi to German newspaper men on terms of peace, 151-152; American on Austrian peace note, 160-163; British on the note, 163, 164; Germany on President's answer, 166; Germany on Bulgarian Armistice, 169, 173-174, 175; America on Germany's peace offer, 180; French on, 181; America on President's answer, 186; on Solf's reply, 188; Paris papers, 189; London papers on, 190; on Mar-mora Conference, 275-276; on German Colonies, 283-284; Germany on the treaty, 349.
- Niblock, Rear Admiral Albert Parker, 30.
- Nineteenth Division, 119.
- Ninety-first Division in Flanders, 126-129; praised by General Degoutte, 126; in the Argonne, 130.
- Ninety-second Division, in the Argonne, 130.
- Non-essential workers, 35.
- Notes, concerning peace, Austrian, 156-160; Germany replies to, 165; United States replies to, 165, 166; Austrian peace offer, 176; Germany asks peace, 176-179; Kaiser announces offer, 182; President's note to Germany, 183; reply of Germany, 187; reply to Germany, 190-192; Turkey asks peace, 193; President's note to Austria, 195; reply of Germany, 196-197; President's note to Germany, 198-199; reply of Ger-many, 200; Austria accepts, 200; Count Andrassy to Lansing, 202; the Allies on the notes, 206-207.
- Offensives. German, 86; of April, 8, 86; of May 27, 86-87; of June, 87; the German front, 87; French offensive, July 18, 14.
- Oldenburg, Grand Duke of, abdicates, 233.
- Orlando, Vittorio, 221, 242, 271, 338, 339-340.
- Patriotic Order of Sons of America, 67.
- Peace, von Kühlmann reopens discussion, 141-142; Chancellor von Hertling's speech, 143-147; German newspapers on Belgian issue, 147; Baron Burian replies to the President's Fourth of July speech, 148-150-151-152; the Kaiser speaks, 152-153; Vice-Chancellor Preyer, 154-156; Austrian peace note, 156-160; the newspapers on the note, 160-163; British press, 163; Balfour, 164; Germany replies to note, 165; United States replies, 165, 166; von Hertling on the answer, 166-168. President's Five Point Speech, Sept. 27, 1918, 170-173; Bulgarian armistice, 168-170; German press on, 173-174; excitement in Vienna, 175, 176; peace rumors; Austrian peace offer to President Wilson, 176; Germany asks peace, 176-179; opposition in the United States, 180; in France, 181; the Kaiser announces the of-

fer to the army, 182; President's reply to Germany's offer, 183. Opposition to German peace in United States Senate, 183-185. Reply of Germany, 187. Answer to Germany, 190-192; Turkey seeks peace, 192-193; President's answer to Austria's peace offer, 195; reply of Germany, 196-197; President's answer, 198-199; reply of Germany, 200; Austria accepts, 200; Armistice with Turkey signed, 204; Foch delivers terms to Germany, 206; Germany signs, 215; flight of the Kaiser, 215-217; the President reads terms of Armistice to Congress, 222-226; Germany asks early peace conference, 230; members of the Conference, 242; first meeting, 242; the President will attend, 242; his going opposed, 242, 243-245; the peace conference, 270-348; the peace treaty, 348-451.

Peace Conference, 242; preliminary work, 270-271; secrecy, 272; protest of American newspapers, 272; first meeting, 273; method of procedure, 273; President's speech, 278-280; urges League of Nations, 279; Lloyd George on League, 280; action of the Conference, 281; commissions appointed, 281; protest of the small nations and Belgium, 282; draft of the League, 285; President reads covenant to Conference, 286-289; President's speech, 289-292; neutral nations offer amend-

ments to covenant, 312; Japan amendment, 312; Switzerland's, 313; League revised, 313, 320; article on Monroe Doctrine, 320; revision adopted, 321; Conference at Principo, 274, 276-277; 325; Czechs and Poles, 325; claims of Greece, 325; of Albania, 326; Fiume, 326-327; reparation, 328; Armistice continued, 328; naval terms, 329; destruction of German war ships, 329-330; military terms, 330; Shantung, 330; Poland, Danzig, East Prussia, 330; responsibility for the war 330-331; the Rhine, 331; Italian claims, 332; Italian delegates threaten to withdraw, 332; demand for speed; the President's answer, 333; Lloyd George on, 334-335; Italians threaten to withdraw, 335-336; reparation, responsibility and extradition of the Kaiser, 336; German plenipotentiaries to come to Versailles, 337; insulting action of Germany, 337; Italians leave, 338; letter from the President on Fiume, 338-339; Orlando answers, 339-340; London press on the letter, 340-341; feeling in Rome, 341-342; Belgium wants more territory, 342-343; treaty delivered to the Germans, 343; speech of Clemenceau, 343-344; reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau, 344; contents of the treaty, 345-348.

Peale, Charles Wilson, 104.

Pershing, Gen. John J., number of troops under; offers

- American troops to Foch, 85, 86; greetings from Poincaré, Clemenceau, Foch, Petain, on anniversary of landing of American troops, 100; Fourth of July greetings from Haig and Lloyd George, 103; on the battle of the Marne, 109; Commands First American army, 116; on St. Mihiel battle, 120-121; Lloyd George congratulates, 122; Sir Douglas Haig, 122.
- Petain, General, congratulates Pershing, 100.
- Philadelphia, War Chest, 71-74; "31 to 1," 73; amount raised, 74; Fourth Liberty Loan drive, 81-82; "Flag Day," 81; "Preparation Day," 81; "Emblem and Conscience Day," 81; "Pershing Day," 82; Fourth of July celebration, 102-103.
- Plebiscite, 345; 360; 361; 368.
- Plenipotentiaries, German meet Foch to receive Armistice terms, 208-209; received by Foch, 208-209; Armistice signed, 214-215; the terms, 222-226.
- Poincaré, Raymond, President of France, to President Wilson on anniversary of landing of American troops, 99; to General Pershing, 100; Fourth of July greetings, 104; greets the President in Paris.
- Poland, claims of, 324, 325; boundary 330; 345; 406.
- Pont Wilson, 106.
- Ports in France used for landing troops, 85.
- Posters, Fourth Liberty Loan, 76.
- "Preparation Day," 81.
- Preyer, Friedrich von, peace speech, 153-156.
- President, The, fixes date of registration, 38-39; address to registrants, 38-39; draws first capsule, Sept. 30, 41; address to Student Army Training Corps, 42; appeal to coal miners, 59; proclamation forbidding private recruiting of unskilled labor, 60-61; to the strikers in an arms factory, 62; on property of interned aliens, 69; addresses Congress on finance; 69-71; appeal for thrift, 74-75; Liberty Loan appeal, 78, 79; Second appeal, 83; celebration of anniversary of landing of American troops in France, Poincaré to the President, 99; the Four Point Speech, 101-102; Poincaré congratulates, 104; King of the Belgians, King of Italy, King of Greece send congratulations, 105; also Joffre, Lord Reading, 106; King George congratulates on St. Mihiel, 120; Poincaré, 122; Baron Burian replies to Fourth of July speech, 148-150; answers to Austria's peace note, 165-166; von Hertling criticizes, 166-168; speech Sept. 27, 1918, the Five Points, 170-173; Austria asks peace, 176; Germany asks peace, 176-179; the press on the offer, 180-181; answer of Germany, 183; the press on the answer, 183-184; the Senate on the offer, 184-185; reply of the President, 187; Turkey asks

peace, 192-193; answer to Austria's peace offer, 195; reply of Germany, 196; answer to Germany, 198-199; Germany answers, 200; Austria asks the President to act, 200-201; notifies Germany Foch will give terms of Armistice, 206; reads text of Armistice to Congress, 222-226; Germany appeals for help, 228-229; will attend the Peace Conference, 242; may he leave the country, 243, 244, 245; 246; proclamation taking Government possession of cable lines, 244, 245; the annual message Dec. 1918, 246-247; resolution in the Senate 248; sails for France, 250; reception at Brest, 254-255; at Paris, 255-259; degrees conferred, 259; visits the army, 260; welcome at Dover, 260; at London, 260; speech of King George, 261; answer, 262-263; freedom of the city conferred, 263; at Carlisle, 264; freedom of city of Manchester, 264; speech at, 264; reception in Italy, 265; at Rome, 265; at Genoa and Milan, 269; returns to Paris, 270; speech to Peace Conference, 278-280; urges League of Nations, 279; recognizes Poland, 283; reads report on League to Peace Conference, 286-289; speech on, 289-292; sails for Boston, 292; speech at Boston, 299-301; Congress adjourns, protest of the President, 306-307; speech at New York on the Covenant, 307-310; sails

for Paris, 310; announces Covenant will be part of peace treaty, 310, 311, 312; answers complaints of delay, 314; calls Congress in extra session, 322; asked to arbitrate Fiume dispute, 327; calls for the *George Washington*, 336; letter on Fiume, 338-339; answer of Orlando, 339-340; pledges aid to France, 348; Scheidemann denounces, 350-351; address after signing peace treaty, 375; sails for home, 376; farewell to France, 376; message from King George, 376, 377; lays the treaty before the Senate, 383-386; Senate calls for papers, 386-387; confers with Republican Senators, 389-390; Senate calls for French-American treaty, 391-393; answers calls for papers on treaty, 393-394; confers with Committee on Foreign Relations, 395-397; Senator Borah and Johnson on the conference, 397-400; starts on western tour; the route, 405-406; speech, 405-415; becomes ill, 415; letter on reservations, 427; Jackson Day letter, 434-435; letter to Senator Hitchcock, 441-443; dispute with Allies over Fiume, 444-447; letter on reservations, 448-449; treaty returned to, 451.

President Lincoln, the, sunk by a submarine, 2.

Press, the German, on the submarine raids, 8-13; *Volks Zeitung*, captain of a U-boat describes raid on our coast, 10-13.

- Prinkipo, Supreme Council invite conference at, 274; opposition to, 276-277.
- Proclamations. Registration, Sept. 12, 38, 39; registration, August 24, 39; forbidding private recruiting of unskilled labor, 60, 61; alien enemies, 69.
- Propaganda, German. Buy New York *Mail*, 64; the *Fatherland*, 64, 65; books and pamphlets, 65; Association of Foreign Language Newspapers, 65, 66; the "whispering campaign," 66; slanders on the Red Cross, 66; on the War Department, 66.
- Punishment of Germans responsible for the war, Lloyd George on, 250; Asquith on, 251.
- Ratification of Treaty, Senate Committee report with reservations and amendments, 401-405; lost, 428; by England, France and Italy, 430-432; ratification rejected, 433-451.
- Rationing, Hoover urges conservation, 54; the bread ration, 54; meat, 54, sugar, 54, 55; clubs, hotels, restaurants, householders, 54, 55; the Sugar Board, 55; savings effected, 56; Hoover's second appeal, 56-57.
- Reading, Lord. Fourth of July greetings, 106.
- Red Cross, 66; drive of May, 1918, 71; War Chest in Philadelphia, 71-74; amount raised, 74; United War Work Campaign, 84.
- Referendum, the intercollegiate, 437; the President suggests national, 435.
- Registrants, new classification, 33-34; age limit extended, 36, 37, 38; interpreters for in New York, 40; total number, 41.
- Registration, of June 1918, 32, 33; General Crowder's address to registrants, 32-33; number registered, 33; classification, 34; registration August 24, 36-37; Sept. 12th, 38, 40, 41; number, 41; round up of slackers, 43-49; number arrested, 249.
- Reparation, 136-137; 251; 328, 336; French Senators demand, 337; Members of House of Commons demand, 337; treaty terms, 347; 355; 359; 362.
- Reservations, Mr. Root suggests, 381-382; Mr. Taft proposes six, 390-391; by Mr. Hughes, 391; Senator Pittman, 400; Committee on Foreign Relations report from, 401, 402-403; 404-405; the President on, 409; thirteen substitutes, 417-419; reservations adopted, 423-425; 426, 427; reported by Committee of the Whole, 428; ratification defeated, 428; bi-partisan conference, 438 note; by Mr. Taft 438 note; by Senator Hitchcock 442 note; the President on, 441-443; the "round robin," 443 note; the President on, 448-449; new ones offered, 449-450.
- Responsibility for the war, 330-331.

- Revolution, in Hungary 204, 205; in Germany, 213-214; 221-222; 233, 234-235.
 Rintelen, Franz von, 67-68, 69.
 Rodgers, Rear Admiral, 30.
 Rodman, Hugh, Rear Admiral, 30.
 Rome, Fourth of July observed in, 107.
 Root, Elihu, would separate the Covenant from the treaty, 381; on Monroe Doctrine, 381; reservations, 382.
 "Round Robin," on Article X, 443 note.
 Rule 13, suspended, 439, 443.
 Russia, 273; invited to Conference, 274; parties in, 274; American troops in, 227.
 Saar Valley, 345, 351, 353, 355, 359, 361, 368.
 Sorbonne, degrees conferred on President Wilson, 259.
 St. Mihiel salient, 116-121; King George sends congratulations, 121; Lloyd George, Gen. Haig, Poincaré, 122.
 St. Quentin, canal, 124, 125.
 St. Quentin, destruction of the city, 136.
San Diego, sunk, 13.
 Saxe-Coburg, Duke of abdicates, 233.
 Saxe-Meiningen, a republic 233.
 Saxe-Weimar, 233.
 Saxony, 233.
 Scheidemann, Philipp, 173; announces overthrow of Empire, 222; in power, 233; denounces the treaty, 350-351; denounces the President, 350-351.
 Schleswig, 345; 361.
 School boards drop German language, 67.
 Scapa Flow, Germans sink interned ships, 371-372; Clemenceau's note, 372-373.
Seaman, Stanley W., description of sinking by submarine, 16.
 Second Division, on the Marne, 88, 89; villages taken by, 94-95; Belleau Wood, 94-99; West of Soissons, 111; the battle, 111-112; at St. Mihiel, 119; in the Argonne, 135.
 Secret meetings of Peace Conference opposed, 272.
 Senate, opposition of Senator to the President going abroad, 248-249; Senator Borah on treaty of peace, 249; on entangling alliances, 249; resolution of Senator Freylinghuysen, 248; Secrecy of Peace Conference opposed, 272; President asks League of Nations be not debated, 293; feeling in the Senate, 293-296; discusses League, 296-297; Senator Reed, 299; White House Lunch, 301; debate on League, 301-303; Senator Knox opposes 303-305; Senator Lodge's Resolutions, 305-306; Senators Lodge and Borah see copies of treaty before it is made public, 378; resolution of inquiry, 379-380; Senator Borah asks it be printed, 380; the treaty printed, 380; Senator Knox opposed to ratification with the Covenant, 380-381; letter from Mr. Root, 381-382; exclude Article X, 382; four courses of action, 383; the President lays treaty before the Senate, 383-386; call for Shan-

- tung treaty, 386; copies of protests against, and drafts of League, 387; the Shantung agreement, 387-389; conference of the President with Republicans, 389-390; Anglo - American - French treaty 391-393; President answers call for papers, 393-394; Committee on Foreign Relations confer with President, 395-397; Senators Borah and Johnson on the conference, 397-399; treaty reported with reservations and amendments, 401-403; majority report, 404-405; amendments to Article 35, 415-416; thirteen substitute reservations, 417-419; Johnson equal vote amendment, 419; amendments lost, 419-420; to fix time for final vote, 421, 422; amendments lost, 422; reservations considered, 422-425; cloture invoked, 425-426; reservations considered, 426, 427; the President on the reservations, 427; report of Committee of the Whole, 428; letter from the President, 428; resolution to ratify defeated, 428-429; Knox resolutions, 433; bi-partisan conference, 437-438; Senator Hitchcock's reservations 422 note; Rule 13 suspended, 439; 443; the "round robin," 443 and note; action of Senate, 447; new reservations, 449, and notes, 450; on Ireland, 450; rejects treaty, 451.
- Seventy-ninth Division; in the Argonne, 130, 131.
- Seventy-seventh Division, 115; in the Argonne, 130; 133-134; Lost Battalion, 132.
- Shantung, 330; Senate call for treaty, 386; how Japan acquired Shantung, 387-388; why the President consented, 388; opposition in the Senate, 388-389; 390; 403; 404; 407; the President on, 410; 413.
- Shaw, Dr. Anna Howard, 44.
- Ship building, 51-54.
- Shipping Board, 52, 53, 54.
- Ships, tonnage needed for army, 52; fabricated ships, 52; Hog Island, 52; speed in building, 52, 53; great launching, July 4th, 53, 54; Lloyd George on, 53.
- Signing the treaty, 374-375; Chinese delegates do not sign, 375; Smuts signs under protest, 375.
- Silesia, Upper; 345; 351; 358; 359; 368.
- Sims, Rear Admiral, 30.
- Slackers, rounded up, 43-49; denounced in the Senate, 45-46; statement of Attorney General, 46-49.
- Smuts, Jan Christiaan, Lt. General, plan for League of Nations, 270; signs treaty under protest, 375.
- "Soldiers in France Day," 76.
- Solf, accepts peace terms, 187; appeals to the President, 229; asks early peace conference, 230, 231.
- Strikes, clause in draft age bill, 37. Gompers' objection, 38; action of the President on, 62.
- Student Army Training Corps, 41; address by the President, 42; by the Secretary of War,

- 42-43; by General March, 43; disbanded, 236.
- Submarine, Cruise of a submarine off our coast described by her commander, 10-13.
- Submarines, German off the coast, 1, 2; vessels destroyed by, 1-3; the U-90, 2; survivors of the *Caroline*, 5; complaints against the Navy Department, 7; reply of Assistant Secretary, 7-8; Senator Lodge defends, 7-8; Secretary Daniels explains, 8; his telegram to London *Times*, 8; German press on the raid, 8-10; captain of the U-boat describes the raid, 10-13; *San Diego* sunk, 13; sinkings off Cape Cod, 13; *O. B. Jennings* sunk by UK-140 off Virginia, 14-15; Mr. R. H. Bastin, a prisoner, describes his experience on, 15, 16, 19-21; destroys *Diamond Shoal Light Ship*, 16, 19, destroys *Merak*, 16, 19; U-117—vessels sunk by, 22-23, 24; sinking of the *Sommerstad* described, 23; cruise of the U-117, 24; sinking of *Dorothy Barrett* described, 25; of the *Mirlo*, 26, 27; *Triumph* armed, 28; U-152 sinks the *Ticonderoga*, 28-29; all submarines called home, 29;
- Submarines, vessels destroyed by, off our coast.
- Edward H. Cole*, 3.
- Edna*, 2, 4.
- Hattie Dunn*, 4.
- Hauppaug*, 4.
- Isabel B. Wiley*, 4.
- Winnieconnie*, 4.
- Texel*, 4.
- Carolina*, 4-5.
- Mengel*, 5.
- Eidsvold*, 5.
- Edward H. Baird, Jr.*, 6.
- Harpathan*, 6.
- Vinland*, 6.
- Pinar del Rio*, 6.
- Vindeggen*, 6.
- Hendrik Lund*, 6.
- Samoa*, 6.
- Kringsjaa*, 6.
- Manx King*, 13.
- Perth Amboy*, 13.
- Robert and Richard*, 14.
- Dornfontein*, 14.
- Nelson A.*, 14.
- Luz Blanca*, 14.
- Gladys M. Hollett*, 14.
- O. B. Jennings*, 14-15.
- Stanley W. Seaman*, 16.
- Diamond Shoal Light Ship*, 19.
- Merak*, 16, 19.
- Tokuyama Maru*, 21.
- Kate Palmer*, 22.
- Cruiser*, 22.
- Earl and Nettie*, 22.
- Peniston*, 22.
- Sydland*, 23.
- Sommerstad*, 23.
- Frederick R. Kellogg*, 24.
- Dorothy Barrett*, 25.
- Madrugada*, 25.
- Mirlo*, 26, 27.
- San Jose*, 27.
- Nordhave*, 27.
- Ticonderoga*, 28-29.
- Stifinder*, 29.
- Triumph*, 28.
- Sugar Board, 55.
- Sugar, rationing of, 55; causes of scarcity, 55.
- Sultan Okwawa, Germany to restore skull of, 347.
- Supreme Council, 206; take up case of Russia, 273; invite conference at Prinkipo, 274;

- opposition to, 275; protest by Russians to Clemenceau, 276; opposition in U. S., 276-277; warning to those using armed force 277-278; the German colonies, 283; on treatment of Germany.
- Taft, William Howard, on President's reply to German peace offer, 185; on Monroe Doctrine, 297; discussion with Senator Borah, 297-298; speaks on the Covenant at New York, 307, 310; proposes amendments to League, 313; 390-391; to Article X, 438 note.
- Tardieu André, 107.
- Telegraph and telephone lines taken over, 244, 245.
- Telegraph*, the London, on victory of the marines, 109.
- Third Division, beats the Germans on the Marne, 108-109; Pershing's report, 109; London press on, 109-110; advance from the Marne, 113-114; relieved, 114; in the Argonne, 130.
- "Thirty-one to One," 73.
- Thirtieth Division, 123-124; 125; 126.
- Thirty-second Division, 114-115; 130.
- Thirty-third Division, 130; 133.
- Thirty-fifth Division, 130; 131.
- Thirty-seventh Division, 126; 130; 131.
- Thirty-eighth Division, 109.
- "Thrift Day," 74.
- Ticonderoga*, sunk by U-152; 28-29.
- Times*, the London, 8.
- Travel, no unnecessary, 63.
- Treaties, Secret, Great Britain and Japan, 283; Great Britain and Italy, 327; Shantung, 387-389; Anglo-French-American, 391-393.
- Treaty, the Peace, complaints of delay, answer of the President, 314; magnitude of the work, 324; demands of the new nations, 324-325; dispute over Fiume, 326-327; Wilson asked to arbitrate, 327; Armenian demands, 328; the Economic Council, 328; reparation, 328; naval terms, 329; military terms, 330; Poland, Danzig, East Prussia, 330; responsibility for the war, 331; the Rhine country, 331; questions settled, 336; Germans to come to Versailles, 337; action of Germany, 337; Belgium dissatisfied, 342-343; treaty delivered to Germans, 343; speech of Clemenceau, 343-344; reply of Brockdorff-Rantzau, 344; contents of the treaty, 345-348; France alarmed, 348; dismay in Germany, 348-349; denounced by Scheidemann, 350-351; by Ebert, 351-352; Brockdorff-Rantzau notes, 353-355, Cabinet will not sign, 356-357; counter proposal, 358-359; observations of the delegates, 359-364; Allies review war acts of Germany, 364-368; must be signed within seven days, 368; German Cabinet resigns, 368; Assembly votes it be signed, 369; time asked and refused, 369; reservations offered and refused, 369-370; treaty will be signed, 371; fleet at

- Scapa Flow, 371-372; Clemenceau's note on sinking, 372-373; the treaty signed, 374-375; Chinese delegates do not sign, 375; Smuts signs under protest, 375; Clemenceau refuses to make treaty public, 378; *Bon Soir* sends copies to the French Chamber, 378; Senators Lodge and Borah see copies, 378; resolution in the Senate, 378-379; the Chicago *Tribune* sends a copy, 379; Senator Borah reads it, 379; the treaty printed, 380; Senator Knox's resolution, 380-381; Mr. Root on the Covenant, 381-383; treaty laid before Senate by the President, 383-386; Mr. Taft and Mr. Hughes propose amendments and reservations, 391-392; committee report with reservations and amendments, 401-405; speeches on the President in the West, 405-415; amendments to Article 35, 415-416; substitute reservations, 417-419; amendments lost, 419-420; attempt to fix time for final vote, 421-422; amendments lost, 422; reservations adopted, 423-425, 426, 427; cloture, 425-426; reported by Committee of the Whole, 428; ratification defeated, 429; treaty ratified by Great Britain, France, Italy, 429; violated by Germany, 429-430; Germany summoned to sign new protocol, 431; reply of Germany, 431-432; ratifications exchanged, 432; the President stands firm, 432; Senators seek a compromise, 433; the Jackson dinner, 433-434; the President's letter, 434-435; Bryan's speech, 435-436; bi-partisan conference, 437-438; vote on in Universities, 439; Viscount Grey's letter, 439-440; Senator Hitchcock's reservations, 422; Rule 13 suspended, 439; 443; the "round robin," 443 and note; action of the Senate, 447; the President on reservations, 448-449; new reservations, 449 and note; 450; on Ireland, 450; treaty rejected, 451.
- Treaty of London, 327.
- Tribune*, The Chicago, sends copy of treaty to Senator Borah, 379.
- Trolley lines, war economies, 58.
- Troops, Allies call for, 36; movement of, 49; Lloyd George on, 49-50; number sent over seas, 50, 51; German press on, 51; Admiral von Capelle on, 51.
- Tuckahoe*, 52, 53.
- Turkey seeks peace, 192-193; 204.
- Twenty-sixth Division, 111; 112; 113; 119.
- Twenty-seventh Division, 124, 125; 126.
- Twenty-eighth Division, 114; 115; 130.
- Twenty-ninth Division, 130; 133.
- UK-140. Sinks the *O. B. Jennings*, 14-15; the *Stanley W. Seaman*, 16; the *Merak*, 16, 19; the *Diamond Shoal Lightship*; Mr. Bastin, a

- prisoner on, describes attack, 19-20; chase of, 20.
- U-152. Sinks the *Ticonderoga*, 28-29; called home, 29.
- U-117. Vessels destroyed by, 21-26; sinking of *Sommerstad* described, 23; of the *Mirlo*, 26; cruise of, 21-26.
- Underwood, Oscar W., Senator, 422-423; 435.
- United War Work Campaign, 84.
- Universities, Student Army Training Corps, 41-43; vote on reservations, 437.
- Victory bread, 54.
- Victory Loan, 84.
- Vierick, George Sylvester, 64, 65.
- Violations of the treaty by Germany, 429-430.
- Vladivostok. American troops landed, 227; complaint in the Senate, 227; troops withdrawn, 227.
- Walsh, Senator, 424-425.
- War, the, in France, ports used by our army, 85; our troops at disposal of Marshal Foch, 85-86; German drives of March and April, 86-87; "With our backs to the wall," 86; the May drive, 86-87; the June drive, 87; the First Division at Cantigny, 88; Second Division at Château-Thierry, 89; the fight of the Marines, 89; foreign newspapers describe the fight, 89-94; Lloyd George on the Americans, 94; Second Division on the Marne, 94; villages taken by, 94-95; the Marines take Belleau Wood, 95-99; General Degouttes order, 99; Hamel wood, 101; German drive of July 15, 108; the Marne crossed, 108; the Americans drive back the Germans, 109; battle line July 16, 110; Foch begins counter drive, 111; battle near Soissons, 111-112; capture of Berzy-le-Sec, Tigny, Bois d'Harlennes, Chouy, Sommelans, 112; capture of Torcy, Belleau, Givry, Licy, Monthiers, 113; Germans evacuate Château-Thierry, 113; capture of Epieds, Trugny; Allied front, 114; Sergy and Serings captured, the Ourcq crossed, 114; Cierges and Hill 230 captured, 115; Soissons entered, Ville-en-Tardenois taken; the German retreat begins, 115; Fismes taken; the Americans on the Vesle, 115; British and French attack along Albert-Montdidier front, 115-116; battle front at end of August, 1918, 116; Americans capture St. Mihiel Salient, 116-121; congratulations on the victory, 121-122; Dixmude taken, British and French near Cambrai and St. Quentin, 123; Americans take Vierstaat Ridge, 124; and break the Hindenburg Line, 124; St. Quentin Canal, 124; villages taken, 125; Americans between the Lys and Escaut Rivers, 126; The Americans before Rheims, 129; Meuse-Argonne battle, 129-136; destruction of St. Quentin, 136; protest of the French Government, 136-137;

- of the French Reparation Committee, 138; of the United States, 138-139; advance of the Allies, 139-140.
- War, Acts of Germany during, reviewed by the Allies, 364-368.
- War aims of Germany; von Kuhlmann on, 141-143; von Hertling on, 143-147; war aims of Austria, Baron Burian on, 148-150; 151-152; war aims of Germany, Herr Preyer on, 154-156.
- War Chest, Red Cross drive in Philadelphia, 71-74; amount raised, 74.
- War Industries Board, 58.
- War Labor Policies Board, 60.
- War Savings Stamps, 74; "Thrift Day," 74; President appeals, 74-75; "Limit Clubs," 75; "Soldiers in France Day," 76; amount sold, 76.
- Ward, Speed in building, 53.
- Washington, George, on alliances, 309-310.
- Weimar, German Assembly to meet at, 253.
- Wheat, rationing of, 54, 56.
- "Whispering Campaign," 66.
- William II., Emperor of Germany, peace speech at Essen, 152-153; message to Fatherland Party, 174; announces Germany's peace offer, 182; on abdication, 203; demands for abdication, 203; abdication announced, 213; flees to Holland, 215; story of the flight, 216-217; demand for extradition, 218-219; Holland explains his status, 218; indicted in England, 218; Lloyd George on, 219; his signed abdication, 219; Holland appoints commission, 220-221; expatriation discussed at Paris, 221; Lloyd George on punishment, 250; extradition to be asked, 336; arraigned in peace treaty, 346-347.
- Wilson, Rear Admiral, false report of Armistice, 211.
- Withdrawal from League, 402; 417.
- "Work or Fight" order, 34, 35.
- Workmen and Soldiers Councils, 214; 221; 222; 233; 234; 235.
- "Your Boy and Mine," 76.
- Young Men's Christian Association, 72; 84.
- Young Men's Hebrew Association, 73; 84.
- Young Women's Christian Association, 72; 84.

History
1141

